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This dissertation explains contrasting patterns of financial reform in China 
and India.   It focuses on “securitization” – the structural shift from credit-based 
finance (banking) to securities-based finance (stocks and bonds) – as a politically 
consequential phenomenon in comparative and international political economy.  
The analysis revises common theories of the developmental state – theories 
derived from Gerschenkron’s emphasis on directed-credit and the state’s role in 
capital formation – in light of securitization’s growing global importance in the last 
twenty years.  Contrasting responses to securitization are explained using 
international and domestic variables including the profile of a country’s exposure to 
the world economy, the distributional coalition supporting the state and the 
prevailing structure of property rights.  
At a theoretical level, the dissertation highlights the political consequences of 
securitization for state authority in the economy, arguing that directed-credit; 1) 
enhanced state discretion in the management of distributional coalitions; 2) 
facilitated the perpetuity of poorly specified property rights; and 3) mitigated the 
consequences of the country’s position with respect to external trade and investment.  
Empirically, the research presented here demonstrates that China and India 
responded differently to the process of securitization, contrary to the expectations of 
globalization theories that identify finance as a domain in which international forces  
favoring convergence should be strongest. The thesis also shows that, in contrast to 
the scholarly depiction of China’s authoritarian system as superior to India’s 
democracy in the reform process, in the area of finance, Indian and Chinese reform 
patterns are mirror images: reform with substantive change in India, reform without 
substantive change in China.  
Finally, most scholars viewed China’s massive foreign exchange reserves and 
world-topping volumes of foreign direct investment as signs of economic strength. 
This thesis suggests the opposite: that these signs indicate Chinese vulnerability is 
derived from an “affliction of abundance.” India, however, made a virtue of its 
weakness, exploiting the “advantages of adversity.”  With little foreign direct 
investment, few exports, and (until recently) scant hard currency reserves, India 
chose to develop world-class securities markets and a rich tapestry of securities 
governance institutions in order to better mobilize and direct corporate finance and 
attract hard currency through foreign portfolio investment. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
GLOBAL SCRIPT, LOCAL ENACTMENT: THE DRAGON AND ELEPHANT ON THE WAY TO 
GLOBALIZATION 
 
I. Increasing Assets: the contemporary life of securities finance  
 
Cab drivers call it the “share bazaar,” and will convey a passenger as close as 
the thronging traffic permits. Crowding up and around its vast flanks are shoeshine 
boys, snack kiosks, and vendors of share applications (who will, for a fee, fill out the 
applications – different prices for handwritten or typed). Banks with doors half open 
are guarded by desultory chowkidars (security guards) drinking tea. The traffic in and 
out, as well as around the building, is incessant and raucous. Despite the fact that it is 
one of the tallest buildings on the south Bombay skyline, situated on hugely valuable 
property, it can be accessed only by way of labyrinthine small lanes. This is the 
Bombay Stock Exchange, India’s best-known securities exchange. 
In Shanghai’s glittering new Pudong financial district, rising majestically 
between a manicured empty greensward and a wide yet often empty boulevard, stands 
the Shanghai Stock Exchange. Inside and out, it is disconcertingly still, soporific. In 
the solitude of the foyer, a footfall is deafening. The exchange building itself is a huge 
chrome and steel affair shaped like a square doughnut, with a vast empty space in the 
middle. 
These renderings of the different social geographies and built environments in 
which the Chinese and Indian securities exchanges exist, evoke themes that 
distinguish the two countries’ patterns of securities finance. Observers often view 
China as a surging dragon, a vigorous economy with a dynamic reform agenda. India  
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is viewed less favorably, as a plodding elephant, a sluggish economy, and a listless 
reformer. Contrary to these common characterizations, I argue in what follows that, 
when we look at the area of securities finance in stocks and bonds, the dragon is less 
fierce than often believed and the elephant more nimble. 
Where will China and India be tomorrow? Two prominent political 
economists, one Chinese and one Indian, reason that “the answer will be determined in 
large measure by how well both countries utilize their resources, and on this score, 
India is doing a superior job” (Huang and Khanna 2003, 80). Table 1-1 summarizes 
the conventional wisdom circa 2002 on this question, highlighting the one clear area 
of difference: finance. The haphazard, heterodox, confused, and yet organic 
constituents of the first tableau rendered above presents an apt evocation of the Indian 
pattern. The rational, orderly, formally impressive, yet ultimately hollow constituents 
of the second tableau present an equally apt evocation of the Chinese pattern.  
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Sluggish economy
Sluggish reformer
Dynamic economy
Dynamic reformer
Overperforms Compared To:
China
Other Indian Sectors
Underperforms Compared To:
India
Other Chinese Sectors
India China
Contrasting Patterns of Financial Governance
Table 1-1: 
A Scorecard for the Dragon and the Elephant 
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   Beginning in the early 1990s, both countries faced a common exogenous 
stimulus in the form of the global securities finance trend. The two shared a common 
legacy of directed-credit developmentalist financial systems. However, their profiles 
of exposure to the international economy, their coalition politics, and their property 
rights structures were different. Based on documentary, quantitative, and interview-
based evidence collected during twenty months of field research from 1997 through 
2001, this thesis draws conclusions about how these three variables help elucidate the 
politics of securitization in China and India and how they help explain the differing 
patterns that emerged in their governance of securities finance. 
In the 1970s and 80s, technological innovation and market expansion made 
securities finance using stocks and bonds cheaper, more reliable, and more prevalent. 
At the same time, securities finance not only became socially more acceptable 
globally, it came to be seen as a necessary element in the common global financial 
reform trend and a desirable, if not obligatory, attribute of a sovereign national market 
participating in the global economy. In the 1990s, facilitated by these earlier changes 
and buoyed by a boom in information technologies, a U.S.-led securities investment 
Zeitgeist seemed to infect much of the rest of the world, triggering a new and rapid 
expansion of securities finance. In many countries, American capital markets were 
considered, in the words of one prominent Indian financier, the “nirvana of financial 
development.”
1 The decade-long American expansion did much to spread the “cult of 
equity” and the craze for stock markets. As one longtime observer of such trends 
                                                 
1 Author’s interview, New Delhi, 2000, #22. There is often a confusing degree of imprecision among 
journalists, and often even among political scientists and economists, in the discussion of “capital 
markets.” The term is often incorrectly used as a synonym for securities markets. The first analytical 
advantage of focusing on securities is the avoidance of this imprecision. Capital markets do include 
securities, but they refer to the organized markets and institutions dealing in long-term instruments 
(typically with a maturity exceeding one year). In addition to stocks and bonds, the capital market 
includes term loans, mortgages (which can be, and now often are, securitized), and even term deposits. 
Commercial paper and certificates of deposit (CDs) are exceptions to rule in this general “long-term” 
definition (Wai and Patrick 1973).  
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remarked, this set the stage for worldwide rivalry of capitalist models – “stock market 
capitalism versus welfare capitalism” (Dore 2000). In the process, American securities 
finance and its watchdog, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), were in 
many quarters valorized, emerging as perceived global standards which governments 
and market participants elsewhere often sought to emulate, and against which the 
progress of securities finance development and regulation were often measured.  
In 1997 and 1998, as financial crisis roiled much of Asia, official promoters of 
caution, gradualism, and market insulation in Chinese and Indian financial policy no 
doubt felt vindicated when a former top U.S. financial official concluded that “one of 
the principal causes of the Asian crisis” was the fact that “financial liberalization was 
undertaken in countries that didn’t have the infrastructure to support it.”
2 In March of 
2000, the decade-long bull run on American stock markets ended. Then in December 
2001 came the collapse of the American energy giant Enron Corporation. It was a 
financial debacle with a significant securities finance component, and a body blow to 
the American “variety” of capitalism. Indeed, during congressional hearings on the 
matter, a U.S. senator upbraided Kenneth Lay, former chairman of Enron, 
complaining that Lay had “failed not just Enron, but America.” Lamented the 
legislator, “we tried to go into emerging markets and talk about the wonderful things 
capitalism has done for our country. Mr. Lay, I believe you bear a great deal of the 
responsibility for shaking the confidence of us being able to export capitalism” 
(Considered 2002). Following Enron’s collapse, Chinese securities regulators quickly 
shelved plans to require audits of Chinese firms by foreign accounting firms such as 
Arthur Anderson (disgraced and fatally damaged by the Enron fiasco). Indians 
                                                 
2 The official quoted is someone who should know: Ricki Helfer, former chair of the U.S. Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (Kristof and Sanger 1999).  
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angered by Enron’s 1990s machinations in a major energy infrastructure investment 
there also enjoyed a moment of Schadenfreude. 
The unfolding of Enron and other securities-related corporate scandals in the 
U.S., together with the recently-burst stock market bubble, began to reveal how the 
1990s expansion in securities finance had instigated a shift in the politics of securities 
finance from one of interest group politics (Stigler 1971) to one of popular politics. 
Contenders on American hustings are now presented with yet another economic issue 
in electoral politics: the “wealth” created by popular, broad-based securities finance. 
According to one prominent political columnist, “whereas in the 1970s and 1980s 
unemployment and inflation were the key indicators of economic performance to the 
public, the White House has come to believe that the stock market is now the key 
barometer” (Lizza 2003). Asserting that “there is a new number, and it is wealth,” one 
seasoned lobbyist and economic policy strategist argued that this new “wealth effect” 
is poised to join the ensemble of key broad-based economic electoral issues.
3  
Summarizing his discussions with officials about the situation confronting the 
incumbent U.S. administration in a post-bubble, post-Enron era in which as many as 
two-thirds of voters own stock, another important observer of economic policy 
explained that this was “the first sustained period of economic weakness since mutual 
funds and 401(k) retirement plans
4 made investing part of everyday life across the 
income spectrum, and some White House officials are concerned that there is no 
playbook for responding to anxiety among the mass investor class” (Stevenson 2002).
5 
The 1990s seem to have introduced a new dimension to electoral politics – investor 
                                                 
3 This was tax policy activist and Republican consultant Grover Norquist, quoted in (Lizza 2003). 
4 These are tax-preferred, specially regulated securities investment funds for retirement in the U.S.  
5 In 2002-2003 the Republican Party did manage to devise one political “play” for the era of securities 
finance. They introduced a tax cut on the dividends companies pay to their shareholders, and one 
Republican Party strategist commented with glee that in opposing this dividend tax cut, the Democratic 
Party had been successfully portrayed as “enemies of the investor class” (Lizza 2003).  
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confidence – and a new interest group, the “investor class.” Although securities 
finance in China and India in the 1990s was not broad-based in this way, and the 
politics of securities finance occurs largely among powerful groups like state and 
coalition actors, the investor class in these two countries is likely to reach proportions 
over the next decade or two that will have the potential to impact popular politics. 
These are key liniments of the global context in which securities finance has 
emerged in developing and transitional economies in recent decades. However, a more 
provocative way to frame the analysis of Chinese and Indian securities finance that 
follows is to consider the American circumstances of the mid-1960s. At that time, 
more than thirty years after the Great Crash of 1929, much of the American general 
public and almost all economic experts considered U.S. stock markets to be a 
dangerous casino-like “playground for speculators” (Bernstein 1990). The public 
remembered when presidents of the New York Stock Exchange didn’t just resign over 
outsized pay packages (as President and Chairman Richard Grasso did in September, 
2003). Within memory of many Americans still living in the 1960s, NYSE chair 
Richard Whitney, husband to Gertrude Vanderbilt Whitney and brother of J.P. Morgan 
Bank Chairman George Whitney, had been jailed for stealing from the exchange’s 
pension fund. As late as the early 1970s, more than a few Americans even recalled the 
great Wall Street banker J.P. Morgan Sr. himself being pilloried in congressional 
hearings. Yet, it wasn’t until 1975 that the Securities and Exchange Commission broke 
up the self-enriching commission system long enjoyed by securities brokers and 
Congress imposed the unifying and cost-reducing National Market System, putting in 
place a market design intended to foster growth and competition in securities trading. 
Not until the 1970s did mutual funds and index funds
6 finally bring easy 
                                                 
6 An index fund is a mutual fund that seeks to produce the same investment performance as a specific 
stock or bond index such as the Dow Jones Industrial Average in the U.S. To achieve this intended  
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diversification of stocks at low costs, helping investors confront risk and complexity in 
the market for U.S. securities. 
This detour into U.S. financial history is a valuable caveat when analyzing 
recent development in Chinese and Indian securities finance. It puts in global and 
historic perspective the seeming riot of these countries’ financial conditions at the turn 
of the millennium. Remembering Richard Whitney is important when we consider the 
ignominious exits of various Bombay and Shanghai Stock Exchange presidents.
7 The 
vilification of the likes of J.P. Morgan helps put in context the recent treatment of such 
erstwhile Indian financial heroes as now-disgraced Global Trust Bank President 
Ramesh Gelli and former chairman P.S. Subramanyam of the massive state-run mutual 
fund UTI – as well as billionaire Chinese businessman Zhou Zhengyi. 
 
II. Convergence, Diversity, and State Authority 
 
Global technology, global markets, and global society are homogenizing 
forces. They act as external stimuli on the way countries organize their economic and 
political institutions. Some argue that these forces encourage convergence, meaning 
that, in the words of political scientist Suzanne Berger, “competition, imitation, 
diffusion or best practices, trade, and capital mobility naturally operate to produce 
convergence across nations in the structures of production and in the relations among 
economy, society, and state” (Berger 1996, 1). Together with domestically driven 
adjustments in many countries around the world, the impact of these global forces has 
                                                 
result (often referred to as “passive management”), an index fund manager maintains a portfolio of all 
(or a representative sample of) the securities in the index. 
7 In India, Bombay Stock Exchange Presidents Anand Rathi and JC Parekh left under clouds in 2000 
and 1998 respectively. For detailed discussion of the dismissal of Shanghai and Shenzhen exchange 
leadership, see chapter 6.  
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led to changes in the state’s role in the economy, particularly in developing and 
transitional economies (DTEs). 
Yet, researchers still struggle to understand how these global forces – techno-
market and social – influence domestic economic governance. For students of politics, 
a particularly important question is how the intrusion of these forces in formerly 
autarkic countries, where commerce and finance were once organized by government 
planning, affects the exercise of state authority in the economy. How and to what 
extent is economic action embedded in state and other social institutions? In this way, 
the analysis presented here carries forward Polanyi’s preoccupation with what he 
called the “embeddedness” of markets and the “double movement” or symbiotic 
tension of socio-political reaction to market expansion (Polanyi 1957). Global forces 
may explain convergence in market outcomes, but they are indeterminate in 
explaining political and governance outcomes. This analysis also extends the growing 
interest in the varieties of capitalism. In identifying distinct patterns among the 
sectoral trends in Chinese and Indian economic governance, the arguments presented 
here should help in thinking about the various “futures” or possible “varieties” of 
Asian capitalism now emerging in these two major developing and transitional 
economies (Hall and Soskice 2001; Schmidt 2003). 
To sharpen the focus of this inquiry, I look to the domain of finance in 
formerly planned economies. Specifically, I examine the politics and governance of 
“marketizing” finance in two of the world’s largest DTEs, a process that extends the 
depersonalization and calculation of capitalism to the financial arena. This process as a 
whole is abstract and not easily grasped. I address the questions it raises by comparing 
the local enactment in China and India of one particular and prominent manifestation 
of global techno-market and social forces: securitization.  
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Securities finance is an area of financial marketization with broad linkages to, 
and implications for, the rest of the financial sector and the real economy. Claims on 
the value-creating “stock” assets that constitute firms are embodied in shares of equity 
often referred to as “shares of stock.” Claims on “flow” assets, including firms’ and 
governments’ revenue streams, are embodied in debt obligations such as bonds. Both 
are packaged into standardized, anonymous, tradable “instruments” known 
collectively as securities. Securities such as stocks and bonds are thus instruments for 
commodifying the equity and credit funds offered to firms or governments.
8  
But the implications of “securitization” go beyond its technical meaning. It is 
an important dimension of a global modernization process. “Commodification” – that 
is, treating an object or relationship not as social or political but as purely commercial 
– evokes a disembodied dynamic. Securitization is a macro-form of commodification: 
the creation and trading of claims on a society’s most productive assets, like firms and 
tax revenues, including the social relations within and among those assets. 
Commodification evokes “disembedding,” where embedding refers to the rooting of 
financial relations in social or political institutions. Direct investment and bank loans 
are alternative, non-commodified sources of finance.
9 For someone exploring the 
marketization of finance in an effort to comprehend the comparative political 
sociology of globalization and of state authority in development and transition, key 
questions include how formerly dirigiste states respond to the global and local 
                                                 
8 There is no equity investment in governments, only in the firms controlled by governments “on behalf 
of” their citizens. 
9 The everyday vocabulary of finance unconsciously recognizes this. As discussed below, political and 
financial economists tacitly internalize this fundamental distinction in the logic of their analytic 
categories. An outsider might be puzzled to hear that they contrast “bank-based” financial systems 
(dominated by banks) with “market-based” financial systems (dominated by securities), with the clear 
implication that securities finance is more “marketized” than is bank finance (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine 2001; Zysman 1983).  
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expansion of “securitized” finance, as well as how those responses shape the 
governance of securities finance. 
Comparing the recent experience of securitization in India and China reveals 
contrasting outcomes. In the early 1990s, as the global tide of securities finance 
gathered momentum and both China and India began to securitize in earnest, their 
prevailing financial governance regimes were comparable. Large, organized industry 
in both countries operated in similar milieus of directed-credit finance based on central 
grants and loans from state-controlled banks or long-term lending institutions. By the 
end of the decade, however, distinct new regimes governing securities finance 
emerged from this common directed-credit legacy, and were discernible in the two 
countries. It is the politics of these two regimes that I will analyze and explain. 
Governance regime is a term used by economic sociologists in characterizing 
the ensemble of actors, institutions, and social relations that “govern” a given sector of 
the economy. It includes structures of hierarchy-like state institutions and 
organizations or firms, and zones of relatively horizontal interaction like markets, the 
media, associations, and networks. The regime governing securities finance in a 
country – the securities governance regime (SGR) – is the dependent variable in the 
analysis that follows. 
The Chinese and Indian securities governance regimes developed very 
differently from one another, and differently from the general reform and governance 
trends in each country more broadly. Tracing how the new SGR reshaped the form but 
not the function of financial power in China’s marketizing state socialism helps us 
understand the curious circumstances of that country’s “Potemkin stock markets”
10 – 
                                                 
10 Naughton (1998) first compared this showcase feature of China’s markets to “Potemkin Villages,” 
which were named after Russian Empress Katherine the Great’s renowned political-military advisor. 
Potemkin (1739-1781) is credited (apocryphally) with arranging sham villages that presented to the 
Empress a façade of thriving orderliness, obscuring a very different reality. In the heyday of Soviet and  
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financial reform without real financial change. Tracing how the new Indian SGR 
reshaped both form and function of financial power as that country moved from plan 
to market in the 1990s helps explain one of the most fundamental transformations in 
modern Indian political economy. 
There is still some disagreement over whether, and/or the degree to which, the 
forces of globalization are causing irreversible convergence in policy institutions 
through the relative disempowerment of the state in favor of markets, capital-rich 
actors, or neo-classical economic ideas (Kurzer 1993; Milner 1998; Weiss 1998). To 
date, the international political economy (IPE) and comparative political economy 
(CPE) literatures make clear that there are trends toward both convergence and 
national diversity in countries around the world (Berger 1996; Laurence 2001; Vogel 
1996; Wade 1996). But the proponents of convergence arguments have yet to stipulate 
what kind of convergence is expected. Do they expect the convergence of various 
countries’ development trajectories toward some infinite intersection point on the 
horizon at which market and regulatory institutions of all nations will become 
formally and substantively alike? Or does convergence mean greater similarity (formal 
and/or functional) across national market and regulatory institutions, even while 
significant diversity persists? While we cannot know the future, looking for variation 
in securities governance regimes in two of the world’s largest economies should 
contribute to our understanding of this issue. 
The results of the China-India comparison on securities governance presented 
here offer evidence for the latter expectation: diversity amid convergence; 
convergence – meaning greater similarity, but not intersection – in many formal 
elements of finance stipulated by the global securitization script; and diversity in the 
                                                 
Chinese state-socialism, “model” towns were presented in domestic and international propaganda, 
purportedly demonstrating the advantages of communist economic and social organization.  
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local enactment of that script’s spirit and underlying functions. There may be a secular 
long-term trend toward convergence, but there is growing agreement among political 
economists and political sociologists that the global convergence trend is: a) long 
enough that diverse, medium-term equilibria along the way are both durable and 
important; b) indeterminate in its ultimate destination point (some “final” common 
universal form of market institutions); and c) almost certainly not toward a single, 
common intersecting equilibrium point in regulatory and market structures (Berger 
1996, 4). The evidence presented in this thesis supports this view, demonstrating that 
the Chinese and Indian trajectories in securities finance are not likely to intersect, and 
that distinct, diverse, relatively stable medium-term equilibrium outcomes were 
reached during the first fifteen years of reform. 
I argue that despite some formal signs of convergence, the responses to 
securitization in India and China are very different. Based on numerous interviews 
with officials and experts in both countries, and drawing on government documents, 
statistics, press coverage, and local secondary sources gathered over the course of 
twenty months of field research, I present a political explanation for these contrasting 
outcomes. The dual imprint of variable international exposure and historically 
provided domestic forces has produced distinct securities governance regimes in each 
country. 
The combined effect of these techno-market and social dynamics is a global 
securitization “script.”
11 Along with certain technologies and expanding exchange 
practices, the script also prescribes certain actors (such as issuers of securities and 
investors in securities), certain institutions (such as securities exchanges, securities 
regulators, or mutual funds), and certain behaviors (corporatization of firms, public 
                                                 
11 The conceptualization of a taken-for-granted intersubjective script, and of the norms, practices, and 
material conditions associated with the enactment of such a script, are elaborated in Meyer et al (1997), 
and Finnemore (1996).  
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offerings of enterprise equity, privatization, mergers and acquisitions, and bond-based 
public and private finance). The script thus encompasses a common set of stimuli. 
However, the actual performance of this script’s plot – its enactment – is not 
predetermined. It is the result of the politics shaping the configuration of state, market, 
and civil society. That configuration yields a country’s particular securities 
governance regime. Countries respond differently to the common stimuli of the script, 
enacting that script in distinct ways. This local enactment is based on variation in the 
dual imprint of each country’s relationship to the international economy: its profile of 
international economic exposure, on the one hand, and its domestic coalition politics 
and property rights politics on the other. Global script, local enactment. 
To be sure, global forces exert formidable pressure for policy and institutional 
conformity in the form of technological innovations (diminishing transaction costs), 
expanding markets (increasing opportunity costs), and proliferating social standards 
and norms of behavior (shaping goals and identities). Yet, the political incentives to 
adopt convergent policies are mediated by each country’s specific profile of exposure 
to the international economy. Differences in these profiles across countries lead to 
variation in the political incentives for policy making and institution building. Facing a 
particular set of such incentives, a country’s securities governance regime will be 
influenced by how the central state acts on them in interaction with domestic coalition 
politics and the structure of domestic property rights institutions. 
Based on my analysis of the development of these two countries’ governance 
of securities finance, I also argue that state authority in the economy is not, as some 
have argued, retreating.
12 Rather, the nature of state authority is being transformed. 
Understanding authoritative relations between the state and the economy requires 
                                                 
12 For a clear statement of this argument, see Nee (1989), Woo (1999), and Strange (1996). For 
arguments to the contrary that differ from the one presented here, see (1998) and especially Wade 
(1996).   
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attending as much to how state power is exercised, as to how much of that power 
exists. The following analysis therefore emphasizes not the quantum, but the character 
of state authority in the economy. This emphasis reveals how state power is exercised 
through different patterns of securities governance in China and India. Changes in the 
nature of state authority with respect to securities finance involve not only a 
diminution of state power, but also a shift in the mix of two ideal-type modes of state-
economy relations – distributive intervention and procedural supervision – or the 
distinction between the tutelary and the regulatory state. 
 
III. Securitization 
 
Securities finance involves the creation, circulation, and use of stocks, bonds, 
and other tradable financial claims. Securitization has a number of meanings.
13 In this 
study, I define it in two ways. First, it is the creation of claims on productive assets 
that are divisible, uniform, and tradable. They can be claims on equity (stocks) or debt 
(bonds). Securitization also refers to the shift in a country’s “financial structure,” as 
the ratio of securities in the financial system increases relative to loans mediated by 
banks or bank-like institutions. At a first order of approximation, this helps us 
distinguish between what political scientist John Zyman called “bank-based” and 
“market-based” (meaning securities-based) financial systems (1983).
14 
                                                 
13 There are other narrow, specialized uses of the term among financial services sub-sectors. 
14 Demirguc-Kunt and Levine devised a “financial structure index” based on combined measures of 
banks-versus-securities (equities) finance, aggregating indicators of size (market capitalization vs. bank 
assets), activity (equity trading volume vs. bank credit), and efficiency (equity trading costs vs. bank 
overhead costs). Some countries demonstrate the usefulness of the index by their counterintuitive index 
rankings. For example, countries such as the Philippines are classified as “market-based,” not because 
of well-developed securities finance, but because they have poorly developed banking systems 
(Hutchcroft 1998). Another important exception is Korea. Generally considered a “bank-based” system 
(Park 1993), Korea is classified here as “market-based” because it has very active, highly efficiency 
equity markets, and because, as in India, there is a large role for what the database calls “non-bank 
finance” (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2001 120).  
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Securities finance is highly formulaic. The standard “script” is familiar.
15 
There are two types of instruments, bonds and stocks. These instruments are most 
often traded on an exchange. Corporate securities have a standard hierarchy of 
claims.
16 However, the essential point of this thesis is that the formulaic script 
nevertheless allows for variable “enactment” of its details.
17 The securitization script 
is dynamic yet teleological. According to the view of many mainstream financial 
economists, as securitization proceeds, a country’s political economy will shift from 
bank-based finance to competitive, securitized capital markets. The convergent 
trajectory of this teleology is imagined to be leading toward the Anglo-American 
model.
 18 
 
IV. A Puzzling Contrast in Responses to Securitization 
 
In the early 1990s, when China and India undertook securities reform in 
earnest, their financial systems initially shared a comparable structure of financial 
governance dominated by directed credit. Yet, a decade later, Indian securities finance 
exhibited a high degree of substantive market and regulatory reform, both relative to 
other sectors and factors within India, and relative to China and other DTEs. By 
                                                 
15 The terms “script” and “enactment” are common terms of art in the economic and political sociology. 
A “script” is an intersubjective set of expectations about the actors and practices appropriate to a given 
field of social action. In dealing with complex social interactions in different fields of human endeavor, 
economic sociologists conceive of actors as using readily available scripts, often provided by 
governments or professionals, to structure their interactions (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Jepperson 
1991). See footnote 17 below. Also, see chapter 1, footnote 4. 
16 Bondholders have first claims on a firm’s assets in the event of bankruptcy, but have no direct voice 
in the firm’s governance. Holders of equity have only residual claims on bankrupted firms, but are 
entitled to dividends and (in the securitization script) a voice in corporate governance. 
17 “Enactment” refers to the execution of that script and the adaptation and learning that occurs in the 
course of that execution (Abolafia and Kilduff 1988; Weick 1987). 
18 In over seventy interviews with Chinese officials and experts, only a few had thought about this long-
term consequence of securitization. Some argued that the Anglo-American model was a good outcome 
because, they reasoned, a more bank-based system would lead to higher industrial concentration 
(Cheabol or Keiretsu-like groupings), Author’s various interviews, 10/1999 to 10/2001.  
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contrast, Chinese securities finance displayed a high degree of superficial convergence 
with global norms in the technical infrastructure of securities finance, but a low degree 
of substantive market and regulatory reform – both relative to other sectors and factors 
within China, and relative to India and other DTEs. Table 1-2 provides a selected 
summary of reform outcomes in various sectors in the two countries. 
These different patterns involved distinctly identifiable regimes for the 
creation, circulation, and use of securities, with China developing a pattern I call 
discretionary involution, while India developed, to use a similar idiom, a pattern of 
constrained evolution. 
In the China of the late 1990s, the social, market, and regulatory contexts for 
products, services, and transport were vigorous and broad in scope. For this reason, 
China has often been viewed as an effective economic reformer. Yet, by the end of the 
decade, despite the attention given to the large capitalization of China’s stock market 
(Asia’s third largest) and the quality of its securities trading and settlement systems, 
the governance of securities finance had not evolved; it had involuted. Involution here 
means that the governance regime that emerged in securities finance was not vigorous 
and broad in scope, unlike the regimes in a number of other Chinese sectors, and that 
the old modes of financial governance that had characterized the directed-credit 
system were reproduced within the realm of securities finance.  
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Power
Transport
Telecom
Petrochemicals Securities India
Banks
Securities
Agriculture
Transport
Manufacturing/Product Markets
Power
China
Minimal
Governance Regime Change
Substantive
Governance Regime Change
Table 1-2:
Sectoral Variation in Reform Outcomes 
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Following an initial burst of reform that dismantled the licensing system and 
encouraged competition in the early 1990s, reform in India’s real (that is, non-
financial) economy has been moderate, and in areas of organized labor and 
infrastructure has been quite slow. For this reason, India has been considered a 
mediocre reformer. But the pace and scope of reform in securities finance has been 
remarkable, with many observers calling it the most significant area of change in an 
otherwise tepid reform agenda. The scope of securities activities, the vigor of 
competition, the changed role of the state, and the participation of civil society 
(particularly associations and the media) have all been significant in securities finance. 
This is evolution, in contrast to China’s involution. 
 
V. The Dual Imprint Explanation 
 
The explanation offered here for the variation in Chinese and Indian securities 
governance regimes uses what I call a dual imprint analysis. At each level 
(international and domestic) of this dual imprint analysis, China and India were mirror 
opposites, as Table 1-3 shows. At the international level, China’s abundant inward 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and robust export-led growth produced a benign 
profile in that country’s external macroeconomic juncture. This contrasted starkly with 
India’s scarcity of FDI and anemic exports, producing a precarious profile. 
Precariousness in the balance of payments plus scarcity in the flow of capital equaled 
jeopardy for the Indian central state. 
At the domestic level, in the realm of securities finance, the central Chinese 
state was constrained by other state actors in what I call the “intramural” dominant 
political coalition, and by the rigidity of state-socialist property rights. However, in 
India, the central state enjoyed relative autonomy from the dominant political coalition  
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and room to maneuver within the flexibility of its inherited Nehruvian “mixed-
economy” property rights regime. 
In this analysis, domestic politics are dominated by struggles within the 
dominant coalition over the property-rights implications of securitization. The 
domestic-level process is a fundamentally political one because by revealing, 
specifying, and enabling the exchange of property rights, securitization at a minimum 
puts pressure on, and at maximum fundamentally challenges, the prevailing definitions 
of property rights and the arrangements for their allocation in the organized economy. 
The politics of securitization are thus a struggle over those two issues. This struggle 
involves political contestation and institutional transformation. Its outcome is shaped 
by the configuration of each country’s dominant political coalition and by the 
inherited institutions that define the property rights of the productive assets that are 
being securitized.  
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Table 1-3: The Explanation 
 
 
 
 
China 
 
 
India 
 
 
International 
Juncture 
 
I. 
 
Enabled by benign abundance 
• benign balance of payments    
position 
• abundant capital 
• abundant foreign exchange 
 
 
II. 
 
Constrained by precarious 
scarcity 
• precarious balance of        
payments position 
• scarce capital 
• scarce foreign exchange 
 
 
Domestic 
Conditions 
III. 
 
Constrained by 
• state dependence on intramural 
distributional coalition 
• rigid state-socialist property rights 
 
IV. 
 
Enabled by 
• state autonomy from tripartite 
distributional coalition 
• flexible mixed-economy 
property rights 
 
 
Where the Chinese central-state-elite was enabled by the benign abundance of 
its external macroeconomic conditions, it took advantage of those conditions, 
adjusting to the constraints imposed by the dominant intramural political coalition of 
other state actors and by the rigid structure of state-socialist property rights. This 
yielded China’s discretionary involution pattern of securities governance. In contrast, 
where the Indian central-state-elite was constrained by the precarious scarcity of its 
external macroeconomic conditions, it was obliged to accommodate those constraints 
by exploiting its relative autonomy from the dominant political coalition and its 
margin to maneuver within the flexibility of inherited Nehruvian mixed-economy 
property rights. This yielded India’s constrained evolution pattern of securities 
governance. 
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VI. Some Contending Explanations 
 
As noted above, both India and China began the decade with similar 
developmental, state-led directed credit systems of finance. But by the end of the 
1990s, the two were displaying evidence of variation in their responses to the 
conformity-inducing power of global techno-market and social forces. Local 
enactment of the increasingly shared global securitization script was not the same. 
What might explain this variation? 
Within the existing corpus of social science theory, the possible explanations 
for these different securities governance regime outcomes in China and India may be 
divided into two general groups: those emphasizing international factors, and those 
emphasizing domestic factors. As mentioned above, on the international side, some of 
the arguments for how global forces shape domestic institutional development and 
policy change in DTEs, including economic governance regimes, emphasize the role 
of international markets, technological change, and an emergent world society. Other 
international or systemic explanations for domestic governance structures emphasize 
ideas or the interests of powerful global actors such as transnational corporations and 
hegemonic states like the United States. Among domestically focused explanations, 
arguments about relative state autonomy and/or differences in regime type are most 
commonly invoked to explain variation in national policy institutions or economic 
governance structures. 
Many of these factors emphasized in the contemporary IPE and CPE literatures 
do indeed influence the securities governance regime outcomes in China and India. 
The merits of these arguments and their limitations in explaining the Chinese and 
Indian cases at hand are discussed further in chapter 3. However, the analysis I 
propose here offers a simple and more comprehensive explanation based on three  
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easily identified variables (one international, and two domestic): 1) the profile of 
external exposure; 2) the relative autonomy of the central-state-elite vis-à-vis the 
dominant coalition; and 3) the constraints imposed by the inherited structure of 
property rights. 
Two important monographs have recently staked out the theoretical and 
empirical poles of the debate over the internationalization of finance and the domestic 
politics of financial governance. Examining the IPE and CPE of financial governance 
in Great Britain and Japan over the last two decades, Steven Vogel and Edward 
Laurence disagree over both the policy outcomes and the process behind changes in 
domestic financial governance prompted by the forces of financial globalization 
(Laurence 2001; Vogel 1996).
19 With respect to outcomes in the area of financial 
governance, Vogel finds divergent responses in the two cases, while Laurence finds 
convergence. Examining the key actors and processes driving institutional change, 
Vogel argues that it was governments, not interest groups – Laurence’s favored actors 
– that drove change. Vogel believes it is the ideational “orientation” and institutional 
“organization” within the state that explains the different outcomes he sees in British 
and Japanese regimes of financial governance. By contrast, Laurence views the actual 
or potential threat of “exit” by mobile capital as driving the process of convergence in 
the two countries’ institutions of financial governance. 
The crux of their disagreement over outcomes can be explained by the 
distinction drawn by Vogel, between “liberalization” and “deregulation.” 
Liberalization involves the introduction of competition and increasing privatization. 
                                                 
19 Laurence’s explanation relies on the mobility of capital when he argues the threat of “exit” leads to 
policies that favor the holders of mobile assets. This limits the generalizability of his thesis, excluding 
the many developing countries with closed capital accounts, including China and India. Vogel’s 
ideational and organizational explanation is more portable. For arguments about capital mobility with   
 
more relevance to DTEs, see Winters (1996).  
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Deregulation involves the reduction of governments’ instruments of distributive 
intervention in the economy. The two authors are not asking exactly the same 
question. Laurence blurs the boundary between liberalization and deregulation, 
measuring reform with reference to market changes. He therefore identifies 
convergence and similar outcomes in the Japanese and British cases when he observes 
significant liberalization in both countries. Vogel seeks to explain not only market 
outcomes, but also regulatory reform, identifying a “re-regulatory” option in which the 
common trajectory of liberalization in market outcomes does not exhaust the scope of 
his dependent variable, which includes institutional and organizational outcomes as 
well as market outcomes.  
Comparing these two monographs helps locate the current study of financial 
change in India and China within this ongoing debate among students of IPE and CPE. 
The Britain-Japan comparison among OECD cases is not unlike the India-China 
comparison among DTEs, and a lesson can be drawn from these studies for the current 
work. Global market forces may explain convergence in market outcomes, but they 
are indeterminate in explaining political and governance outcomes. Consequently, 
when the scope of the dependent variable is expanded to include political as well as 
market outcomes, the case for convergence is harder to make. Furthermore, the Vogel-
Laurence debate demonstrates that only by taking the whole economic governance 
regime (and not just market outcomes) as the dependent variable, is it possible to 
adequately explore the important issue of transformations in the nature of state-
economy authority relations.
20 
                                                 
20 Research on “marketization as state-building” is still under-developed. After Ikenberry’s initial salvo 
(1988), Fligstein’s work on “markets as politics” (1996; Fligstein 2001), and Padgett’s research on the 
“co-evolution” of states and markets (Padgett) have now firmly established this as a promising research 
agenda. Vogel’s work on finance and telecommunications sectors was valuable for OECD cases (1996). 
Chaudhury addressed some Middle-Eastern cases (1997), David Woodruff the Russian case (1999), and 
Lu Xiaobo has begun looking at the PRC case (1997). The most comprehensive conceptualization and  
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The key difference between Vogel’s and Laurence’s lines of argument is the 
emphasis put on the role of global market forces: Do global forces act to impose 
conformity with a standard set of micro- and macro-economic structures of 
organization and governance (Laurence)? Or do they form a common stimulus to 
which states and other social actors respond in different ways (Vogel)? Because global 
techno-market and social forces (the global script) are indeterminate in explaining 
specific institutional outcomes (local enactment) at the domestic level, I agree with 
Vogel that these forces should be treated as stimuli provoking distinct national 
responses. For this reason, we must look elsewhere for explanations of variation in 
governance regime patterns. Proceeding from Vogel’s insight, I therefore argue that 
the way countries respond to the stimuli of global forces depends on the nature of their 
junctures with the international economy. These can vary broadly, creating different 
incentive structures for powerful actors within those countries, particularly the central-
state-elite.  
 
VII. Explaining Securitization Using the Dual Imprint Approach 
 
This exploration of the securitization process in DTEs is a new contribution to 
the study of both international political economy (IPE) and comparative political 
economy (CPE). These fields have not paid adequate empirical and conceptual 
attention to the marketization of finance associated with the growth of non-banking 
finance in general, and securitization in particular. Furthermore, while finance is often 
considered the most internationalized of economic sectors or factors, the politics and 
institutions of finance have generally been taken as an independent variable – a factor 
explaining other outcomes – not as something itself to be explained. The increasing 
                                                 
empirical exploration to date is Schamis’ exploration of the issue in Latin American and East European 
cases (2002, particularly Chapter Eight).  
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use of securities in finance, both within countries and across borders, has been one of 
the most dramatic changes in this expansion of global finance, particularly in the last 
twenty years (Sobel 1999). Securitization, wrote political scientist Ethan Kapstein in 
one of the earliest discussion of this issue among OECD countries, was eroding the 
longstanding “distinction between lending and underwriting,” thus blurring the 
distinction between commercial and investment banking (1989, 325).
21 Yet, since 
Kapstein’s article, few published books or articles have specifically addressed the 
international or comparative political economy of securitization in general, and in 
DTEs in particular. 
 
A. Comparative and International Political Sociology of Financial Change 
 
Research on the politics of financial policy in DTEs continues to be scant for a 
number of reasons. First, research, policy-practice, and popular discourse are 
dominated by a focus on the debate over finance and economic performance (Levine 
1997; Rajan and Zingales 1998). The selective focus on how financial structures 
contribute to overall welfare, and the impediments to allocative efficiency, tend to 
crowd out other non-economic questions such as the political causes and consequences 
of financial change. Second, the increasing complexity of financial transactions and 
technologies tends to deter non-experts from attending to the political and social 
dynamics of financial policies and practices. Finally, the decade of securitization’s 
most rapid global expansion coincided with, and indeed was strongly inspired by, the 
ICE (information, communication, and entertainment)-driven supercharged American 
bull market of the 1990s. In this context, the irresistible specter of comparison with 
U.S. financial markets limited the contemplation of alternative objectives for, and 
                                                 
21 “Underwriting” here refers to the issuance of securities, not bank loans.  
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approaches to, financial organization. The post-2000 decline of the U.S. stock market, 
followed by the Enron-initiated parade of corporate scandals in the U.S. and 
elsewhere, opened analytic space for a more sober and open-ended (that is, less 
teleological) analysis of securitization and the organization of financial governance. 
This neglect is serious for macro-concerns in political sociology and political 
economy. Understanding the politics of securitization in financial change is important 
because, at the broadest level of interest to students of politics, finance is crucial to 
how authority and power are exercised in any economy. Finance is a form of capital. 
Proprietary rights such as the ownership or “bonding” conferred by corporate shares 
and bonds are also a form of capital. By virtue of their fungibility, securities 
encompass both of these properties. Securities are thus the ultimate capitalist 
institution. We cannot understand varieties of capitalism without understanding 
variation in the way securities finance is governed in different polities. Furthermore, 
until recently, there has been a similar neglect of the “rise of the regulatory state” in 
DTEs. The analysis of securitization and financial governance offered here revises our 
understanding of market regulation and state-economy relations. In the tradition of 
Polanyi, this comparative analysis of securities finance in China and India explores 
how shifts in the exercise of state authority in the economy – from distributive 
intervention to procedural supervision – present a challenge to the neo-classical 
economic conception of state-economy relations as broadly zero-sum.
22 
The neglect is also serious at the meso-level of research, for without an 
understanding of the securitization process, it is difficult to make sense of many 
important changes taking place in DTEs around the world.
23 Specifically, 
                                                 
22 Nee (1989) states the clearly the neo-classical view.  Szelenyi (1996) responds with a perspective 
inspired by Polanyi’s “double movement” argument, and a case for the importance of sectoral variation 
in state-economy relations. 
23 The variety of countries where this process is important could, in principle, include the whole 
universe of DTEs, as well as mature capitalist economies. However, it is perhaps most relevant to  
 
28 
understanding the politics of securitization in DTEs is valuable for comprehending 
other key areas of contemporary research in these countries, including privatization, 
industrial organization and the conduct of economic adjustment, firm-level 
organization (including “corporate governance”), and the degrees of economic 
inequality and volatility. 
 
B. The Asset-Class/Financial-Position Matrix 
 
But understanding the politics of securitization in DTEs is not easy. The recent 
rate of financial change in developing countries has been rapid. The protean character 
of the actors and institutions in transitional economies further complicates the task. 
Part of the framework I present here is specifically designed to address these 
challenges and to help clarify the implications of securitization, general and specific, 
enumerated in the previous paragraph. This part of the framework – the asset-
class/financial-position matrix – is a new approach I use to analyze the process of 
political contestation that influences securities governance. The matrix, displayed in 
its simplest form in Table 1-4, relies on the highly formulaic distinction in securities 
finance between, on the one hand, the different asset-classes of equity (stocks) and 
debt (bonds), and on the other hand, the different financial positions created by the 
structural distinction between those who issue securities (issuers) and those who invest 
in them (investors). That is, what is the financial position of a given financial actor 
with respect to a security? This is similar to other analyses in political economy and 
                                                 
formerly planned DTEs that possess large industrial, commercial, and financial enterprises that could 
form the basis of an independent national securities market that would be economically viable on its 
own. Good examples include Brazil, Russia, and Korea. For a discussion of countries that wish to have 
securities markets despite a small industrial and financial base, see Lavelle (1999).  
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economic sociology that derive expectations from the distinction between seller and 
buyer, or between producer and consumer. 
Issuer-investor relations are important in determining the kind of capitalism a 
given polity will produce. The matrix helps identify the “what, who, and where” of 
securities finance.  The matrix is thus a simple idea that helps categorize varieties of 
capitalism. As the Table shows, the matrix helps to identify and map many of the 
issues that influence the character of a capitalist economy, including inter alia external 
enterprise finance, privatization, mergers and acquisitions, and bond-based public and 
private finance. It offers a new way of analyzing variation in the authority structures 
and social relations that govern securities’ finance and productive assets (from tax 
revenues, to factories, to telephone receivables) in any country. This matrix 
contributes to the overall framework I use to explain the differing political responses 
to securitization that are shaping the Chinese and Indian varieties of Asian capitalism. 
IV
• Bankruptcy/Creditor Rights
•Interest Rates/Fixed Returns
III
• Enterprise Finance
• Public/Fiscal Finance
• Monetary Policy
II
• Shareholder Rights
• Industrial Organization
I
• Enterprise Finance
• Wealth Capitalization
• Privatization
Equity
Debt
Issuers Investors
Table 1-4:
The Asset-Class/Financial-Positions Matrix:
Analyzing the Domestic Politics of Securitization 
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The overall framework I use supplies guidance for a structured-focused 
comparison that can be used to conduct a process-tracing analysis of the politics of 
securitization across case studies. It involves a two-level analysis that explicitly links 
theoretical and empirical concerns central to contemporary international political 
economy literature with those at the core of the comparative political economy 
literature. From IPE, I borrow a cognizance of the relative power of domestic and 
international forces, and a focus on how countries’ connections to the international 
economic and social systems affect domestic political outcomes.
24 Analytically, I draw 
on a venerable tradition in IPE research that relies on varying national responses to 
common exogenous stimuli as a comparative framework.
25 In this case, the stimulus 
was the expansion of global finance in general, and securitized finance in particular, 
during the late 1980s and early 1990s. I also look to parts of the IPE tradition in 
considering the relative importance of a country’s juncture with the world economy as 
an explanatory variable.
26 
I link these IPE considerations with two factors central to many comparative 
politics analyses: distributive coalitions and property rights.
27 Furthermore, in focusing 
                                                 
24 For this I draw on Katzenstein (1985) and Meyer (Meyer 1980). 
25 The key empirical works in this lineage are Katzenstein (1985) and Gourevitch (1986). Conceptually, 
Frieden and Rogowski (1996) and Garrett and Lange (1996) did much to clarify and formalize this 
tradition. The schema presented in Chapter 2 summarizing my argument is a modification for 
securitization of Garrett and Lange’s modeling of this tradition. 
26 Key works that pioneered this approach are Gerschenkron (1962 (1951)), Kurth (1979), Skocpol, and 
Chaudhry (1989). 
27 For an overview of comparative politics schools and methods, see Philippe C. Schmitter’s article, 
“Comparative Politics,” in Joel Krieger et al, eds. (1993). On political coalitions, the locus classicus is 
Olson (1982). Research on the political sociology of Indian economic policy and institutions by 
Bardhan (1984), Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), and Herring (1999) have relied heavily on the structure 
of distributive coalitions as an explanatory variable. With China’s opening in the 1980s, the scope of 
coalition analysis expanded from the factional bases of economic policies and institutions, to include 
explanations that used more general “corporatist” or particularistic interests (involving provinces, 
ministries, sectors, and the military) in the work of Lieberthal and Oksenberg (1988), Shirk (1993), and 
Zweig (2002). Contemporary empirical research on the comparative politics of property rights is a 
relatively recent phenomenon drawing on the experiences of developing and transitional economies in 
the 1980s and 1990s. See Weimer (1997) and Murrell (2001). China has received some of this attention 
(Oi and Walder 1999), but India practically none (Austin 1999). This new research attention to property 
rights in comparative politics has its roots in the economic history of Douglass North (1990).   
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on the institutions of economic governance, I engage the key comparative politics 
theme of state authority in analyzing the quality, not just the quantum, of state power. 
This is an organic result of analytically locating the state within an ensemble of 
components, including the market and civil society, which govern economic action. I 
thereby address what is considered by two eminent surveyors of the field to be the 
major lacuna in research on the comparative and international political economy of 
finance. Political scientist Stephan Haggard and economist Chung H. Lee lamented 
that studies have “not bothered to ask whether financial market policy was in fact a 
result of political pressures or whether it sprang from economic constraints or the 
projects of state officials.” The failure to treat financial institutions as outcomes is 
responsible for a major blind spot in contemporary research in the comparative and 
international political sociology of finance: “The inability to account for variations 
across countries in terms of the extent or nature of government intervention in 
financial markets” (Haggard and Lee 1993, 8-9). This framework begins to address 
this failure by taking the institutions of financial governance themselves as outcomes 
to be explained. It presents a unified two-level analysis (international and domestic) 
that includes a new way of unpacking the “what” and the “where” in the domestic 
politics of securities finance: the asset-class/financial-position matrix. 
 
 
VIII. The Rest of the Argument in Brief 
 
 
In chapter 2, I evaluate the process of securitization in light of existing 
arguments about the relationship between the state and financial structure.
28 This leads 
                                                 
28 These arguments are part of an identifiable corpus of IPE and CPE research on finance, 
backwardness, and “developmental states.” The lineage began with Gerschenkron (1962 (1951)), was  
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to some suggestions for a revised and more coherent analytic framework for the study 
of the state and finance in the political economy of late development, incorporating the 
advent of securitization as a politically consequential phenomenon. 
 This revised framework is the core of chapter 3. It is the dual imprint 
framework that links the elite politics of a country’s external economic exposure to 
domestic coalition dynamics and property rights structure using the asset-
class/financial-position matrix (AC/FP matrix) shown in Table 1-4. While the dual 
imprint framework bridges the international-domestic divide, the AC/FP matrix is a 
novel tool for analyzing the “what and where” in the political sociology of securitized 
finance in any country. That chapter begins by carefully defining economic 
governance regimes – the outcomes to be explained in this thesis. It then briefly 
discusses how those outcomes were coded. Before concluding, I place the dual imprint 
explanation that I offer in the context of other possible explanations. I then conclude 
chapter 3 with a discussion of research and method-related issues. 
Chapter 4 deals with comparisons and antecedents. To begin, the chapter 
describes the use of financial control by developmental states. It considers why and 
how the model of dirigiste socialism came to rely on financial control in the economy 
and society. The discussion is a critique and modification of Kornai’s stylized model 
of the socialist. The case is made that China and India are nevertheless comparable 
cases based on the similar political and developmental logic of centrally controlled 
finance and directed-credit. Chapter 4 then outlines and compares the landscapes of 
Chinese and Indian financial prior to the 1990s. Neither country started from scratch 
with securitization in the early 1990s. During the post-Independence years, the Indian 
                                                 
extended in general IPE terms by Gourevitch (1978), and elaborated with reference to specific CPE 
cases in Asia, Europe, and Latin America by Johnson (1982), Zysman  (1983), Amsden (1989), Wade 
(1990), Maxfield (1990), and Woo-Cumings (Woo 1991). Recently, the research agenda has been 
revived with a general treatment from Woo-Cumings (1999) and Boyer (2000), and CPE cases from 
Vogel (1996) and Dore (2000).  
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state had colonized or marginalized securities finance; and during the 1980s, China 
initiated a haphazard set of experiments. Identifying the key elements of these 
antecedents is essential to understanding the politics of securities finance during the 
securitization boom of the 1990s. Circumstances across some components of the 
governance regime – including the state and market – are surveyed. This is an 
important preface to the analysis of incentives analyzed in chapter 5 and the outcomes 
explained in chapters 6 and 7.  
At the international juncture, how do we trace the molding of central-state-elite 
preferences by the country’s profile of external economic exposure? This requires a 
historical and sociological analysis of the events, conditions, ideas, and institutions 
that constitute the preference-formation relationship between that elite and the profile 
of external exposure. Such an analysis is the subject of chapter 5. It draws on external 
macro-economic data, intensive interviews, a range of press reports, and other expert 
opinion and secondary material. 
Chapter 6 draws on a comparative case study of stock exchange 
development.
29 At the domestic level, how do we trace the formulation of central-
state-elites’ strategies to satisfy the preferences identified in chapter 5? For that, we 
need a framework to analyze how they pursue their preferences in interaction with the 
dominant political coalition and the prevailing structure of property-rights. I offer such 
a framework in the asset-class/financial-position matrix. Chapter 6 focuses on 
unpacking and deciphering the politics of equity finance in the two cases. It examines 
the top row of the AC/FP matrix – the equity asset-class – demonstrating how the 
interests and actions of issuers and investors (in the field of equity assets) are mediated 
by coalition dynamics and property rights structures in their influence on state 
                                                 
29 In later versions it will include similar case comparisons of mutual funds, brokers, 
shareholder/investor rights, corporate governance, and industrial organization (which I define to include 
the equity securities implications of and for competition, mergers and acquisition).  
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strategies and the securities governance regimes they produce strongly.  Chapter 7 
does much the same thing for bonds. 
In conclusion, I address two particular extensions of the framework and 
concepts introduced in the previous seven chapters. First, I explain how the politics of 
debt, that is, bonds, could be analyzed using the asset-class/financial-position matrix. 
This has particular relevance for the development of what financial policy experts call 
“credit culture,” which some consider to be a polite reference to rentier power. 
Management of enterprise failure, bankruptcy, and the degree of assistance creditors 
can expect from the state are crucial in shaping the business climate of any country 
and the character of its capitalist institutions. The right of sub-national political units 
to use bond finance, and the power of the central government to use bond finance both 
for the central fisc and for the management of monetary policy, all shape the nature of 
center-local or federal relations in any country. Second, based on the political 
challenges of securitized finance discussed in chapter 2, I explore the transformation 
of state authority in the economy. This section elaborates on the conceptual distinction 
between distributive intervention and procedural supervision and how state authority 
can vary across economic sectors and factors. Finally, I conclude the analysis with a 
consideration of how the contrasting Chinese and Indian experiences of the 1990s hold 
surprising implications for the future: China’s seeming advantages and strong 
economic performance may undermine its future, while India’s disadvantages and 
poor economic performance perhaps hold out unexpected promise.  
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LATE DEVELOPMENT, SECURITIZATION, AND STATE AUTHORITY 
 
As early as the mid-18
th century, Montesquieu identified the challenge of 
securitization for state authority when discussing how political coercion led to the 
creation of the earliest securities. In Book XXI of the Spirit of the Laws, he explained 
the medieval European invention of bills of exchange, the first known tradable 
securities. “We owe…to the avarice of rulers,” wrote the French baron, “the 
establishment of a contrivance (bills of exchange) which somehow lifts commerce 
right out of their grip. Since that time, the rulers have been compelled to govern with 
greater wisdom than they themselves might have intended” (Montesquieu et al. 1989 
(1748)). Here we have one of the earliest analyses of the power of financial mobility 
and capital’s “structural power” vis-à-vis the state (Gill and Law 1989; Winters 1994). 
The inherent “marketness” of securities-based finance relative to banking 
renders the hierarchical character of state intervention in securities finance both more 
transparent and more difficult. Securitization therefore has political effects, and as 
such becomes both an instrument and an object of political contestation. This 
highlights one of the puzzles that this thesis addresses. Why, to use Montesquieu’s 
word, were the Indians and Chinese differentially “compelled” with regard to 
securities finance? How was the Chinese central-state-elite able to “hack” this attribute 
of securities finance that “compelled” so many other states, including the one in New 
Delhi, to “govern with greater wisdom than they would otherwise have intended”? To 
address these empirical questions, it is useful to understand what securitization is, 
what is at stake economically, sociologically, and politically in the process of 
 
 
42securitization, and finally how it came to developing and transitional economies 
(DTEs). 
The spread of securities finance is one part of the increasingly popular, yet still 
controversial central idea of late capitalism: that wherever possible, allocation of 
economic factors should be determined in the market. Securitization is a highly 
formulaic process associated with the application of this principle. Understanding how 
states respond to the spread of securitization and to the need to regulate securities 
finance requires 1) an understanding of the internal logic of securitization’s formulaic 
doctrine, and 2) an understanding of the political consequences of that doctrine’s 
application to the distinct structures of particular developmental states’ political 
economies. This chapter addresses each of these requirements in order. 
The chapter introduces the reader to securitization, frames it in the history of 
developing and transitional economies, and highlights its implications for domestic 
politics and state authority in DTEs. The first section defines securitization and 
discusses the theoretical and conceptual terrain in which it fits, emphasizing its 
commodifying properties. The next section discusses the progress and potential effects 
of securitization in those countries of the developed world where it where it has 
progressed the furthest. Section three outlines the role of finance in “developmental 
states.” This is important for understanding how securitization might affect political 
action and state authority in countries like China and India, which are prominent 
descendants of the “developmental state” lineage. Finally, the last two sections 
examine, in conceptual terms, how securitization affects the political control of 
finance and, by implication, economic action in the organized sector of an economy. 
 
 
 
43I. The Process of Securitization 
 
Financial globalization includes at least four ongoing changes in the 
international economy that alter the “decision environments” and affect the 
“alternatives and incentives” faced by investors and issuers (that is, those raising 
funds). These changes, in political scientist Andrew Sobel’s apt phrasing, 
“fundamentally transform the international financial environment” (Sobel 1999, 1). 
This transformation has been wrought by a tripartite combination of technological, 
market, and sociological factors. They include: 1) Capital’s increasing international 
mobility; 2) The participation of a growing number of states in global financial 
markets (particularly formerly socialist and/or autarkic states); and 3) The spread of 
formal securities finance institutions and practices (such as stock exchanges, the 
creation of companies limited by shares, and the use of bond finance) as common 
attributes of the modern nation-state and an internationally sanctioned set of norms. 
Together, the previous three changes are driving a fourth summary change: growing 
“securitization.” 
In this study, I adopt a broad definition of “securitization” based on the 
vernacular usage of the term among financial service providers and non-financial 
academic political economists. This definition has two parts. First, in broadest terms, 
securitization is the process whereby large portions of societies’ productive assets 
located in the organized economy are commodified at the highest possible level. 
Claims on the value-creating assets that constitute firms are embodied in shares of 
equity, commonly called stock. Claims on flow assets, including firms’ and 
governments’ revenue streams, are embodied in debt obligations such as bonds and 
stocks. Both types of asset bundles are packaged into standardized, divisible, uniform, 
anonymous, tradable “instruments,” and made available for exchange. These are 
 
 
44commonly referred to as securities.
1 This first part of securitization involves two steps. 
First, corporate or public funds are raised when securitized claims such as stocks or 
bonds are “issued” to investors, in what is called the “primary market.” Second, these 
securitized claims circulate in a “secondary market” as they are traded among 
individuals or on a stock exchange.  
A common indicator of securitization defined in this way is the market value of 
all stocks or bonds – referred to as “market capitalization” – as a percentage of a 
country’s productive output (GDP). Figure 2-1 shows the size of securitization for 
equity securities (stocks) in a range of countries. Highly securitized countries like the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and Singapore have market capitalizations well 
above 100 percent of GDP. Countries that have only just begun to securitize, such as 
Poland, have capitalizations under 20 percent. Figure 2-1 makes clear that, with the 
exception of Japan, almost all countries’ levels of securitization increased in the 
1990s.
2 In the U.S. and other economies relying heavily on securities, debt finance 
through bonds (which includes government and corporate debt) is even greater than 
through stocks. U.S. bond market capitalization is more than twice its GDP. Compare 
that to India, where bond market capitalization is not quite half of GDP. Or consider 
China, where it is a minuscule 2 to 4 percent.
3
                                                 
1 This definition, which emphasizes “the emergence of intangibles as commodities,” would also include 
the multitude of financial futures, options, and swaps that embody claims on stocks, bonds, or revenue 
streams (Sobel 1994). Though trade in these derivative instruments (“derivatives” for short) now dwarfs 
the trade in “real” securities, they are not addressed directly in this study. 
2 These data are from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators 2002 (Bank 2002b). China’s 
negotiable market capitalization is included because more than two-thirds of China’s equity is held idle 
under state control and does not trade. These data are from the (Commission 2001). 
3 China’s small debt market capitalization is explained by the fact that most of the debt is hidden away 
in that country’s (technically insolvent) state-run banking system (Lardy 1998).  For U.S. markets, see 
the Bond Market Association of America (2003); for China, see the CSRC Yearbook (2001); and for 
India, see Tahir (2003). 
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Securitization also refers to change in a country’s “financial structure” 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1999).
4 As formerly planned economies have marketized 
their financial systems, there has been a shift in the balance of their financial 
structures. In this process, the role of mediated lending by banks and long-term credit 
institutions diminishes relative to the role of “securitized” finance provided directly by 
investors to issuers of stocks and bonds. Analyses of financial structure commonly 
distinguish between “bank-based” systems dominated by “mediating” lending 
institutions like commercial banks or long-term credit institutions, and “market-based” 
systems that include a large share of “direct” or “unmediated” securitized finance 
(Zysman 1983). 
The equally infelicitous term “disintermediation” is also used to refer to this 
process, because it involves cutting out the role of commercial banks as “mediators” 
who stand between savers and borrowers, shouldering the default risk that borrowers 
may not repay their loans, and charging a fee (in the form of the spread between 
interest rates on deposits and loans). Securitized finance is “disintermediated” because 
investors incur this financial risk themselves when they buy stocks or bonds from 
issuers (Goodhart 1987).
5 Increasing securitization or disintermediation worldwide is 
slowly eroding the traditional distinction between commercial and investment 
banking.
 
4 This is a macro-economic definition of “financial structure” not to be confused with the firm level of 
use of the term, referring to the right-hand side of a corporate balance sheet.  
5 This terminology is mildly disingenuous because in the real-world practice of securitized finance, 
investment banks (what Europeans call “merchant banks”) actually “mediate” between issuers and 
investors, often bearing significant amounts of financial risk (referred to as “underwriting risk”), and 
charging accordingly. 0
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Figure 2-1: The Size of Securitization (stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP) 
World Bank, 2002.  China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2002. 
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7
 
 There are a number of indicators for financial structure that measure the size, 
activity, and efficiency of bank finance relative to securities finance.  Table 2-1 
displays the results of a composite indicator of “financial structure.” Developing and 
developed country categories are presented separately, ranking countries from least to 
most bank-based and from least to most market-based within each country-category of 
development. 
 
Table 2-1: 
Country Classification of Financial Structure
6
 
  Developing and 
Transitional Economies  Developed Economies 
Bank-based 
financial systems 
Egypt 
Indonesia 
China
7
India 
Italy 
Japan 
France 
Germany 
Market-based 
financial systems 
Peru 
Brazil 
Mexico 
Philippines 
Great Britain 
Singapore 
United States 
Switzerland 
 
Confirming the first-order indicator of securitization based on market 
capitalization presented in Table 2-1, the United States, the United Kingdom and 
Singapore appear as “market-based,” highly securitized financial systems. Germany, 
France, and Japan are considered typical examples of bank-based systems among 
developed countries (Allen and Gale 2001). Brazil is the case most often cited as an 
example of “market-based” finance among developing countries. This classification, 
however, is as much due to the fact that while its banking system is not small (as in the 
Philippines which is also classified as “market-based”), Brazilian banks are relatively 
inactive in terms of new lending or refinancing (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2001, 
                                                 
6 This table is based on Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2001, 121). 
7 China does not appear in Levine’s database, but is commonly considered a bank-based system. 
 
 
48108). China and India have huge banking systems with vast reservoirs of deposits and 
consistently high savings rates.
8 This begs the questions if, and how, these funds will 
shift from banks into securities. 
This is precisely the institutional and policy challenge faced by the central 
elites of the developmental states in China and India during the 1990s and beyond. 
The graph in Figure 2-2 graphically crystallizes this challenge. It is a version of an 
overhead slide presented to leading members of the Chinese financial community at a 
Beijing symposium on China’s capital markets in July of 2001. The symposium was 
sponsored by the once-powerful State Council Committee for Restructuring the 
Economic System (SCRES, known as the Tigaiwei) in collaboration with the top 
French investment-banking house BNP-Paribas. SCRES was a key agency in 
formulating and implementing the central state’s governance of securities finance as 
early as 1989. The author of the presentation in which this slide appeared was Chen 
Xingdong, BNP Paribas’ Chief Economist for China. Chen had formerly worked at 
SCRES in the agency’s early years. His presentation, like that of many China-oriented 
investment bankers during the late 1990s, highlighted China’s persistent robust 
economic growth, while minimizing the many structural problems in securities 
governance identified later in this thesis.
9
                                                 
8 In the 1990s, Chinese saved over 40 percent of GDP yearly, Indians over 20 percent (Bank 2002a). 
9 During this period, other major investment banks such as Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs hired 
well-connected Chinese to guide their Mainland operations. Less than a year after this symposium, BNP 
Paribas became the first truly foreign investment bank to win a rare and much coveted license for 
operating a joint venture investment bank serving clients interested in foreign listings. 
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Figure 2-2: 
Trading Places: 
“Monetization” and “Securitization” in China’s Developing and Transitional Economy 
BNP Paribas, 2001 
 
 
 
50The slide depicts very succinctly the central question of securitization in China 
and India. In Mr. Chen’s rather imprecise yet provocative investment banking lingo, 
the top line of the graph indicates “high monetization” (huobihua gao) measured as 
the ratio of money and “quasi-money” (made up largely of banking deposits, and 
known as M2)
10 to national output (GDP).  The bottom line, “low securitization” 
(zhenquanhua di) displays the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP (the same 
measure used in Figure 2-2 above). The point of this slide was to invoke the prospect 
of the structural shift in Chinese finance were the two lines to “trade places,” with the 
M2/deposits funds that constitute the “high monetization” flowing into securities and 
shifting the “low securitization” line upward, eventually inverting the positions of the 
two lines. 
The next slide in the presentation elaborated on this prospect, clarifying why 
the audience should be interested. The flow of Mr. Chen’s presentation followed the 
not uncommon argument that, as financial systems develop, they will approach the 
Anglo-Saxon “market-based” model, and securitization will overtake monetization. A 
selection of the data from this second slide (plus Brazil, South Korea, and the 
Philippines) is shown in Figure 2-3. 
                                                 
10 M2 is technically defined as money and quasi money comprising “the sum of currency outside banks, 
demand deposits other than those of the central government, and the time, savings, and foreign currency 
deposits of resident sectors other than the central government” (Bank 2002b). 
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52At the left of Figure 2-3, the late industrializing, directed-credit developmental 
states like China, India, Korea, and Japan all record “monetization” exceeding 
“securitization.” At the right of the figure, highly developed and Anglo-Saxon cases 
like the U.K., U.S., and Singapore all demonstrate the reverse. The great attention now 
given to this potentially shifting locus of financial activity from banks to securities is 
not just a technical matter. There is also considerable money to be made in creating 
these new securities, bringing them to market, and managing them. The distance 
between the top and bottom lines of the graph in Figure 2-3 and the vision of their 
trading places in China, India, and elsewhere among “emerging markets” quickens the 
pulse of investment bankers and financial service providers. But it is also a political 
predicament for central-state-elites, since this shift represents a challenge to the matrix 
of financial resource distribution and the structures of power associated with the 
developmental state’s directed credit system – that is, in short, coalition politics. 
Moreover, the shift also threatens to refashion the ways in which property rights 
claims over major industry are constituted and exercised. 
 
II. The Economic, Social, and Political Dynamics of Securitization 
 
It is hard to dispute economists’ claim that, relatively speaking, modern 
electronic securities exchanges are perhaps reality’s closest approximation of the 
“perfect market” envisioned in economic theory (Bernstein 1990).
11 Already, much 
                                                 
11 This claim is based on the low transaction costs of trading securities and the uniformity of the units 
being traded (stocks or bonds). The exchange of financial assets like securities as digital information 
involves very little cost and friction as compared to the exchange of merchandise, labor, or services. 
The modern digital market for stocks is perhaps the closest approximation of the “perfect market” 
envisioned in economic theory (Fama 1991). The dominant theory in financial economics is the 
“efficient market hypothesis” (EMH). The EMH is applied to the market for securities and holds that 
because transaction costs are low, information is abundant, and competition vigorous, the prices of 
securities will tend toward their “true” fundamental value. While there are many trends in real securities 
finance that persistently violate the pristine theoretical expectations of the EMH, it is hard to dispute 
 
 
53research has focused on the importance of electronic technology in the growth of 
global finance, but little attention has been directed to the variable impact of electronic 
technologies on different finance sub-sectors, and the attendant political consequences 
of that variability.
12 Key to the politics of securitization is the technical fact that the 
digital revolution favors securities finance over bank-mediated loan finance (Mayer 
2002).
13  
Digital technology lowers costs, facilitating payments and insuring banks’ 
survival as financial service providers generally. However, it does little to change the 
process and cost structure of scale lending, which entails independent risk-evaluation 
and project monitoring by the lender. At the same time, it decreases the advantages 
previously enjoyed by those big banks that assembled the largest lending deals.
14 By 
contrast, for securitization, digital technology dramatically reduces the cost structure 
and process, making the issuance, trading, and settlement of securities significantly 
cheaper and faster than in the era of paper-based share and bond certificates. Banks 
                                                 
economists’ relative claim that much of the time, modern, digital securities markets are purer realms of 
market action than almost any other arena of exchange.  
12 Digital automation helps securities markets to further approach “perfection” in several ways. It 
reduces transaction costs, increases transparency, improves price information (making information 
availability more “symmetrical” among market participants), and homogenizes the interpretation of that 
information among participants. [I think I would combine this with the previous note so as to avoid too 
many footnotes in one paragraph]  
13 As the cost of information exchange declines and its speed increases, “insider” advantages of banking 
relationships are reduced. Similarly, as the cost of computation necessary to create and evaluate 
securities products such as stock indices and derivatives pricing declines, the utility of these instruments 
rises. The classic statement of this technological element in financial change is Richard O’Brien’s 1992 
monograph. “The communications revolution,” he wrote, “alters the roles of different financial 
intermediaries by encouraging securitization…The grip that banks have over the credit assessment 
process has been reduced…In short, the new information technologies have reduced the barriers to 
entry into core areas of banking by improving the market’s ability to process information and by cutting 
the costs of information processing” (O'Brien 1992, 13-14). 
14 There is the potential for technological determinism in this argument. At the level of transaction cost 
analysis, I am comfortable with such determinism when it is limited to comparisons between the costs 
and benefits of disintermediated securities finance and monitored bank-mediated lending (Allen and 
Gale 2001) But for a broader understanding of securitization, I think that economic and sociological 
factors must also be considered. 
 
 
54themselves therefore rely increasingly on securities and, indeed, the traditional process 
of loan syndication is steadily giving way to securitization.
15
From a sociological perspective, the “marketness” of a transaction depends on 
the degree to which affective ties or authoritative relations play a part (Callon 1998). 
Comparing financial sectors, the trading of securities on an electronic exchange is 
fundamentally a more marketized process than is bank lending.
16 The existence of a 
liquid secondary market imposes a form of market discipline on the securities industry 
that does not exist for banking.
17 There is no secondary market for bank loans.
18 The 
secondary market in securities contrasts fundamentally with non-securitized credit 
lending due to the effects of potentially large numbers of participants and the presence 
of continuous, anonymous trading. 
                                                 
15 This trend has driven the erosion of the Glass-Stegall-like segmentation of finance in the Anglo-
American context, pushing banks to maximize scale economies in the provision of financial services, 
even while fighting for access to a piece of the securitization action (Barth 2000). 
  In the PRC and India, automation of the securities industry has been implemented in a severely 
compressed time frame. In 1990, both countries were still conducting paper-based trades of share 
certificates and bonds, and neither of them had centralized depository, clearing, or settlement systems. 
The low transaction-cost effects of automation therefore only began to “bite” in the latter half of the 
1990s. By contrast, these transaction-cost effects of automation were already apparent in the U.S. 
financial system in the late 1970s, provoking banking interests to urge the U.S. Federal Reserve to 
undertake the de facto dismantling of Glass-Stegall segmentation that began in the 1980s (Barth 2000). 
16 Even where banking services are highly competitive and interest rate regimes free, bank-based 
finance is still less marketized than securities finance, because it is less anonymous, less standard, and 
the potential for liquidity much lower. However, it is important not to overstate [is that what you 
meant?] that even highly securitized financial markets (such as those in the U.S.) are still embedded in 
domestic and international social relations, which significantly influence the functioning of securities 
finance. In this regard, the primary market for securities depends heavily on non-economic factors such 
as affective networks and reputation in much the same way as bank-mediated loans. A number of 
popular studies illustrate the dense “social” nature of securities finance in the U.S. (Burrough and 
Helyar 1990; Chernow 1990; Lewis 1990). The “society” of securities financiers was also of great 
interest to Max Weber (Roth 2000). 
17 Not all secondary markets are liquid, a significant assumption central to my argument, requiring a 
caveat. This is why the definition of securitization employed here stipulates “the potential for liquidity.” 
18 In China and India, markets for securitized assets other than stocks and bonds, things such as 
mortgage loans were only beginning to grow after 2000. But in the U.S. and elsewhere, assets such as 
credit card debt and telephone receivables are packaged as “securities.” 
 
 
55A. Securitization as Meta-Commodification 
Thinking about the “market value” of a country’s capital stock and economic 
factors is important to understanding the implications of securitization. A country’s 
stock of businesses and other income-producing properties (known as “capital stock”) 
has a market value, which is the price paid if the entire capital stock were sold. 
Moving from the macro-level of a country’s organized business and governmental 
sectors to the micro-level of individual firms and governments, financial economist 
Edmunds explains how securities “valorize” (impart a market price to) capital stock or 
revenue streams: 
 
The value of a manufacturing company, an electric power plant, toll 
road (or any revenue stream such as government tax receipts) is the 
price it will bring in the financial market. Investors pay higher prices 
for ownership rights that have wide appeal to potential buyers. A 
productive enterprise’s listing of shares on the national stock exchange 
makes the shares easy to buy and sell and establishes the company’s 
value. The liquidity makes the shares acceptable to banks as collateral 
for loans. Listing the shares gives some protection against abuses, 
which raises the value of the shares (Edmunds 1996, 119).
19  
 
Securitization is thus a way of creating a market for capital stock and for firms’ and 
governments’ revenue streams.
20 Viewed from this perspective, securitization may be 
understood as an extension of the familiar process of commodification. 
Commodities are “objects, persons, or elements of persons which are placed in 
a context in which they have exchange value and can be alienated. The alienation of a 
thing is its dissociation from producers, former users, or prior context” (Thomas 1991, 
27-28). Commodification is the process whereby social relations, knowledge, and 
                                                 
19 Liquidity is defined in two related ways. First, it refers to the degree of ease with which an asset (such 
as a stock or bond) can be converted to cash. Second, in the more technical definition used among 
financial economists, liquidity refers to the ability to buy or sell an asset quickly and in large volume 
without significantly affecting that asset’s price (Downes 1998, 329). 
20 Government bonds can be understood as claims on tax receipts and other government revenue, and 
corporate bonds are claims on firms’ earnings. 
 
 
56productive capacity are reduced to an exchange relation.
21 But securitization is not just 
an incremental difference of degree in the process of commodification. Rather, 
because it moves beyond the alienation or disembedding of objects and persons, it 
represents a significant, punctuated difference of kind in the process of 
commodification.
22  
Marx, Weber, Simmel, Polanyi and others examined the social and political 
consequences of the commodification of a country’s economic factors and capital 
stock − land, capital, and particularly labor. But from this perspective, securitization is 
not just commodification: It is meta-commodification.
23 It is the highest possible level 
of commodification: the apex stratum of markets. A highly securitized economy 
creates a market for a huge proportion of the country’s capital stock, social relations, 
and revenue streams in the organized economy. As such, securitized finance 
potentially represents a qualitative variation in the organization of national and 
international capitalism.
24 Societies’ most productive and value-enhancing forces, and 
their largest revenue streams, are “captured” in the claims represented by securities. 
When they are packaged in units like stocks and bonds − which are divisible, 
standardized, uniform, anonymous, and easily tradable − securities have commodified 
                                                 
21 The securitization of a country’s capital stock, as described above, links securities finance with the 
origin of the commodification concept in modern political economy. Writing in 1867, Marx suggested 
that “the wealth of those societies in which the capitalist mode of production prevails, presents itself as 
‘an immense accumulation of commodities,’ its unit being a single commodity. Our investigation must 
therefore begin with the analysis of a commodity” (Marx 1990 (1867), chapter 1). 
22 As discussed below, the continental Regulation school has for some time been grappling with the 
concept of “financialization,” which is similarly defined as the increasing commodification of equity 
and debt claims as securities, but with the addition that financial services and transactions associated 
with these claims represent an ever larger share of economic activity (Boyer 2000). 
23 The word “meta” can be as provocative as a toreador’s red cape. In this case I refer not to “post-
modern” discursive approaches to commodification, but rather to the classical political economy 
approaches represented in the work of Marx, Weber, Simmel, Veblen and, most importantly, Polanyi. 
The word “meta” here carries its conventional connotations of “later,” “more comprehensive,” and “at a 
higher state of development” (Language 2000). 
24 Stock markets are celebrated as the core of modern capitalism precisely because 1) they commodify 
everything, and 2) they are, as discussed above, the closest approximation of a “perfect” market 
available in reality (see note 11). 
 
 
57everything from factor inputs such as land, labor, and capital, to technology, brand 
recognition, management skill, distribution systems, and (in the case of government 
bonds) the governments’ main revenue streams including tax receipts.
25
It is important to note that these commodification effects impose their logic in 
any liquid secondary market for securities.
26 However, a wholly electronic secondary 
market, such as the screen-based trading systems that became increasingly common 
around the world in the 1990s, magnified these consequences of meta-
commodification and shifts in financial structure toward securitized finance. Once the 
instruments (bonds or stocks) are created in the less-commodified primary market, the 
prospect of price-setting on a highly commodified secondary market such as a stock 
exchange imposes a level of market discipline qualitatively distinct from that found 
even in “hard-budget” banking systems with significant degrees of “arm’s length” 
relations among government, finance, and commerce.
27
 
B. Debates Over Securitization 
There is agreement that the securitization process has progressed the furthest in 
the Anglo-American economies, and that it is a trend elsewhere in both developed and 
developing countries. Advocates of securitization emphasize its wealth-generating 
effects and its alleged growth-enhancing properties. Critics emphasize its tendency to 
concentrate wealth, disrupt non-market forms of social organization, and corrode 
republican institutions. 
                                                 
25 The revolution in derivatives has created securities that in turn commodify other securities (see note 
1). 
26 Phone-based and “open-outcry” order systems can be highly liquid. The former are common in many 
bond markets, and the latter was in use in 2003 at the New York Stock Exchange. The existence of 
highly liquid, non-electronic exchanges is an important point of rebuttal against the charge of 
“technological determinism” occasionally leveled at arguments about securitization.  
27 For a discussion of how “fear” of secondary market dynamics influences firms and their investment 
bankers, see Burrough and Helyar  (1990) and Fligstein, (1990). 
 
 
581) Securitization and Finance-led Growth         
     
Debate over securitization is not entirely new. In the field of economics, a 
related debate was waged among development economists about the sources of 
growth: Was it production-led or finance-led? As far back as the 1960s, Joan 
Robinson staked out her position against John Hicks in her famous remark, “where 
enterprise leads, finance follows” (Robinson 1962, 80). In the 1970s, some economists 
argued that “financial repression” was slowing growth in developing countries 
(McKinnon 1973; Shaw 1973). In recent years, there has been increasing empirical 
and theoretical fortification of Hicks’ view that finance is not just “a side show,” and 
that financial development can contribute positively to economic growth. The relative 
contributions to growth of securities-based (“disintermediated”) finance and bank-
based (“intermediated”) finance as part of financial development are as yet uncertain 
(Allen and Gale 2001). Moreover, when the characteristics of growth are considered – 
how evenly it is distributed, for example – the debate is still messy and bitter 
(Henwood 1998). 
Turning specifically to securitization, then, those who see it as a positive 
development tend to focus on the economic issues of growth and wealth realization. 
Among the cheerleaders for securitization, financial economist John Edmunds is 
surely the head. In a 1996 article in the journal Foreign Policy, he argued that: 
 
Securitization…has become the most powerful engine of wealth 
creation in today’s world economy. Financial securities have grown to 
the point that they are now worth more than a year’s worldwide output 
of goods and services, and soon they will be worth more than two 
years’ output. While politicians concentrate on trade balances and 
intellectual property rights, these financial instruments are the leading 
component of global wealth today as well as its fastest-growing 
generator. Overall, securitization is fundamentally altering the 
international economic system (Edmunds 1996, 118). 
 
 
 
592) The Socio-Economic Dynamics of Securitization 
In the debate over securitization, some analysts prefer the less precise, but 
broader term “financialization” instead of “securitization” because it facilitates the 
inclusion of the customary, status, and demographic implications of the growing use 
of securities. Max Weber was one of the first to write about the political sociology of 
finance in his study of the German stock exchange scandals of 1890s. Weber was 
interested in the social structure of brokers and exchange participants, the modalities 
of “self-regulation,” and the connections between finance and the real economy (Roth 
2000). Today, this concern over the socio-political causes and consequences of 
securitization has made some strange bedfellows. 
The best example of this is agreement on the dangers of securitization (they 
call it “financialization”) between two elder statesmen of the Anglo-American Left 
and Right, respectively – Ronald Dore and Kevin Philips.
28 Dore sees financialization 
as the characteristic feature of contemporary Anglo-American “stock market 
capitalism” and the intrusion of financialization into Japan and Germany as a threat to 
those countries’ “welfare capitalism.” For Dore, the British leftist, the key features of 
the financialized Anglo-Saxon model are: 1) economic action determined more by 
competition and less by regulatory and customary governance; 2) finance-led growth 
and the ascendance of financial over fixed assets; 3) the ascendance of “capital” 
income over “earned” income; 4) the increasing social importance of securities, 
typified by securities finance becoming a leisure activity and a fixation of retirement 
planning; and finally, 5) the growth of the financial services industry and its appeal to 
a society’s top talent (Dore 2000, 6). 
                                                 
28 Long before Phillips’ (2002) Wealth and Democracy, John Kenneth Galbraith had weighed in on this 
issue in his famous attack on wealth concentration and finance capital in the U.S. in “The New 
Industrial State” (1967). 
 
 
60American conservative Kevin Philips concurs with Dore in identifying and 
lamenting most of these elements. For Philips, “financialization” involves 
“securitizing…income and debt streams, becoming electronically dependent, and 
exalting the stock exchanges.” The key turning point for Phillips’ view was in 1995, 
when mutual funds’ assets under management surpassed the quantum of deposits in 
U.S. commercial banks for the first time. The consequences of this, Phillips argues, 
are “record wealth concentration, and rising inequality,” as well as the corruption of 
republican institutions as financial power steers American democracy toward the 
gratification of private interest and away from the achievement of public purpose.
29
The economists’ focus on the growth consequences of securitization intersects 
with social scientists’ interest in the political and sociological causes and 
consequences, when we consider the possibility that different financial structures may 
deliver different types of growth – for example, high but unequal, or low and even – 
and that there may therefore be a policy tradeoff, or regulatory necessity, to be 
contemplated by financial institution builders. Increasing securitization may contribute 
to overall growth (Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2001). Increasing securitization and the 
growth it delivers may come at the cost of increasing inequality and wealth 
concentration.
30 This is a concern that even the most ardent securitization enthusiasts 
acknowledge (Edmunds 1996, 123).
31
 
                                                 
29 In an argument reminiscent of  Gilpin (1981). and Kennedy (1987), Philips later argues that the 
corrosive impact of financialization has contributed to the downfall of other great powers in history, 
particularly Spain, Holland, and Britain. 
30 Henwood (1998) and Phillips (2002) both document how securitization is certainly correlated with 
and very likely causes increasing wealth concentration. Since 1976, when American securitization took 
off following the 1975 “May Day” and National Market System reforms in securities finance, U.S. 
wealth concentration has increased monotonically. The U.S. is now the most unequal of OECD 
countries when comparing the wealth of the top quintile against that of the bottom quintile. 
31 The wealth concentration potential of securitization is a problem confronting many countries, 
particularly Russia and the United States. Dealing with the concentration of financial power has been a 
concern of analysts ranging from Marx, to Hilferding (1981 (1910)), to Drucker (1976), and was 
 
 
61C. Firm- and Government-level Dynamics of Securitization 
 
As discussed in previous sections, securitization commodifies a country’s 
capital stock. This is a macro-sociological effect. However, that commodification 
process also has effects at the micro-sociological and micro-economic levels, within 
and among firms. Economic sociologists analyze these effects by examining how 
inter-firm relations (competition and coexistence) and authoritative structures (state-
cultivated institutions such as property rights, corporate law, and anti-trust regulation) 
influence the norms governing corporate action (Mizruchi and Stearns 1994).
32 It is 
here that the economic and political sociology of finance intersect with corporate 
finance, corporate law, and state power in debates over corporate governance, 
principle-agent theory, and economic performance.
33 The fundamental issues in this 
debate pertain to information symmetries, the management of potentially conflicting 
interests (those of owners and managers − outsiders versus insiders − or shareholders 
and “stakeholders”), and the organization within and among the firms that constitute 
an economy’s most productive assets.
34 Empirical areas where these issues are 
observable − such as enterprise finance, wealth capitalization (both of which matter to 
issuers of stock), shareholder rights, and industrial organization (which matter to 
investors in stock) − are presented in the analytic matrix introduced in chapter 3 and 
examined in detail in chapter 6.  
                                                 
recently the subject of a popular book The Ownership Solution by corporate governance activist Jeff 
Gates (1998). 
32 Fligstein calls the dominant norm governing corporate action among large firms in a given national 
enterprise system the “conception of control.” In Fligstein’s formulation, the conception of control is a 
classic sociological “collective representation” operating in the heads of those who control firms 
(insiders and outsiders alike), and shaping how those firms compete and cooperate (Fligstein 1990). 
33 On corporate finance, see Stearns  (1986). On corporate law, see Sciulli (1999). On state power, see 
Schmidt (2003) and Strange (1988).  On debates over corporate governance, see Roe (2003) And for 
principle-agent theory, see Fama and Jensen (1983). 
34 The category “stakeholder” is most often defined to include employees, suppliers, and consumers, as 
well as shareholders. 
 
 
62Ownership and control of firms in good times is a matter of equity (stock) 
finance. Tradable loan obligations issued by firms and governments, and the 
consequences of firm (or government) insolvency are a matter of debt (bond) finance. 
Here, as in equity finance, the economic and political sociology of finance intersects 
with corporate finance, corporate law, and state power, but bond finance also involves 
government debt and the monetary system. The debates here are over enterprise 
finance, fiscal and monetary policy, and contract enforcement (bankruptcy).
35 The key 
issues in these debates pertain to firms’ capital composition, the structure of 
federalism, and the institutions and culture of credit. Empirical areas where these 
issues are observable such as enterprise/public finance, monetary policy (which matter 
for bond issuers), and bankruptcy (which matter for bond investors) are introduced in 
chapter 3 and discussed further in the conclusion. 
 
D. Society-level Dynamics of Securitization 
 
These individual issues of enterprise/public finance, monetary policy, 
ownership, control, industrial organization, and creditor rights all aggregate, having 
effects at the macro-socio-economic level for innovation, growth, and social justice. 
Following Galbraith (1967) and Shonfield (1966) in considering such macro-effects, 
Robert Boyer and other analysts in the continental Règulation School of economic 
sociology have updated these earlier analyses of “Fordism,” placing financialization at 
the heart of their comparative analyses of Anglo-American and German-Japanese 
                                                 
35 The literature on bond finance is much less developed and more dispersed than that covering the 
economic and political sociology of equity finance. Recent work has been dominated by economists 
(Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler 2003; De Broeck, Guillaume, and Stichele 1998; Herring and 
Chatusripitak 2000; Settlements 2002). This is an area wide open for new research in comparative 
economic and political sociology of finance. 
 
 
63models of capitalism in the twilight of the Keynesian Welfare State (KWS) (Boyer and 
Drache 1996). 
Financialization, they believe, is an important factor in the transformation of 
the KWS, and they too believe it has been scanted in contemporary political economy 
research (Boyer 2000). Others, particularly David Harvey and Bob Jessop, have 
rightly focused on a crucial contradiction at the core of the 
financialization/securitization phenomenon: the mismatch between the respective 
temporal and spatial horizons of different types of capital (“financial” versus 
“productive”). Financial capital (and securities in particular) today inhabits a digital 
world in which time and space are severely “compressed,” while “real” capital such as 
productive capacity or fixed property inhabit a material, human world in which project 
completion and return on investment take time, and in which physical location 
matters.
36 This mismatch is central to the increasingly common analyses of the 
ongoing displacement of the KWS and Fordist production regimes, as well as the 
equally popular speculation and lamentation about what will replace them in “post-
Fordist” era (Jessop 2000).
37
 
III. Finance, Power, and Lineages of the Developmental State 
 
The broad securitization of the Chinese and Indian economies has experienced 
setbacks and course changes in its first two decades, and is likely to experience many 
more. But much has already occurred in a compressed time frame, suggesting that 
                                                 
36 The contradiction is between “productive capital as abstract value in motion (notably in the form of 
realized profits available for reinvestment) and [productive capital] as a concrete stock of time- and 
place-specific assets in the course of being valorized” (Jessop 2000, 326). 
37 Harvey argues that this mismatch in the forms of capital, together with the “time-space compression” 
produced by high-speed digital, communications, and transportation technologies, is a structural shift in 
human history that began in approximately 1972 (Harvey 1990) Securitization – and particularly the 
meta-commodification aspect of securitization – is central to this shift. 
 
 
64international and comparative political economy theories of late development based on 
state-dominated, directed-credit regimes of financial governance merit some revision 
to account for the advent of securitization in these large and economically powerful 
countries, and in other DTEs.  
My argument begins with the notion that finance differs from other economic 
sectors, or factors of production, in the degree to which its structure can act as a form 
of social control. States have a stake in the structures of finance because of the 
economic control associated with those structures, but also because of the political or 
social control they represent. John Zysman highlighted this element of social control 
when he argued that state involvement in finance facilitated industrial adjustment. 
Marx, with his emphasis on variable relations to the means of production; 
Gerschenkron, with his emphasis on ideology and organization; Woo-Cummings, with 
her emphasis on the brutality of rapid capital accumulation; and Winters and Frieden, 
with their emphases on the mobility of finance capital, all represent a rough 
intellectual lineage demonstrating the importance of this relationship between finance, 
state power, and social control.
38
The politics of financial change are important because finance is both a source 
of power and means of exercising it. Along with monopolies on the use of force, and 
the right of taxation, the control of finance can be a crucial component of state power. 
A focus on official control of the finance system, writes Skocpol, provides “the best 
general insight into the direct and indirect leverage a state is likely to have for 
realizing any goal it may pursue” (Skocpol 1985). Financial structures are the 
pathways that connect the state to the forces of production and thrift in society, and 
have consequently received a fair share of the attention in analyses of the lineage of 
                                                 
38 See, respectively, Marx (1990 (1867)), Gerschenkron (1962 (1951)), Woo (1991), Winters (1994), 
Frieden (1991). 
 
 
65the developmental state (Woo-Cumings 1999; Woo 1991). The financial sector is a 
strategic, Archimedean point from which to evaluate a country’s political economy. 
By following financial flows in the “economy and in the institutions that structure that 
flow, we can learn a great deal about the uses to which society’s resources are put, the 
people who make the allocative decisions, and the process through which control is 
obtained and exercised” (Zysman 1983, 7-8).  
This concept links the current study to a tradition in political economy that 
views financial structures and the organization of finance capital as central to the 
exercise of power by state or private actors. Sixth-century French jurist Jean Bodin 
wrote that finance forms “the nerves of the state.” Finance is also the means by which 
the state nourishes a country’s “sinews of power” (Brewer 1989). Official control of 
finance is the defining characteristic of the developmental state (Gerschenkron 1962 
(1951); Johnson 1982; Woo-Cumings 1999). Turning to private or societal actors, the 
potential mobility of certain forms of capital − such as convertible “hard” currencies 
and other easily fungible financial assets like securities − represent a form of 
“structural power” (Gill and Law 1989; Goodman and Pauly 1993; Winters 1994). 
The developmental state as a form of political organization can be understood 
as part of a remarkably durable historical pattern that survived because it effectively 
served the imperatives of late industrialization. The developmental state has been 
defined in political, ideological, and institutional terms as a “state which can create 
and regulate the economic and political relationships that can support sustained 
industrialization,” and which “takes the goals of long-term growth and structural 
change seriously, ‘politically’ manages the economy to ease conflicts inevitable during 
the process of change (but with a firm eye on the long-term goals), and engages in 
institutional adaptation and innovation to achieve those goals” (Chang 1999, 192). A 
dominant, centralized, “developmental” state was effective in promoting fast and 
 
 
66massive accumulation of capital for the purposes of rapid industrialization. It was thus 
an effective means of marshalling a society’s resources in the international game of 
“catch up.” At the heart of this pattern was finance. 
The most commonly referenced explanation for the political economy of 
finance in late developers was first formulated by Gerschenkron (1962 (1951)). He 
argued that the timing of the push for industrial development would shape a particular 
pattern of state-structure and state-economy relations. Based on historical and 
comparative observation, Gerschenkron reckoned that the crucial problem facing late 
developers was the accumulation of capital. Historically, late-developing states 
dominated finance in an effort to accelerate industrialization through centralized 
capital accumulation and allocation. A fairly coherent theory has emerged from 
Gerschenkron’s synthesis and historically grounded propositions.
39 Together, their 
arguments stipulate that the combination of backwardness and geography was a 
powerful motivation for political mobilization in the service of development. In his 
view of modern Eurasian history, the later the hour, and the further the eastward 
distance from the English channel, the greater would be the imperative for 
concentrated political power in the effort to overcome the challenges of backwardness. 
The catch-up game necessitated ever more centralized forms of control in order to 
accumulate capital and generate productive capacity in a compressed time frame. 
From such a perspective, it’s hard not to see teleology in Soviet and other 
developmentalist “solutions” to the problem of backwardness – the political and 
economic systems of what Hungarian economist Janos Kornai calls “classical 
socialism” (Kornai 1992). 
                                                 
39 These elements of Gerschenkron were foreshadowed by Hintze (1902 (1975)) and masterfully 
recapitulated by Gourevitch (1978). 
 
 
67Chapter 4 examines how this state domination served to prevent the 
commodification of capital, as control of societies’ most productive assets was 
achieved often by direct state ownership, and almost always indirectly, as the 
allocation of finance came under the administrative discretion of the government. This 
took the finance of large enterprise out of the market. Such domination was achieved, 
according to Gerschenkron’s thesis, by means of state-promoted ideological and 
organizational mobilization. Finance capital was governed at the discretion of the 
state, with financial resources being directed through government ministries or 
government-controlled institutions such as banks or bank-like long-term lending 
institutions. 
Late-developing states in Gerschenkron, the “Developmental State” in its 
classic formulation by Johnson, and the effective executor of industrial adjustment in 
Zysman all relied on the “non-commodification” of finance. The state became the 
dominant financial accumulator and allocator, while it “repressed” finance (McKinnon 
1973). Developmental states like India and China intervened in various degrees to 
administer product, labor, and land markets, but the ultimate source of economic 
control was finance. Economic control is an important, though by no means the only, 
means of social control. From this perspective, the sine qua non of the “developmental 
state” as a category in economic and political sociology is state control of financial 
allocation. 
Such systems of financial governance were a means of pursuing development; 
a fundamental instrument of state power; a shaper of the relationship between state 
and economy; and an elemental expression of these states’ social purpose.
40 Mutatis 
                                                 
40 Michael Loriaux argues that the developmental state is not merely a means of achieving economic 
growth. The “developmental state” is also a “mythological” expression of national “moral ambition” in 
the pursuit of which he believes state-dominated regimes of financial governance play a central role 
(Loriaux 1999, 236-237). 
 
 
68mutandis, this created a general type of political economy variously referred to as 
dirigisme or “developmental states” in cases ranging from France and Japan to 
Argentina and Korea. At a first order of approximation, the standard model of 
directed-credit finance deployed by developmental states has been fairly consistent 
across time and space. This is elaborated in light of Kornai’s model of socialist 
political economy in chapter 4. The model has been present in various types of 
economies, from fully socialist command economies such as the Soviet Union and 
China, through mixed, quasi-socialist economies such as India, to capitalist economies 
such as Japan and Korea (and to some extent Taiwan). Starting with France, Germany, 
and Russia in the 19
th century, and continuing with the Newly Industrialized Countries 
after World War II, developmental states have used administered interest rates and 
credit-based systems of financial allocation, “directed” through centrally controlled 
banks and long-term lending organizations, for the purpose of promoting development 
through industrialization and general employment.
41 In the idiom of economic 
sociology, developmental states’ directed-credit systems of financial allocation were 
hierarchical and heavily embedded in the social networks and purposes of these 
countries’ development regimes (both political and economic). They were not market-
based forms of allocation. 
A significant but often neglected element of the developmental state pattern 
was that among most late-developing states (roughly from Bolshevik Russia onwards), 
developmentalism and intervention in the economy were the result, not of state 
strength, but rather of relative state incapacity. Most often, the planned economy was 
not a policy driven by the desire of strong states to intervene in their countries’ 
economies, but rather a defensive reaction of relatively weak states lacking the 
capacity to create national markets. As one scholar of developmentalism explains, 
                                                 
41 See Gerschenkron, (1962 (1951)), Haggard (1990), and Zysman (1983). 
 
 
69“direct state participation in the (economy)…serves as an administrative shortcut. At a 
purely administrative level, the involvement of the state as a producer, direct 
employer, and lender in countries lacking a regulatory infrastructure is simpler than, 
and thus preferable to, the much more elusive alternative of creating and regulating a 
market economy” (Chaudhry 1993, 252), italics added). 
The success of the developmental state in the years immediately following 
World War II, in countries ranging from Russia and China to Korea and Japan, 
ingrained the institutions and ideologies of that system’s financial script: directed 
credit. The recent difficulties faced by Japan and Korea, some of the earliest “late, 
late” developers in reforming this system testify to the “stickiness” of directed-credit 
political-economy arrangements. Whatever the current impasse, however, the early 
acts of the directed credit drama were heroic. Japan, Korea, India, Russia, and China 
were successful in the 1950s and 1960s in concentrating financial resources for the 
expansion of their heavy industrial base. This lineage was based empirically in the 
historical practice of state-controlled financial allocation through ministerial planning 
and directed-credit finance. 
China and India are often cast as contrasting examples of the developmental 
state, China as a successful case and India as a failed one (Maswood 2002). 
Development should not be conflated with growth; in the period from 1950 to 1993, 
the PRC delivered steady growth at a rate higher than India, even while doing more to 
improve the basic welfare of its citizens (as measured by poverty, public health, and 
literacy) (Dreze and Sen 1995). If India’s developmental state “failed” because of 
what political scientist Ronald Herring calls “embedded particularism,” then we may 
perhaps say that China’s succeeded because of its “autonomous universalism.” 
Success or failure, financial control was the core of these states’ structure. As Herring 
puts it, “India’s failed developmental state slowed capital and restricted its 
 
 
70circuit…but the social purposes that legitimated this cost were largely unrealized.”
42 
In the argument that follows, I demonstrate that these differences – Indian failure and 
Chinese success – contributed to outcomes in the securitization component of 
economic and financial reform. The failure of India’s developmental state contributed 
to its later success in changing functionally (not just formally) the structure of 
financial control and the transformation of state economic authority. The success of 
China’s developmental state contributed to its later failure in changing functionally 
(though it did change formally) its structure of financial control and the reproduction 
of the old forms of state economic authority. 
 
IV. Securitization in Developing and Transitional Economies 
 
Until recently, economic development in DTEs and research on that subject 
tended to cleave to the “production-led” growth view of development, neglecting 
finance. Consequently, through the mid-1990s, the preponderance of IPE and CPE 
research on development and economic transition focused on labor, industry, and 
commodities. Such preoccupation was reasonable, given that in most developing 
economies, including the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of East Asia, 
financial systems were relatively static and state-administered. 
As Gerschenkron’s thesis suggested, capital accumulation in DTEs, at least 
until the 1980s, was largely state-led (Haggard 1990). However, from the early 1980s, 
the fruits of rapid economic growth, in conjunction with a scarcity of investment 
options, produced high savings rates in many Asian countries, including India and 
China. For some years, this growing pool of savings capital was directed almost 
                                                 
42 See, Herring (1999, 332).  In the same article, Herring discusses the confusion surrounding 
development and growth. 
 
 
71exclusively through banks or state-run long-term lending institutions. Then, in the late 
1980s, various developments led to the redirection of some of these funds into 
securities.  
Furthermore, until the 1980s, external capital in the form of foreign bank loans, 
bilateral government-to-government loans, and loans from multilateral lenders were 
administered by central governments (Chaudhry 1993). In China and India, from the 
1980s onward, direct foreign investment augmented these funds, but was also 
carefully regulated. Where the finance of DTEs was studied during this period, the 
focus was on debt, foreign direct investment (FDI), and the political determinants of 
economic performance. But in the mid- to late 1980s, these old patterns of state-
administered directed-credit finance began to change and were modified in practice 
among many DTEs. In the early 1990s, some political economists began to address the 
strategic importance of finance in DTEs, and the implications for state power of 
changes in financial organization (Haggard and Lee 1993; Haggard and Maxfield 
1996; Loriaux 1991; Maxfield 1990; Winters 1994; Winters 1996; Woo 1991). 
In China and India, as in many other DTEs, securitization grew in the 1990s, 
driven by the global techno-market and sociological forces mentioned in the 
introduction to this thesis. Summarizing the role of technology and markets in the 
spread of securitization, one commentator observed that what gave securities finance 
“new momentum” in the 1990s “was its congeniality with other expansive forces: 
computer programming,
43 advanced mathematics [technology], global deregulation of 
capital movement, global trading, and a Noah’s Ark of new speculative instruments 
[markets]” (Phillips 2002, 138, parenthetical remarks added). 
 
                                                 
43 In the 1980s and 1990s, the financial sector bought 30 percent of the computers sold to U.S. 
businesses (Phillips 2002, 112). 
 
 
72A. DTEs, Global Forces, and a Changing World Economy 
 
Innovations in technology have made securitization easier, cheaper, and more 
efficient, lowering transaction costs and time delays. First, communications 
technologies such as fiber-optic and wireless networks have facilitated the 
instantaneous transmission of large amounts of data, making securities transactions 
easier and providing more and quicker access to the information needed to evaluate 
them. Digital technologies have made the depository and trade settlement components 
of securities transactions cheaper and easier too. The “dematerialization” of stocks and 
bonds by secure digitally encrypted records has replaced bulky and easily manipulated 
paper certificates. These innovations make cross-border portfolio investments using 
multiple currencies easier and more reliable. Finally, ever faster and more capable 
computers make high volumes of transactions and ever more sophisticated securities 
investment analysis or strategies possible. These innovations have also favored 
securities finance over bank-based finance.
44 As a result of these technological 
changes, in the late 1980s and into the 1990s, merchandise trade and long-term fixed 
investment were vastly overshadowed by the volume and value of exchange and 
investment in financial assets, including securities (Kurtzman 1994; O'Brien 1992). 
This was a major change in the nature of the global economy. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, world markets were expanding as cross border trade 
grew with developments in transport, shipping, communications, the post-War revival 
of Europe and Japan, and the rise of new traders in the developing world. In addition 
to this growth in cross border trade, the mobility of capital that began in the 1970s 
dramatically changed the nature of the world economy. This was spurred by the 
technological innovations discussed above and by policy changes in the U.S., first 
                                                 
44 See note 13 above. 
 
 
73with the shift to a floating currency, and then with other financial deregulation policies 
in the 1970s (Sobel 1994). Growing trade, capital mobility, and the huge volumes of 
financial transactions that accompanied that capital mobility represented a 
fundamental change in the nature of the global economy in the 1980s, leading up to 
the eve of the securitization boom that shaped the world economy faced by China, 
India, and other DTEs during the 1990s.
45
Capital flows to the developing world in the 1950s and 1960s were generally in 
the form of aid, multilateral bank loans, and some direct investment. In the 1970s, this 
composition of capital shifted to include a high ration of private lending from large 
banks in the developed countries. This was particularly true for capital flows to Latin 
America. In these years, there were still only “developing” economies, as the 
“transitional” economies now included in “developing and transitional” economies 
had yet to begin their formal “transition” phase. With the Latin American debt crisis in 
the 1980s, however, much of this private lending and other forms of capital were 
replaced by “equity” investment. The memory of the Latin debt crisis and the steadily 
falling interest rates of the late 1980s and early 1990s forced developed country capital 
to venture abroad in search of more ample returns. This inaugurated what economists 
Eichengreen and Fishlow call the “era of equity finance,” in which a stream of capital 
flowed into what were now both developing and transitional economies (Eichengreen 
and Fishlow 1996). This flow of equity investment into DTEs was dependent largely 
                                                 
45 Frieden and Rogowski’s opportunity-cost syllogism summarizes best the market dynamics of 
spreading securitization in the 1990s. As their first premise, they argue that trade and payments are 
exact substitutes for finance capital, and that their argument holds equally for trade in goods or money. 
Second, they argue that openness and internationalization increase aggregate welfare through growth 
and efficiency. Even in closed economies (as most DTEs were and largely still are), they conclude, 
financial openness in the world economy at large imposes increasing incentives (in the form of 
opportunity costs) on domestic economic actors, including the state, to liberalize the securities finance 
(Frieden and Rogowski 1996). Gourevitch presents a more general articulation of what Charles 
Lindblom even earlier (1982) called the “market as prison” thesis of how market forces shape policy 
and institutions. He suggests that economic development in an international context “is like a market in 
that it rewards and punishes certain economic and institutional forms according to their utility in a 
process that is constantly changing” (Gourevitch 1986, 64). 
 
 
74on market variables such as liquidity and interest rates in the developed economies of 
the North (Maxfield 1998). 
By the early 1990s, facilitated by the technological innovations discussed 
above, a U.S.-led securities investment zeitgeist seemed to infect much of the rest of 
the world. The decade-long American expansion, propelled by the boom in technology 
stocks, did much to spread the “equity cult.”
46 This zeitgeist spurred a number of 
developments. First, inspired by the International Finance Corporation (IFC), foreign 
(mainly U.S., Japanese, and European) institutional players led an unprecedented 
increase in cross-border portfolio investment.
47 Second, beginning in the mid-1990s, 
firms in developing countries began raising money and listing on exchanges in the 
U.S. and Europe (Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler 2002). 
Another driver of securitization is the sociological process by which ideas, 
practices, and institutional forms diffuse across the increasingly dense connections 
among countries. This literature seeks to explain institutional isomorphism with 
reference either to the “world society” or to information about “best practices.” 
Explaining the world society approach, John Meyer writes, “Many features of the 
contemporary nation-state derive from worldwide models constructed and propagated 
through global cultural and associational processes” (Meyer and al 1997, 144-145). 
These sociological processes may operate in “mimetic,” “normative” or “coercive” 
dynamics, producing similarity – or “isomorphism” to use the sociologists’ term of art 
– in practices, and organizational or institutional forms such as those associated with 
securities finance (DiMaggio and Powell 1991b, 67-74). This idiom of “isomorphism” 
is perhaps more appropriate in this argument, as its connotation emphasizes similarity 
                                                 
46 Analyst Daniel Yergin summarized this saying, “this global equity culture is redefining capitalism 
and the New Economy in every corner of the planet,” quoted in Weber (2000).  
47 “Portfolio investment” is investment in financial assets such as securities, and differs from direct 
investment in fixed assets known as “foreign direct investment (FDI).” 
 
 
75in form and shape, while the idiom of “convergence” emphasizes substantive 
similarity. 
First, turning first to the mimetic dynamic, proximity to and interaction with 
other countries using securities finance in the 1980s and 1990s increased a state’s 
likelihood of adopting securities finance, through a process of contagion in which the 
exchange of information and status-seeking play a role (Strang and Soule 1998; Weber 
and Davis 2000). The U.S. financial model, which stresses the role of competitive 
securities finance, became the basis for a pervasive global financial episteme in which 
the securities market “script” became a powerful and infectious norm.
48 The 
establishment of stock exchanges or even of Nasdaq-like “Second Boards” (stock 
exchanges dominated by innovation-driven “new economy” companies) in Europe, 
Japan, and Hong Kong, and the pressure on companies to offer employee stock 
options, served to spread the forms of American-style securities-based 
entrepreneurship. 
Second, normative dynamics encouraging isomorphism are considered by 
international sociologists to be the most powerful. This seems to be true for securities 
finance in the last twenty years. Increasingly, the use of securities finance has become 
one such feature of a “contemporary nation state.” Particularly since the collapse of 
the Soviet socialist systems, it is an expected attribute of “actorhood” in the modern 
society of states. Other such attributes include a centralized bureaucratic governance 
structure, a legal system, or a system for the expression of popular sovereignty. In the 
conceptual framework of sociological neo-institutionalism, these are “macrolevel 
abstractions” and quintessential “institutions”: that is, they are “rationalized and 
impersonal prescriptions” that become “taken-for-granted scripts, rules, and 
                                                 
48 For a discussion of how norms, international standards, and global best practices influence DTE 
equity markets, see Echeverri-Gent et al (2001) and Weber et al (2000). 
 
 
76classifications” (DiMaggio and Powell 1991a, 15 italics added; Meyer and Rowan 
1991, 44). 
Is having a stock exchange like having other attributes common among 
sovereign nation-states in the modern world − attributes such as a legal system, a 
centralized governance structure, or an air force? It is easy to imagine securities 
markets as comparable. What does it mean that China has a stock market? Functional 
conformity with the standards of the world polity does not necessitate uniformity in 
the enactment of those functions. For example, the enactment of the unit-attribute 
“legal system” can be achieved through a common law or civil law system, while 
enactment of the unit-attribute “system for the expression of popular sovereignty” may 
be enacted through parliamentary, presidential, or “vanguard party” systems. How can 
securities finance be enacted? This is one of the questions raised and answered in this 
thesis. 
Third, coercive isomorphism can operate through the economic competitive 
dynamics mentioned above in the discussion of the market drivers for securitization. 
The norms and practices of any society reflect to some extent the ideas and interests of 
its most powerful members. U.S. policy, as broadcast in that country’s foreign policy 
and by multilateral international organizations − such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) – further amplified the securities finance 
message.
49 The World Bank’s multilateral investment promotion arm, the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), enthusiastically endorsed the idea of open 
equity markets as a developmental solution for “emerging markets.”
 50 Moreover, the 
                                                 
49 See Biersteker (1995) and Wade (1998). U.S. securities market proselytizing was pursued through 
direct official avenues such as USAID’s Financial Institutions Reform and Expansion (FIRE) program, 
as well as the aggressive lobbying of international financial service providers such as Morgan Stanley 
and Goldman Sachs. 
50 Attracting risk-averse portfolio investment to unknown and unappealing under-developed 
destinations presented a key problem. IFC public relations mavens did much to change the investment-
chilling discourse with seminars, papers, and data transparency. Among their most brilliant coups was 
 
 
77U.S. government and the World Bank were offering free support for the evaluation of 
financial policy reform and the training of securities market regulators. The 
privatization or (as in China) corporatization of state-owned assets and the creation of 
new companies in the newly liberalized market spaces of DTEs led to the rapid growth 
of equity securities and the rising capitalization of stock markets. Similarly, the shift in 
public finance to the use of market borrowing in the form of bonds (issued with an 
increasing range of maturities) for both fiscal and monetary policy management was 
equally swift. Corporate and local government debt markets have been much slower to 
develop. 
 
B. The Expression of Global Forces in DTE Securities Exchange 
 
A crucial component in the securitization process is the securities exchange. 
The stock exchange, after all, is where securities are traded.
51 The stock exchange is 
one, but not the only, place to observe the causes and origins of securitization in the 
era of global finance. They are a good place to look for evidence of the techno-market 
and sociological drivers of securitization in DTEs. A number of indicators show how 
these techno-market and sociological drivers propelled securitization. In 1980, only 59 
countries had stock exchanges. In the year 2000, more than 100 countries have them. 
More than 31 of those opened in the heyday of the equity cult (between 1990 and 
1997). This was the same period in which China’s exchanges were established in 
Shanghai and Shenzhen, and India’s transformational National Stock Exchange 
                                                 
the spin and promotion of the more enticing moniker “emerging markets” in place of the off-putting 
“under-developed” economies (Kristof and Sanger 1999; Weber and Davis 2000). 
51 While there is a long history of OTC trading, a necessary first step in the development of any 
sophisticated securities market is the centralization of trading on an exchange. 
 
 
78presented its upstart competitive challenge to the archaic Bombay stock exchange 
(Weber and Davis 2000). 
In the techno-market realm between 1990 and 1996, China and India 
established fully electronic exchanges with digital “dematerialized” share trading, 
settlement, and depositories. Figure 2-4 indicates the degree to which these techno-
market changes attracted global investors to the numerous new exchanges. Finally, 
market structure also became ever more similar, as transactions were increasingly 
conducted on simple price-time priority basis. 
In this context, China and India undertook their financial reforms. Initial 
reforms in the 1980s began with restructuring firms and the growth of securities 
finance. In the late 1980s and into the 1990s, globalizing financial price signals and 
norms with the support of the powerful U.S.-led financial model and episteme 
provided compelling incentives to state actors in China to undertake further 
corporatization and securities market development. 
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Figure 2-4: 
Portfolio Inflows to Low and Lower Middle-Income Countries 
World Bank, 2002 
 
 
80Techno-market-imposed isomorphism and sociologically-imposed 
isomorphism help explain why China and India began adopting securities finance. 
These complementary forces drove the adoption of the securitization script and help us 
understand where it came from and how it spread. They also tell us where the highly 
formulaic script outlining the set of practices and institutions that constitute securities 
finance – securitization – came from. These are often treated as alternative 
explanations for diffusion and adoption of various forms of financial action in an 
increasingly interdependent world. I see them not as exclusive explanations or 
processes, but as complementary ones. Nevertheless, they should not be confused with 
the various explanations for why India and China differ in their patterns of securities 
governance. They say very little about the ways in which these countries enacted that 
script, or about why countries enacted the script in particular ways. To understand this 
variation in Chinese and Indian responses to the common international script of 
securities finance, we must look elsewhere for explanations. That is the subject of 
chapter 3. 
 
V. The “New Commanding Heights”: The Politics of Securitized Finance in 
DTEs 
 
Much has already been made of the power of finance, global and local, because 
of the ability of financial capital to move – from firm to firm within a political 
jurisdiction (domestically), or across firms and jurisdictions (internationally). This 
mobility confers “structural power” on financial capital, making its movement – or 
threat of movement – politically consequential. Securitization makes mobility easier 
across firms, sectors of the economy, jurisdictions, and even asset classes (substitution 
between bank deposits, bonds, or stock). This increases the potential relative power of 
 
 
81capital holders. The relative absence of the affective element and the ease of 
transactions enabled by securitization increase the potential for “mobility,” or what 
financial economists call “liquidity.” The market power of securitized finance derives 
ultimately from this mobility, and can have an independent effect on governance. 
The potential political consequences of securitization unfold as a result of 
changes (or the threat of such changes) in the relative power of the controllers of 
capital. I call this the “politics of securitization,” but it can also be thought of as the 
“politics of financial liquidity.” In chapter three, I introduce a new way to analyze 
these politics using an asset-class/financial-position matrix. In the new commanding 
heights of securities finance, price signals from the secondary market in stocks and 
bonds come to be seen as a daily vote on the health of the economy and the quality of 
governance at the corporate and national levels. Furthermore, circulation of securities 
in the secondary market puts pressure on the specification of property rights. 
Corporate law, the market for companies or company control, the nature of ownership, 
and the credibility of contracts (in bankruptcy particularly) are tested by the exchange 
of securities. As these claims circulate, anyone can end up holding them when positive 
or negative events occur (such as adverse price changes, or a default/bankruptcy). 
There is less affect in the realm of securities-based than in bank-based 
financial allocation, and therefore it is more difficult to impose political control. From 
a sociological perspective, the “marketness” of a transaction depends on the degree to 
which affective ties play a part. Standardized, anonymous, tradable claims on 
productive assets and revenue streams make it easy to “frame” the exchange of 
society’s assets in discrete, fully marketized transactions.
52 The inherent “marketness” 
of securities-based finance relative to banking renders the hierarchical character of 
                                                 
52 For a discussion of this sociological view of market exchange as “framing,” see Callon (1998). 
 
 
82state intervention in securities-related transactions both more transparent and more 
difficult to achieve. 
As discussed above, the secondary markets for securities are very good at such 
framing, because the items exchanged are so commodified. The zenith of this type of 
un-embedded, abstract transaction is the digital screen-based trading of stocks, and 
program trading in particular (in which computers buy or sell securities based on pre-
programmed instructions regarding price and volume). Comparing financial sectors, 
the trading of securities on an electronic exchange is more marketized than bank 
lending, even in cases where interest rates are completely liberalized and banking 
services highly competitive (and India is still some way away from this).
53
State control of institution-based lending is fairly straightforward. It requires 
administering interest rates, setting quotas for the destination of credit, planning and 
evaluating large credit projects, and controlling appointments. The secondary market 
in securities is fundamentally different, due to the effects of vast numbers of potential 
participants and the fact of continuous trading. There is a technological element to 
this. An electronic secondary market magnifies these two effects. The existence of a 
liquid secondary market imposes a form of market discipline on the securities industry 
that does not exist for banking. That is, once the instruments (bonds or stocks) are 
created, the prospect of price setting on the secondary market imposes a level of 
market discipline that does not exist in the banking industry.
54
                                                 
53 Even where banking services are highly competitive and interest rate regimes free, bank-based 
finance is still less marketized than securities finance, because it is less anonymous, less standard, and 
the potential for liquidity much lower. 
54 In the primary market for securities, networks and reputation play a crucial role, both in terms of how 
the market is organized and in terms of individual motivation. In this regard, the primary market for 
securities depends on non-economic factors such as affective networks and reputation, in much the 
same way as markets for loans from credit institutions. See supra-notes 14-19. 
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A. The “Liquidity Spectrum”: Securitization and Political Control 
From this understanding of securitization, it is possible to design a scale 
representing various forms of financial allocation based on the potential for affective 
versus price-based relations, and their vulnerability to political intervention. I call this 
the “liquidity spectrum.” The liquidity spectrum depicted in Figure 2-5 illustrates why 
central-state political control of finance is easier in directed-credit systems than in 
securitized finance. This is particularly true under conditions of directed credit 
finance, and at least potentially true in private bank-based systems.
55
 
55 Though the power of a Morgan or Rothschild vis-à-vis the state may be large because the huge 
concentration of financial power in few private hands presents a challenge to state control, it also means 
the state has fewer actors to deal with. When such actors begin to control not just bank funds, but also 
securities, the picture may change. This is what happened in the period of securities finance 
development in the U.S. prior to the 1933 Glass-Stegall Act. The era of “combinations” provoked in the 
state and society a concern that too much private power in the hands of financial actors who owned both 
banks and holders of large concentrations of securities (Chernow 1990). The dual control of banks and 
large concentrations of securities by German “universal” banks has (until recently) been made possible 
by the “corporatist” arrangement between government, business, and labor there (Schmidt 2003). Authoritative Relations Common
Most Affect
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Political Control Harder Political Control Easier
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Figure 2-5:
Securitization and the Liquidity Spectrum:
Political Control and the Commodification of Finance
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5The liquidity spectrum draws on insights about capital mobility within and 
across borders, which scholars of IPE and CPE refined in the 1990s. Of particular 
importance are Jeffrey Frieden’s concept of “asset specificity” and Jeffrey Winters’ 
elaboration of the “structural power” of capital concept. The former is defined as “the 
degree to which the return on an asset depends on its use in a particular circumstance” 
(Frieden 1991, 20). Finance capital has low asset specificity. Land, labor, and fixed 
capital have high asset specificity. In critique of Frieden’s model, Jeffrey Winters 
proposed an alternative (Winters 1994). Like me, Winters focused on state power over 
capital, but he operates with a paradigm of “control.” He argued that state power over 
capital can best be understood by determining 1) its source; 2) the constraints that 
those supplying it can exercise (and their motives); 3) the intermediary channels 
through which it moves; and 4) policy makers’ discretion over end use (Winters 
1994). This paradigm of “control” is useful for understanding the financial dynamics 
of the planning state and directed credit system. 
As the analysis and empirical circumstances move away from authoritative 
(developmental state) allocation and toward market allocation, however, this “control” 
model unravels in reverse order. The expansion of securities finance reduces policy 
makers’ discretion over end use, intermediary channels proliferate (investment banks, 
brokerages, and mutual funds, for example), suppliers’ (savers and investors) 
discretion widens, and (to the extent that there is external openness) sources 
proliferate. This suggests at least a prima facie case that the mechanisms of the 
developmental state would be increasingly blunted by the growth of securitization.
56  
                                                 
56 Note that this is conceptualized based on the potential for affect in the transaction. Securities 
transactions can also be affective, see note 16 above. For example, one category of Anglo-Saxon 
primary market practice reserves shares for “family and friends.” The practice of employing a trusted 
stockbroker is an affective link to both the primary and secondary markets, and persists today despite 
the growth of Internet trading. It is common now to consider “insider trading” (an affective transaction) 
a violation of the principals of “fair” securities market practice, but this was not always and everywhere 
 
 
86It leads to the theoretical expectation that political intervention in securitized finance 
is more demanding in terms of state capacity than in bank-based finance – that is, the 
powerful “thumbs” of the developmental state financial structure, so useful when state 
authority in the economy was exercised in a dirigiste distributive intervention mode, 
may be less useful when the state needs nimble “fingers” to exercise economic 
authority in a procedural regulation mode.
57
Securities finance is a challenge to the developmental state in a number of 
ways. At the front end, the enactment of securitization is very demanding in 
institutional, ideological, and political terms. At the back, once a significant portion of 
financial assets take the form of securities, governance is also very demanding. 
Securitization makes political control more difficult for two reasons. First, capital 
mobility and the disclosure imperative diminish the potential scope of discretionary 
intervention. Second, the public goods provided by securitization (increased efficiency 
and participation) bring with them the potential for significant public “bads” 
(volatility, herding, crises, fraud, and corruption). 
Remembering, as mentioned earlier, that Chinese and Indian dirigisme was a 
consequence of weak state capacity and an inability to build national markets or 
regulate society-driven accumulation of capital (Chaudhry 1993; Shue 1980), we 
immediately see why securitization could be problematic for these states’ development 
objectives. If the command economy was initially the result of state incapacity to 
manage political conflict, “regulate, define, and enforce property rights, dispense law, 
and (to) tax,” and the ubiquitous dirigisme of the developmental state perpetuated this 
incapacity, the more severe demands of securities finance with its implications for 
                                                 
the case. For example, see the discussion of how insider trading was justified practice in the U.K. for 
many years in (Laurence 2001). 
57 This insight is the foundation of John Zysman’s argument that the political economy of “bank-based” 
financial systems facilitates the conduct of “industrial policy” by the state, while that of “market-based” 
systems (analogous to “securitized” systems) renders it more difficult (Zysman 1983). 
 
 
87coalition politics and property rights structures will be particularly challenging in the 
relatively low-capacity twilight of the developmental state. 
Securitization presented a challenge to the institutional arrangements in the old 
directed-credit system of financial governance and its relationship to both the structure 
of distributional coalitions and the structure of property rights in each country. In both 
cases, however, the politics of coalitions and property rights varied by asset class 
(stocks versus bonds) and financial position (issuers versus investors). This is revealed 
and analyzed through the application of the asset-class/financial-positions matrix to 
equity (stock) assets in chapter 6, and briefly to debt (bond) assets in chapter 7, the 
conclusion. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
Financial economist and securitization cheerleader John Edmunds argued that 
for countries early in the development of securities finance, securitization “offers two 
clear alternatives: keep the country’s financial system closed and grow slowly through 
production, or open the financial system and grow quickly by revaluing upward the 
market prices of income-producing properties” (Edmunds 1996, 133). For countries 
lacking large domestic markets and huge populations with available savings, 
Edmunds’ claim may be right. China and India have not made been forced to make the 
choice as starkly as Edmunds argued. Rather, they have been able to choose both, 
relying on production-led growth and opened finance. On the latter, China has 
“hacked” the securities finance logic, while India has been forced to cleave more 
closely to it. Many states would wish to “have their securities finance cake and eat it 
too,” but few have been in the same sort of advantageous external macroeconomic 
position that allowed China to do so. At the same time, many states in similarly 
 
 
88precarious macroeconomic positions have not been able to achieve what India has 
under those circumstances. To understand why, we must look at how these external 
macroeconomic conditions interact with domestic politics. 
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Chapter Three 
 
 
EXPLAINING SECURITIES GOVERNANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL 
ECONOMIES 
 
Chapter 2 introduced the securities finance script. If the enactment of that 
script in the Indian and Chinese contexts had been direct and frictionless, these 
countries’ securities governance regimes should have been the same, or at least 
convergent. Furthermore, this “marketization” of finance through securitization should 
have, according to conventional theories of globalization and market transition, led to 
a diminution of the state’s role and its authority in finance. While there is some 
evidence of these trends, the more obvious outcomes suggest otherwise. 
Until recently, much of the research on comparative and international political 
economy has treated institutional variation as an independent variable. Such analyses 
take the institutions of economic governance as given, seeking to explain outcomes 
such as growth, industrial adjustment, liberalization, debt management, or government 
business relations.
1 Some have criticized this approach for taking outcomes and 
reading back into history for their institutional “causes.” Taking institutions as given 
ignores how they come to embody both the political incentives of countries’ 
relationship to the world economy, and the domestic politics of interest aggregation or 
property rights.
2 
Taking DTEs’ institutions and practices of financial governance as outcomes 
to be explained addresses what is considered by two eminent surveyors of the field to 
be one of the major unexplored areas of the comparative and international political 
                                                 
1 Zysman linked financial structure to variation in the ability to adjust industrial policy (Zysman 1983), 
and Katzenstein used domestic political arrangements to explain policy responses to the oil crisis 
(Katzenstein 1985). 
2 “Using institutions as explanatory variables stalls the analysis precisely where it links up to the critical 
issue of how exogenous resources affect institution building itself” (Chaudhry 1997, 18).  
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economy of finance. Haggard and Lee lamented that studies have “not bothered to ask 
whether financial market policy was in fact a result of political pressures or whether it 
sprang from economic constraints or the projects of state officials.” This failure to 
treat financial institutions as outcomes is responsible for a major blind spot in 
contemporary research on the political economy of finance: “The inability to account 
for variations across countries in terms of the extent or nature of government 
intervention in financial markets” (Haggard and Lee 1993, 8-9). Analyses 
emphasizing “extent” have crowded out those of “nature” in scholarly research. 
The design of this study helps address these two problems directly. It explores 
the disjuncture between global script and local enactment in securities finance. In 
doing so, it offers an explanation for why different Chinese and Indian responses to 
the single common exogenous stimulus of securitization produced contrasting 
outcomes in their patterns of securities governance. The study also addresses the 
“extent or nature of government intervention” question – what economist Charles 
Lindblom called the problem of “strong thumbs” versus “nimble fingers.” Why and 
how do developmental states shift from the distributive intervention mode (strong 
thumbs) of state economic authority to the procedural supervision mode (nimble 
fingers)? What role does securitization play in provoking this shift in the doctrine and 
practice of state authority in finance? To address this problem I present a Weberian 
ideal-type scheme – contrasting distributive intervention with procedural supervision – 
with which to analyze changing governance regimes in DTEs. 
This chapter presents in detail the analytic framework used to deal with these 
questions in subsequent chapters. The next section introduces the concept of economic 
governance regimes, the dependent variable in this study. It also briefly lays out how I 
characterize the different governance regime outcomes in China and India. In the 
following section, I present the “dual imprint” two-level analysis in detail,  
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distinguishing between the structural incentives of these countries’ external economic 
exposure, and the process of domestic political dynamics based on political coalitions 
and property rights structures. An innovative part of the dual imprint framework 
involves unpacking and deciphering these domestic political dynamics of 
securitization. Section four describes the analytic tool I use: the asset-class/financial-
position matrix. Section five summarizes important existing explanations for 
variations in securities governance and the exercise of state economic authority. 
Finally, I close the chapter discussing issues of method and application. 
 
I. Country Responses to Securitization 
 
Policy and institutional patterns are constituted during the process of securities 
market building and the regulation that accompanies that process. One term for these 
policy patterns is economic governance regimes (EGRs). EGRs may be thought of as 
relatively stable patterns generated by the aggregation over time of discrete but 
complementary institutions and policy measures, often driven by a stable set of 
purposes and cohering into a trend. In countries with a tradition of state-led 
development, the purposes reflected in the governance regime will tend to be most 
significantly shaped by the state. The patterns we observe in these regime outcomes 
demonstrate a significant degree of routinization, and are often reproduced in new 
rounds of reform. In China between 1994 and 1997, a distinct pattern I call 
discretionary involution emerged from the welter of ad hoc stop-and-go measures of 
previous years. In India between 1993 and 1996, the emergence of a pattern of 
constrained evolution was discernable. 
The categories on which I draw for defining the dependent variable in this 
study – the securities governance regime – come from the work of economic and  
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political sociologists investigating convergence and diversity in the institutional 
structure of advanced industrial political economies. They use an approach focused on 
regimes of governance within and across economic sectors.
3 This approach regards 
economic action as a special case of social action requiring coordination and 
governance by institutional arrangements. The actions and variables to be coordinated 
include prices, quality,  sources of finance, standards and safety, information to 
consumers, labor recruitment, allocation, and compensation. 
A regime governing the coordination of economic factors is defined as the 
totality of institutional arrangements – including rules and rule-making agents – that 
regulate production and transactions inside and across the boundaries of an economic 
system.
4 Until recently, this research has focused largely on collective bargaining, 
consumption norms, and the processes that generate economic governance regimes. 
The research in this thesis follows Boyer, Jessop, and others, who shift the study of 
EGRs from production to finance, reflecting an explicit cognizance of the 
securitization shift.
5 While Japan has been studied in this way, few, if any, researchers 
have applied this conceptual idiom to cases of Asian DTEs. 
 
A. Governance Regimes 
Economic and political sociologists use the concept of “economic governance 
regimes” when studying the ensemble of actors, institutions, and practices that 
“govern” a given sector or factor in the economy. This privileges the ensemble of 
formal political institutions, and of informal socio-economic institutions themselves, as 
                                                 
3 For the sectoral approach to “economic governance regimes,” see Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and 
Streek , (1994). (Echeverri-Gent 1998) points out that the EGR concept is especially useful in studying 
Chinese and Indian reform “given the unevenness of reform across sectors.” 
4 This is a revision of the definition in Hollingsworth et al, (1994, 5). 
5 See the special issue of the British journal Economy and Society (Society 2000) in which Boyer and 
others presented an initial foray into research on “financialization”.  
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an outcome to be explained. Relying on this analytic tradition but simplifying it for 
application to the domain of securities finance in this analysis, I use the term 
“securities governance regime” (SGR) in referring to the actors, institutions, and 
practices involved in the creation, circulation, and use of securities.  
The word “governance” often evokes the role of governments or states. It can 
also evoke two other mechanisms of governance commonly used in mainstream 
economics: markets and corporate hierarchies (firms). But the point of the economic 
governance regime concept as a research variable is precisely that it includes all three 
forms of governance – states, markets, and firms – while also recognizing a role in the 
coordination of economic action for the media, for less-official and less-corporate 
institutions such as associations, and even for informal institutions such as networks. 
This makes the “governance regime” concept useful as a dependent variable because it 
is precise yet sufficiently inclusive, even while it is an evocative and compelling 
referent (Gerring 2001). As such, a governance regime includes both state and civil 
society.
6  It also includes the market as the arena in which these two spheres and the 
actors that inhabit them operate and interact. Figure 3-1 is a graphic rendering of the 
governance regime concept.
7 
                                                 
6 I prefer to think of “civil society” in this context as the “civil economy.” That said, I continue to use 
the more familiar term. For important caveats on the over-zealous application of the state-society 
distinction, and the analytic costs of doing so, see Mitchell (1991), and Kohli and Shue (1994). 
7 It is inspired by a similar rendering in Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997).  
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Figure 3-1:
Economic Governance Regimes
Mode of Coordination
Distribution of Power
Vertical (Hierarchy) Horizontal
Associations
Media
Networks
Markets
Firms
State
civil society the state the market Legend: 
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The dependent variable in this study – governance regime – is defined as the 
ensemble of institutional arrangements and practices involved in the creation, 
circulation, and use of securities. Those arrangements and practices have state and 
civil society elements, and they are enacted in the market. They include 1) structures 
of authority, 2) social linkages, and 3) arenas of exchange, which may be considered 
analogous to the common social science categories of state, market, and civil society.  
Structures of authority include hierarchies like governments or firms. 
Governments are part of the state, while firms are part of civil society, except in the 
case of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Social linkages include associations of interest 
and networks of affect. Corporate entities that formally represent businesses (the 
mutual fund industry, for instance) or consumer groups (like investor protection 
federations) are examples of associations of interest, and are most often part of civil 
society.
8 Networks of affect, the other form of social linkages, include identity-based 
connections like ethnic, linguistic, native place-based or professional background. 
These should also be thought of as part of civil society.
9  
Finally, arenas of exchange include markets and the media. Markets for goods, 
services, and production factors (labor, land, money) are neither state nor civil society. 
They are, among other things, arenas in which the state and civil society interact. The 
media is an element that previous research has tended to neglect, but is an essential 
component in the ensemble of governance regime components. Information and 
opinion are both oxygen and intoxicant for securities finance. The media is an 
                                                 
8 This becomes a difficult category in the Chinese case, where such associations are colonized or co-
opted by the state (Foster 2002). 
9 This is true, I think, even if such a network exists among members of “the state,” such as factions 
within the Chinese Communist Party and state or among members of India’s Administrative Service.  
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important arena of exchange for information, and is typically considered part of civil 
society.
10 
Structures of authority, associations of interest, networks of affect, and arenas 
of exchange each represent distinctive modes of governance. In the conception of 
Hollingsworth and his colleagues, such modes “are likely to be present to varying 
degrees in any given economy or economic sector. The object of comparative 
empirical research on institutional arrangements for coordinating economic activity is 
to determine the relative importance of various modes of governance in different 
contexts, to describe how they are articulated with one another, and to assess the 
extent and direction of change in regimes over time” (Hollingsworth, Schmitter, and 
Streeck 1994, 8). 
The governance regime is thus a summary variable encompassing both 
institutional/policy outcomes and market outcomes.
11 This distinction is not always 
made sufficiently explicit, often leading to analytic confusion (Vogel 1996, 261).
12 
Among the institutional outcomes there are often (but not always) formal and informal 
institutional elements. Institutional outcomes include market building measures, 
intramural coordination of securities activities, and extramural coordination with other 
financial and real economy sectors.
13 Market outcomes include, inter alia, the 
capitalization of stock and bond markets; the volume of trading; market liquidity; and 
the number of firms using the securities markets. 
                                                 
10 Anyone focusing on the governance of securities finance cannot afford to ignore the role of the 
media. When considering the China case, as with associations, so with the media. The colonization and 
control of the media can make its analytic disposition in the “civil society” sphere a delicate matter. 
11 For an explication of the “summary variable” as methodological device, see Easton (1953). 
12 This is discussed in the introduction with regard to the debate between international political 
economists Steven Vogel and Edward Laurence (chapter 1). I am grateful to John Echeverri-Gent for 
encouraging me to emphasize this distinction Echeverri-Gent (1998). 
13 Developments in commercial banking, insurance, and pension and social welfare systems are also 
important in determining the securities governance regime. There are interaction effects between the 
process of securitization and developments in these other areas.  
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Formal institutions can be official and unofficial. For example, ministries of 
finance and securities regulators or securities-related statutes and rule-making are 
some of the official and formal institutions of an SGR. This includes the methods and 
institutions for exercising state power with respect to financial allocation, such as 
official distributive intervention in or procedural supervision of securities finance 
practices. Examples of unofficial yet formal institutions include business and 
consumer associations. Informal institutions include ethnic, linguistic, native-place, 
and professional background networks. 
But we shouldn’t take the word of economic sociologists on the value of 
governance regimes as a category for social science research. As political scientists 
James Scott (1985) and John Gerring (2001) have pointed out, the best concepts are 
those that make sense, not just to academic audiences, but also to the actors whose 
worldview or behavior the concept purports to theorize. Arthur Levitt, onetime stock 
broker, erstwhile chief executive of the American Stock Exchange, and former 
chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, provides an example of 
how securities finance participants think implicitly in terms of a securities governance 
regime, even if they do not themselves use the term. In discussing the Enron collapse 
of 2001, Levitt explicitly enumerated the components of the U.S. securities 
governance regime (which, for better or worse, is a formal model that many of the 
Indian and Chinese official and unofficial informants confessed to using as a cue). In 
his inventory of those responsible for coordination, Levitt listed “the boards of 
directors, the accountants, the lawyers, the rating agencies, the Congress, the 
regulators.” Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of their configuration in the 
governance regime ensemble to the healthy operation of securities finance. “In 
fairness,” he remarked, “Enron wasn’t the failing of any one entity” (Levitt 2002).  
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Looking to China and India, we find a similar cognizance of the relevant 
players and interactions in the field of securities governance. According to an 
experienced securities financier in Bombay, “regulation of securities in India should 
be, and sometimes is, a dialectic. We interact with SEBI (the state securities 
regulator), but they also rely on us. Not as much as I would like, mind you. My 
association (the association of Indian bond dealers) sometimes mediates between its 
members and SEBI, sometimes members go straight to SEBI.” Finally, in a telling 
remark, the same securities financier explained that when securities market 
participants got wind of improper or risky behavior on the part of a “colleague” among 
the “Marwari brokers,” someone “knowing his chacha or his boss will call, and it will 
be taken care of.”
14 
Or take for example the remarks of Shi Meilun, Vice Chair of the Chinese 
Securities Regulatory Commission: “in a developed (securities) market,” Shi 
explained, “the regulator worries about few things because self-discipline and market 
forces can solve problems. But ours is an emerging market and our listed companies 
and securities sector lack the concept of self-discipline as in a developed market” (Hu, 
Wei, and Niu 2002). Why China’s securities governance remains so underdeveloped, 
twenty years after the first securities were issued in that country, perhaps also bears 
some consideration. Nevertheless, in both these cases we hear securities finance 
participants themselves voicing their awareness of the various components of the 
securities governance regime, and describing how those components articulate with 
                                                 
14 The affinity this securities financier feels with this “colleague” is based on the fact they are both part 
of an ethnic network known as Marwaris. His offhanded reference to the offending brokers’ chacha 
indicates the way ethnic and familial ties overlap. While chacha technically translates as “father’s 
younger brother,” this affectionate honorific is used to refer to close older males who one might deem 
as close as an uncle. This interviewee was the scion of a family involved in a range of securities 
services. The family businesses are medium sized in capitalization terms, but the scope is broad, 
encompassing stock broking, bond trading, securities underwriting, and financial information. The 
geographic scope of the family is also broad, with businesses in Bombay, New Delhi, and Calcutta. 
Author’s interviews, Bombay, 2000, #58; and Bombay, 2001 #110.  
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one another in coordinating the creation, circulation and use of securities. Each 
component was identified: the state as represented by the regulator; markets as arenas 
of exchange and sources of competitive constraint; firms; associations; and (in the 
Indian case) networks. 
 
B. Coding the Cases 
In this study I trace the process of securitization in China and India, two 
countries whose systems of financial governance shared a common legacy of state-
dominated, centrally-planned financial allocation through grants and directed credit. I 
find that different responses to the securitization process led to distinct patterns of 
securities governance in each case: discretionary involution in China, and constrained 
evolution in India. Chapter 4 describes the developments within the various 
components and their articulation with one another in the overall configuration of the 
Chinese and Indian governance regimes that constitute these patterns. 
China’s securities governance regime of discretionary involution was largely in 
place by 1996. Many comparative studies applaud Chinese policy makers’ ability to 
incrementally reform the economy and their governance of it. Yet, evidence from 
securities market is a prominent exception to this trend of success. Securities markets 
appeared almost out of nowhere in 1981. Merely twenty years later, they constituted 
one of Asia’s largest securities markets (though not as large as the Chinese authorities 
would like the world to believe), equipped with state-of-the-art technical elements.  
In the early 1990s, the Chinese government launched ambitious plans to 
establish stock exchanges as part of their broader financial reforms. This held out 
some promise for a significant shift in the way the Chinese state interacted with the 
capital markets. Between 1981 and 2001, there was an enormous change in the formal 
structure of China’s securities markets. But substantively, in terms of the functions  
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that financial economists typically attribute to securities markets,
15 there was much 
less than met the eye. Growth in the scale of Chinese securities finance was indeed 
remarkable, but the function of securities finance, its governance, and particularly the 
state’s relationship to it has changed little since the establishment of the involutionary 
pattern in mid-decade. 
More than ten years after its reform began, Chinese securities finance 
languishes. Volatile casino-like markets provide no credible savings/investment 
substitute to bank deposits, have little bearing on corporate finance, and contribute 
insignificantly to deepening the financial system. Moreover, having established a new 
market regulator ostensibly designed to conduct procedural supervision of securities 
finance and develop civil society supplements to state governance, policy makers 
persisted in using that regulator to conduct distributive intervention, cultivating or 
permitting only minimal development in unofficial and informal governance 
structures. Development of non-state elements of the governance regime – such as 
firms, associations, and networks – were stunted. To the extent that substantive change 
occurred, it happened before 1994. Between 1994 and 2002, there was little 
substantive or intensive development, but lots of formal mimesis, extensive growth, 
and segmentation. Changes of scale in the Chinese securities finance were impressive, 
changes in scope significantly less so.  
India’s constrained evolution securities governance regime was also largely in 
place by 1996. The development of modern securities markets in the U.S., from the 
Great Crash of 1929 to the implementation of the National Market System after the 
“May Day” reforms of 1975, took almost fifty years. By contrast, in formal terms, 
despite much turmoil in 1993 and 2001, Indian securities markets have taken less than 
                                                 
15 These include the efficient allocation of finance, a market for companies, a market for corporate 
control, and (recently, some argue) a market for risk (Bernstein 1990).  
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ten years to evolve from a commercially irrelevant peripheral enclave, replacing a 
long-entrenched network of paper-based traders isolated in sleepy regional clubs, into 
a highly sophisticated, nation-wide, fully electronic market that “now approaches 
global standards.” More importantly, however, in substantive terms, market scope and 
non-state elements of the Indian governance regime have flourished. This would be 
fast for any country. It is particularly surprising for India, a country not well known 
for either the vigor of its economic reforms or its love of financiers. 
Involution occurs when “state organizations expand (into the economy) not 
through the increasingly efficient use of existing inputs (such as personnel and 
administrative apparatus) but through replication, extension, and elaboration of an 
inherited pattern of state-society (or state-economy) relations” (Duara 1988, 75-76).
16 
Reproduction of old patterns or functions, as well as replications, are key 
characteristics of involution.
17  
                                                 
16 Involution, particularly in the Chinese case at hand, is not unlike mercantilism as conceived by 
Polanyi. “That mercantilism,” he wrote, “however emphatically it insisted on commercialization as a 
national policy, thought of markets in a way exactly contrary to market economy, is best shown by its 
vast extension of state intervention into industry (and, one might add finance). On this point, there was 
no difference between mercantilists, feudalists, crowned planners, and vested interests, centralizing 
bureaucrats and conservative particularists. They disagreed only on the method of regulation, not on the 
commercializing of labor and land (and one might add capital).” And in an elaboration of this 
characterization with prescient relevance to the Chinese case, Polanyi added, “The mercantilist was 
concerned with the development of the resources of the country, including full employment, through 
trade and commerce; the traditional organization of land and labor (and/or finance we might again add) 
he took for granted. He was in this respect as far removed from the modern concepts as he was in the 
realm of politics, where his belief in the absolute powers of an enlightened despot was tempered by no 
intimations of democracy” (1957, 74 parenthetical comments added). This macro-historical perspective 
reminds us that, though the term “involution” in contemporary social science is attributed to Geertz 
(1963), the lineage of the idea in general terms goes back through the work of Sinologist Karl 
Wittfogel’s “oriental mode of production” (1957), to the works of Weber (1949) and thence back to 
Marx.  
17 Geertz’s early formulation included both reproduction (of old patterns) and replication (and 
segmentation of units). Drawing on Duara, Burrowoy, and Stark (1996), I see replication as an equal 
constituent of the involution pattern, not its dominant characteristic. The fact that there is replication of 
past modes of organization (discretionary allocation of finance), and replication of forms (such as the 
multiple and segmented share types, and the market segmentation all discussed in chapter 6) to my 
mind adequately qualifies the Chinese behavior on the “replication” criterion.  
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Whereas the conventional wisdom is that China has in the last twenty years 
been steadily “liberalizing,”
18 evidence from some sectors such as finance or the 
petrochemical industry suggest there may be as much “flow” as there is “ebb” in the 
role and control of the state.
19 Political scientist Lu Xiaobo has also used the involution 
concept to elucidate the dynamics of Chinese Communist Party organization in the 
reform era (2000).  
The involution pattern of China’s governance regime for securities is not only 
consistent with the empirical cases just mentioned. The pattern also conforms to 
theoretical expectations derived from what economic anthropologist Hill Gates has 
called the “tributary mode of production” (TMP) in Chinese history. The tributary 
mode of production is defined as a political-economic system in which “a class of 
scholar officials…transferred surpluses from the various producer classes (peasants, 
petty capitalists, laborers) to themselves by means of direct extraction as tribute, taxes, 
corvee, hereditary labor duties, and the like.” These political and institutional 
circumstances, which produce a bias for scale over scope (that is, for example, 
extensive versus intensive growth, characteristic of involution) are thus evident 
elsewhere in Chinese history. The “high-level equilibrium trap” that stagnated Chinese 
economic development into the early 20
th century was described by economic 
historian Mark Elvin as “quantitative growth, qualitative standstill,” and is yet another 
historical example of involution (Elvin 1973). The modern Chinese state, TMP 
analysts argue in the idiom of involution, has “reproduced” this centuries-old tributary 
system in the current transitional context, following a pattern in which it is often the 
                                                 
18 “Liberalization” refers to the introduction of greater competition, easier market entry, and, typically, 
growth in the private sector. 
19 An important example is the takeover of “private” oil wells in Shaanxi province in early 2003 
(Economist 2003). For detailed treatments of this elsewhere in finance, see Shih (2003) and Sehrt 
(1999). For a discussion of this dynamic in the petrochemical sector, see Lin (2002).  
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case that “cadres in state-run institutions subordinate the goal of efficient production 
to the goals of control, stability, and self-promotion” (Gates 1996, 7; Hertz 1998, 14). 
The term “evolution” here designates the incremental development of a 
substantively new pattern of state-society (or state-economy) relations. Michael 
Burawoy explains that involution is an “economic regression that is not merely 
preparatory for a future resurgence but is chronic and persistent. Involution is the 
antithesis of evolution and…leads to systemic underdevelopment” (Burawoy 1994, 2-
3). The question is what turns an involutionary, often predatory, pattern into one that 
can be durably developmental. These contrasting outcomes furnish an opportunity to 
identify and analyze the political factors that are most important in shaping financial 
governance responses to securitization. This, in turn, helps me address the central 
themes of this thesis: 1) The degrees of convergence and diversity in state responses to 
global market and social forces, and 2) The changes in the character of state-economy 
authority relations occasioned by the expansion of markets, and particularly markets 
for finance. 
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II. The Dual Imprint Explanation 
 
The explanation that I offer involves a two-level analysis highlighting how 
both international and domestic phenomena leave their mark on governance regimes, 
accounting for differing patterns of securities governance in China and India. I call 
this, following Chaudhry (1997), a “dual imprint approach.” Such an explanation 
requires an analytic framework that explicitly regards the institutions of economic 
governance as a dependent variable.
20  
Few authors, other than Chaudhry and researchers in the world-systems school, 
have specifically explored how countries’ juncture with the world economy shaped, 
not policies, but the development of domestic institutions of governance, particularly 
economic governance.
21 Proposing a modification to the dominant techno-market 
approaches that posit a direct link between “exogenous easing” in the international 
economy and government policy, political scientists Geoffrey Garret and Peter Lange 
argued for the importance of domestic institutions as significant intervening variables 
in explaining policy outcomes (Garret and Lange 1996). Garret and Lange’s 
institutional perspective is more sensitive to context, and they recognize that a 
country’s particular position in the world economy may shape policy outcomes theory; 
but only when researchers take domestic institutions themselves as outcomes to be 
explained does the full relevance of the specific character of each country’s 
                                                 
20 For a working definition of institutions, I rely on sociologist Neil Fligstein’s formulation, in which 
institutions are “rules and shared meanings (implying that people are aware of them or that they can be 
consciously known) that define social relationships, help define who occupies what position in those 
relationships, and guide interaction by giving actors’ cognitive frames or sets of meanings to interpret 
the behavior of others. They are intersubjective (i.e. can be recognized by others), cognitive, (i.e. 
depend on actors’ cognitive abilities), and to some degree, require self-reflection by actors. Institutions 
can, of course, effect the situations of actors with or without their consent or understanding” (Fligstein 
2001). I agree with Paul Pierson that “policies” are “political institutions” (personal communication 
03/12/2003). 
21 For discussions of this, see Chaudhry (1997 Chapter One), and Rand Smith (1993).  
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relationship with external economic forces become apparent. It is this foregrounding 
of institutions themselves which is emphasized in the dual imprint analytic used here. 
To explain the institutions and practices of securities governance, I need to be 
able to trace the response of states like China and India to the stimulus of global 
techno-market and social forces favoring securitization, as mediated by the profile of 
their structural juncture with the world economy on the one hand, and by the influence 
of domestic political coalitions and property rights on the other. The explanation 
offered here satisfies these analytic requirements.
22 In the conceptual development of 
comparative and international political economy explanations of national variations in 
economic policy, Peter Gourevitch’s “production profile” approach was one of the 
clearest early efforts to trace how international and domestic variables together shape 
consequential political outcomes.
23 
In a similar vein, political scientist Kiren Chaudhry’s analysis of liberalizing 
late developers argued that these countries’ institutions of economic governance “will 
carry the dual imprint of the international economic context in which reforms were 
undertaken and the confluence of domestic institutional and political factors that 
marked the initiation of liberalizing policies” (Chaudhry 1993, 248). The dual imprint 
explanation identifies the institutions of securities governance as a dependent variable. 
It accommodates analytically the empirical significance of both external exposure to 
the international economy, and the role of domestic forces. Finally, by focusing on the 
institutions of economic governance themselves, foregrounding institutional change, 
                                                 
22 In her study of Saudi Arabia and Yemen during the 1970s and 1980s cycles of boom and bust in the 
oil industry, Chaudhry examined how the timing of “structural junctures” with the world economy, 
punctuated by changing oil prices, reconfigured the institutions of economic governance in her two 
cases (Chaudhry 1997; Vogel 1996). 
23 The production profile explanation concentrated on “the preferences of societal actors as shaped by 
the actors’ situation in the international and domestic economy” (Gourevitch 1986, 55).  
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the dual imprint explanation also provides a conceptual platform for considering the 
character (not just the quantity) of state-economy relations. 
At the international level, a dual imprint explanation of institutional change 
involves an analysis of “structural junctures” with the world economy. The character 
of the structural juncture will vary for each country, based on the general systemic 
conditions prevailing in the international economy at the time of juncture and the 
character or “profile” of each country’s exposure to the world economy. Scholars of 
IPE and CPE have suggested a range of profile parameters with salience for political 
outcomes within countries, including, inter alia, the timing of industrialization, 
country size, location on the product cycle, or location in the global hierarchy of 
capitalist production. Other variables important to the profile could include countries’ 
balances on their current and capital accounts, currency reserves, indebtedness, and 
the composition and control of capital flows. 
This analysis focuses on elements of the external profile associated with a 
country’s volume of foreign industrial investment and balance of payments position, 
including:
 1) the size and reliability of FDI; 2) the size and stability of export earnings; 
and 3) the size and stability of foreign currency reserves. The central state in almost all 
developing countries acts as a gatekeeper between the world economy and society on 
the outside, and the domestic economy and society on the inside. The profile of a 
country’s structural juncture with the world economy, therefore, presents a hugely 
important opportunity structure – both incentives and constraints – to which central 
states respond. Chapter 5 elaborates on the mechanics of this structure and traces the 
political implications as these economic variables influence strategies of policy 
making and institution building in securities finance. 
At the domestic level, a dual imprint explanation of institutional change 
involves a political sociology of interest aggregation and coalition dynamics “that is  
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sensitive to historical context.” This entails an explicit recognition of how institutions 
embody the accommodations struck between stratified and segmented group interests 
in both state and society, and particularly their role in the dynamics of the dominant 
political coalition (Chaudhry 1997, 17-19). The domestic side of the “imprint” also 
includes the prevailing structure of property rights. 
Two imprints thus forge countries’ securities governance regimes: one from 
above and outside, the other from below and inside. The first is the hammer of 
international forces, the second the anvil of domestic structures. Figure 3-2 is a 
stylized depiction of this dual imprint. 
At the international level – one side of the dual imprint – the key variable is a 
country’s profile of exposure to the international economy. That profile presents states 
and other actors with a powerful inventive structure. The securities finance 
preferences of central-state-elites were crucial in almost all DTEs’ financial changes. 
Those of the center in cases of state-led reform such as China and India were no 
different. Consequently, these two countries’ profiles of external exposure 
significantly molded the preferences of central-state-elites regarding securities finance.  
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At the domestic level – the other side of the dual imprint – the key variables 
are the configuration of political coalitions and the structure of property rights. 
Accordingly, this analysis emphasizes how the domestic politics of securities finance 
are dominated by struggles within the dominant coalition over the property rights 
implications of securitization. The strategies pursued by central-state-elites to satisfy 
their preferences shaped the regimes that governed securities finance. These strategies 
were formulated by interaction with political coalition actors and with the domestic 
structure of property rights. This process is a fundamentally political one, because by 
revealing, specifying, and enabling the exchange of property rights, securitization at a 
minimum puts pressure on, and at maximum fundamentally challenges, the prevailing 
definitions of property rights in the organized economy, and the arrangements for the 
allocation of those rights. The politics of securitization are thus a struggle over the 
very definition of property rights, and over the allocation of access to those property 
rights embedded in securities. This struggle involves political contestation and 
institutional change. Its outcome is shaped by the configuration of each country’s 
dominant political coalition, and by the inherited institutions that structure the 
property rights of the productive assets being securitized. Making sense of this 
domestic-level struggle is not easy; for the purpose of analyzing and explicating this 
struggle, I developed the asset-class/financial-position matrix described below. 
China and India embarked on their respective experiments with economic 
reform and securitization at roughly the same time. Both countries were drawing on 
the same formulaic global securitization script. On the eve of the 1990s securitization 
thrust, China and India had comparable financial governance regimes, characterized 
by a legacy of state-dominate directed credit. Their respective structural junctures with 
the world economy began simultaneously in the 1980s and hit their stride, also at the  
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same time, in the 1990s. The timing of the common juncture is crucial. As 
Gerschenkron first emphasized, and Skocpol later elaborated, conditions prevailing in 
the international system at the “world time” moment of juncture will powerfully shape 
the development of domestic institutions. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, having 
relied on state-dominated directed-credit finance to achieve the stage of heavy 
industrialization, China and India peered out upon the world economy and wondered: 
What “different instrument” of finance for further industrialization would be “suitable 
to the new stage of backwardness”?
24 This was the moment in world time when 
securities finance was ascendant. Techno-market forces and sociological normative 
pressures among the community of states encouraged the adoption of securitization in 
financial practice. Consequently, the first component of the structural juncture – the 
prevailing conditions (favoring securitization) in the international economy at the time 
of juncture – is held constant for both country cases. 
Whereas the world time of securitization was the same for both countries, the 
second structural juncture parameter – the profile of each country’s exposure to the 
international economy – differs dramatically. The focus of process-tracing in this 
analysis, therefore, turns to the profile of each state’s exposure to the international 
system, not to the conditions in the international system itself.
25 Each country’s profile 
of external exposure was imprinted on the institutional response to securitization – the 
securities governance regime. Variation in external exposure profiles established 
differing political incentive structures for securities reform in the two countries. 
                                                 
24 This is a reference to the passage of Gerschenkron’s “Economic Backwardness” paper in which he 
discusses the transformation of Russian financial governance after the “government had fulfilled the 
function of industrial banks” (1962 (1951), 22). 
25 This is a key deviation from “opportunity cost” explanations of the effects of internationalization on 
domestic politics (Frieden and Rogowski 1996).  
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Comparing the international side of the imprint, the benign profile of China’s 
external exposure contrasted with India’s precarious form.
26 In contrast with India, 
China possessed a stable, positive balance of payments position and abundant and 
persistent flows of FDI, producing very different political incentives. These incentives 
determined the preferences assigned to securities finance reform among those in 
government and business who were fashioning the institutions of securities 
governance in China and India. This explains why Indian policy makers and economic 
actors made a high priority of the securitization process – setting as their goal 
substantive changes in the institutions of securities-related financial governance – 
while Chinese policy makers and economic actors were casual about the pace of 
securitization. It also sheds light on their willingness to set predatory goals for the 
development of securities governance in the new securities sector. The political effect 
of the incentives generated by China’s benign external profile was that the state and 
large business had a range of discretion in the process of securitization. In India, with 
its precarious external profile, the state and business felt constrained in the process of 
securitization. China involuted because it could. India evolved because it had to. 
However, given the preferences for securitization imposed by these countries’ 
respective profiles of external exposure, the particular process for enactment of the 
global securities script also bore the imprint of local domestic coalitions and property 
rights structures. Use of the term “enactment” might suggest that I consider the 
development of securities finance regimes in China and India to be just an “act”; not 
“real” economic reform. Such arguments are common with regard to China’s 
securities markets, including the “Potemkin Village” charge cited earlier. Indeed, the 
realist tradition of domestic and international politics has always held that forms and 
                                                 
26 In this instance, use of the word “benign” refers to the semantic range of its second definition in the 
American Heritage dictionary: “Tending to exert a beneficial influence; favorable” (Language 2000).  
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institutions are unimportant, and that strong actors will do as they wish. There is 
evidence for such a claim in the Chinese experience of securities markets. Yet, the 
state did not do just as it pleased, though the benign structure of its external exposure 
afforded a wider margin for manipulating the “script” than was available to countries 
such as India with less benign profiles of external exposure. Nevertheless, securities 
finance involves a set of social actors and social relations. It is thus a social 
construction, and as such, this Athena of securities finance does not spring forth fully 
formed from the head of some economic Zeus. It is enacted, and in both country cases, 
the actors, their identities, and the social relations among them reflect how coalition 
politics and property-rights structures interacted with the inherent logic of the 
securitization script. This is how distinct patterns of policy and institutions emerged to 
govern securities finance. 
Figure 3-3 is a stylized depiction of how this dual imprint framework works in 
the explanation I offer here.
27 When viewed together with Table 3-1, it is easy to see 
how these pieces fit together. 
                                                 
27 This is a version of Garrett and Lange’s (1996) well known “Institutions and Political Change” 
model, modified for sectoral relevance in securities finance.  
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Table 3-1: The Explanation 
 
 
 
 
 
China 
 
 
India 
 
International 
Juncture 
 
structure 
 
Enabled by benign abundance 
• benign balance of payments 
position 
• abundant capital 
• abundant foreign exchange 
 
 
 
Constrained by precarious scarcity 
• precarious balance of payments 
position 
• scarce capital 
• scarce foreign exchange 
 
 
Domestic 
Conditions 
 
process 
 
Constrained by 
• state dependence on 
intramural distributional 
coalition 
• rigid state-socialist property 
rights 
 
 
Enabled by 
• state autonomy from tripartite 
distributional coalition 
• flexible mixed-economy property 
rights 
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In explaining the contrasting Chinese and Indian regimes of securities 
governance, I first turn to the profile of these countries’ juncture with the world 
economy to identify central-state-elite preferences in both countries’ undeniably state-
led responses to securitization. Difference in these junctures, or external exposure 
profiles (EEPs), was a structural variable that provoked contrasting central-state-elite 
preferences in the two cases. These preferences established general trajectories for the 
local Chinese and Indian enactment of the global securitization script. From the 
structural EEP variable and the preferences it inspired, I then explain how the 
particular attributes of Indian and Chinese SGRs were forged through a domestic 
process in which these preferences were translated into specific strategies of securities 
script enactment. The dual imprint analytic thus showcases the linkages between 
structure and process in the development of a country’s securities governance regime. 
At the international level, that country’s juncture with the world economy – the EEP – 
is the relevant structure (see Figure 3-4, top row). At the domestic level, the struggle 
among coalition members over securities-related property rights is the crux of the 
political process (see Figure 3-4, bottom row). 
 
A. Structure: External Exposure and State Preferences 
Securitization is of such potential significance to both the real and financial 
sectors of the overall economy that its dynamics are perforce influenced by the profile 
of a country’s juncture with the world economy. This is true even for countries like 
China and India that strictly control the flow of capital.
28 In the early 1990s, when 
securitization began in earnest, China and India were mirror images of one another. 
                                                 
28 Both countries have maintained closed capital accounts (and their concomitant, non-convertible 
currencies).  
 
125 
China’s stable, positive balance of payments position, robust exports, and abundant 
and persistent flows of FDI produced very different political incentives than did 
India’s dubious balance of payments position, anemic exports, and scarce and erratic 
FDI flows. 
 Precariousness in the balance of payments plus scarcity in the flow of capital 
equaled jeopardy for the Indian state. The constraints of its precarious scarcity EEP 
therefore imposed on India’s central policy makers a preference for a securities 
governance regime that would provide sufficient, stable foreign exchange, while 
contributing directly and indirectly to improving industrial finance. Foreign direct 
investment into China by overseas Chinese drove the export boom that fueled as much 
as a quarter of China’s growth in the 1990s. The liberty conferred by China’s benign 
abundance EEP provoked among Chinese central policy-makers a preference for 
manipulating securities institutions (because there was a margin to do so) to service its 
dominant coalition, providing life-support to the large state-owned enterprise (SOE) 
sector, interior provinces, and sunset sectors, and limiting disruption to those elements 
of the state-socialist property-rights regime that facilitated the exercise of CCP 
discretion. This structural, international-level dimension is summarized in the top row 
of Figure 3-4.  
 
B. Process: State Strategies, Domestic Coalitions, and Property-Rights 
Struggles 
 
Where did the specific attributes of India’s constrained evolution and China’s 
discretionary involution come from? How were their differing EEP-derived 
preferences transformed into the specific patterns that characterize their contrasting 
securities governance regimes? The next section of this chapter discusses this process-
oriented, domestic-level part of the argument (depicted in the bottom row of Figure 3- 
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4). In each case, I trace how the preferences of the central state-state-elite interact with 
domestic coalitions and property-rights structures. This interaction translates those 
preferences into the strategies producing each particular SGR outcome. Untangling the 
politics of such a Byzantine and opaque process in any developing and transitional 
economy is tricky. Such untangling is the purpose of the asset-class/financial-position 
framework that I use to analyze the Chinese and Indian cases in subsequent chapters. 
In characterizing these contrasting securities-related governance regimes, the 
coding of China’s involution pattern as “discretionary” captures two related elements 
of the case. First, it indicates the latitude enjoyed by the Chinese state in institution 
building and policy making with respect to securitization, flowing from the country’s 
benign profile of external exposure. Second, the term indicates the way governance 
structures and institutions were developed, to maximize state discretion in the 
management of securitization. In short, the government enjoyed a wide range of 
discretion in setting priorities and objectives in response to securitization because of 
the benign EEP profile. In pursuing those preferences, the strategy that developed in 
response to the constraining domestic structures of the “intramural” political coalition 
and the rigid state-socialist property rights led to an SGR in which the state 
institutionalized a wide range of discretion for itself in the emergent governance 
regime. 
The opposite was true for India. The coding of India’s evolution pattern as 
“constrained” captures two related elements of the case. First, it indicates the 
limitations confronting the Indian state in institution building and policy making with 
respect to securitization, flowing from the country’s precarious profile of external 
exposure. Second, the term indicates the way governance structures and institutions 
were developed, to restrict state discretion in the management of securitization. In 
short, the Indian government suffered from a limited range of options in setting  
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priorities and objectives in response to securitization because of the precarious EEP 
profile. In pursuing those preferences, the strategy that developed in response to the 
enabling domestic structures of state autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant coalition; the 
flexible mixed-economy property rights led to an SGR in which the state 
institutionalized a constrained role for itself in the emergent governance regime. 
 
III. Asset-Classes, Financial-Positions and the Political Analysis of Securitization 
 
The politics behind the governance of securities-related finance is important, 
but poorly understood. For the governments involved, the shift of financial assets from 
directed-credit systems into securities has been a complex political challenge. For 
students of political economy in developing and transitional economies (DTEs), 
securities finance can seem a particularly opaque sphere in which the interests, 
incentives, and relevant actors are often unclear. 
One objective of this thesis is to present a framework for clarifying this 
opacity, and to demonstrate the utility of that framework in analyzing the political 
responses to securitization. This new framework – the asset-class/financial-position 
matrix – relies on the distinction between asset-classes, and on the different financial 
positions of the issuers of securities and those who invest in them. The matrix reveals 
the politics of securitization in DTEs to be a struggle over the definition and allocation 
of property  rights in this new and rapidly expanding domain of finance. Two variables 
– the role of the central state (its preferences and strategies), and the relationship 
between the dominant political coalition and the structure of property rights – 
influence this struggle, thus shaping the regime governing the creation, circulation, 
and use of securities.  
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A. The Asset-Class/Financial-Position Matrix 
At the domestic level, specifying the actors, their properties, and the nature of 
the domestic environment relevant to the politics of securities finance is a significantly 
less tidy task than was sorting out the stark and easily measured parameters of the 
external exposure profile at the international level. However, the center-state-elite’s 
preferences, derived from the EEP, are not sufficiently fine-grained to account for 
strategic interaction among a variety of domestic public and private actors in the 
securitization process. Analyzing this process at the domestic level thus requires 
creating a map of the factors influencing central states’ strategies for achieving these 
preferences within the lineaments of the dominant coalition and its relationship to the 
institutions and ideologies of securities-related property rights. Unfortunately, pre-
existing theories are not much help in providing such a map, which at least partially 
accounts for the dearth of contemporary research on the comparative political 
sociology of finance. The absence of such a map explains the difficulty previous 
studies have encountered in accounting for variations across countries regimes of 
financial governance.
29 
                                                 
29 There are few good concepts for analyzing the political sociology of “non-real” economic sectors 
such as finance. For real sectors, Shafer’s synthesis is very useful (1994). For tertiary sectors like 
finance, the word of (Vogel 1996) and Laurence (Laurence 2001) is the state of the art in the 
comparative and international political economy literature, but of limited use in the context of closed 
capital-account DTE country cases.  
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The asset-class/financial-position matrix presented in Figure 3-4 offers such a 
map. It is a new approach specifically formulated to address this need for a framework 
with which to analyze the comparative political sociology of securities finance.
30 The 
matrix is derived from the highly formulaic scripted distinction in securities finance 
between equity and debt on the one hand (the rows of Figure 3-4), and the structural 
distinction between the issuers of securities and investors in securities on the other (the 
columns of Figure 3-4). 
The differences between stocks and bonds in the types of claims they represent 
furnish the first dimension along which to analyze the politics of securitization and its 
                                                 
30 Among those studying the political economy of finance, Chernow (1990) and Maxfield (1995; 1998) 
have had some success using analysis similar to, but less fully developed than, the asset-class/financial-
position matrix presented here. 
Figure 3-4:
Process-Tracing the Politics of Securitization
The Asset-Class/Financial-Position Matrix
IV
Financial Institutions, Individuals
fixed return vs. default risk
Creditor-rights enforcement, liquidity
III
Firms, Governments@
finance w/out loss of control vs. 
debtors exposure (bonding)
deficit finance, low i-rate,
large long term project finance
II 
Financial Institutions, Individuals
Ownership & limited liability vs. variable 
return
capital appreciation,* “voice,” market for 
firms (or parts of firms),  liquidity, investor 
protection
I
Firms, Entrepreneurs
“free” finance vs. dispersal of 
ownership & control
high market value, minimize loss of 
control/ownership, wealth 
capitalization 
Equity
Debt
Issuers Investors
Bold = the actors
Italics = the attributes of the asset for actors in that financial position (typically a trade-off)
Underline = actors’ interest with respect to that asset
* Some would argue that an “equity premium” is involved here.
@ Central and sub-national governments (states/provinces/municipalities) 
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consequences for securities governance. This is the distinction between asset classes: 
debt versus equity. The two different locations in the creation and subsequent 
circulation of any given security, between the user of finance and its supplier, furnish 
the second dimension. This is the distinction between financial positions: issuer versus 
investor.
31 With the growth of securitized finance, issuer-investor relations 
increasingly affect capitalist outcomes because they involve the relative power of 
enterprise insiders and outsiders; determine the structures of enterprise ownership and 
control; influence the rules governing the merger and acquisition of enterprises; and 
finally, establish the balance between creditors and debtors. Together, these two 
distinctions – asset-classes and financial-positions – create a matrix that helps specify, 
across the cases, commensurable actors, interests, and relevant institutional outcomes 
within which public and private actors create, exchange, and use securities. The 
matrix, like any heuristic or ideal type, helps provoke analytic thinking about a 
complex and contingent reality; it does not purport to be a comprehensive rendering of 
that reality. 
In Figure 3-4, these parameters are arrayed within the appropriate cells of the 
matrix, identifying relevant actors, attributes of the corresponding asset-class for these 
actors, and a deductive expectation of the actor’s preferences regarding that asset-class 
based on the formulaic dynamics of the securitization script. From these expectations, 
it is possible to infer which empirically observable domains (institutional outcomes) 
might offer useful evidence with which to analyze the political struggle over 
securities-related property rights.
32 These domains are presented in a modified version 
of the AC/FP matrix depicted in Figure 3-5. 
                                                 
31 There are government and corporate entities whose need for finance leads them to create securities by 
issuing bonds or stocks. These are issuers. There are entities (public or private) and individuals who 
provide finance when they “buy” these securities. These are investors. 
32 Researchers conducting structured, focused case-comparisons are advised to identify observable 
implications that apply across (and hopefully beyond) the cases at hand (George and McKeown 1985).  
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Figure 3-5:
Using the AC/FP Matrix
Observable Domains of Securitization Politics
IV
Bankruptcy
Returns
• Corp./Govt. Yield Curve
III
Firms
• Enterprise Finance
Governments
• Public Finance
• Monetary Policy
II 
Shareholder Rights
• transparency/disclosure/dividends, investor 
protection (information symmetry)
Industrial Organization
• Market for Companies, M&A, Corp. 
Governance, Market for voice/control
I
Enterprise Finance
• share issuance
Wealth Capitalization
• “founders rent”
• equity leverage, equity currency”
Privatization
Equity
Debt
Issuers Investors
Public Finance = Fiscal policy, deficit spending, local developmentalism
Monetary Policy = Open-Market Operations, sterilization, and monetizing debt
The alternative issuer-investor financial positions are analogous to the 
dichotomy familiar to many political economists from work on power distribution in 
the economic (or political) marketplace between producers (politicians and political 
parties) and consumers (voters).
33 Multiple dynamic equilibria between issuers and 
investors are possible across the domains identified in Figure 3-5. These outcomes are 
the result of political struggles over finance-related property rights. Their aggregate 
configuration shapes each country’s SGR, and ultimately the type of capitalism it 
encourages. In chapter 6, evidence on stock exchange development demonstrates how 
the Chinese SGR has served to organize securities finance in that country into a 
                                                 
33 In the 1960s and 1970s, the academic debate focused on the conditions favoring either producer or 
consumer sovereignty in different political economic systems (Downs 1965; Lindblom 1977; Wittman 
1973).  
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system “of, by, and for” issuers. The Indian SGR has served to create a system 
increasingly characterized by dynamic contestation between issuers and investors. 
 
IV. Securities Governance and the Politics of Securitization: The Intellectual 
Terrain 
 
Though they both started the decade with similar developmental state-led 
directed credit systems of finance, by the end of the 1990s the Indian and Chinese 
cases display evidence of variation, both in their responses to the conformity-inducing 
power of global techno-market forces of securitization, and in their local enactment of 
the increasingly shared global script of securities finance. What might explain this 
variation? 
Within the existing corpus of social science theory, the possible explanations 
for these different securities governance regime outcomes may be divided into two 
general groups: those that emphasize international factors, and those that emphasize 
domestic factors. On the international side, some of the arguments for how global 
forces shape domestic institutional development and policy change in DTEs (including 
economic governance regimes) emphasize the role of international markets, 
technological change, and an emergent world society, as I have already mentioned. 
Other international or systemic explanations for domestic governance structures 
emphasize the ideas or interests of powerful global actors such as transnational 
corporations and hegemonic states like the U.S. Among domestically focused 
explanations, arguments about the autonomy of the state relative to other actors or 
differences in regime type are most commonly invoked to explain variation in national 
policy institutions or economic governance structures. 
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A. International Explanations 
 
Many scholars of IPE argue that globalization, acting through technological, 
market, and sociological processes, is leading to a convergence of cultures, economic 
practices, and regulatory structures. They point to the similarity of formal structures 
and practices (referred to by sociologists as institutional isomorphism) such as central 
banks, stock exchanges, regulatory practice, and economic openness.
 34 
The first generation of “second image reversed” theories explored how broad 
global historical forces such as the timing of industrialization or the product cycle 
shaped domestic institutions. More recent innovations have tried to link globalization 
and domestic politics using variations on the techno-market-based opportunity-cost 
analysis popularized by political scientists Jeffrey Frieden and Ronald Rogowski 
(1996). According to these arguments, states are passive adjusters to global market 
forces, as increasingly free, open, and voluminous financial flows in the international 
system impose rising opportunity costs on differentially positioned domestic actors. 
Following the logic of a pluralist model of political change, these domestic actors 
influence government policy and institution building. This view was partially 
successful in analyzing the effects of internationalization in pluralist polities such as 
OECD member states, where the dynamic density of interactions in trade, ideas, and 
communications, along with the democratic process, make the translation of actors’ 
changing policy preferences quicker and easier. The model suggests that this dynamic 
will be roughly the same for small open economies as it is for large relatively closed 
ones.
35 It is a “bottom-up” explanation that does not account very well for the state-
                                                 
34 The forces behind institutional isomorphism form the core empirical domain for the neo-
institutionalist research agenda (DiMaggio and Powell 1991). 
35 They reason that even in closed economies, financial openness in the world economy at large imposes 
increasing incentives on domestic economic actors, including the state, to liberalize economic policy 
including the capital account. For a contrary view regarding the politics of closed economies, see 
Evangalista (1996).  
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led, top-down financial reforms undertaken by strong states with relatively closed 
financial systems (Echeverri-Gent 1999). States such as this, like China and India, can 
proceed with some independence as either domestic or transnational actors. But the 
international economy does not act equally on all states, and the profile of each state’s 
exposure to international markets will shape the political incentives for domestic 
financial change. In this regard, China and India represent polar cases, with China 
enjoying a benign profile of external exposure and India suffering from a precarious 
one. 
Finance is a medium through which the influence of markets, social norms, 
technologies, ideas, and the interests of powerful actors spread around the world. Few 
now dispute the claim that global finance is a significant cause of domestic change and 
convergent policy tendencies among nations. But there is no prima facie means of 
ascertaining whether there are multiple intermediate equilibria, or only one ultimate 
convergence point. The most common explanations of convergence and economic 
reform, focusing on markets, “mislead us by portraying markets as determinants of 
outcomes rather than as stimuli to which national governments respond in distinct 
ways” (Vogel 1996, 262).
36 In other words, there is good reason to believe that “the 
accommodation between liberalizing LDCs (Less Developed Countries) and the global 
economy will, no doubt, reflect the diversity of economic endowments in late, late 
developers” (Chaudhry 1993, 254). This suggests that investigations of specific 
countries, and specific sectors within those countries, will reveal important differences 
in the manner in which they respond to global forces. These two ideas provide the 
structure of the following investigation. Securitization is taken as a “stimulus” in the 
                                                 
36 The market-based convergence model suggests that successes in Chinese and Indian financial reform 
“are the consequences of …institutions being allowed to converge with those of non-socialist market 
economies,” and that these successes are diminished as a function their degree of divergence from such 
models (Woo 1999, 117).  
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global economy and international society that provokes policy responses from states. 
This addresses a prominent debate among scholars of IPE and CPE over the degree to 
which such policy responses will tend toward convergence or diversity in governance 
regimes. 
Ideas are another important international variable often used to explain both 
convergence and diversity among national policy institutions (Darden 2000; Drezner 
2001; Goldstein and Keohane 1993; Sikkink 1991; Yee 1996). Indeed, the “idea” of 
securities markets is crucial to the Indian and Chinese changes in financial 
governance. But the outcomes I observe in India and China testify to the limit of ideas 
as a convergent force. The nominal structure of securities markets designated by the 
script of securitization has become a taken-for-granted intersubjective social fact in 
both countries. Even the most aggressive critics among Indian nationalists and 
Chinese “leftists” accept the stock and bond markets (at least in their domestic mode). 
The securities exchange and the basic script of securitization have been de-linked from 
the competition of economic ideas. However, the ideas of neoliberal marketization 
find expression in the projects of coalition members and in property rights institutions. 
It is the ideas expressed in the interaction of interests, and legacy institutions in 
response to securitization that generate diversity in newly forming policy institutions, 
and the governance regimes of which they are a part. The outcome of these political 
interactions circumscribes the effect of ideas on the development of governance 
regimes, and determines the degree and vector of convergence. 
It is not clear how an ideas-based argument could account for the variation in 
Chinese and Indian securities-related financial governance. The International Finance 
Corporation promoted the use of securities equally in both countries. The United 
States Agency for International Development provided assistance and training in 
securities market development to both countries. Moreover, China, the less eager  
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promoter of the “ideas” associated with securities markets, experienced a much higher 
volume of interaction with heavily securitized capitalism through its links with Hong 
Kong, Asia’s most advanced and active securities market. India had no equivalent. 
Both countries had a volume of foreign-trained economists and financial experts who 
were carriers of these ideas circulating in policy and business arenas.
37 
Ideas-based explanations suffer from the difficulty of determining which ideas 
matter. One of the most consistent messages from numerous interviews in both China 
and India was the persistence of competing ideas about how to proceed with 
securitization. Policy makers in both countries reported to me that from the 1994 
Mexican Peso crisis onward, there were active debates in both capitals about the 
merits of financial opening policies prescribed by neo-liberal economic ideas. The 
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) explained how, in 
debate with Ministry of Finance officials, he invoked the success of Malaysian 
controls on Singaporean stock holders as validating the use of ad hoc measures in 
managing foreign portfolio investment.
38 Likewise, an opponent of China’s push to 
establish a NASDAQ-like “second board”
39 argued that even before the March 2000 
NASDAQ crash, Chinese policy makers were wary because the idea of second boards 
didn’t seem to be doing so well in Japan and Hong Kong.
40 The flow of ideas about 
finance provides little insight into the difference between the two countries’ securities-
related financial governance regimes. However, the ideas behind the formulaic global 
securitization script are important as a stimulus to institutional response, in the same 
way as global markets and elements of global society. 
                                                 
37 Both countries suffered severe “brain drain” in the 1980s and 1990s, but there were also significant 
numbers of returnees, particularly in the 1990s (Desai, Kapur, and McHale 2001; Zweig, Chen, and 
Rosen 1995). 
38 Author’s interview, Bombay, 2000, #49. 
39 The idea, which became popular after the 1999 establishment of Hong Kong’s “Growth Enterprise 
Market” (GEM), was called the chuanye ban (“innovation board”). 
40 Author’s interview, Beijing, 2000, #17.  
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A final international explanation commonly deployed to explain national 
financial policies is the role and interests of powerful actors like transnational 
corporations (TNCs) or hegemonic powers such as the U.S. (Sobel 1994; Stopford and 
Strange 1991). On these accounts, a country with greater exposure to TNCs or U.S. 
power, or the U.S. financial episteme, would be more likely to undertake substantive 
reform (Wade 1998). This argument is best summarized by Andrew Sobel’s use of the 
“inside-out” view of financial reform in the U.S., U.K., and Japan in the 1980s. He 
argues for the importance of exposure to American interests in trade and other 
international interactions. It is not, he contends, opportunity costs or attributes of the 
international system that cause financial policy change in the domestic policy 
institutions of countries, but interaction with U.S. ideas backed by U.S. power (Sobel 
1994). 
For the last two decades, China has run a large trade surplus with the U.S.; 
many U.S. companies involved themselves in that trade, mostly as investors in export-
oriented joint ventures. This exposed China significantly to U.S. power and interests, 
while over the same period India’s exposure in these areas was minimal. Furthermore, 
during the 1980s and 1990s, great numbers of Chinese students attended American 
universities and were exposed to the U.S. educational emphasis on neo-liberal ideas of 
financial reform. Based on this exposure, Sobel’s model would lead us to expect that 
China, not India, should be the more aggressive adopter of U.S.-style financial 
institutions. Furthermore, when it had the chance, the U.S. did not push for 
securitization in India. The IMF, on whose board the U.S. enjoys a veto, did not 
include securities market reform in the conditionality requirements of its 1991 
structural adjustment loan to India. 
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B. Domestic Explanations 
The contrasting securities governance outcomes in China and India are not 
well explained by existing comparative political approaches to institutional change. 
Comparative politics scholars often argue that authoritarian regimes are better at 
pursuing economic reforms than are democracies.
41 Indeed, by the end of the 1990s, 
there was a general consensus that because of its one-party control, “by any account, 
China’s economic reform has been far more successful than India’s.”
42 The arguments 
about state capacity or state autonomy and about regime-type often get tangled 
together. The deductive expectation of such arguments is that governments with an 
electoral base will be less autonomous and less capable than authoritarian ones.
43 
China’s single-party state is generally understood to have a large degree of autonomy 
in economic policy making and a relatively high capacity to implement those policies 
(McCormick and Unger 1996; Rowen 1998; Weiss 1994).
44 India is considered to be a 
state with constrained autonomy, and little capability to implement policy (Evans 
1995; Herring 1999).
45 The common theoretical expectations for India predict a state 
captured by status quo-inclined interests, leading to particularistic biases favoring 
certain industries, sectors, or social groups. In China, the expectation is of the state as 
a relatively autonomous adjuster of policies, willing and able – because of its 
                                                 
41 While the evidence regarding regime type and the effectiveness of economic reform in industrial 
states and middle-income developers is mixed, there has been some agreement that in low-income 
developers, authoritarian systems may better facilitate economic reform (Chhibber and Eldersveld 
1995; Geddes 1995). 
42 Such analyses often stress GDP growth and scant the substantive institutional and political elements 
of “reform.” For example see, Studwell (1995). 
43 Such arguments emphasize politicians’ preference for re-election, while discounting the possible 
effects of inspired leadership shaping public opinion and overcoming organized interests, or the benefits 
of legitimacy conferred by strong electoral victories. For a good discussion of this generally, see 
Haggard et al (1992). For India, see Jenkins (1995). 
44 For a dissenting view with specific reference to the late 1990s, see Pei (2002). For a review of the 
more nuanced understandings of subnational variation in state capacity within China, see Chung (2000), 
and for India, see Kohli (1987). 
45 For a view of the contradictory nature of Indian state capacity, see Jenkins (1999).  
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monopoly control over political power – to undertake change where necessary in the 
interests of long-term welfare.
46 The explanation commonly given for this difference is 
that authoritarian regimes can stifle and control the opposition of organized political 
interests. Thus, India’s slow pace at reducing state intervention “is seen as a result of 
its democracy,” while China’s “spectacular success” is usually attributed “to the more 
authoritarian one party rule” (Chhibber and Eldersveld 1995, 74-75). 
Theories of state autonomy and state capacity would lead us to expect that the 
current beneficiaries of the financial status quo will resist changes in the regime of 
financial governance associated with increasing securitization (Stallings 1992).
47 
According to this line of reasoning, “weak” states like India would be unable to 
overcome such resistance. Any changes that did occur would reflect shifting interests 
among powerful status quo-disposed actors. By contrast, a “strong” and autonomous 
state such as China would exhibit the opposite dynamic.
48 The two cases confound 
such expectations. 
We see almost exactly the opposite of these expected outcomes in the real 
development of securities finance in the two countries. 1990s securities reform was 
state-led and top-down in both countries.
49 The irony is that in India’s multiparty 
pluralist political system, the state pushed ahead with neo-developmental securities 
                                                 
46 For India, see Harriss (1987), and Kohli (1990, Chapt. 11). For China, see McCormick et al (1996). 
47 Such expectations are based on the “Olsonian” logic of collective action, public choice theory, and 
the concepts of “neoclassical political economy” (Colander 1984). For an application of such arguments 
in various comparative cases, see Haggard et al (1992). One of the earliest expositions of the 
neoclassical political economy approach was in fact an empirical study of Indian economic policy 
(Krueger 1974).  
48 In a challenge to such arguments founded on Latin American and Eastern European case material, 
Hector Schamis has proposed that state autonomy explanations do not take the interests of the variety of 
economic actors seriously enough. He argues that beneficiaries of reform may be equally likely to 
prevail in promoting reform, based also on Olsonian logic, because “there are increasing opportunities 
for rent seeking during reform” – a possibility many scholars have ignored (Schamis 2002, 18). 
49 It is important to note, however, that the less spectacular but nevertheless significant securities reform 
of the 1980s in both countries included an important “bottom-up” dynamic. This was true for elements 
of corporatization in China. For discussions of this dynamic, see Zweig (1997), Ma (1999), and Yang 
(1998). It was also true for the early stages of the “equity cult” in India (McDonald 1998, especially 
Chapter 5).  
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reform in the face of societal opposition and in the absence of any existing societal 
constituency for reform. More ironically, in China’s one-party monopoly-sovereignty 
political system, the state pursued involuted reform in order to manage distributional 
and coalitional politics, and because it needed to calibrate property rights and 
corporate control in the absence of the contractual and institutional prerequisites for 
increasingly securitized finance. Why did the superficially more autonomous and 
capable Chinese state fail to reform its institutions of securities governance, while the 
apparently less independent and less capable Indian state moved ahead with vigor and 
a large measure of success? 
A corollary of domestic explanations based on regime type relates to the role 
of voters as potential investors, and the electoral politics of securitization. India has 
voters who are savers, and Indian voter-investors might be expected to use the 
electoral system to promote securities market reform. In China, where savers have no 
vote, one would expect them to have little voice in financial reform. To evaluate this 
subsidiary explanation, one would first want to explore potential collective action 
dynamics favoring the interests of incumbent concentrated financial interests over 
those of saver-voters. There were few such concentrated interests in India. However, 
there was an even less significant force of voter-investors, and where they existed they 
had been institutionally co-opted into the old regime of state-dominated directed-credit 
in a fashion similar to that of the large private businesses (Herring 1999). At the 
beginning of reform, the independent Indian investor base was small, but the 
“dependent” investor-voter base was relatively large, and it was co-opted into the old 
financial governance regime via a monopolistic state-owned mutual fund, the Unit 
Trust of India.
50 These investors had no incentive to reform the system because that 
                                                 
50 UTI, a statutory creation of the Indian parliament in the early 1960s heyday of Nehruvian mixed-
economy planning, is a government-run mutual fund that paid guaranteed returns on a portfolio that 
consisted largely of state-owned enterprise assets. It is the subject of extended analysis in Chapter Four.  
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would end the privileged position of UTI and threaten their guaranteed returns from 
that source. 
If electoral politics were important to financial policy in India, we would 
expect to see parliamentary activism on the issue of governance in securities finance. 
In the early 1990s, there was an extensive investigation by a Joint Parliamentary 
Commission (JPC) into the famous “Scam” of 1992.
51 Yet, it was the executive branch 
of government (the “permanent government” of bureaucrats) in the office of the 
Ministry of Finance – not the parliament of elected politicians – that took the lead in 
fashioning an institutional response in the aftermath of the scam, much as it had been 
doing since it first established the embryonic securities market regulator (SEBI) in 
1988.  
Turning to China, to the extent that citizen-investors affected securities market 
policy, they did so by voting with their savings. Unable to invest abroad due to the 
PRC’s strict capital controls, Chinese citizens kept their large savings
52 in bank 
deposits bearing negative real interest rates, investing only a small share of that pool in 
the securities market. This is because, with such a huge supply of individual savings 
chasing a limited supply of shares available to the public, valuations of Chinese shares 
in the late 1990s reached levels that were obviously inflated by any standard, and that 
were particularly unrealistic given the well known unprofitability of Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOEs).
53 To the extent that it considered citizens’ interests, the 
                                                 
51 This was the largest stock market fiasco in India history, and involved the illicit use of bank funds for 
speculation in the stock market, leading to volatile boom and bust. Not long after the JPC submitted its 
report, Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao resigned, partially due to the taint from allegations of his 
corrupt links to the powerful stock-broker Harshad Mehta, whose unethical and often illegal practices 
had been central to the progress of the scam. For detailed accounts of this event and its profound effect 
on subsequent Indian securities market development, see Basu et al (1993), and Barua et al (1993). 
52 China had an average savings rate of over 30% of GDP in the 1990s (Bank 2000). 
53 In the period since 1996, Chinese shares have traded at an average price-to-earnings ratio above 35/1. 
In 2002 they were at an unbelievable 57/1 (Commission 2001). As a matter of comparison, at the height 
of the 1990s boom, average Indian and American P/E ratios reached the range of 30-35/1. Eventually, 
wealthy Chinese savers got fed up with the Hobson’s choice and began investing informally in illegal 
banks and illegal asset management schemes (Rudolph 2002; Tsai 2002).  
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PRC government therefore had to accommodate itself to the “votes” cast by individual 
savers. Furthermore, the major element of China’s involuted securities policy was the 
development of an FGR designed specifically to channel stock market funds into the 
obsolescent SOEs. This capital market “subsidy” to the SOEs was part of the central 
government’s top priority effort to avoid instability by making good on the “Socialist 
Social Contract,” maintaining employment and the provision of social services linked 
to the SOE system. In other words, contrary to the expectation of policy autonomy for 
the authoritarian CCP state, the development of China’s securities-related governance 
regime was vulnerable to “societal interests” despite the country’s lack of formal 
democracy. 
Finally, if variation in regime type – democracy versus authoritarianism – is to 
explain the differing PRC and Indian outcomes, it must also account for why India 
does well at securities finance reform but badly in other economic sectors, both 
relative to itself and relative to China.
54 After all, voters are also consumers of water, 
transportation, communications, education, technology goods, and clean air, sectors 
where India lags relative to finance and to the same sectors in China. 
 
V. Selecting Cases, Applying Methods, Using Evidence 
 
Much of the research on the governance of securities finance has been focused 
on OECD countries that are open to capital flows and are therefore “easy cases” for 
the argument that global forces cause convergence. If we don’t see convergence in the 
OECD cases, that is, we aren’t likely to see it anywhere. But two key studies of OECD 
states, by political scientists Steven Vogel and Edward Laurence (discussed in the 
                                                 
54 For an excellent cross-sectoral analysis of regulation in India that discusses the success of financial 
regulation relative to other sectors, see Bhattacharya (2001).  
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introduction), were indeterminate on this question. In contrast to OECD countries, 
China and India severely restrict capital flows. Does this make them a “hard case” for 
convergence theory? At the same time, one conclusion drawn by this study is that, 
even if securities finance is seen as an “easy case” from the international perspective 
because of the size and scope of global securities finance, it should also be viewed as a 
“hard” case because of its crucial importance for the exercise of central state power. 
As discussed in chapter 2, securities finance in developing and transitional economies 
is an especially useful issue area in which to explore the transformation of state 
authority in the economy, because of the particular challenges it presents to the old 
developmental state mode of authority and the political arrangements that supported 
that mode of authority. 
One uncommon element of this research project is the introduction of India as 
a case study in the comparative analysis of economic transitions. It may often be 
analytically useful to corral post-communist states together, distinguishing between 
research on “post-Communist” or “post-socialist” political economy – classified as 
“transitions” – and research on other “mixed” or heavily socialized economies where 
the political economy of change is referred to as “liberalization” or “reform.” But such 
a distinction often elides some commonalities with other political economies, and may 
unnecessarily restrict the generalizability of research findings. This is the case with 
China and India in this issue area at least. Consequently, this research started by 
ignoring conventional professional divisions in comparative politics, attempting to 
develop a unified analysis of the politics of economic change in India and China. This 
should direct attention to the comparable elements of financial reform in the mixed 
economies of the two countries in 1990s. 
India and China are different countries in terms of many social, economic, and 
political factors. Their political economies do not permit the tight “matching” of  
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variables necessary to conduct a “Millian” comparison. However, the timing of 
securitization within the international economic system is the same, beginning in the 
early 1990s in both countries. The official stated objectives of the central states were 
also equivalent. The two countries adopted many of the same forms and idioms in 
developing securities finance. And most importantly, my findings suggest that, given 
the character of state control through systems of directed-credit and industrial 
planning, China and India were commensurable political economies when we compare 
the form and function of financial allocation to the organized corporate sector on the 
eve of securitization in the early 1990s. This rough matching of the cases is elaborated 
in chapter 4. 
Comparative research is conducted in a variety of ways. One typology of these 
methods conceives of comparative research as first considering a universe of relevant 
cases – the “sampling frame” – and then considering a specific number of cases to be 
studied in the actual analysis (the “units of analysis”). Table 3-2 is a graphic 
representation of this conception. The common debate in political science is between 
Cell I and Cell IV. 
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Table 3-2: 
Varieties of Comparative Case Selection
55 
 
Units of Analysis   
Large N  Small N 
Large N 
I. 
Laitin/Fearon 
“Explaining Ethnic 
Cooperation” 
II. 
Peter Katzenstein 
“Small States”  Sampling 
Frame 
Small N 
III. 
Ashuthosh Varshney  
“Ethnic Conflict” 
IV. 
Peter Hall 
“Governing the 
Economy” 
 
Taking formerly directed-credit DTEs as an example, the researcher would 
have chosen a sampling frame that is abundant (there are many DTEs, making it a 
reasonably large-n sampling frame). The researcher could then choose to study only 
two specific cases of DTEs, such as China and India. This would put the researcher in 
cell II, with a (moderately) large-n sampling frame, but a small-n number of units to 
analyze. Such is the orientation of this study. 
Using the dual imprint framework to understand the politics of securitization in 
specific empirical contexts involves a number of analytic choices. As Figure 3-3 
illustrated, three independent variables (the EEP, coalition politics, and property rights 
structure) shape the securities governance regime outcomes. Intervening among these 
                                                 
55 See Fearon (1996), Varshney (2002), Katzenstein (1985), Hall (1986).  
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are the preferences and strategies of the central-state-elite, and the configuration of 
financial actors (issuers/investors) with respect to different asset-classes 
(stocks/bonds). In weaving these together in a coherent analysis of securities 
governance regime outcomes, this argument relies on a combination of “rationalist” 
and “sociological” approaches. Without explicit analytic recognition of the 
preferences, strategies, and sequencing of them among central-state actors and other 
actors, it is difficult to make sense of the politics of securitization. The “process 
tracing” approach to case comparisons used here requires the investigator to examine 
closely the “decision process by which various initial conditions are translated into 
outcomes” (George and McKeown 1985, 35). This is not necessarily inconsistent with 
the sociological institutionalism that anchors the overall analytic framework of the 
thesis. As economic sociologist Neil Fligstein writes, “a sociological theory of action 
needs to take rational actor views seriously in the sense that actors do pursue interests 
and aggressively engage in strategic interaction. But it must ‘sociologize’ them by 
making actors collective, and motivate their actions by having them orient their 
strategic behavior to groups” (Fligstein 2001 p. 11). 
Political Scientist Jeffrey Frieden has argued that it is helpful to start with a 
“theory of preferences” (Frieden 1999). He suggests that the analyst be explicit about 
how she arrives at the preferences she ascribes to key actors. I specify preferences 
both deductively and inductively. We already have existing theories of Chinese and 
Indian state preferences and political coalitions that point us in the right direction, and 
fieldwork results allows me to get hints of “private information” that facilitate 
refinement of these. Moreover, I can further supplement my specification of these 
preferences by matching and comparing my observations of contentious debate with 
private information hints, public documents, and expert “local knowledge.”  
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In both “rounds” of my argument – the “structure of international exposure” 
round, and the “process of domestic politics” round – I use two of the techniques 
Frieden recommends for ascertaining actor preferences. I combine theoretically 
derived specifications of Chinese and Indian central elite preferences with inductively 
inspired inferences about preferences based on the research process discussed above. 
In round one – how each country’s structure of external exposure interacts with 
fundamental central-state-elite preferences – I rely on previously existing theories in 
the China and India literature, supplementing them with some observations about 
preferences from my field research. In round two, the domestic central-state-elites 
devise policies and institution-building strategies based on preferences formed in the 
previous round. Those strategies must be devised in interaction with the dominant 
political coalition and the prevailing structure of property rights. To follow this 
process of strategic-interaction-based institution building, I use a synthesis of 
deductive and inductive techniques to specify the identities and interests of the 
relevant actors – that is, the asset-class/financial-position matrix. These intensive 
analytic demands are not surprising, given that round two is much more focused on 
process, and that this political action is occurring within the more “dynamically dense” 
context of domestic politics.
56 
The asset-class/financial-position matrix furnishes an important part of the 
“structure” for the “structured-focused” comparison of these two cases. In a 
structured-focused comparison, the researcher seeks some “congruence” among the 
cases in order to facilitate a careful tracing of the processes that lead to the particular 
outcomes in question. In multi-case, cross-country comparisons, the researcher must 
craft a compelling focus for the comparison. Methodologically, the matrix provides 
                                                 
56 Ruggie defines dynamic density as “the quantity, velocity and diversity of transactions that go on 
within society” (Ruggie 1982).  
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this kind of common analytic framework for tracing the politics of securitization. It 
does not provide a theory of change in securities governance regimes, but it does 
facilitate the process-tracing analysis central to structured, focused comparison by 
providing some deductive guidance to be applied uniformly within and across cases. 
That guidance helps identify actors, specify their structural position, and infer their 
preferences. It also demonstrates that these basic elements of the political dynamics of 
securitization are comparable across cases, even if the socio-political context in which 
that process occurs is not perfectly commensurable.  
Finally, George and McKeown advise researchers conducting “structured, 
focused, comparison” to proliferate observable implications that apply across the cases 
under examination (and hopefully beyond them as well) (George and McKeown 
1985). So, while the number of institutional pieces comprising securities governance 
regimes (state, market, and civil society) and a number of intermediate outcomes they 
influence (the elements in Figure 3-5 such as enterprise/public finance, etc.) are 
analytically challenging, they also offer a useful opportunity to tease out more 
observable implications to be deployed in the analysis. To find evidence about these 
outcomes and the processes that produced them in the policy making and institution 
building process, I relied on macro-economic and financial data, official documents, 
biographies, newspapers, interviews, and also secondary sources such as more detailed 
studies of securities finance, coalition politics, and property rights in China and India. 
This is neither a typical IPE monograph nor a typical CPE monograph. IPE 
studies are expected to “take sides,” arguing that the outcome they are explaining is 
primarily determined by either domestic or international factors. Akin to much of the 
economic and political sociology work from which it draws, the framework I deploy 
in this study emphasizes, empirically and theoretically, the meso-level. First, it 
investigates a “local social order” – governance in a specific sector of the economy –  
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securities finance. Second, the framework locates the social construction of securities 
governance regimes at the mezzanine between the celebrity forces of globalization on 
the international floor above, and the rough and tumble of domestic coalitions and 
property rights on the domestic floor below. In the cases at hand, institutionalization of 
securities governance regimes in China and India entails precisely the process neo-
institutionalists hope to understand: how powerful actors, ideas, and ambient structural 
forces interact with local social orders. 
I devised the dual imprint framework because I judged it the best fit with the 
evidence collected in the field. Those materials, however, were not selected 
haphazardly. They were selected based on deductive inferences derived from theories 
of global convergence and state-economy relations during marketization. I use the 
dual imprint explanation to represent analytically my explicit empirical conclusion 
that variation in the Chinese and Indian securities governance regimes can’t be 
satisfactorily accounted for by either domestic or international factors alone, or even 
that one of these can reasonably be considered more important than the other. The 
explanation is not, therefore, stark in its parsimony. But one of its conclusions, that 
China may be worse off and India better off than many think, is at least moderately 
counterintuitive, and I hope that the analysis will convince the reader that this 
particular combination of factors was the most reasonable trade-off between 
parsimony and explanatory scope in two distinctly non-trivial cases. 
 
A. Final Thoughts on Method 
The theoretical expectations of the techno-market approach would predict that 
the securitization changes of the early1990s globally and locally opened avenues for 
the operation of such political processes.  The theory assumes that the opportunity  
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costs of a country’s relative economic closure and divergent policy regime are steadily 
rising. 
Even before considering the empirical record, this is a puzzling assumption.  It 
often puts financial economists who agree with the argument and who therefore favor 
more aggressive financial liberalization in the awkward position of ignoring the 
fundamental principle of their own discipline: That returns are related to risks.  The 
returns from openness should be no different, and rational domestic actors 
contemplating external or internal financial reform would calculate the risks as costs 
just as they calculate potential returns as benefits. 
Considering the empirical record, the assumption of steadily rising opportunity 
costs is also puzzling; particularly from the perspective of the late 1990s.
57  For 
government and business in DTEs contemplating financial reform, the mid-1990s 
brought new information about how to calculate the opportunity costs of their 
financial governance regimes.  As a series of spectacular international financial crises 
unfolded beginning mid-decade, vivid evidence crowding the news highlighted the 
real and potential costs of international and domestic financial opening.  The parade of 
disasters that began in late 1994 with the Mexican Peso crisis, continued with the 1997 
East Asian Crisis, spread with the 1998 Brazilian and Russian debt crises, and 
culminated ominously with major American banks’ bailout of Long Term Capital 
Management (LTCM) at the very heart of the open international capital system.  These 
events could reasonably be construed as evidence of significant potential costs to be 
weighed against the benefits of domestic and international financial openness, and by 
                                                 
57 International economists began turning their attention to this problem in the mid-1990s.  The 
conclusions for national economies were not unlike those for financial firms.  That is, the development 
of prudential norms and mechanisms for risk management were essential to protect financial firms from 
devastating losses as they increased their exposure to international financial activity Rodrick 2001).  
Countries, the argument goes, like firms, must cultivate “software” such as appropriate institutions and 
practices as a basis for stable and equitable market development.  
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late 1997 many governments and businesses had begun to re-evaluate their rational 
expectations of the opportunity costs of relative closure.  As a consequence, in the 
second half of the 1990s we did not witness a unidirectional bottom-up operation of 
the internationalization and convergence mechanisms predicted by opportunity cost 
theories.  What happened? 
It is true that there is some evidence supporting the unidirectional variant of the 
techno-market opportunity cost approach, particularly when one looks at leading 
Indian sectors such as software and services (both commercial and financial).  Both of 
these sectors have been aggressive lobbiers favoring greater capital account flexibility, 
improved corporate governance, greater flexibility in industrial organization (M&A), 
and improved enforcement and disposition of financial claims (bankruptcy and 
creditor claims).  For this reason there is no denying the existence of bottom-up 
political momentum in the convergence of financial governance structures.  But, in 
China, for example, the growth of financial interests has not always led in directions 
that opportunity cost theories would predict.  For example, in 2001 it was the domestic 
securities industry that scuttled the government's plan to sell down the state's large 
ownership of shares in SOEs. 
However, the predicted changes that did occur were accompanied by many 
changes that contradict the expectations of liberalizing change.  I have explained 
above how Chinese and Indian profiles of external exposure produced political 
incentives that shaped the policy trend in which securities-related financial governance 
proceeded during the crucial first half of the 1990s.  But a remarkable feature of the 
Chinese and Indian patterns of securities governance identified here is their durability.  
Despite repeated indications that the discretionary involution equilibrium in China was 
about to be upset in favor of fundamental reforms in 1997, 1999 with a change in the 
procedure for listing companies, following and finally with the WTO signing in 2001,  
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and with the opening to institutional investors in 2002, the pattern still persists.  In 
2003 the U.S. and Chinese authorities clashed over the keystone of China's capital 
control policy, the Yuan peg to the American dollar.  U.S. Treasury Secretary Snow 
and Commerce Secretary Evans both made forays to Beijing in the first of many 
skirmishes over policies related to Chinese central control of finance.  The Chinese 
had hoped to head this problem off by making a seemingly significant concession by 
permitting foreign investors (read U.S. financial service providers) an opportunity to 
participate in the country's share markets through a specially mediated route known as 
the "Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor" program.  In India faced a spectacular 
fiasco in 2001, and major embarrassments in the mutual fund industry in 1998 and 
2001.  Nationalist and quasi-socialist resistance to further privatization and 
modernization in the securities sector continues.
58  In spite of this resistence, the 
constrained evolution pattern with its state-led emphasis has also persisted. 
In numerous interviews with Chinese and Indian financial policy makers, the 
most common justifications given for gradualist changes to their regimes of financial 
governance, particularly securities markets and capital controls were presented with 
reference to the East Asian Crisis and the LTCM bailout.  One international economist 
who frequently advises the Chinese government said simply, "Even pre-Asian 
Financial Crisis, they were reluctant to allow foreign participation in equity markets 
and the Asian financial crisis only bolstered this view."
59  Several of my foreign-
trained interlocutors also commented on the ill effects of the junk bond fueled savings 
                                                 
58 The left in India persists in criticizing the securities governance regime, often on reasonable concerns 
about volatility and inequality.  However, not only does the Left fail to fails to propose useful 
substantive alternatives.  They don't even bother to make any alternative proposals. See, Ghosh (Ghosh 
2002b) and Chandrasekhar (2003).  The nationalists, best represented by the vocal and well-organized 
Swadeshi Jagran Manch (SJM), has opposed the reliance on foreign portfolio investment and related 
measures at every step.  The SJM, a small but influential member of the pariwar (family) of Hindu 
nationalist parties and groups, does not oppose marketization of securities finance, only 
internationalization.  Author's interview, Chennai, 2000, #59. 
59 Author's confidential correspondence,  2002, #6182.  
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and loan crisis in the US as an example of overzealous domestic deregulation and 
excessive financial complexity.
60 
This misfit between theory and evidence does not fatally undermine the 
techno-market-based opportunity cost approach.  Rather, they do not adequately 
consider the implications of their own assumptions.  There is more then a hint of 
teleology in many applications of the approach.  The argument presented here suggests 
an important revision based on the politics of institutional change in cases of state-led 
reform and severe turbulence in the international economy.  As this discussion of 
Indian and Chinese external exposure profiles suggests, variation in countries' juncture 
with the world economy means domestic actors do not face a uniform set of 
incentives.  Furthermore, conditions in the international economy do not present a 
uniform and unidirectional set of incentives over time.  The benefits of international 
openness were calculated very differently before the 1994 Mexican Peso Crisis than 
they were after the 1997-1998 Asian and other crises.  The opportunity costs of 
closure, and more importantly governments and businesses perceptions of them, do 
only go up.  Opportunity costs and perceptions of them can fluctuate just as they do 
for any other costs, and risks.  In particular, the variability in the “uncertain” risks (a 
la Knight) associated with the human element behind the global economy, were 
reckoned very highly as such by Chinese and Indian policy makers and business 
people in the late 1990s. 
                                                 
60 Various interviews in China and India, author’s notes 1999 to 2001.  
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Chapter Four 
 
FINANCE AND THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE IN CHINA AND INDIA: COMPARISONS AND 
ANTECEDENTS 
 
Chinese and Indian state responses to the global securitization boom in the 
early 1990s began at the same time.  In this chapter, I argue that at the time of these 
responses, the two countries’ financial systems were comparable.  Both sheltered their 
capital-scarce economies from the downside of capricious effects and the upside 
benefits of global finance.  Both Chinese and Indian policy makers have, over the last 
decade, applied themselves to the institutional development of the finance sector.  In 
spite of these similar beginnings, a shared emphases on capital control, and a common 
goal of financial market evolution, there are significant differences in the outcomes we 
observe today in the governance of Chinese and Indian securities finance.  This 
chapter addresses describes and explains the important points of comparison in the 
two cases in the period preceding the 1990s global securitization push. 
The contrast between the two countries’ patterns of securities governance 
discussed in the later chapters becomes clearer if we first consider: 1) the formulaic 
character of the securitization script; and 2) the similarity of Chinese and Indian 
financial governance regimes and their relationship to organized industry in the period 
preceding reform.  The formulaic nature of the securitization script was outlined in 
chapter 2 and is elaborated throughout this thesis in discussions of the asset-
class/financial-position matrix.
1  The purpose of this chapter is to provide an 
                                                 
1 This “formula,” elaborated in chapter 2, includes the main enactors of the script (issuers and 
investors), the main devices of the script and their attributes (stocks and bonds), and the main venue for 
the script (the securities exchange).  The actual narrative or plot followed by the script – its enactment  
– however, is not predetermined.  It is the result of the politics shaping the configuration of state, 
market, and civil society.  That configuration yields a country’s particular securities governance regime.  
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assessment of these countries’ financial governance regimes prior to reform.  This is a 
necessary point of comparison that advances the analysis in two ways.  First, it helps 
to reveal more clearly the variation in post-reform governance regime outcomes that I 
seek to explain.  Second, it helps identify possible historical and institutional reasons 
for that variation. 
This chapter refers to the pre-securitization history of China and India to make 
several points that are important to the dissertation's subsequent analysis.  First, since 
China and India had different polities – China authoritarian and closed, India 
democratic and open – one might think they had very different economies, and in 
particular that India had an open economy to match its open politics.  One point of this 
chapter is to stress that on the eve of securitization in the 1980s, both countries had 
comparably controlled regimes of financial governance.  Second, the most common 
reaction to a comparison of Chinese and India securities finance is reference to the 
long history of stock markets in India.  It is true that the Bombay bourse, established 
in 1875, is Asia's stock exchange, but while that history may indeed be long, this 
chapter explains that it is not very significant, at least in the period from Independence 
until 1991.  Securities finance in pre-reform India was co-opted to the directed-credit 
regime of India's developmental state.  Stock markets were marginalized in an 
innocuous and largely irrelevant enclave.  Third, past as prologue.  In spite of 
similarities in the way both states controlled finance, the future differences in the 
development of securities governance were nevertheless foreshadowed by the basic 
principles of private property, and the ability of the state to act autonomously.  These 
elements are identifiable in the antecedents discussed here. 
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I. Developmental States, State Capacity, and Financial Control 
 
In countries such as China and India facing the problem of economic 
backwardness, control of finance was a pragmatic tool in the race to "catch up."  This 
control of finance had political effects, shaping the state and its political relations with 
society and powerful actors economic actors.  In this section I summarize briefly the 
ways in which the developmental aspect of these states relate to the analysis of 
securitization and financial reform.  Why was the dominant form of the state in China 
and India so interventionist?  Following the work of economic historian Alexander 
Gerschenkron (1962) and political scientist Kiren Chaudhry (1993) I argue that the 
severe dirigiste aspect of some developmental states is related to the issues of state 
capacity and the prerequisites for capitalist development.  I take state socialism to be 
the most extreme form of the dirigiste developmental state. 
Hungarian economist Janos Kornai has mapped the “classic” socialist 
economic and political system.  In his model, which stylizes the facts of numerous 
socialist economies, the dominance of a single party and its associated ideology are 
the common wellspring of the socialist system – the ultimate cause of the socialist 
economic outcomes he identifies.
2  The other two structuring elements of the socialist 
political economy (property rights and bureaucratic coordination) emerge from this 
initial party-ideology component.  In this model, the purpose of state-led socialist 
developmentalism was “forced growth.”
3 
                                                 
2 It is worth noting that in India a single party, the Congress Party, has ruled at the federal center for 45 
of the years since Indian independence in 1947.  Until 1991, this hegemonic perennial incumbent 
pursued a remarkably consistent economic policy, e.g. significant dedication to directed-credit finance 
and a large measure of socialist commitment. 
3  The notion of “forced growth” which Kornai seems to accept, necessarily implies the existence of an 
alternative, that of “natural growth.”   In what system does growth occur “naturally”?  Kornai suggests 
an answer in his chapter on property.  In the section “Capitalism, Socialism, and Property” he makes the 
extraordinary claim that “though the regulations of the state gives a greater boost to capitalist ownership 
in certain periods, one certainly could not say that the state had organized capitalism’s development and  
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Kornai’s model seems so elegant because all the elements of the system appear 
to flow logically from this conjuncture of ideology and single-party absolutism. This 
elegance may seduce the reader into accepting the inevitability of the system’s 
evolution as he presents it.  However, other scholars studying the specific 
paradigmatic cases from which Kornai derived his model have proposed alternative 
hypotheses to explain the growth of developmental state-socialist intervention. 
Specifically, scholars looking at Lenin’s New Economic Policy in the USSR 
(Nove 1982), the pre-collectivization period in China (Shue 1980), and the first three 
five-year plans in India (Chibber 2003) have argued that alternative, less 
comprehensively controlling versions of state socialism were tried and abandoned.  
They were discarded, however, not because the state preferred to exercise a 
preponderant role, but, on the contrary, because these states were administratively 
incapable of regulating mixed economies on near-continental scales.  This is a very 
different motivation from that proposed by Kornai to explain the preponderant state 
role that coincided with socialist-inspired ideology and single-party dominance.
4  
Moreover, this alternative account of dirigiste interventionism provides an equally 
sound explanation for why these states focused so much on the control of finance. 
Chaudhry has made a compelling argument that the colonization of the 
economy by the plan was not inevitable in these cases.  The plan in many developing 
countries, she suggests, was a policy driven, not by the desire of strong states to 
intervene in their countries’ economies, but rather, in large measure as a defensive 
reaction of weak states lacking the capacity to create national markets. They were, in 
                                                 
stabilization” (1992, 87).  Such a statement requires a certain forgetfulness, both with regard to 
capitalist development in the early modern period (Polanyi 1957), and with regard to the stabilizing 
policies that followed the Great Depression and the growth of the Keynesian Welfare State in the 
second part of the 20
th century (Ruggie 1982).  States played an important role in dismantling the pre-
capitalist institutions that obstructed the growth of competitive market forces.  They continue to do so in 
fighting the monopolistic tendencies of large business. 
4 For an extended version of this argument, see Chaudhry (1993).  
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short, “strong weak states.”
5  From an institutionalist, market-building-as-state-
building perspective, the “political conquest” (Vogel 1969) of the economy in China 
after 1955 was not driven by state strength, but by state weakness.  The “world time” 
of the post-World War Two decolonization and third-world self-reliance era 
encouraged China’s early dirigiste autarky (Skocpol 1979).  In India, the occupation 
of the economy’s “commanding heights” by Nehru’s Planning Commission, and the 
state-run heavy, urban industrialization had a similar dynamic.  Writing about a group 
of countries that – like China and India – had heterogeneous pasts and even varietal 
differences under socialism, economic historian Ivan Berend explained that the Soviet 
model “rendered Europe east of the Elbe more homogenous than it had ever been 
before.” Berend’s ultimate conclusion was as true for China and India as it was for 
Hungary and Poland: “The role of the state in socialist transformation,” he wrote, 
“became practically absolute” (1986, 168). 
Thus, the reason for such extensive planning and the establishment of such 
hard-to-break institutional path-dependencies began with a lack of state capacity to 
establish unified national markets (Chaudhry 1993; Shue 1980; Solinger 1984).  As 
Chaudhry explains, “direct state participation in the (economy)…serves as an 
administrative shortcut.  At a purely administrative level, the involvement of the state 
as a producer, direct employer, and lender in countries lacking a regulatory 
infrastructure is simpler than, and thus preferable to, the much more elusive alternative 
of creating and regulating a market economy” (1993, 252 italics added).  The 
interventionist episodes from 1955-1978 in China, and 1947-1984 in India, did not 
resolve this problem.  They merely forestalled its resolution, and produced the 
                                                 
5 This phrase is borrowed from Rudolph and Rudolph (1987), and I take it to be consistent with the 
argument of Shue (1980; 1988).  
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institutional legacy that constrains the options available to financial reformers in the 
current period.  
In India, government occupation of the economy’s “commanding heights” 
emphasized state administration and direction of finance.  This reached its zenith with 
the bank nationalizations of 1969 and 1980.  While preserving the principle of private 
property and private enterprise, a combination of institutions and practices produced, 
in India’s ancien regime of financial governance, a situation functionally equivalent to 
that of the pragmatic socialist financial regime operating in China by the end of the 
1980s.
6  
 
A.  The Singular Logic of Financial Control across Developmental States 
 
Both states considered finance to be a crucial sector, and as Gerschenkron 
(1962 (1951)) suggested in his “backwardness” thesis, Chinese and Indian state 
structures had been profoundly influenced – ideologically and organizationally – by 
the imperatives of capital accumulation.
7  This is consistent with the theory of 
pragmatic socialism first proposed by Hilferding in his Finance Capital (1981 (1910)) 
and later put into practice by Lenin in the April Theses (1975 (1917)).  Both men 
argued that state domination of finance was the key to socialist planning, and that 
control of the rest of the capitalist enterprise system was less important.  The 
justification for directed-credit exercised through state control of the banks, and the 
                                                 
6 For an exposition of finance in “orthodox socialism,” see Kornai (1992, especially Chapters Eight, 
Nine, and Twenty Three).  For a summary of the formal and institutional changes that shifted Chinese 
financial allocation flows from ministries to banks during the 1980s, see Lardy (1998, Chapter Three). 
7 The Chinese Communist Party, for example, refers ominously to finance as the “life-blood” of the 
country (Johnson 1999).  In the period from Indian Independence to the first stirring of economic 
reform in the mid-1980s, there was a secular trend of increasing state domination of finance (Dhar 
2000; Patel 2002, Chapter 7; Sen and Vaidya 1997).  
 
168 
precursor to the monobank concept that eventually prevailed in China and the Soviet 
Union, found its most clear expression in these two formulations. 
To argue that Kornai’s model overshoots in its claims regarding the causal 
priority of party and ideological dominance is not to say that these don’t matter.  
Indeed, Kornai’s view that analysts must adopt a “system paradigm” in studying 
national political economies, either in their socialist or transitional forms, explicitly 
stresses that various parts of a system – material, social, and ideological – may vary in 
their relative importance over time.  A system paradigm is an analytic framework that 
deals, “not just with individual details of the economy but with the system as a whole, 
and not just with the economy but with the political, ideological and social 
dimensions, paying special heed to the interactions between each sphere” (Kornai 
2000).  Kornai’s analysis of the “socialist system” is an example of the system 
paradigm whose lineage includes the work of Marx, Polanyi, and Schumpeter, among 
others.  Kornai has regarded the study of post-socialist transition to be the priority for 
inquiry among students of the system paradigm today.  The research presented in this 
thesis is intended to help clarify the changing relationship between the state and 
finance in this context. 
The model Kornai presented in The Socialist System is useful to this analysis in 
two ways.  First, Kornai’s model outlines the core elements of socialist systems.  
Almost all the challenges of market reform in post-socialist cases relate to the key 
elements Kornai identifies: state dominance, ownership/property rights, 
interventionism, plan bargaining (that is, vertical bargaining within the state), soft-
budgets, and price-insensitivity.  The second way in which Kornai’s model is useful is 
in assisting in the conduct of sociological and historical-institutional analysis, which  
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requires that we identify the elemental features of what came before. This is not 
controversial.  However, the problem is identifying which antecedents are important.
8 
After the initial industrialization drive in late developers like China and India – 
in most cases this coincided with the first two five-year plans – socialist productivity 
(extensive not intensive) began to level off or slow significantly.  Later, this moderate 
growth was insufficient to compensate for the absence of innovation and the other 
costs of autarky.  The system began to collapse almost everywhere by the early 1980s.  
Why, then, do we care today about the structures of this old system? And how can 
Kornai’s model help us distinguish and diagnose the patterns and pathologies of 
reform in political economies emerging from variations of the classical socialist 
system? 
Had enough change occurred in the Chinese and Indian socialist systems in the 
period before the early 1990s securitization drive to relegate Kornai’s model to the 
role of a quaint historical reminder?  Or were there still historical-institutional 
antecedents persisting into the 1980s which rendered Kornai's model relevant for a 
binary comparison of the two country cases?   This exercise suggests that, based 
largely on the singular logic of financial control across varieties of developmental 
states, as well as on the reliance on directed-credit systems of finance in marketizing 
socialism, the two cases are comparable.  The similarity of these directed-credit 
systems highlights several points of comparison: the mode of government financial 
control in developmental states (i.e. directed-credit), as well as the purpose of such 
control.  State intervention was a reasonable response to limited state capacity, and as 
Lenin and Hilferding pointed out, was a powerful tool of state intervention in the 
economy.  The levers of finance are the best way to exercise control over economy 
and society. 
                                                 
8 There is a danger of infinite regress.  How far back is far enough?  
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Despite this similarity, there are also many important differences between 
China and India.  While similarities in state financial control ground the comparison, 
variation in macroeconomic and institutional contexts (beyond finance) offer 
important potential explanations for differences in the governance regime outcomes of 
reform. 
 
II. Comparing Financial Governance in India and China Prior to Securitization 
 
Chinese and Indian finance were comparable on the eve of the securitization 
boom.  This is a point of comparison between the two countries' systems of political 
economy that is not always well understood.   In this section I explain the dimensions 
of state control of finance that make the two systems commensurable. 
The comparability of Chinese and Indian financial governance circa 1990 
depends on the recognition that finance was the least “mixed” sector of India’s “mixed 
economy.”  The central state-socialist organization of Chinese finance was simple and 
easy to identify.  But in India, the existence of private property and a thriving realm of 
small- and medium-scale free-market production and exchange might confuse the 
casual observer.  Despite this zone of economic independence, in aggregate, India’s 
mixed economy was, until 1991, subject to extensive planning and central 
administration, particularly in the “organized” sector.
9 
The consensus view of India’s political economy prior to 1991 was 
summarized thus: the “private sector’s decisions in all significant areas – investment, 
expansion, use of foreign exchange, and imports – are regulated by a system of 
licensing and controls that imposes social objectives and public priorities on the 
                                                 
9 This is large-scale enterprise (employing at least 100 workers) that is subject to specific regulation.  
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calculations, decisions, and costs of private firms” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 26).  
Making this Sino-Indian comparison more compelling is the fact that, in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, a significant source of growth in the Chinese economy came from the 
informal sector, particularly if semi-private township and village enterprises are 
included in that category.  As in the China of the 1980s and early 1990s, so too in 
India:  labor and capital as organized interests were marginal forces in the political 
arena. 
Describing the conditions prevailing in India in the 1980s, two experts painted 
a picture that could just as well have describe the role of the state in China's post-Mao 
reformist period during the same decade: 
 
Much of the organizational and representational “space” occupied by 
pluralist  actors  and  processes  in  the  Anglo-American  world  and  by 
societal corporatism in Western Europe is occupied in India by state 
agencies. This is not surprising in a state that opted, in the industrial 
policy resolutions of 1948 and 1956, for a mixed economy in which the 
public  sector  would  dominate  the  “commanding  heights”:  that 
nationalized finance capitalism – banks and insurance – in the 1960s; 
and that had at its command a proliferating series of state long-term 
lending  institutions.    By  occupying  the  commanding  heights  of 
industrial  and  finance  capital,  the  state  also  came  to  occupy  the 
commanding heights of the representational infrastructure.  At the same 
time,  the  line  between  the  public  and  private  sectors  has  become 
increasingly obscure, as state-controlled lending institutions and equity 
holders – (such as state owned financial intermediaries like the Life 
Insurance Corporation of India or the government-run mutual fund, the 
Unit Trust of India) – have acquired sufficient equity in private-sector 
firms  to  give  them,  potentially,  the  power  to  control  management 
(Rudolph and Rudolph 1987, 255). 
 
To be sure, control of organized business was not exercised in the same way in both 
China and India, but the net effects of that control were very similar, and finance 
played a key role in both.  
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In both countries, the financial decisions of large enterprises were determined 
by the plan in two ways.  On the supply side, allocation was determined by quintennial 
and annual allocations through ministries, state-run banks, and (in India) state-run 
development financial institutions (DFIs). At the first level, most fixed asset 
investment and infrastructure spending came from plan allocation of grants flowing 
through ministries and state corporations to state-owned enterprises and construction 
projects. At the second level, bank credit
10 to industrial corporations was controlled by 
“policy lending,” government-administered interest rates, and targeted lending quotas. 
At the third level, government control of bank management meant that lending 
decisions were implicitly (or in China, explicitly) controlled by the state. 
On the demand side, the state indirectly determined large firms’ financial 
requirements by licensing procedures (in India) and production quotas (in both 
countries).
11  Writing in 1985, one close observer of the range of Indian organized 
industries concluded, “there are few, if any, purely private large-scale enterprises in 
India today.”
 12  Internationally, both countries were very strict in their control of 
capital flows, creating a situation in which foreign sources of finance in the form of 
FDI, credit, or grant aid were incorporated into the system of administered finance.
13  
In sum, the plan, systems of directed credit, licensing and production quotas, and 
capital control in India circa 1988 all combined into a system that produced a regime 
of financial governance that was, in its impact, comparable to the “un-mixed,” 
orthodox socialist regime of financial governance operating in China at that same 
time. 
                                                 
10 Bank “lending” in China only begins in recognizable forms in the 1980s (Bowles and White 1993). 
11 For China see Naughton (1996). 
12 Erdman quoted in Rudolph and Rudolph (1987, 31).  Also, see Erdman (1989). 
13 See the summaries of capital control measures listed in Figures 4-1 (for China) and 4-5 (for India).  
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Both countries had securities markets before the 1990s.  These are discussed at 
greater length below.  China’s pre-1990s securities finance developed willy-nilly, was 
poorly regulated, and had little influence on government or large-scale industry.  In 
India, there was what I call a “securities finance enclave,” tolerated and even 
cultivated by the Nehruvian developmental state as long as the enclave’s denizens did 
not challenge their ghettoized status.  I argue, therefore, that during the 1980s the role 
of securities in the financial governance of both countries was an uneven mix, 
characterized largely by severe repression in accordance with the singular logic of 
developmental state directed-credit regimes, yet unable or unwilling to completely 
squeeze out a small element of haphazard “marketness” and independent irregularity.  
Thus, while neither stocks nor bonds played a significant role in allocating financial 
resources or in shaping the real economy, they were tolerated.  It is nevertheless very 
important to carefully map out and distinguish the ways in which pre-1990s financial 
structures (including incipient securities finance) interacted with political coalitions 
and with property rights structures. 
During the 1990s, however, securitization proceeded in response to the global 
techno-market and social forces, further encouraged by both countries’ broad projects 
of state-led financial reforms.  There were dramatic formal changes in both countries’ 
securities markets, accompanied by varying degrees of substantive change in the 
institutions of financial governance.  Why was the transformation of China’s product, 
transport, and communications sectors so aggressive – formally dramatic and 
substantively thorough – compared to the mere formalism of securities reform?  Why 
was the transformation of India’s securities sector so dramatic and thorough, while 
reform in other sectors persisted in what political scientist Atul Kohli likes to call its 
“middling” character?  Why are there such different outcomes in the patterns of 
Chinese and Indian securities finance in the first decades of reform?  
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III. Chinese Securities Finance before the 1990s 
 
In the autumn of 1987, the practice of financial capitalism in China 
experienced one of its most unrestrained moments since the pre-World War One 
Shanghai rubber boom (Thomas 2001).  Less than a decade after reform began, bonds 
and stocks were traded willy-nilly among individuals and institutions around the 
country, using methods ranging from quasi-formal over-the-counter exchange to 
completely unregulated kerb trading.  While China’s formal securities markets today 
are vastly larger than they were in 1987, they are in many ways more constrained.  In 
this section, I outline the characteristics of the early development of Chinese securities 
finance, before the 1990s global securitization push and the development of the 
discernable discretionary involution governance regime for securities finance in the 
mid-1990s.  The period of approximately a decade from the issuance of the first bonds 
in 1981 and progressive liberalization, through the reaction of the late 1980s ending 
with the establishment of formal exchanges in 1990, lends itself to clear division into 
two phases. In what follows, I identify and assess some of the most important market 
characteristics and policy changes, highlighting en route the heterodox outcomes and 
uneven regulation of this period.  This serves to accentuate the multiplicity of possible 
trajectories or futures that might have come from this early start.  This historical tour 
d’horizon should serve as an important empirical base from which to gauge the 
institutional change that emerged during the 1990s, and to evaluate the policy choices 
that drove those changes.  
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A.  “Wild West” Liberalization and Chinese Securities Finance: 1981-1987
14 
 
As Deng Xiaoping and his team of economic reformers set about refashioning 
China’s economy in the post-Mao era, a range of changes took place.  For the state 
itself, growing macroeconomic instability in the form of increased deficits and rising 
inflation focused attention on the issue of fiscal management, forcing leaders to 
consider alternative sources – domestic and foreign – of public finance.
15  
Furthermore, the broad trajectory of reform policy that emerged from the 1979 Wuxi 
Conference, and particularly the emphasis on greater “enterprise autonomy,” and more 
“local responsibility,” opened up space for experimentation in firm structure and firm 
finance.
16  In this context, the government and firms in China turned to securities 
finance for the first time since the 1950s.
17  As with the many other domains of 
reform-oriented experimentation in these early years, innovation in equity finance 
began first in the countryside with small production units.  State council blessing of 
such activity in a small-scale and rural milieu was politically less provocative it would 
have been in a large urban enterprise. 
 
Governing Bond Finance.  In the early years of Chinese bond finance, it was 
not difficult to distinguish the modes of state dominance.  The state was everything, 
while markets and civil society were incipient at best.  During the era of strict socialist 
control of the economy under Mao, China’s financial system had been based on a so-
                                                 
14 In their book “Privatizing China” (2003, 28), Walter and Howie use the “Wild West” phrase to 
characterize Shenzhen stock trading, but in an interview in 2000, Fraser Howie first suggested to this 
author the appropriateness of this term for the whole pre-1988 experience in Chinese securities finance. 
15 Deficits stood at 17 and 12 billion Yuan in 1979 and 1980 respectively.  The urban cost of living rose 
5.5. percent year-on-year 1979-1980 (Fewsmith 1994. 87). 
16 A prominent promoter of these reforms was Zhao Ziyang, whose political power base in Sichuan 
made that province an important pioneer in some of the securities finance developments (Yang 1998). 
17 During the 1950s, two different types of central government bonds were issued (People’s Victory 
Bonds and National Economic Construction Bonds) and enjoyed heavy demand.  These were ended in 
1958 (Ecklund 1966, 87-90).  
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called “monobank” regime, in which the financial system was coordinated by one 
enterprise that served as central bank, the main commercial bank, and financial 
supervisor. 
In 1981, the Chinese government issued the first government bonds since the 
establishment of the People’s Republic.  These bonds were “sold” via mandatory 
allocations to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), individuals, and financial institutions.  
Officially, there was to be no trading or exchange of these bonds.  However, as 
generalized commercial exchange flourished under the Deng-era reforms, bondholders 
facing immediate liquidity needs
18 began selling their bonds or using them in other 
ways.  They were used to settle debts, and some shops even accepted them as 
payment.
19  A black market emerged in bond-based payment and in the inevitable 
“secondary” trading of bonds themselves.  In July 1987, the central bank began 
official discounted bond transactions.
20 This only fueled the black market by providing 
further arbitrage opportunities using the official discount window (Li 2000, 93-95). 
 
 
The State. During the early 1980s, the institutional structure of the state in 
finance changed in form.  A range of new financial institutions, including state-
development banks (often called “policy banks”), state-owned “commercial” banks  
(central and regional), and trust and investment companies (TICs, central and regional) 
were developed.  The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) continued to control the others 
on the instructions of central authorities, but it was granted some margin to focus more 
on its central banking role.  In that role, it emphasized last-resort lending, regulation, 
                                                 
18 That is, they had to make payment for something, and required some means like cash or a close 
substitute with which to make that payment. 
19 In return for present liquidity the initial bondholder accepted a loss on the face value, and an 
additional discount for the risk born by the seller of goods in this illegal transaction. 
20 This means the central bank was selling bonds below their face or “redemption” value.  
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and serving as banker for the government, including management of government bond 
debt for the Ministry of Finance and control of sub-national and corporate bond 
finance.  Initially, starting in 1981, treasury bills (T-bills) and other government bonds 
were issued as part of new experiments with deficit spending and long-term debt-
based projects or enterprise finance.  This practice has grown ever since, subject to the 
“plan-rational” central decision making of key apex economic agencies like the 
Ministry of Finance and various incarnations of the State Development and Planning 
Commission. 
These formal changes were accompanied by substantive change in the 
institutional locus of power.  This was part of a decentralizing trend in governing 
economic development that characterized the 1980s, contributing to the country’s 
robust economic growth during that decade (Oi 1999; Qian and Xu 1993).  As a way 
of both managing and recapturing some of the resources lost to provinces and 
localities in the course of decentralization, the central state required banks, financial 
institutions, provinces, firms, and even individuals to buy and hold government bonds 
(T-bills and “special project” bonds).  This created, in effect, an additional form of 
taxation (Gordon and Li 1999).  Government set the interest rates on these bonds 
administratively.  Moreover, when it wasn’t convenient to pay off its bond debts, the 
state merely “rolled over” (extended) the payments or the whole bond issue itself.
21  
At the same time, in selected cities during 1986, SOEs, trust and investment 
companies, and other financial institutions were permitted to issue bonds.  Often these 
issues were sold to the firm’s employees or to other state-owned firms.  Approval from 
central or local PBOC authorities was always required, though not always obtained. 
 
                                                 
21 In an interesting, albeit exceptional concession to the popular politics of finance, the central state, in 
one important instance in 1990, exercised this kind of arbitrary power, rolling over bonds held by SOEs 
even as it paid off the same bonds held by individuals (Bowles and White 1993, 136-137).  
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The Market. Markets for these debt securities were incipient at best.  The vast 
majority of bonds were forced upon their owners at pre-set prices, and most could not 
be transferred, limiting the potential for trading and liquidity in any bond markets that 
might emerge.  Nevertheless, “markets” for these debt securities did exist.  As 
discussed above, state bonds were themselves sometimes used as a form of currency.  
There was a sizeable black market for government bonds, but prices in this market 
were 70 to 80 percent of face value, and occasionally as low as 50 percent (Yi 1994, 
263).  In 1986, formal secondary markets – approved “trading centers” – were 
authorized for operation in “experimental” selected cities.
22    “Inflation-proof” 
indexed T-bills were issued and highly coveted. Typically, in a capitalist economy 
with even moderate reliance on debt securities, the interbank market is an important 
venue for securities trading, as the circular flow of cash and bonds among banks and 
other major financial actors provides stability and flexibility in the financial system.  
Between 1983 and 1985 there was an informal interbank market operation in China, 
but it was not very large and developed mostly among branches within a single bank.  
Later, after the official 1986 establishment of secondary markets, there was 
formalization of these markets and more growth (Xu 1998, 94-96). 
In the realm of corporate securities, with the rise among SOEs of the so-called 
sanjiao zhai  (“triangular” interenterprise debt), enterprises that sold bonds (issuers) to 
other enterprises (investors) were sometimes known to service the interest payments 
on those bonds with in-kind payments (of cement or steel, for example) (Bowles and 
White 1993, 138). For some of these years, enterprise bonds were permitted to pay as 
much as 20 percent above interest rates prevailing on other financial assets, making 
them very attractive.  Thus, as inflation grew in the vigorous, newly opened, pre-
                                                 
22 The term trading center (jiaoyi zhongxin) was preferred because it was more politically palatable than 
the explicitly capitalist term “securities exchange” (zhengquan jiaoyisuo).  
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Tiananmen economy, demand for enterprise bonds increased rapidly in the 1986-1988 
period. 
In their early analysis of the political economy of reform in Chinese finance, 
political economists Bowles and White enumerated the forces that they believe 
combined in shaping the market for bonds at this time.  In ranked order (most to least 
significant), these were coercion (by the state), collusion (among specially entitled 
actors like SOEs), and choice (by actors selecting among alternatives).  Offering a 
general summary of China’s early experience with bond finance, Bowles and White 
aver that the effort led to “complex and often perverse results because of the activities 
of powerful agents in the economy, agents which had no binding mechanisms to solve 
distributional conflicts” (1993, 139).  Recognition by the central-state-elite of these 
problems with bond finance have, I will argue later, led to an institutional bias 
favoring strict central domination and control of this asset class. 
 
Governing Equity Finance. The early period of equity finance was in many 
ways wildest part of this “Wild West” era.  Equity securities finance in contemporary 
China began with experimentation in shareholding companies and cooperatives in the 
early 1980s.  In the two years after the PRC issued its first bonds, the first shares of 
stock were offered to the public by shareholder cooperatives (gufen hezuo qiye), and 
after, 1984, SOEs restructured as companies limited by shares (gufen youxian gongsi).  
Between 1979 and late 1984, many rural enterprises and a few urban firms issued 
shares of stock in a variety of ways.  In late 1984 and early 1985, however, the 
Shanghai companies Feile Acoustics and Yanzhong Industrial (nominally a 
manufacturer of photocopiers) made the first formal, regularized equity issues by 
urban state owned enterprises.  Feile’s issue was placed privately with special large  
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investors.  Yanzhong’s was a truly “public” issue in which average individual Chinese 
could and did invest. 
Before broad financial reforms were introduced in the early 1990s, the 
exchange and handling of equity securities in China was a mix of ad hoc controls and 
informal irregularity.  Stock issuance grew in the 1980s as firms restructured 
themselves in various corporate forms.  At the time, there were no formal securities 
exchanges, and the creation, exchange, and use of stocks was haphazard.  Under a 
range of different understandings and agreements, firms initiated stockholding 
arrangements.  The shares themselves were paper certificates.  As discussed below, 
trading took place sometimes over-the-counter, sometimes in special trading centers, 
and very often spontaneously in informal kerb trades (Chen and Shi 2002; Chen 1996; 
Yang 1998). 
Under the circumstances, one could hardly call the acquirers of stock during 
these years “investors.”  Most were employees of the firms that issued the stock.  
Often they were compelled to buy the stock, or faced the Hobson’s choice of taking 
the shares in lieu of wages.  Sometimes shares or vouchers representing some right to 
buy or bid for shares were freely distributed (Ma 1999).  Individual and corporate 
outsiders also bought shares or acquired them in lieu of interenterprise debt or other 
institutional relationships.  Most of these “investors” held their shares.  These stocks 
were treated more as a fixed-income instrument like a bond or bank deposit (Walter 
and Howie 2003).  Indeed, dividend payments were largely benchmarked to bank 
deposit rates, though there was no formal dividend system as understood in Anglo-
Saxon equity finance.  The claims represented in shares of stock were unclear, and 
varied across municipal and provincial jurisdictions.  The irregularity of these shares, 
their issuance, and their trading was such that they served little financial or 
commercial purpose for the firms involved.  
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The State.  In the early 1980s, firms were still tightly bound to, or embedded 
in, the state at various levels from central ministries down through other sub-national 
strata of government to the township and village level.  Indeed, the latter were 
proliferating and developing rapidly in the early 1980s and would become the basis for 
the many local enterprises that came to be shareholder cooperatives.  Various state 
directives incrementally provided space for equity finance experimentation, but all on 
a distinctly ad hoc basis.  The most significant of these were the provisional measures 
issued by the Shanghai branch of the PBOC in mid-1984.  The terse “eight articles” 
(batiao) of these regulations laid the groundwork for the Feile and Yanzhong issues 
and began the general use of shareholding by SOEs in the 1980s.
23 
Much of the liberalizing pressure came from the Shenzhen Special Economic 
Zone (SEZ), where the Communist Party’s “zone of indifference” was most relaxed, 
and where market experimentation was often most daring.  The existence of shares of 
stock or corporate bonds is premised on the existence of companies limited by shares.  
In 1986, the Shenzhen city government issued formal rules regarding the process of 
corporatization and the use of equity finance.  The language invited firms from other 
localities to incorporate in Shenzhen using these rules, which were heavily inflected 
with English corporate practice reflecting the influence of the nearby British colony in 
Hong Kong (Walter and Howie 2001, 24-28). Building off the early 1983-1984 
restructuring of enterprises large and small, a sharp expansion in the primary market – 
the supply of new shares – was sparked by the Shenzhen’s 1986 provisions and the 
fillip they gave to corporatization around China.  A year later, there were 6,000 
                                                 
23 The batiao specified that collective enterprises could issue shares, what types of shares could be 
issued, how various different types of investors could be compensated with dividends, how share 
transfers should be executed, and that only actual, physical trading was permitted (delivery-versus-
payment and not options or futures).  
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shareholding enterprises nationwide, and another 3,800 were added the next year (Li 
1998, 55). 
What was most remarkable about this period was the rather cavalier attitude of 
the central state to these developments in equity finance, and the haphazard quality of 
regulation.  Regulatory authority over the issuance and trading of shares was unclear.  
Supervision of the issuance process was lax and was overwhelmed by volume.  Local 
branches of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC, the central bank) and municipal 
governments were ill prepared.  There was confusion over jurisdictional competence.  
The PBOC and its local bureaus scrambled in a game of catch-up, as the rising tide of 
stock issues and a swell in trading volumes overwhelmed their limited understanding 
of the problem as well as their institutional resources (Chen 1996; Hertz 1998).  Two 
experts described the situation thus: 
 
Almost  as  an  afterthought,  the  People’s  Bank  of  China  was  given 
responsibility  for  securities  in  1986  as  part  of  more  elaborate 
regulations governing the commercial banking sector. From that point 
on, until its displacement in 1992 by the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC), the PBOC or, more properly, its local branches, 
played an active role in promoting developments (in securities finance), 
even  to  the  extent  of  establishing  its  own  brokerages  (Walter  and 
Howie 2003, 8). 
 
  It was not until the 13
th Party Congress in 1987 that a clear official statement 
came from the central state.  “The shareholding system form that has appeared during 
the reforms,” declared the Congress, “including state majority ownership (konggu) 
with participation in shareholding by ministries and local enterprises as well as 
involvement by individuals, is one kind of organizational form of enterprise property 
and can be continued.  The ownership (chanquan) of some small scale enterprises may  
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be transferred to collective bodies (jiti) or individuals.”
24  The phrasing of this 
declaration is significant as an early and prominent official pronouncement in the 
public record pointing toward the chief elements and possible trajectory of the 
emerging political economy of securities finance in China before the 1990s 
securitization boom.  The guiding and dominant role of the central-state is affirmed.  
The key players in the “intra-mural coalition” are identified and located in subordinate 
yet beneficial positions relative to the central state.
25  Finally, property rights relations 
are stipulated, with the state (and the central state is clearly implied in this case) 
maintaining majority control, while subsidiary rights are bestowed on the subordinate 
coalition members.  No property rights (chanquan) are conferred to individuals, who 
may “enter” stocks (rugu) but do not enjoy the same right to “participate” (jiancan). 
 
The Market.  Due to China’s isolation from the outside world during the Mao 
era, and the consequent absence of exposure to the technologies, markets, ideas, and 
practices of securities finance for over thirty years, most Chinese had little idea of 
what stocks and bonds were.  Initially, few common Chinese, firm managers, or party 
members understood the purpose or value of the stocks and bonds they held.  In this 
sense, the secondary market that did emerge in many parts of the country can indeed 
be fairly described as “spontaneous” (Yang 1998) (Ma 1999). 
The available evidence regarding the nature of share issuance and secondary 
trading at the time is thin.  Businesses wishing to restructure and issue shares were 
                                                 
24 This is translated from Section 4, Article 1, of Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang’s address to the 13
th Party 
Congress, which reads “gaige zhong chuxian de gufenzhi xingshi, baokuo guojia konggu he bumen, 
diqu, qiye jiancan gu yiji geren ru gu, shi shehuizhuyi qiye caichan de yi zhong zuzhi fangshi, keyi jixu 
shixing.  Yixie xiaoxing quanminsuoyouzhiqiye de chanquan, keyi you zhuanrang gei jiti he geren.” 
Significantly, the word “investment” (touzi) appears nowhere in this statement regarding shares (Zhao 
1987). 
25 “Ministries” here can be understood as representing the bureaucratic aspect of industrial ministries, 
but also the broader interests of the sectors in their jurisdiction. “Local enterprises” may be understood 
as a proxy reference to local governments, particularly provinces, but also to lower levels (though these 
tend not to be represented in national political coalition dynamics).  
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encouraged to use the 1986 Shenzhen provisions, but regional and local variation in 
corporatization persisted.  In Shenzhen and Shanghai, a few formal OTC venues were 
open.  The Shanghai branch of the People’s Bank of China ran counters, as did the 
then-new trust and investment companies and some of the newly semi-independent 
commercial banks (Chen 1996; Yi 1994, 260-268).  Some major provincial cities such 
as Tianjin, Shenyang, and Wuhan established “securities trading centers” where local 
company stocks were traded (along with some local company bonds).
26  Nevertheless, 
a lot of share trading occurred informally on kerb markets, not just in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen, but elsewhere around the country. Equity trading was heaviest in Shenzhen, 
reflecting its importance as the inspiration for much of the firm restructuring and 
stockholding movement.  Conversely, reflecting the importance of Shanghai as the 
locus of the central state’s interest in securities finance, such as it then was, debt 
trading was heaviest in Shanghai (Kumar et al 1997). 
By 1986, a “secondary market” was certainly evident in which these shares 
were trading informally in various cities around the country (Yang 1998).  By 1987, 
official trading was partially formalized as “over-the-counter” (OTC) transactions at 
seven points in Shanghai and elsewhere.  These OTC trades were initially transacted at 
a price fixed by the state, and buyers and sellers had to find each other and appear 
together at the counter. Later, transactions could be anonymous, but were restricted to 
within an officially limited trading band.  However, a vast sub-economy of “scalpers” 
(huangniu) operated outside trading centers, and informal deals were struck practically 
everywhere (Chen 1996).  Again, as with bonds, a black market emerged in which 
                                                 
26 These are the same trading centers mentioned in the previous section on bond finance.  
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prices were set by negotiation among parties prior to formal settlement at the official 
rate, or informal settlement outside of official channels (Yang 1998).
27 
The big change in stock trading came in 1989, when the Shenzhen 
Development Bank issued handsome dividends and offered a stock split.  This made 
share acquisition obviously appealing, sparking an interest in the secondary market.  
Increased demand caused share prices to climb precipitously, further feeding interest 
in the secondary market.  This was a dynamic familiar in other stock markets, but new 
to mainland China. Interest in the share market thus spread beyond the dividend 
chasers, arbitrageurs and liquidity seekers
28 of the mid-1980s to the wider public 
(Walter and Howie 2001, 29-31). 
                                                 
27 This process was facilitated by the fact that physical share certificates were in use, and were 
transferable. Furthermore, there was sufficient leniency in the system for illegal transfers to be 
“laundered” (Chen 1996).  
28 As discussed above, early holders of securities were willing to use or sell them because they did not 
comprehend their value, or because they faced liquidity pressure.  
 
Table 4-1 
China Securities Governance before 1992 
State  Period 
Policy 
Cycle 
Policy 
Tenor 
Institutions & 
Administrative 
Organization 
Capital Controls 
(domestic and international) 
Market  Civil Society  Asset Classes  
1981 – 1987 
 
Open 
 
“Wild West” 
Liberalization 
Bottom-Up 
Localism 
Central 
Discretion 
Limited 
People’s Bank 
plays “catch 
up” and is a 
beneficiary 
participant 
Financial repression w/ some 
interest-rate relaxation 
Some Forex sharing to firms 
FDI in Joint Ventures 
Dual-track currency (forex 
vouchers) 
Foreign commercial borrowing 
(loans) 
Sovereign debt (bonds) issued 
Loosening the Monobank 
“Commercial Banking” 
established 
 
Experimental 
Heterodox 
OTC 
Black markets 
Spontaneous 
Informal/Kerb 
Bonds as 
informal 
currency and 
collateral (at 
a discount) 
Regional 
trading 
centers 
Experimental 
Spontaneous 
Involvement 
Danwei-based 
networks 
Pamphleteering 
 
Bonds 
Coercion, Collusion, 
& Choice 
Corporate bonds pay 
up to 20% above 
benchmark 
interest-rates 
Equity 
“Shenzhen 
Provisions” for 
corporatization 
 
1988-1991 
 
Close 
 
“Tiananmen” 
Reaction 
Top-down 
Central fiat 
Central repression 
Central discretion 
↑ 
Same as above  Increasingly 
Constrained 
Formalized on 
exchanges 
Repressed   
Bonds 
Corporate bonds pay 
up to 15% above 
benchmark 
interest-rates 
1
8
6
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In sum, during this “Wild West” period, securities finance was enacted mostly 
from the bottom up.  It was spontaneous, experimental, local, and most importantly 
indeterminate in its future bearing.  As one prominent Chinese financial economist 
explained: 
 
The emergence of new financial instruments and markets during the 
period  was  apparently  not  the  outcome  of  an  explicit  government 
policy…there  was  no  official  blueprint…The  spontaneous  and 
rudimentary nature of financial market development was, at the time, 
typified  by  a  general  absence  of any  form  of  professional  guidance 
from  financial  bodies  to  direct  the  issue  of  various  kinds  of 
securities…(and)  by  the  fact  that  the  government  and  financial 
authorities lacked clear policy orientation to guide the use of the new 
means of finance (Xu 1998, 95). 
 
Under the heading “Wild West,” Table 4-1 summarizes the state, market, and civil 
society characteristics of what served as a regime of securities governance during this 
period.  The central state was conspicuous by its absence in the regulation of equity 
shares.  The Shenzhen regulations on corporate restructuring were loose, and reflected 
nearby Hong Kong (and therefore Anglo-Saxon) practice.  OTC trading, as always, 
was a relatively decentralized system of exchange, and the ubiquitous informal share 
trading was a grass-roots affair.  Two veteran foreign observes of Chinese securities 
finance remarked that, had the Shenzhen experiment – with its intrepid corporate spirit 
and its vigorous trading atmosphere – not been interrupted by the events of 1989 and 
other related policy reactions discussed below, the continuation of the securitization 
script as it was being enacted through this early period would have taken China in a 
very different and (they believe) probably more productive direction (Walter and 
Howie 2001).  
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B.  “Tiananmen” Repression and the Imposition of Central Control: 1988—
1991 
 
In 1988, a decade after China embarked on her major economic reforms, 
securities finance had touched many parts of the economy from small rural enterprises 
to large state owned steel companies.  Individuals and companies were trading in the 
secondary market for bonds and stocks.  Securities finance in China was vigorous and 
heterodox.  The economy was growing rapidly – perhaps too rapidly.  Macroeconomic 
conditions were again unstable.  Debt and inflation were once more climbing 
precipitously.  Policy makers at the center feared the economy was overheating.  
Financial factors were probably contributing to these problems, as local governments 
twisted the arms of local bank branch managers to lend funds even as local SOEs 
issued more corporate bonds (Shih 2003).  Furthermore, compounding these economic 
stresses, the central political elite was in the midst of a conservative realignment 
following the ouster of party leader Hu Yaobang in 1987.  When Hu died in April 
1989, the mix of economic and political instability quickly escalated to a bloody 
climax in Tiananmen Square. 
In the realm of securities finance, the initial thrust of the early 1980s 
corporatization and share issuance had carried the pendulum of economic change far 
in the direction of openness.  However, in the post-1988 environment, political 
pressure had already begun to slow the pendulum’s liberalizing progress.  Yet, these 
pressures had largely taken the shape of ad hoc measures only.  The ceiling limiting 
interest rates paid on corporate bonds was lowered. The company restructuring 
process was modified in a more constrained and uniform direction.  OTC trading was 
regulated through measures such as price ceilings and more rigorous registration.  But 
these measures were fragmented across jurisdictional levels and competencies, with 
municipal and central action incompletely coordinated (Chen 1996).  The pell-mell  
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issuance and trading practices spreading around the country had not gone unnoticed, 
and in the grim post-Tiananmen atmosphere, the pendulum began its repressive return 
swing.  The central state elite resolved to shift from the ad hoc approach to securities 
finance.  In the period immediately preceding and succeeding the Tiananmen tragedy, 
Beijing moved across a broad front to centralize, rationalize, and control securities 
finance.  Even as they did so, however, popular interest in using and trading securities 
was finally blossoming among localities, firms, and individuals. 
This period can conveniently be characterized as the “Tiananmen” phase of 
securities finance development and, accordingly, it was distinctly “top-down” and 
repressive. In the bottom row of Table 4-1, bearing the period heading “Tiananmen,” 
are summarized the state, market, and civil society characteristics of what served for a 
regime of securities governance.  In contrast to the multiple city experimentation, the 
Shenzhen restructuring principles, and the OTC/informal markets for secondary 
trading of the Wild West days, this period ushered in two new high-tech centralized 
exchanges and preparation of the Standard Opinion for corporate equity finance, 
which was implemented shortly thereafter.  This represented a diminution of 
heterodoxy and market-oriented pricing.  
During this phase of repressive reaction in China’s local enactment of the 
securities finance script, we begin to see some of the institutional elements that would 
later contribute to the discretionary involution governance regime, though this was 
then still a contingent future outcome.  With respect to the primary market for stocks, 
this phase of enacting the securities finance script served to increase central 
government discretion in distribution and control of equity finance.  Similarly, in the 
central government’s first major secondary market initiatives (the establishment of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen securities exchanges), the content of the global securitization 
script stipulated a bundle of technologies and trading practices – centralized electronic  
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securities trading on an exchange – that seemed benign or “power neutral.”  Yet, in 
hindsight, the consequence of enacting these parts of the script was actually 
reactionary, facilitating the exercise of state power and curtailing a more organic 
course of growth in securities finance.  The irony is that, in many ways, the opening of 
the bourses and the formulation of a formal nationwide restructuring in the Standard 
Opinion policy for firms represented a step forward for central state control of 
securities finance. 
 
IV. India’s Securities Finance before the 1990s 
 
From a sociological perspective, India’s pre-reform, directed-credit system of 
finance, based on state-controlled banks and long-term lending institutions, was an 
“instituted economy.”  This system was itself part of a larger state-planned “mixed-
economy” system.  In this system, the embedded finance regime of directed credit was 
a suitable complement to the equally embedded prevailing production regime of 
licenses and quotas.  The ideology and organization of this system, begun under 
India’s first post-Independence Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, was inspired in large 
measure by the tripartite anti-finance biases of anti-colonialism, upper caste 
Brahminism, and Fabian Socialism.  The evolution of this mixed economy was part of 
Nehru’s ambition to create what he famously called a “socialist pattern of society” that 
would complement his larger national vision of  “secularism, socialism, and 
democracy” in India.  These notions did for many years become the basis of an 
ideological consensus in the country, entering the lexicon of Indian political economy 
as the “Nehruvian” system. 
Under this system, neither finance nor the production regime were “market-
based.” They were embedded in the socialist-developmental institutions and purposes  
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of the Nehruvian political economy, and administered hierarchically by state 
bureaucrats led by an elite corps of rigorously selected officials hailing from the 
prestigious Indian Administrative Service (Potter 1986).  In post-Independence India, 
private property coexisted with state-ownership.  While the enterprise controls of the 
so-called “license-permit-quota raj” are most often cited as the typical characteristic of 
India’s planning state, this is only because the dirigiste control regime in production 
was solidified before similar controls were achieved in finance.  Yet, eventually 
government power and discretion in the allocation of finance came to be just as 
significant as licenses and quotas in the state’s ensemble of dirigiste tools.
29  
Moreover, state-guided capital allocation complemented both the powerful anti-
finance bias of the Nehruvian economic-planning ideology, and the omniscient 
aspirations of the powerful state planning bureaucracy.  Addressing his apex planning 
body, the Development Council, in 1956, Nehru explained his vision: 
 
Forgetting the words public sector and private sector, the main thing is 
that  power,  economic  power,  should  not  be  concentrated  in  private 
hands,  that  vested  interests  should  not  grow  up  in  regard  to  any 
important  matter,  strategic  matter,  or  socially  important  matter,  that 
there should be a dispersal of economic power and, therefore, (there) 
should be avoidance of development of monopolies of any kind (Mehta 
1965, 5). 
 
Accordingly, licensing and permits were strictly allocated and enforced, and 
large scale investment was determined by the state, with planned allocation to the 
private sector constituting two thirds or more of the amount designated for the public 
sector in the first three plan periods (1951-1966) (Mehta 1965, 6-7). 
                                                 
29 When the statesman C. Rajagopalachari coined the term “license-permit-quota raj” and broke with 
the Congress Party, signaling his rejection of what he believed was overzealous economic control, the 
edifice of state financial control was still a work in progress.  
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This regime of directed-credit finance was a remarkably stable system of 
capital accumulation and regulation.  The regime was foreshadowed but not yet fixed 
in the years immediately following the presentation of the 1944 Bombay Plan.
30  The 
plan’s authors argued, “practically every aspect of economic life will have to be 
rigorously controlled by the government”(Thakurdas, Tata, and Biòralåa 1944, 48).  
Although they were leading private industrialists, the supporters of the Bombay Plan 
seemed concerned with the perils of a free-market approach in India’s late 
development and therefore explicitly sought to work in a partnership with the state.
31  
Assaying the evolution of Nehruvian political economy twenty years after Indian 
independence, one-time private secretary to Nehru, former Planning Department Joint 
Secretary, and erstwhile central bank Governor H.V.R. Iengar explained that: “It is all 
there in the Bombay Plan — the concept of massive state intervention in the economy, 
of mixed private and public sector enterprise, the emphasis on heavy industry…and 
(the) need for deficit financing.  Indeed, there seems little difference between the basic 
approach of the Bombay Plan and the approach of the Planning Commission of the 
Government of India and it would by no means be far-fetched to say that the Planning 
Commission actually got its inspiration from the Bombay Plan” (Iengar 1968). 
 
                                                 
30 The Bombay Plan set the tone for post-Independence government-business relations in India. The 
plan, proposed by a group of influential Indian industrialists, offered suggestions for promoting Indian 
economic development after independence. It supported state action in planning equitable growth, 
protecting national industries against foreign competition, and developing heavy industries using state-
ownership to concentrate capital. 
31 Mine is a charitable interpretation of these industrialists’ concern.  Some have argued otherwise, 
suggesting that Indian industrialists orchestrated the license-permit-quota raj of Nehruvian socialism to 
provide a comfortable, lucrative, and assured incumbency (Chatterjee 1997; Kochanek 1974).  This has 
been the source of a long and bitter historiographic controversy over the degree to which Bombay Plan 
supporters “captured” the Indian state or were themselves “captured.”  This debate, and a new view that 
it was the state who was captured by India’s large capitalist class in the 1950s and 1960s is presented in 
Chibber (2003).  
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A.  The Political Conquest of Credit and Banking in India 
 
In the post-Independence era, India did not go as far as China or the Soviet 
Union in crafting a full “monobank” structure.  But by the early 1980s, it got fairly 
close.  The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was nationalized in 1948 with the central 
government reserving authority over appointments and direction.  By the mid-1950s, 
the government
32 had secured (de facto but not de jure) the commitment of the bank to 
underwrite its deficit spending as and when it needed.
33  The nationalization and 
restructuring of the State Bank of India (SBI) and its subordinate link to the RBI in the 
late 1950s meant that the central bank was now a provider of funds to the government, 
a commercial banker, and a banking supervisor.
34  By the late 1960s, on the eve of the 
next bank nationalization step, the RBI was indirectly in control of well over a third of 
the nation’s commercial bank deposits: not quite a full monobank system per se, but 
moving in that direction, a trajectory soon to be further enhanced by other significant 
measures. 
Iengar’s above-quoted observations were penned in 1968, on the eve of 
another institutional shift that definitively assured the Indian state’s colonization of 
finance.  The very next year, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Nehru’s daughter, 
                                                 
32 In Indian politics, reference to “the government” involves an inescapable measure of semantic 
imprecision related to the objective and subjective uncertainties inherent in Indian political institutions.  
It can designate “the state” more generally, in the way Nettle famously theorized the concept.  But, 
when juxtaposed with other parts of the state such as the central bank, the term should be understood as 
in the classic Westminster model, referring to the executive role of the Prime Minister and her/his 
appointed cabinet of ministers. 
33 This was the fateful development of the so-called “ad hoc Treasury Bill” issuance (Rangarajan 1998, 
38-41). 
34 A 1955 act of parliament constituted the State Bank of India (formerly the venerable Imperial Bank 
of the colonial era), bringing more than a quarter of the resources of the Indian banking system under 
the direct control of the State. Later, the State Bank of India (Subsidiary Banks) Act was passed in 
1959, enabling the State Bank of India to take over eight former State-associated banks as its 
subsidiaries (later named “Associates”).  Even in the late 1990s, the Reserve Bank of Indian still held a 
60 percent stake in the SBI (Balachandran 1998).  
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nationalized many of the country’s remaining private commercial banks, further 
restraining any vestigial power of private financial interests (Dhar 2000).  The 
rationale given in the enabling legislation – couched in characteristically 
developmentalist language – was the need for the Indian government to “control the 
heights of the economy and to meet progressively…the needs of development of the 
economy in conformity with national policy and objectives” (India 1969).  This fixed 
ever more deeply and durably the power of the state in finance. 
Moreover, as it became clear that bank nationalization had, as promised, 
facilitated the building of new distributions systems which were successfully 
delivering credit to previously under-served areas (rural areas and small scale 
industry), New Delhi’s financial policies enjoyed growing popular legitimacy in the 
countryside (Singh 1998).
35  This further enhanced the state’s dominion in finance 
(Patel 2002).  In a sense, Indira’s ability to act autonomously against the interests of 
the capitalist controllers of these banks in the bank nationalization was an important 
foreshadowing of the kind of state autonomy exhibited in the 1990s.  In the 1990s a 
different government took similarly autonomous initiative operating in the opposite 
direction – toward greater marketization – when the center took the initiative against 
the stock broking community in favor of a new securities exchange in the course of 
building new institutions of securities finance institutions and expanding the scope of 
securitization.
36 
                                                 
35 As with many policy initiatives, success did breed excess.  As the potential political utility (as 
opposed to ideal-typical developmental utility) of such financial intervention measures became clear, 
more particularistic uses of finance were devised.  The most egregious example of this was the use of 
loan “melas” (fairs) in the early 1980s to attract the support of young lower middle-class voters to the 
Congress Party. 
36 It is often argued that this nationalization had as much to do with Prime Minister Gandhi’s immediate 
struggle with politically powerful capitalists as it did with any ideological or developmental objectives.  
For this reason, her behavior in this matter, as in other populist measures such as inter alia her anti-
poverty garibi hatao (“halt poverty”) campaign and her effort to deprive formerly sovereign Indian 
Princes of their “privy-purses” of Indian Princes, have been drolly characterized as “slightly left of self-
interest.”  
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Between 1951 and 1969, the number of banks in India fell from 566 to only 85 
(Sen and Vaidya 1997, 13).  In 1980, still more banks were nationalized, bringing the 
public sector banks share of total domestic deposits to a hegemonic 92 percent (Sen 
and Vaidya 1997, 14).  While bank nationalization did not put more banks directly 
under immediate RBI control, as would have occurred in an orthodox socialist 
monobank format, indirect state control of both the central bank and these commercial 
banks brought the Indian banking arrangement close to that model. 
The stability of this state-dominated, directed-credit financial governance 
regime is evident in the long-term expansion of state power in finance from the 1950s 
through the 1970s, the durability of its structure, and its ability to resist – like Dr. 
Frankenstein’s monster – challenges from one of its own creators.  These challenges 
came during the early-80s reform flirtation of Indira Gandhi, and later from the comet-
like mid-1980s reform foray of her son, Rajiv Gandhi.
37  So, by 1980, the Indian state 
had achieved a remarkable political conquest of banking finance, putting it in charge 
of the rapidly increasing savings deposits of the country’s numerous citizens.  This, in 
turn, meant that the state controlled the funds with which “its” commercial banks 
furnished the short-term and working capital loans needed by businesses.  More 
importantly, however, long-term finance capital was also controlled through what 
Indians call “Development Financial Institutions” (DFIs). 
These DFIs include three different kinds of financial actors, all of which are 
large and national in their scope of operations.  Most important and well known were 
the long-term lending institutions.  The first of these, the Industrial Finance 
Corporation of India (IFCI) – formed in 1948 and wholly state-owned – was the 
prototype for its several siblings.  Later variations on this model, like the Industrial 
                                                 
37 For arguments about these reforms, and their often unheralded positive effects on industrial 
productivity, see Ahluwalia (1991), Rosen (1992) and Jenkins (1999).  
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Credit and Investment Corporation (ICICI) established in 1955, and the Industrial 
Development Bank of India (IDBI) set up in 1964 under the Reserve Bank of India, 
extended the reach of India’s developmental state into industrial finance.
38  These 
DFIs provided medium- and long-term capital to industry for capital improvement and 
project finance.  
The state’s stable of DFIs also eventually came to include providers of other 
financial services.  The nationalization and concentration of the insurance industry 
magnified the centralized dynamics of Indian finance, as these insurers were a major 
investor in, and manager of, financial assets. In 1955, life insurance was nationalized, 
and in 1973 general insurance also came under state control, making the Life 
Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), and the General Insurance Corporation of India 
(GIC) powerful levers of state-directed finance.  This put the government in the 
position of owning and running financial intermediaries that, as fiduciaries, managed 
stocks and bonds on behalf of many Indians.  Finally, this ensemble of DFIs 
eventually also came to include a mutual fund-like organization. The Unit Trust of 
India (UTI) set up in 1963 was a government owned and operated mutual fund-like 
asset management “trust.”  It is of such significance to both pre- and post-reform 
securities finance that it is discussed in detail in the next section.  UTI was the DFI 
most actively involved in securities finance under the Nehruvian system.  At the 
periphery of that system, corporate securities such as stocks and bonds circulated 
through the stock exchanges and through UTI.  The actual role of securities in several 
                                                 
38 Its partisans regularly hasten to stress that ICICI was a collaborative enterprise promoted by the 
World Bank and some domestic financial institutions with what one official called the “government’s 
blessing.”  Author’s interview, New Delhi, 2000, #14. 
One wonders if these partisans did protest too much?  Until the early 1990s, its status was 
never entirely clear.  The government’s role in its operations and appointment structure were always 
politely obscure.  The distinction between it and the other DFIs was further obscured by the fact that it 
enjoyed many of the same rights as the other DFIs and by the way in which its personnel organization 
largely mirrored that of the other DFIs.  
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of the areas identified by the AC/FP matrix (enterprise finance, wealth creation, and 
industrial organization) was minor.  They were, however, as discussed below in the 
case of government bonds, important to public finance and monetary policy. Finally, 
shareholder rights were largely irrelevant in the enclave system of stock finance.   
In this sense, the DFIs were a direct substitute for the sources of large, long-
term project funds that equity (stock) and debt (bond) finance typically provided to 
firms (commercial or financial) by securities finance.
39  As in the political control of 
commercial banking, credit allocation through the DFIs was politicized by the 
appointment procedures and by the political-bureaucratic subservience of the DFIs to 
the central-state-elite. However, additional government control over firms receiving 
credit was exercised by DFI membership on corporate boards, and in some by equity 
control gained through debt-for-equity swaps.
40  Control of such a wide scope of 
financial action through these DFIs meant that the state held a plurality of equity 
capital in most of India’s largest firms, putting it in a position of significant potential 
influence over management and personnel decisions.
41   
As a consequence of the industrial regulations and financial organization 
discussed above, neither industrial capital nor finance capital were commodified under 
the Nehruvian system.  Large-scale production belonged either to the state, or to 
India’s large family-run conglomerates, both of which were tightly hemmed in by the 
licensing and quota systems, by an assortment of strict regulations on other fronts such 
                                                 
39 One study of the use of securities finance by Indian firms concluded that during the 1970s in 
particular, reliance on securities as a source of external funds was “minimal…(since) most private firms 
relied on the cheap credit provided by the government through commercial banks and DFIs like IDBI, 
IFCI, etc., and used less of stock market sources of finance like debenture and equity” (Murali 2000, 
12). 
40 Some of these debt-for-equity swaps occurred when firms were in distress.  However, options to 
exercise debt-for-equity swaps were often written into loan agreements from DFIs.  Even if the options 
were not exercised, however, their mere existence was a significant form of securities-based coercive 
financial power enjoyed by the state (Kochanek 1974, 84-85 and 251-253). 
41 Customary practice and even statutory language discouraged the exercise of such power, but given 
the regulation of industrial capital and the control of financial flows discussed above, such crude 
measures were rarely necessary.  
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as protections and subsidies for “small scale industry,” and by the direct political 
control of ministries overseeing large portions of the formal economy in state-owned 
enterprises at the central and state levels.
42 
Finance capital was thus intricately enmeshed in the state, limiting its 
commodification and creating tight government-business ties through state-run 
banking and DFI financial relationships.  In this governance regime, finance was 
controlled and allocated in a hierarchical fashion by government-directed financial 
institutions and the central administration of interest rates.  The directed-credit system 
orchestrated through this network of DFIs and state-owned banks thus allowed the 
Indian state to enjoy the dirigiste benefits of a non-commodified, embedded form of 
lending-institution-based finance.  While it may have had some early benefits, 
particularly in the provision of credit at the local level in rural areas, the directed credit 
system also had negative consequences for banking and aggregate industrial 
performance in the long run.
43 
 
B.  The Unit Trust of India: The Developmental State’s Two Faces 
 
Political Scientist Chalmers Johnson notably argued that the essence of the 
developmental state was the “plan rational” exercise of state discretion in the conduct 
of industrial policy and economic development (Johnson 1982).  Michael Loriaux 
                                                 
42 Capacity and prices were controlled under the Industrial Development Regulation Act (1951).  The 
Industrial Policy Resolution (1956) ensured the reservation of some sectors of the economy for state-
owned enterprises.  Regulation of the transfer and control of firms was achieved through the 
Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act (1969). 
43 In 1991, the Ministry of Finance admitted that the old system had “led to a decline in the 
productivity, efficiency, and profitability of the banking sector” quoted in Sen (1997, 42).  
Summarizing a number of empirical studies on various determinants (including investment and finance) 
of Indian industrial performance, economist K.L Krishna concludes that despite some improvement 
during the 1980s, “in terms of growth, the progress of industrialization in India has been far below 
expectations and targets” (2000, 499).  
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demurred, arguing rather that the developmental state was defined by the expression of 
“moral ambition” (Loriaux 1999).  Both elements – the commanding vanguard 
expression of state guidance and the intrepid spirit of moral purpose – were behind the 
1963 establishment of the Unit Trust of India (UTI).
44  UTI stands out as an unusual 
institution even amid the Noah’s ark of Indian government agencies.  It demonstrates 
how the politics of the developmental state can create strange bedfellows.  UTI is a 
blend of quintessentially capitalist elements with dirigiste Nehruvian socialism.  The 
details behind UTI’s peculiarity merit some attention, because they are responsible in 
large measure for the important and controversial role this institution played, both in 
the securities finance enclave of the old Nehruvian financial governance regime, and 
in shaping the new evolutionary pattern of securities governance that emerged during 
the 1990s.  Of particular interest are the subtle ways – formal and symbolic – in which 
control and responsibility were framed in the legal, institutional, and informal 
elements of UTI’s development. 
The idea of establishing these mutual fund-like investment unit trusts had been 
circulating in India’s elite policy-making circles since the mid-1950s, but at that time 
key planners were too preoccupied with other initiatives in the flurry surrounding the  
reparation and implementation of the much-fêted Second Five Year Plan (1956-
1961).
45  Then came war. 
                                                 
44 The term “unit trust” comes from the British financial lexicon of collective asset management.  Shifts 
in the idiom of financial services and asset management are a subtle indicator of the changes in Indian 
financial doctrine and practice from the British colonial legacy to the American-inflected global 
securitization script of the 1990s. A “unit trust” is similar to an American mutual fund.  Shares are 
called “units.”  A trust corresponds to what in the U.S. would be referred to as a “family” of funds.  In 
India, individual funds under the trust are called “schemes.”  In the 1990s, the common parlance of 
Indian asset management mostly shifted to the Americanized “mutual fund” terminology, but the above 
terms remain. 
45 Under the direction of A.D. Shroff, influential industrialist and executive of the august Tata & Sons 
company, a 1954 blue ribbon panel made some recommendation about improving industrial finance.  
The committee reasoned that “such institutions (unit trusts) seem to be particularly suitable to India, 
where in order to increase capital available to industries, small savings have to drawn into the 
investment market,” and that, “unit trusts can be operated with advantage to the investors as well as to  
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Following what many Indians considered a humiliating defeat in the 1962 war 
with China, there was a distinct national sentiment that new, ambitious steps must be 
taken to reinvigorate the development and industrialization drive. That war had 
adversely affected the economy and created a perception that the policies of the 1950s 
had fallen short, provoking in many Indians – elite and popular – a sense that they 
must redouble their efforts (Singh 1990).  In economic policy-making circles, 
agreement emerged that the nation was in need of more aggressive mobilization of 
national savings, as well as more energetic and creative efforts to direct those funds. 
In this atmosphere, all that was needed to launch the unit trust idea was a 
capable promoter, and it found one in the person of longtime Congressman T.T. 
Krishnamachari (known as “TTK”).  TTK, a close Nehru friend and political 
supporter, was a uniquely motivated champion of the UTI cause.
46  In announcing the 
UTI plan to Parliament in 1963, TTK – recently appointed Finance Minister – 
explained that “the basic idea of the proposal is to afford the common man a means to 
acquire a share in the widening prosperity based on industrial growth of the country 
which combines the advantages of maximum security and reasonable return.”
47  UTI 
was to achieve this goal by “encouraging savings and investment and participation in 
the income, profits and gains accruing to the corporation from the acquisition, holding, 
management and disposal of securities” (India 1989 (1963)).  Thus was born the Unit 
Trust of India, an apex national securities finance institution that would deeply 
influence the tenor of Indian organized industry for the next forty years through both 
                                                 
the industries, and that steps should be taken by both the public and private sectors to encourage (their) 
formation” (Pendharkar 2003, 3-4). 
46 In the success of UTI, TTK glimpsed the potential for his own political redemption from the 
embarrassing finance-related Mundhra scandal that had less than a decade earlier sidelined him within 
the Congress Party elite (Balachandran 1998).   
47 Quoted in Pendharkar (2003, 5).  
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dimensions of developmentalism: Johnson’s “plan rational,” and Loriaux’s “national 
purpose” vision. 
UTI was modeled on British investment trusts, institutions that collected 
savings from many individuals and managed the investment of these funds in 
securities and other financial assets.  The “trust” structure, dating back to the 1880s in 
England, was both a legal and organizational innovation in financial engineering that 
was the precursor to American mutual fund.  During the “Go-Go” years of the 1960s, 
trusts in the U.K. and mutual funds in the U.S. were gaining popularity, promising “to 
make the ‘people’s’ capitalism’ a reality and not just a catch phrase.”
48  The staid 
English trust structure committed such institutions to a fiduciary responsibility over 
the assets they controlled on behalf of investors.  The trust structure was 
simultaneously an organizational solution that permitted the spreading of risk among 
multiple participants and across a variety of assets (investments).  It also enabled the 
pooling of smaller sums from many individuals, facilitating investment in what might 
otherwise have been prohibitively large or costly asset purchases. 
UTI was established in 1963 by a special independent act of the Indian 
parliament.  This was an unusually public procedure and one that conferred an aura of 
sovereign grandeur and state commitment on the institution.  The creation of UTI in 
this way blended the practices of conservative British finance capital with the 
institutional structure of Nehruvian socialism.  In the event, the details of UTI’s 
genesis located it in the bureaucratic firmament of other statutorily empowered apex 
financial institutions such as the Reserve Bank of India, the State Bank of India (SBI), 
and Life Insurance Corporation (LIC) of India.  In the ranking of the official agencies, 
                                                 
48 John Brooks of the New Yorker and author of the famous history of the Go-Go years, quoted in 
Nocera (1994, 46).  
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this situated UTI in a status position subordinate to the RBI and on a par with that of 
SBI and LIC.   
As stipulated in the UTI Act, the primary contributors of capital to this latest 
addition to India’s growing stable of development financial institutions were the RBI 
(50 percent), SBI and LIC (15 percent each), with the balance (20 percent) provided 
by other financial institutions and commercial banks yet to be nationalized. These 
contributing institutions appointed some board members, the RBI appointing most of 
the others (a plurality).  The RBI also appointed the executive officer.  The 
government itself selected one board member.
49  Appointment of the UTI chairman 
was reserved for the “central government in consultation with the Reserve Bank.”
50  
The Act further authorized UTI to borrow money and issue bonds (guaranteed by the 
government).  It was also tax exempt.  All these elements together helped cultivate 
UTI’s broad public service image. 
The Act’s stipulations regarding the appointment of UTI’s top two officials 
have been the subject of much subsequent historical debate and policy analysis.  The 
word “consultation,” wrote one former official in his analysis of UTI politics, “does 
not imply approval.” Thus, explained this official, V.G. Pendharkar, a man with top-
level experience at both UTI and the RBI, “the government could appoint a person of 
its choice even if the (Reserve) Bank did not approve him.”  Furthermore, since “it is 
an established convention (in Indian administration) that the appointing authority is 
also the disciplinary authority…the government could remove the chairman if he did 
not fall in line with its wishes, which in practice meant the wishes of the Finance 
Minister.  This meant that although the government did not have the power to give 
                                                 
49 Typically, a joint secretary or higher-ranked official at the finance ministry has represented the 
Government of India on UTI’s board of trustees (Thakurta 2002). 
50 Section 10 [a] (India 1989 (1963)).  In 1975, this clause and those discussed later in this section were 
amended when the Reserve Bank devolved its UTI-related authorities to the Industrial Development 
Bank of India (IDBI), an institution created by, and beholden to, the RBI.   
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orders directly it could covertly influence the Trust through this relationship to invest 
in particular securities” (Pendharkar 2003, 61, italics added).  This allocation of 
appointment authority to the government was a change from the penultimate draft of 
the Act, which had granted appointment authority to the RBI.
51  Some argue that this 
change was fateful both in symbolic and practical terms, as it bound UTI that much 
more closely to the sovereign authority of the state.  The revised draft rendered the 
chairman directly beholden – symbolically and administratively – to the apex political 
authority rather than to a professional agency. 
As a centralized national institution for investment in securities under 
government control, UTI would furnish yet another lever of state power over the 
economy and large industry.  This was obvious to the industrial interests, who initially 
opposed the UTI proposals.  They feared the new powers this would give the 
government, but they also lamented the prohibition on private sector participation in 
the investment trust business.
52  The predominant apex business association, the 
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), offered an 
alternative proposal that would develop both public and private sector investment 
                                                 
51 In earlier drafts of the Act, appointment authority had been vested with the RBI.  The last draft 
mysteriously divided the UTI control mechanisms in a legislative twist that deviated from standard 
Indian practice of agency control mechanisms in such enabling legislation, subsequent articles the Act 
specified that, while the government had appointment authority, the Reserve Bank would have the 
authority to demand information from UTI.  Most importantly, the RBI was also entitled to issue 
“written directions” to the UTI board.  The right to issue written directions – a notorious Sword of 
Damocles in the Indian bureaucratic hierarchy – is a power rarely exercised explicitly because its mere 
existence compels subordinates to cooperate (India 1989 (1963), Sections 29 and 30).  The result put 
the UTI chairman in an “anomalous” position.  On the one hand, the RBI could give him direct orders.  
On the other hand, he was under the direct disciplinary control of the government.  If the two “did not 
agree on a matter of public interest the chairman would be faced with a dilemma” (Pendharkar 2003, 
63). 
52 It was only after some years of operation that private Indian corporations learned that they could use 
UTI to their own benefit.  Firms realized that when they had idle cash on hand, having not yet decided 
how to invest that money for the long term, just like individual investors, they could avail themselves of 
the ease, liquidity, security, and reasonable returns offered by UTI.  This short term “parking” of 
corporate cash balances led to high volatility in the Trust (Mujumdar 2002).  
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trusts.
53  This plan was rejected by the government, and during debate, advocates of 
the bill in Parliament were careful to build a case against private involvement.
54 
 
“Flagship”: US-64 and the political conquest of Indian equity finance.  UTI’s 
first “unit scheme” or fund was made available to the public in 1964.  This open-
ended
55 scheme was given the rather dull moniker “Unit Scheme-64,” or “US-64” for 
short.  In the Indian press and financial vernacular, US-64 is referred to as UTI’s 
“flagship” scheme.  The flagship metaphor – evoking the image of US-64 cleaving the 
wide seas of the Indian economy with all the other UTI schemes steaming along 
behind in its benign wake – aptly captured both the commanding spirit and the 
vanguard expression elements of state developmentalism that UTI embodied.  There 
was for many years a familiar, yet reverent tone in the way Indians referred to US-64, 
which carried over to UTI as an institution more generally.  As discussed later, this all 
began to fall apart in 1998; but in the meantime US-64 attracted over 20 million 
investors and defined many average Indians’ relationship with government and 
industry as their periodic dividends arrived on handsomely embossed UTI vouchers. 
US-64 quickly became extremely popular.  Its profound impact was based 
largely on the reliability and seemingly persistent returns it paid to its investors.  In its 
first year, US-64 set a fixed rate of return at 6.1 percent.  Thereafter, the scheme 
periodically stated the dividend it would pay out to unit holders.  This number 
                                                 
53 See Kochanek (1974, particularly chapter 6). 
54 Opponents of private involvement in the trust industry based their case on three main arguments 
drawn from the mainstream of then-prevalent Nehruvian mixed-economy doctrine: 1) an “infant 
industries” argument for a state-led single entity in the context of India’s primitive financial services 
sector; 2) the dangers of too much competition; and 3) the potential for industrial interests gaining 
financial power.  See the parliamentary debate collected in Pendharkar (2003).  In the end the 
disagreement was resolved when private firms were at least permitted to use UTI (as discussed in note 
52 above). 
55 An open-ended fund continually creates new shares of itself on demand.  Typically the shares of the 
fund are sold at a “net asset value” (NAV) and can be redeemed for cash later at a NAV that may be 
above or below the price at which they were acquired.  Net asset value is the value of all the assets in 
the fund divided by the number of outstanding shares.  
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fluctuated from as low as 6.1 when the scheme opened, to as high as 26 in the early 
1990s.  Even more unusual was the commitment US-64 undertook to “redeem” units 
at a premium to their face value of ten rupees.  These premiums for repurchase and 
sale were also periodically announced. At an early date in the history of UTI, the 
Governor of the Reserve Bank made an unusual commitment to the investment 
scheme, stating that “any loss in repurchase of units (if their value fell below face 
value) would be borne by the RBI.”
56  The first chairman of UTI, R.S. Bhatt, later 
wrote, in a disarmingly uncritical assessment, that this measure “went a long way to 
sustain the confidence of the unit holders in the formative period”  (Bhatt 1996, 20).  
Here again were two dimensions of UTI practice that were unusual and potentially 
troublesome, though they were clearly favorable, at least in the near term, for savers 
who invested in UTI. 
Thus, on the one hand, the formal structure of UTI largely mimicked that of a 
professional British trust, with clear fiduciary responsibilities.  On the other hand, the 
state charter, combined with the original state-owned or state-related sources of 
capital, the embedded control mechanisms of appointment, discipline, and direct 
written instructions, and the symbolic sovereign commitment these represented, 
demonstrate what an odd beast was UTI.  These odd conditions do lend credence to 
the argument that UTI was a joint expression of the plan rational and moral ambition 
dimensions of the Indian developmental state.  This, at least, is how one might present 
the charitable account of UTI’s purposes and functions.  It was certainly designed to 
serve broad public service goals, and in large measure delivered on this promise.  As 
indicated in the statements of UTI’s political promoters documented above, the central 
state recognized that special inducements and guarantees were needed to encourage 
individuals to invest in government and corporate securities.  And UTI did undertake 
                                                 
56 Quoted in Bhatt {, 1996 #7587, 20}.  
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to organize the management and concentration of the formidable transaction costs and 
risks of dealing with India’s slow, costly, and corrupt stock markets.  This provided 
convenient transactions and reliable returns to poor and middle class individual 
investors, as well as to opportunistic corporate clients. 
Yet, a complete account of the UTI project must also emphasize the dirigiste 
aspects of the UTI project.  UTI could influence firms, securities markets, and the 
overall economy in a variety of ways.  Until 1988, UTI was the monopoly mutual fund 
provider in India, and it continued to dominate into the post-1991 reform period.  Its 
decisions in securities finance were therefore the most important and could move the 
market.  Through its operations, UTI became the manager of large blocks of corporate 
shares, either purchased for its own portfolios in the market or acquired as part of 
debt-for-equity swaps from its debtors (firms).
57  As a large shareholder, UTI was 
often represented by directors on company boards.  Convention dictated that 
government representatives on boards not exercise their voting rights in crucial 
matters (strategic decisions or mergers and acquisitions), but UTI did influence 
outcomes – particularly preservation of the Nehruvian status quo – through moral 
suasion, agenda setting, and occasionally even through outright voting.
58 
While UTI was encouraging the “direct” flow of funds from savers to 
borrowers such as government and business (avoiding the “intermediation” of banks), 
the state did not wish to encourage an overly familiar relationship between investors 
and firms lest its own dominion over the “commanding heights” be eroded.  Use of a 
                                                 
57 As mentioned above, UTI was empowered to extend term loans and as such was also a source of loan 
credit for large projects in the same way as other long-term lenders among the development financial 
institutions (DFIs).  See supra note 40. 
58 This system favored the status quo of dependent capitalism under the Nehruvian financial governance 
regime, because, as to two experts on Indian finance explain, UTI “coordinated” the exercise of its 
voting rights with other DFIs.  These two financial economists point out that, “this enabled many 
managements to retain control of companies without needing to own a significant share of the paid up 
capital (the firm’s total shares of equity).”  This limited the threat of takeovers because any bid would 
require UTI acquiescence (in coordination with other DFIs), and UTI largely favored incumbent 
management (Sen and Vaidya 1997, 86).   
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state-managed mutual fund was one way to “mediate” this relationship.  UTI played a 
primus inter parus coordinating role in managing the voting rights associated with the 
share holding of government-run financial institutions.  Of the thirty stocks that 
comprised India’s benchmark Sensex share index on the Bombay Stock Exchange, 
these institutions had share-holding ranging from 13 and 50 percent.
59  Through UTI, 
the government was thus “capable of indirectly influencing the market and has done so 
on occasions of a major downswing by asking financial institutions to prop up the 
market by increasing their buying activity” (Sen and Vaidya 1997, 86). 
A parliamentary statute was used to deploy elements of Anglo-Saxon financial 
practice and fiduciary law pursuing the customary goals of late developmentalism: 
capital accumulation and administrative financial allocation. The British investment 
trust model was embedded in a powerful central bureaucratic structure, subject to the 
politically potent organization of India’s civil service with its rigid personnel 
management system (including the patronage elements of promotion and the ossifying 
effects of numerous hard-to-fire employees). UTI hence fittingly embodied the 
overlapping principles and practices of developmental Nehruvian mixed-economy 
socialism in India.  Here was an institution comprised of capitalists elements – an 
investment trust focused on stocks and bonds – yet capitalized from funds provided by 
the state, directed by public officials, and using price signals (the dividend yield and 
redemption price) administered at government discretion not set by the market. 
Adding to the many demand-side constraints on Indian industrial finance 
discussed earlier in this chapter, UTI led the state’s colonization of the supply side of 
Indian securities finance under the Nehruvian regime of economic governance.  In this 
sense, UTI reproduced the role of banks as a risk bearing, mediating institution, 
                                                 
59 The Bombay Stock Exchange’s SENSEX is India’s equivalent of the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  
The Sensex debuted in 1979.  When the National Stock Exchange eclipsed the BSE in the 1990s, the 
NSE’s NIFTY index of fifty industrials came to compete for the claim to benchmark status.   
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though it did not do so explicitly.  This point is the main target for UTI critics.  The 
latent conflict between the strict fiduciary objectives (serving investor interests) and 
the broader public purpose (as defined by the state) was evident even in the early 
parliamentary debate, when a prominent MP explicitly elided the distinction between 
them, saying the Trust would be managed “on business principles” which she claimed 
“would not be different from the larger public interest.”
60  
It was this conflation of the government-defined public interest with investor 
interest, argue critics of UTI, that undermined the positive elements of the legal and 
organizational structure of the investment trust model.  The institutional ensemble that 
constituted UTI was a Faustian bargain of sorts, inasmuch as the sovereign aura that 
attracted investors and gave UTI its various powers also provided the devices of 
discretionary action that facilitated the state’s dirigiste capabilities.  This vagueness 
and latent conflict introduced the potential for what economists call “moral hazard.”
61  
In this implicit deal, the state assured reasonable earnings and reliability in return for 
the ability to use UTI, as necessary, to achieve government goals that were not 
immediately coterminous with the formal fiduciary responsibilities and narrow 
financial objectives of the trust.
62   
The appeal of this arrangement was crafted using the symbolic sovereignty of 
the parliamentary act, in combination with the bureaucratic symbolism of the binding 
mechanisms of original state funding and the details of the appointment procedures, to 
                                                 
60 These somewhat insouciant remarks of Congress Party member Tarakeshwari Sinha in the Rajya 
Sabha (upper house of parliament) are quoted in Pendharkar (2003, 72). 
61 The strict definition of moral hazard derived from the economics of the insurance industry has more 
generally been applied (and more loosely interpreted) to include circumstances like the case of UTI in 
which the presence of implicit incentives or guarantees may lead to the socializing of private costs in 
the event of complications in a financial relationship. 
62 UTI failure could lead to the socializing of costs in a state bailout using taxpayer funds.  This could 
happen in two ways.  First, poor portfolio management, politically expedient investing, or adverse 
market conditions could cause the Trust to fail to achieve returns sufficient to pay the publicly promised 
rate of return.  Second, the corpus of the trust as measured by NAV (see supra note 55) could fall so low 
in actual assets that there were not enough funds to redeem all outstanding “units” at the guaranteed 
repurchase value.  Both of these things happened in 1998 and 2001.  
 
209 
come to a tacit social (but not legal) contract.  Thus, UTI was given a special status 
that hindered the process of moving to a market-based system of securities finance 
involving procedural supervision and, in particular, complicated the regulatory 
treatment of UTI investment schemes for many years to come.  Elevating UTI to this 
special status also produced uncertainty regarding the competency of other 
government agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Board of India, to regulate 
any part of the UTI.
63 
 
C.  Indian Bond Finance in the Era of Dependent Capitalism 
 
As the Indian central state came to dominate the financial system through the 
1950s and 1960s and reached its zenith in the early 1980s, a distinct set of institutions 
was produced which shaped each area of bond finance identified in the asset-
class/financial-positions matrix: public finance, monetary policy, federalism and local 
development, creditor/debtor relations, and the interest rate structure.  As development 
economists McKinnon and Shaw had expected, financial repression in India created a 
heavy issuer-bias.  As the dominant issuer of bonds, the central state was keen to 
cultivate and preserve this systemic bias in the era before global securitization 
(McKinnon; Shaw). 
 
The State. Government-issued, “paper”-like bonds or treasury bills dominated 
the realm of debt securities such as it was under the old regime.  This use of 
government securities was largely an accounting shell game, moving funds around 
among state-owned banks, the central bank, and of course, the mint.  Banks, insurance 
                                                 
63 This became a matter of some contention during the development of India’s constrained evolution 
securities governance regime in the 1990s.  
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companies, and pension plans (which were government run) were obliged to hold 
government bonds at specified levels, creating captive markets for government 
paper.
64  These bonds had a limited range of maturities, which made sense since they 
were very rarely traded, generally being held to maturity as part of the coerced system 
of government debt management.  Markets for corporate bonds were relatively small 
and saw very light trading volumes. 
Continual increases in deficit spending over time created a constant demand on 
government for more credit (see Table 4-2).  This produced a cascade of additional 
financial control measures.  First, it meant a corresponding supply of government 
bonds was needed to provide the state with the funds it needed to make up the deficits. 
Relations with the central bank and control of the financial system permitted the 
government to force banks to hold these bonds.  This was achieved by way of an 
official regulation called the “Statutory Liquidity Requirement” (SLR).  The SLR 
obliged banks to hold a specified ration of their reserve assets in the form of 
government bonds and DFI-issued securities.  Designed initially as a monetary policy 
measure, over time the SLR became a fiscal tool, providing an ever expanding 
“captive market for government securities,” and hence “served as a means of 
allocating a larger share of banks’ resources to government” (India 1985, 254).
65  
Between 1964 and 1991, the SLR rose steadily from 25 percent to 38.5 percent. 
 
                                                 
64 For India, see Sen and Vaidya’s excellent and concise summary (1997). 
65 This constant flow of state debt necessitated a growth in the money supply to pay for the government 
bonds, leading to what macroeconomists call the “monetizing” of the deficit.  To offset the effects of 
this surge in the money supply, the government required banks to hold ever higher reserves of cash 
through (yet another) administrative requirement known as the cash reserve ratio (CRR).  
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Table 4-2: 
Trends in Fiscal and Budget Deficits, 1971-1991 (as a percentage of GDP) 
  1971-1975  1976-1980  1981-1986  1987-1991 
Fiscal Deficit  3.56  5.07  6.84  8.29 
Budget Deficit  0.96  1.34  1.33  2.09 
Source: Reserve Bank of India. 2002. Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy 
 
Through constitutional authority and customary practice, the central state, over 
the years, came to be responsible for managing states’ access to debt, and was thus in 
charge of their use of bond finance.
66  Thus, in sub-national finance, the ability of 
India's many states to issue bonds and undertake borrowing independently of the 
central government was limited.  Even this limited ability was very rarely exercised by 
the states.  Instead, they relied mostly on the center for direct grants and revenue 
dispersal through the national plan. 
 
The Market.  This dominant role of the state could not but affect the market for 
bonds.  In the parlance of official Indian documents, government bonds are referred to 
as “market borrowings.” This is particularly confusing since, before the 1990s, there 
wasn’t much of a “market” into which these bonds were issued (known as a “primary 
market”).  The SLR system meant that the price, the interest rate (known as the 
“coupon rate”), and therefore the yield on government bonds were not subject to 
market forces of supply and demand.
67  Nor was there much of a secondary market 
into which they could later be sold.  Trading in government securities was very thin.  
It was conducted largely by phone or in person, and required a complicated procedure 
of registering trades and transfers in the Reserve Bank’s oddly-named Subsidiary 
General Ledger. 
                                                 
66 Article 293 of the Indian constitution limits state borrowing internationally and gives the center 
power over any state that is in debt to the Union (central) government. 
67 The yield on a bond is the (coupon) rate of interest, divided by the market price (not the face value) of 
the bond.  This is why bond yields go up when the price of bonds goes down.  
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Corporate bonds, too, were a part of the Nehruvian finance regime, and they 
also were subject to strict regulation.  Corporate bonds were of two types, private and 
public.  The bonds of state owned enterprises (SOEs), also known as “public sector 
undertakings” (PSUs), enjoyed a de facto sovereign guarantee and were therefore 
considered low risk (but paid lower interest rates to investors).  Private firms had to 
pay higher rates on their bonds.  The major investors in these instruments, again, were 
the DFIs and state-owned banks, but firms also held one another’s bonds.  Corporate 
bonds were a distinct but not major source of outside finance for firms, sometimes 
exceeding 15 percent of total funding sources in the 1980s.
68  However, the use of 
bond finance was strictly constrained.  There were rules governing firms’ permissible 
levels of debt-equity ratios.  Foreigners were prohibited from investing in corporate 
bonds.  Finally, even the purposes for issuing such bonds were limited to long-term 
working capital needs (Ghosh 1991).  
Summarizing the situation in Indian bond finance, a former Reserve Bank 
governor concluded that the “effects of financial repression policies quite clearly had a 
negative effect on the financial sector: markets were heavily segmented and 
underdeveloped secondary markets inhibited the competitive pricing of assets” 
(Rangarajan 1994).  Other experts rounded out these conclusions, adding that “the 
presence of non-price allocation mechanisms led to an inefficient use of credit” (Sen 
and Vaidya 1997, 17 ). 
 
                                                 
68 This estimate is based on an ICICI portfolio sample of 417 public listed companies referenced in 
Ghosh (1991).  
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D.  Indian Equity Finance in the Era of Dependent Capitalism 
 
Before activity began to pick up on India’s stock exchanges in the mid-1980s, 
few Indians outside of Calcutta and South Bombay paid much attention to the stock 
market index.  Indeed, there was little point in doing so, since before 1984 it hardly 
moved at all, and up until 1990 was quite sluggish.  Figure 4-1  – “Trends in New 
Indian Capital Issuance” – displays the degree to which non-government Indian 
corporations used securities to raise capital between 1951-1992. The monotonously 
low and flat curve of the trend line between 1951 and 1985 makes clear that such 
corporations only began using securities in a meaningful way in the mid-1980s, and 
only began raising significant sums through securities issuance late in the 1980s.  
Examining equities specifically, Figure 4-2 confirms the remarkable inactivity of 
India’s stock markets in the heyday of the Nehruvian planning state.  It shows that the 
value of Indian stocks only began to pick up with the stirrings of reform under Prime 
Minister Rajiv Gandhi in the mid-1980s.  
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Source: Misra (1997). 
 
Figure 4-1: 
Trends in New Indian Securities Issuance 1951-1994 
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Base 1980-1981 = 100. Source: Misra (1997) 
 
Figure 4-2: 
Movement of the Reserve Bank of India’s 
Ordinary Share Price Index 1951-1994  
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While the majority of finance capital in the form of short and long-term loans 
or grants flowed through the directed-credit circuits of the planning state and its post-
Independence state-business arrangements, some finance capital was embedded 
elsewhere.  The circuits of equity finance of India’s shareholding system were by the 
mid-1960s rooted in two interconnected sets of institutions – one being the UTI and its 
DFI associates discussed earlier, and the other being the South Bombay and Calcutta 
communities dominated by ethnic Gujurati and Marwari stock brokers.  Stock 
issuance and trading was conducted through these two distinct institutional cultures of 
securities finance civil servants and brokers, one official and bureaucratic, the other 
closely-knit, localized, and tightly networked through social, linguistic, family, and 
native-place ties.
 69 
 
The State.  The most significant role of the state in equity finance was played 
by the Development Finance Institutions such as the Unit Trust of India and the Life 
Insurance Corporation of India.  But the state also had other instruments of direct 
involvement, particularly in the issuance of equity – the primary market for shares.  
The primary market was government controlled and little used by firms.  Stock 
issuance was severely limited by the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI), who 
determined the volume and price of share issuance. The authorization to raise funds 
was at the discretion of the CCI, an agency with a small bureaucracy subordinate to 
the Ministry of Finance.  The price of primary issues was set by the CCI, which 
consistently underpriced these issues of stock, favoring investors over firms (Shah 
1995). 
 
                                                 
69 For the classic discussion of these two communities roles in Indian business, see Kochanek (1974).  
 
217 
The Market. For most of the post-Independence period, securities played only a 
small role in industrial organization or in the financing of firms.  Industrial 
organization issues were discussed above in connection with the production regime of 
the license raj, and the corporate governance subset of those issues was dealt with in 
connections with the DFI’s default bias toward incumbent management. 
With regard to enterprise finance and the primary market for securities, 
companies relied very little on securities finance as an source of external funds (see 
Figure 4-3).
70  Firm finance in general relied on internal sources for a plurality of 
funds.  Nevertheless, as a proportion of the funds enterprises did bother to raise using 
securities, stocks played the dominant role in the period from the 1960s to the early 
1980s.
71  In the 1980s the balance shifted in favor of bonds, even as firms’ overall use 
of securities finance grew 23-fold.  Whereas in earlier decades stocks represented 75 
to 80 percent of securities finance for non-government public limited companies, that 
number fell to below 50 percent in the 1980s as bond finance gained in relative 
importance (Murali 2000, 13).  Even if shares of stock did not play a significant role in 
enterprise finance or industrial organization during the Nehruvian era, they still were 
traded and circulated in the securities finance enclave. 
The secondary market for shares was segmented and isolated. Regulated by the 
government’s Controller of Capital Issues and operated by the Bombay- and Calcutta-
based community of brokers, the secondary market further reinforced the 
marginalization of the securities finance enclave.
72 
                                                 
70 Securities were a small source of firms’ funds generally (external or internal).  The DFIs and banks 
dominated external funding sources.  Together securities finance from stocks and bonds made only a 
small contribution to gross fixed capital formation in the country in the 1957-1980 period, rarely 
exceeding 2 percent of Gross Fixed Capital Formation, and hovering around 1 percent for much of the 
1960s and 1970s. See supra note 68. 
71 Equity finance as a percentage of firms’ total sources of funds ranged from 2 to above just above 8 
percent. See supra note 68. 
72 These are discussed at greater length in Chapter 6.  The following paragraphs draw heavily on 
Holdsworth (2001), Government of India (1985), and Echeverri-Gent (1999).  
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In the mid-1980s, a special committee chaired by former UTI chief G.S. Patel 
was empanelled by the Indian government to examine the workings of the stock 
exchanges.  The committee argued that amid the “diversity of organizational 
structures” prevailing in the country’s securities markets, the mobilization of finance 
for “national development” had suffered.  In a scathing attack on the Bombay and 
Calcutta broker community, the report asserted that “the securities business in the 
country has tended to be in the hands of a few families of stockbrokers whose actions 
are primarily governed by the need to protect their own interests and bereft (sic) of the 
interests of the investing public” (Government of India 1985, 10-11).  The report 
criticized the brokers for a host of improprieties ranging from intentional delays 
(redounding to their benefit), insider trading, and price manipulation (Government of 
India 1985, chapter 2 passim). Political scientist John Echeverri-Gent’s detailed study 
of the Indian stock trading community concluded that these brokers formed an 
“exclusive club” often subdivided into “cartels” which exploited the Indian stock 
exchanges (Echeverri-Gent 2001).  Echeverri-Gent colorfully describes the brokers’ 
pre-1990s behavior thus: 
 
…(T)heir ethic was similar to that depicted in Max Weber’s concept of  
‘ancient capitalism.’ Rather than increasing their profits by maximizing 
the volume of transactions that they conducted, the traders attempted to 
maximize  their  returns  on  individual  transactions  even  if  it  meant 
manipulating  institutions  to  the  disadvantage  of  their  transaction 
partners…As  a  group,  the  brokers  brazenly  manipulated  the 
investments  of  the  public  to  enhance  their  private  wealth,  and  they 
resisted modernizing the archaic technology because they feared that 
changes would transform their traditional business practices and curtail 
their opportunities to exploit the system (Echeverri-Gent 1999, 211). 
 
While Echeverri-Gent is certainly right that these circumstances “epitomized a 
classic rent seeking equilibrium,” it is important to recognize that the marginalization 
and economic insignificance of the securities finance enclave limited the actual power  
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of the brokers (Echeverri-Gent 1999, 212).  While their ethnic ties and special 
knowledge facilitated their concentration and organization as a collective actor, their 
ability to exploit diffuse public interests was limited by the enclave treatment of 
securities finance.  Until the 1990s, the challenge presented by the Indian stockbrokers 
was trivial because securities finance was merely a ghetto.  And it was a ghetto not 
because of the brokers’ behavior, but because the state had designed and implemented 
a governance regime that successfully constrained securities finance. 
A unique feature of pre-reform Indian stock markets was the form of trade 
settlement, or more accurately, the avoidance of trade settlement.
73  Typically, stocks 
are traded in a “spot” (or cash) market where each exchange transaction is deemed 
immediate or nearly immediate.  This is distinct from a futures or options market 
where the delivery of shares or money is agreed upon for a later date.  But for over a 
hundred years in India, the system known as badla allowed traders to defer “spot” 
settlement.   
In Hindi, badla literally means “substitution,” but as a trading practice it is 
typically translated as “carry-over” or “carry-forward” – as in “carry-forward my long 
position in Tata Steel Company into the next settlement cycle.”  The badla system 
dates back to the days when the settlement of stock trades took place on a fortnightly 
basis.
74  Badla permitted traders to defer settlement of their trades and to carry their 
“open” positions (orders to buy or sell) into the next period.  This would be done with 
the assistance of a broker or a badliwala, who would of course charge for this service.  
The charge was akin to “interest” that the trader paid to keep open his position and 
                                                 
73 The settlement of securities trades is the exchange of securities for payment. 
74 In the U.S. “day traders” buy and sell stocks all day “on margin,” meaning that in the course of the 
day they do not actually pay for or take possession of stocks in every trade they make.  Only at the end 
of the day do they “square-off” the many buy and sell orders they placed, calculating the net of sales 
and purchases and then paying out money or delivering stocks as necessary.  In this way they trade 
many more shares they must actually “settle” for with funds or shares.  In the badla system, the “day” 
was a fortnight (fourteen days) in length (Mulji 2000).  
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avoid having to produce either all the shares or all the money to complete a trade.  The 
rate of this “interest” – published in newspapers and posted in brokers’ offices – 
depended on the demand for the particular stock involved in the deferred trade (not the 
market value of the stock).  Stocks in high demand attracted a higher badla rate.  
Often, settlements were repeatedly delayed in this fashion, and the volume of 
outstanding positions of unsettled trades carried forward under various forms of this 
system rose and fell significantly over the years.  Badla was thus a de facto blend of 
elements of futures and margin trading in a nominally spot market. 
Describing the system, a veteran foreign investor and long-time observer of 
badla explained: 
 
For more than a 100 years the badla system has provided ‘risk capital,’ 
in a flexible manner, to fund speculative positions taken by investors in 
the  Indian  equity  market.    Badla,  and  its  derivatives,  have  allowed 
speculative positions to be built up and maintained with relatively little 
capital, and without the need for physical delivery.  However, monies 
obtained through the badla system came to be used by brokers to fund 
their  own  operations  and  proprietary  speculation  within  the  market. 
Badla  thus  introduced  systemic  risks  into  the  market  through 
margining, and gearing up, of not only speculative positions but also 
brokerage operations themselves.  In addition, the system provided the 
potential for the managements, and promoters, of companies to work in 
conjunction  with  select  ‘operators’  or  brokers  to  manipulate  share 
prices. The diverse routing and locations of credit capital within the 
system have raised significant challenges to the regulator in monitoring 
the overall structure (Holdsworth 2001, 3). 
 
Badla was very popular and created a distinct corps of vested interests for three 
reasons.  First, and most important for those who were supporters of the system, by 
generating high trading volume badla provided greater liquidity to the market.  
Second, the earnings from providing badla services –lending either shares or money – 
were a major source of profits for many brokers and upper middle class participants in  
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the badla market in Bombay, Calcutta, and Ahmedabad.
75  Third, badla allows traders 
to speculate on stock price movements with very little original capital of their own.
76 
Badla created a broad domain of the trading system in which patronage 
networks guided by large lead brokers with access to sizeable badla financing acted as 
patrons to poorly capitalized smaller brokers, who in return helped the large brokers 
by providing a loyal trading network.  Using the leverage provided by netting within 
the settlement cycle and badla finance, these “cartels” were able to manipulate prices 
by elevating trading volumes and ramping  (for the bulls), or patience and shorting (by 
the bears).
77  Regardless of how one rates the ultimate worth of the badla system, 
argues Echevveri-Gent, any reform effort had to recognize the matrix of interests 
created by the existing badla-shaped structure of the market (2001).  Those interests, 
relying on their incumbency in the Bombay financial community, the strength of the 
pro-badla arguments, and the fear of lost liquidity became a significant challenge to 
the reform of securities finance in the reform period.  Badla and UTI were two major 
obstacles that the constrained evolution regime of securities finance governance in the 
1990s had to overcome. 
To summarize, then, Table 4-3 is a resume of Indian securities finance before 
the 1990s.  The figure shows how the governance of securities operated during the 
majority of the post-Independence period.  It suggests that there were some marginal 
                                                 
75 The size of the badla market in its various incarnations was not well documented, nor was the market 
well regulated.  It was, in a sense, a very large informal system of “banking” for the share trading 
business.  The “interest” rates were often well above rates prevailing on bank deposits or rates other 
financial assets (often in the 14 to 22 percent range on an annualized basis, occasionally even higher).  
Some brokers reported that their business earnings on actual brokerage advising and trade transaction 
was a “sideshow” compared to their badla business.  Author’s interviews, India, New Delhi and 
Bombay, 2000-2001; #58, #78, #85, #110. 
76 While the value of financial speculation in macroeconomic and social welfare terms is controversial – 
having both positive efficiency enhancing potential and negative volatility and risk producing potential 
– those who do speculate are naturally strong supporters of a system such as badla that facilitates the 
practice. 
77 “Ramping” involves running up the price of a stock artificially and then selling before letting it fall.  
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changes during the false dawn of the still-born reform efforts launched and abandoned 
by Indira and Rajiv Gandhi during the first two thirds of the 1980s. 
India’s long history of stock exchanges and shareholding companies had been 
effectively sidelined in the “securities finance enclave,” with sleepy clubs of brokers 
operating listlessly at the fringe of a directed-credit finance system dominated by 
development finance institutions (DFIs); while a large state-run mutual fund-like 
institution, the Unit Trust of India, managed most of the country’s listed shares 
(though these shares were seldom actually traded).  In the idiom of development 
finance expert Edward Shaw, India’s pre-1990s securities finance, though well 
established, was “shallow,” and contributed only marginally to organized commercial 
industry.  The trading of Indian shares was dominated by the two exchanges in 
Bombay and Calcutta, which were run as clubs.  The trading practices at these 
exchanges insured extremely low trading volume and high rents for an exclusive 
exchange membership composed largely of two tightly networked ethnic groups 
whose corruption and incompetence further marginalized equity finance. Nevertheless, 
like China, the issuance of shares did grow in the 1980s, and then took off in the 1990s 
with the global securitization boom.  
 
Table 4-3: 
Indian Securities Governance before 1992  
State  Period 
Policy 
Cycle 
Policy 
Tenor 
Institutions & 
Administrative 
Organization 
Capital Controls 
(domestic and international) 
Market  Civil Society  Asset Classes  
1956 – 1981 
 
Closed 
 
“Nehruvian 
Securities 
Enclave” 
 
Top-down 
Central fiat 
CCI 
UTI 
Central 
discretion 
complete 
Financial repression 
Administered interest rates 
Foreign equity ownership capped at 
40% (“FERA companies”) 
Fixed-inconvertible currency/FERA 
Foreign commercial borrowing low 
Multilateral loans and aid hi 
Central hegemony over federal 
finance 
 
Regulated by 
CCI 
Dominated by 
BSE brokers 
Badla 
Poor delivery 
Low volume 
Corrupt/fraud-
ridden trades 
Ghettoized 
Bombay-
Calcutta 
Gujarati-
Marwari 
nexus 
Bureaucratic & 
UTI/DFI- 
dominated 
organized 
finance 
 
Bonds 
SLR and “captive” 
bond market 
 
Equity 
UTI-CCI-Broker 
created 
“enclave” 
 
1982-1991 
 
Semi-
Closed 
 
“False 
Dawn” 
 
Same as above 
Cement 
industry 
deregulation 
Central 
discretion 
slightly 
challenged 
(Escorts, 
Reliance 
Inc.) 
Same as above 
Foreign commercial borrowing 
increase sharply 
Primary market 
moderate 
growth 
Some secondary 
market 
growth 
 
News coverage 
of finance ↑ 
 
Reliance-
Ambani-
inspired 
equity cult 
Bonds 
Deficit growth & 
spending fuels 
sharp growth 
government bonds 
Equity 
Cement deregulation 
sparks expectation 
of some M&A 
fueling interest in 
construction 
stocks 
2
2
3
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V. Conclusion 
 
Because this is part political sociology, part historical institutionalism, it is 
critical to assess the institutional system prior to reform in order to understand the 
dynamics of that reform.  For China and India, financial governance regimes in the era 
of explicit directed credit – that is, the1950s into the 1980s – were remarkably similar.  
By the 1980s, China's state socialist system and India's dependent capitalism system 
shared a common reliance central political domination of finance for the organized 
sectors of the economy.  This resemblance changed in the 1990s, as financial 
governance in the two countries diverged.  The rest of this thesis explores what 
happened to Chinese and Indian financial governance in the 1990s era of increasingly 
globalized and securitized finance.  The state in contemporary China and India 
responded to economic backwardness in similar ways in the era before global 
securitization. 
Establishing the parameters of this comparability helps to reveal those 
elements that best explain differing patterns of securities governance that emerged 
during the intensive expansion of securitization in the 1990s.  Demonstrating that the 
prior regimes of financial governance were similarly dominated by directed-credit 
systems is not to say that China and India were identical.  These systems of directed 
credit were located in very different social, political, institutional, and macroeconomic 
contexts.  We can divide these into two broad categories: the international, externally 
oriented context, and the domestic, internal context.  It is within these two domains 
that I find the variables that significantly influence the development of Chinese and 
Indian securities governance regimes.  In chapters 5 and 6 I examine these external  
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and internal factors that shaped Chinese and Indian responses to the securitization in 
the 1990s.  
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Chapter Five 
 
STRUCTURAL JUNCTURES AND POLITICAL INCENTIVES 
 
 
Low-income countries, similarly large and similarly populous, predominantly 
rural and agricultural, China and India have periodically been the subjects of 
international and comparative political analysis. Yet, in the recent structure of their 
external macroeconomic profiles, they could not be more different.  In those areas of 
what Indian officials call the “external sector” that matter most, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), exports, and foreign exchange (forex) reserves, the two countries 
were, by the early 1990s, already clear polar opposites.  These three areas are critical 
dimensions of a country's external exposure profile (EEP).  This profile plays a crucial 
role in shaping the nature of a country's structural juncture with the world economy. 
Chapter 2 explained how global techno-market and transnational social forces 
encouraged the spread of securitization to developing countries in the 1990s, making 
securitization a prominent condition of the world economy at that time.  Global 
technologies, markets, and transnational society may account for why states take at 
least some nominal interest in the process of securitization, setting up stock 
exchanges, restructuring and listing companies, and generally “following the script.”  
Yet, chapter 2 also explained how securitization poses a challenge to directed-credit 
financial governance regimes, developmental states’ most fundamental institutions of 
dirigisme: Institutions that contain or limit powerful independent financial actors, and 
that preserve states’ discretionary control over the flow of funds to enterprise or public 
finance. 
So why would developmental states seriously undertake to promote new 
systems of securities finance at all?  Why, for example, do some states, such as India,  
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respond with fundamental change, while others, like China, merely go through the 
motions of reform even as they reproduce old directed-credit patterns of financial 
governance?  One part of the answer, it seems, is that India changed because it had to, 
while China didn’t change, because it didn’t have to.  The motivations for change, as I 
argue in this chapter, were produced in large measure by the political incentives that 
flowed from these countries’ varying profiles of external economic exposure. 
I argue that varying responses to securitization in China and India were the 
result of different political strategies formulated by central-state-elites in interaction 
with the dominant political coalition and the prevailing structure of property rights.  
These political strategies were driven by a collection of priorities and objectives that 
establish a policy trajectory pursued by policy-making members of the central-state-
elite.  These priorities and objectives constitute what political scientists call 
preferences.  But, those preferences did not by themselves provide the sufficient 
conditions for determining the different patterns of securities governance in the two 
cases.  Few specific institutional elements of the eventual securities governance 
regime can be derived from the analysis presented in this chapter.  The contrasting 
junctures with the international economy – framed by each country's EEP – provide a 
structure of incentives directing the policy trajectory of central-state-elites.  For a 
more thorough explanation of how those institutions developed within the ambit of the 
policy trajectory, we must look to the domestic political process in which the central-
state-elite fashioned specific strategies for achieving those preferences in strategic 
interaction with coalition participants and property rights structures.  This is the 
subject of chapter 6.    Nevertheless, these preferences – shaped by the EEP-imposed 
incentive structure – did supply an important necessary condition – the policy 
trajectory – for securities governance regime formation.  The political strategies that  
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shaped securities governance thus begin with these preferences.  Where do they come 
from? 
The last chapter began exploring the international side of the dual imprint.  It 
followed the “second image reversed” tradition of exploring how variables that 
pervade the international system such as the intersubjective norms of the global 
society or spread of markets and technologies can influence institutional outcomes. 
This chapter now follows later innovations in second image research by focusing on 
the specific character of each country’s links with the outside world – the profile of 
external exposure. 
Relying on macroeconomic data, interviews with officials and businesspeople, 
government documents, and secondary analysis from experts, this chapter presents 
evidence that these countries’ EEPs played a crucial role in framing the incentive 
structure within which important preferences were formed and political decisions 
made.  The policy trend that led to China’s discretionary involution pattern of 
financial governance was thus shaped by that country’s benign abundance profile of 
external exposure.
1  India’s pattern of constrained evolution was shaped by a very 
different profile of external exposure, one of precarious scarcity. 
 
I. The External Exposure Profile 
 
The external exposure profile variable used here is inspired by Political 
Scientist Peter Gourevitch's "production profile" concept.
2  My reformulation of the 
that concept is based on inductively-inspired modifications to that concept drawn from 
                                                 
1 In this instance, “benign” is used as it is defined in the American Heritage dictionary: “Tending to 
exert a beneficial influence; favorable: a policy with benign consequences for the economy” (2000). 
2 This concept which helps explain the link between politics and policy outcomes was discussed in 
chapter 3 with regard to the “dual imprint”.  
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my research.  The EEP focuses on how a country's situation in the international 
economy shapes important political actors' preferences.  As I sought to uncover what 
was driving the institutional changes behind differing Chinese and Indian patterns of 
securities governance, interview results, government documents, media coverage, and 
popular debates (both elite and vernacular) all pointed in one direction.  It became 
clear that the key actor in both countries' state-led financial reforms was the central-
state-elite.  It also became clear that the pervasive influence, both explicit and implicit, 
of the external profile strongly shaped the structural conditions and decision-making 
context in which financial governance institutions were developing.  As such, the EEP 
is not a deductive analytic tool derived from international macroeconomic theory.
3  
Rather, the EEP is an heuristic intended to capture the way important elements of a 
developing and transitional economy’s (DTE) interaction with the outside world 
impinges on domestic political decisions and ultimately the institutional structures of 
governance by shaping the preferences of the central-state-elite. 
 
A. Defining the Profile 
 
Components of the external profile do correspond to several of the major 
variables that determine the balance of payments position, which could serve as a 
convenient proxy for what I am calling the EEP.  But, what experts call the 
“accounting balance of payments” is a statistical ledger and does not fully capture the 
                                                 
3 EEPs may be practically related to international macroeconomic theory to the extent that bureaucrats, 
official decision makers, and policy analysts internalize the ideas, idiom, and practices (such as 
procedures for calculating national accounts) of modern trade theory through exposure to the dominant 
nodes of the prevailing international financial episteme, including foreign universities, the mainstream 
Anglo-Saxon economic business press [and translations of it in Chinese neibu (internal Party 
circulation) publications, and open-source “digests” such as the Cankao Xiaoxi], learned journals, and 
international institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, international financial service providers, and 
the US Treasury Department.  
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practical, psychological, financial, and ultimately the political implications of the EEP, 
such as the significance of FDI inflows for industrial finance, or the fear of a “balance 
of payments crisis” when there is no foreign exchange left to pay for critical imports 
such as oil-related products.
 4  Furthermore, the “market balance of payments” (the 
actual flow of payments in and out of the country) is only observable in its effects.  
The story of how one of these effects − a country’s stock of forex reserves − has 
become politically salient in semi-open DTEs like China and India is central to my 
argument, and is therefore of great importance to the external profile concept.
5 
Over the course of two years exploring this problem in China and India, 
talking to experts and policy makers, and looking at the record of the crucial 1992-
1995 period in both countries, it became clear that two variables in the accounting 
balance of payments itself were most salient to these countries’ external profiles − 
exports and FDI.  Also salient was one result of the B-of-P flow, the forex reserves.  
The case material below presents evidence supporting this claim, but the stylized facts 
that can be induced from them suggest that the politically important parts of the 
external exposure profile include: 
 
Exports:  Exports  as a  component  in  the  EEP  are important  in  shaping 
political incentives for domestic financial reform for three reasons.  First, 
high and growing exports typically contribute to GDP growth, which has 
salutary  consequences  for  political  stability  and  government  legitimacy 
                                                 
4 In the first heading of a typical developing country’s balance of payments ledger, the “current 
account” is computed as the net export (or import) of goods and services for a given unit of time.  In the 
second heading the capital account is computed from the sum of various capital flows including gross 
foreign investment (direct and portfolio), external assistance (net of grants and concessional loans), 
foreign commercial borrowings (net), debt service, inward remittances of forex, and a residual capital 
category.  An overall surplus on the balance of payments will yield a reserve of forex. The treatment of 
precious metals in this accounting can vary and can influence the accounting of the total reserve stock.  
5 Another effect of the balance of payments in a fully open economy can be observed in “market 
determined” exchange rate movements.  However, since China and India maintain non-convertible 
“managed” exchange rates [China with a de facto “peg” to the dollar, and India with a (aggressively) 
“managed float”], this effect is less relevant.  Measuring the costs of adjustment under such managed 
floats is tricky.  For a discussion of China, see Lin (2002).  For a discussion of India, see Krueger 
(2001).  
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based  on  the  effects  of  increasing  employment  and  income.    Second, 
where export production is efficient relative to the cost of imported inputs, 
the sale of merchandise or “invisibles” (such as services and software) to 
foreigners can contribute to the accumulation of hard currency reserves.  In 
developing countries, export strength begets a virtuous circle of industrial 
finance as further investment is drawn into the export sector from home 
and abroad.  Finally, the growth and earnings discussed above (in theory) 
link  up  with  improvements  in  human  capital  and  technology  causing 
“development.” 
 
Foreign Direct Investment: FDI as a component in the profile of external 
exposure is important in shaping political incentives for domestic financial 
reform in two different ways.  First, FDI enters the country as forex and as 
such  has  the  potential  to  contribute  to  the  foreign  exchange  reserve.  
Second,  FDI  furnishes  funds  for  fixed  capital  investment  in  organized 
industry,  providing  an  important  supplement  to,  or  compensation  for, 
insufficient or inefficient domestic industrial investment.  There are, of 
course, the other alleged benefits of FDI, such as the transfer of technology 
and managerial skills that can contribute to industrial productivity. 
 
Foreign  Exchange  Reserves:  As  discussed  already,  in  a  semi-open 
economy with a fixed exchange rate (the result of a capital control regime 
of the kind used by China and India), forex becomes crucial in managing 
the  exchange  rate,  and  covering  the  cost  of  imports  and  debt-service.  
Forex  reserves  also  come  to  have  powerful  symbolic  value  in  a  neo-
mercantilist ethos that is now increasingly common among DTEs. 
 
Not all of the components of the balance of payments are relevant to the profile 
of external exposure.  Emphasizing FDI, exports, and forex in the EEP, I have 
neglected other components of the “capital account” that may contribute to industrial 
investment or forex reserves.  Some of these components, remittances in particular, are 
hard for receiving national governments to influence in any meaningful way.  Others, 
like external commercial borrowings (ECBs) are not necessarily appealing sources of 
forex or investment funds.
6  Thus, for countries like India that cannot rely (as China 
                                                 
6 The volume of inward remittances by locals living abroad (or by members of a Diaspora) is largely 
beyond the control of national governments, depending largely on the real interest rate differentials.  
Chaudhry’s (1997) study of Yemen discussed the institutional consequences of an EEP in which 
remittances play a large role.  In the 1980s and 1990s grant aid and concessional loans to the developing 
world were declining (Chaudhry 1993).  External commercial borrowing is not appealing to semi-open 
DTEs because of the pressure it can put on both exchange rate management and the supervision of 
domestic financial intermediaries.  These were among the lessons of the Latin American debt crisis of 
the 1980s and the Thai and Korean crises of 1997 (Eichengreen and Fishlow 1996).  
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can) on FDI flows for industrial investment and forex, or on exports as a growth 
catalyst and forex source, foreign portfolio investment (FPI) becomes an important 
option in addressing an external profile characterized, as India’s is, by precarious 
scarcity. 
As DTEs shift to semi-open external sectors with open trading accounts even 
while they maintain capital controls, the stock of forex reserves has become an 
important shield against the vicissitudes of an international economy in which rich 
country interest rates, the whim of fund managers, and commodity price volatility 
(particularly oil) can capriciously destabilize a country’s living standard and growth 
prospects practically overnight.  Among DTE financial officials who frequent private 
meetings at the Asian Development Bank in Manila, the idiom in which currency 
reserves are referred to as “war chests” suggests the prevailing outlook on this matter 
(Lahiri 2002 p. 2).   This attitude toward forex reserves has several sources.  There is a 
Veblen-like “conspicuous consumption” element.  To be counted as such, forex 
reserves must mostly be held in highly liquid forms like cash, precious metals, or as 
highly liquid securities (such as US Treasury Bills).  This means they are financially 
inert, gaining little or no interest.  The size of a country’s foreign currency reserve has 
thus come to represent, among other things, a mark of prestige among DTEs.
7 
Another reason forex reserves have become so important among DTEs is the 
importance placed on such reserves by international credit-rating agencies (CRAs) and 
the growing reliance on those ratings by international financial service providers.
8  
With the growth in the cross-border exchange of financial assets in the last twenty 
                                                 
7 In his 1995 address to his alma matter, Cornell University, Taiwanese President Lee Denghui 
addressed an audience gathered largely to celebrate Taiwan’s achievements as a development success 
story and de facto independence.  The climax of President’s Lee’s speech was his declaration that 
Taiwan was the holder of the developing world’s largest reserve of forex (author’s notes, June 9, 1995). 
8 There is a stunning scarcity of IPE research on the role of CRAs from a truly political perspective 
(Sinclair 2003).  
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years, and particularly the growth of investment in “emerging markets” by bank and 
non-bank financial actors, the services of CRAs have become indispensable in 
evaluating investment risk.  Technically, the scores that credit-rating agencies assign 
to countries and companies are measures of credit risk.  But overworked fund 
managers and portfolio investors who control the majority of foreign securities 
investment in DTEs frequently resort to credit ratings as a convenient short hand 
indicator of the investment quality of securities from a given country or firm-sector.
9  
While the printed methodology provided to the public by CRAs professes commitment 
to a broad range of qualitative and quantitative measures, fairly weighted, the agencies 
do not make public their actual country-wise computations, only the results, and there 
is good reason to believe that ratings committees strongly emphasize forex reserves.
10 
Finally, probably because of the increasing power of the CRAs, governments 
do not make the task of estimating forex reserve positions easy.  In discussing the 
issue of optimal forex reserve management, former Chief Economic Advisor to the 
Indian Prime Minister, Dr. Shankar Acharya explained, “if you want to carry out a 
study to find out the optimum amount of forex reserves that should be held by the 
government, you cannot do so. No government, apart from the US, gives out the 
composition of the forex reserves” (Acharya 2002 p. 5). 
 
                                                 
9 Fund managers in Mumbai and Hong Kong both said they used CRA ratings as “cover” when 
challenged on investment decisions by their superiors. Author’s interviews, Bombay, 2000, #115; 1999, 
#31. 
10 The sovereign ratings methodology prospectus of CRA Standard and Poor’s, describes the 
importance of currency reserves thus: “Central bank reserves are another external indicator, one whose 
importance varies across the ratings spectrum. Reserves usually act as a financial buffer for the 
government during periods of balance of payments stress. They include foreign currency and gold 
holdings, with the latter valued at market prices. Reserve adequacy is measured in relation to imports, 
and to projected current account deficits and total debt service. Whether a given level of reserves is 
adequate or not is judged in relation to the government’s financial and exchange rate policies and, 
consequently, their vulnerability to changes in trade and capital flows” (ChinaOnline 2001).  
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a.  External Exposure Profiles and Potential Endogeneity 
 
None of these three components of the EEP are entirely “exogenous.”  That is, 
they are not independent of any country’s general economic policy regime. They are 
certainly not impervious to concerted national policy adjustment or even accidental 
developments, as in the fortuitous and unplanned emergence of India’s services and 
software export sectors in the mid-1990s.  For example, China's high levels of inward 
FDI during the 1990s were certainly in large measure an outcome that was amenable 
in the medium term to the agency of political authorities including specific political 
measures designed to encourage FDI (Huang 2002). 
However, these high FDI inflows were also the consequence of durable 
structural conditions such as the attractiveness of China's educated low-wage 
workforce, and the size, wealth, and affective ties of the Chinese diaspora who 
invested so much in the Mainland.  The diaspora factor is an extremely significant 
contributor to the benign nature of the international economy that China faces 
(Thakurta 2002).  These structural variables are, quite “sticky,” and do not respond 
immediately to policy calibration or structural adjustment, and policy makers are 
aware of this stickiness.  For example, in the India case, policy makers knew it would 
be some time before they could count on any substantial changes in FDI inflow,
11 or 
before the forex costs of import intensity in a new, expanded export base could be 
redressed by forex accruals earned from that export base.  Chinese policy makers 
similarly understood that in the absence of further Tiananmen-like episodes, they 
could count on continuing FDI from the overseas Chinese community and continuing 
export competitiveness from the nexus of that FDI and their abundant labor.
12   For 
                                                 
11 A key player in the formulation of the policy at the time told me “we thought in terms of a matter of 
several years.”  Author’s interview, New Delhi, 2001, #104. 
12 Author's interview, Beijing, 1999, #35.  
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this reason it makes sense to treat as exogenous in the short and medium term; exports 
and FDI, as well as the degree to which both contribute (or do not contribute) to 
industrial finance, GDP growth, and the stock of forex.  Understood in this way, these 
elements of the EEP form the salient lineaments of the political incentive structure 
during the crucial period (1992-1995) in which China and India were responding to 
rapid securitization, and in which the regimes of securities governance were 
established. 
The endogeneity problem is particularly important when considering the 
possibility that the profile of external exposure (treated here as an independent 
variable) can be, and often is, influenced by the dependent variable − the regime of 
securities governance. It was Indian’s policy makers’ fervent hope that they could 
modify their EEP, or at least diminish its precariousness by changing the institutions 
of financial governance in ways that would invite foreign portfolio investment to 
cover their forex needs, and to mobilize finance in new ways so as to alleviate the 
short and medium term scarcity of FDI.  By contrast, it has been the Chinese hope that 
their EEP will persist in its imperviousness to the patterns of domestic financial 
governance, allowing them to continue the flow of funds (what some call “life 
support”) to the SOE sector out of domestic savings, while new industrial growth and 
forex needs are covered out of the FDI−export nexus. 
II. A Study in Contrasts: Chinese and Indian External Exposure Profiles 
 
The big China story of the 1990s, indeed the big Asia story of the 1990s, was 
the vast quantity of FDI that flowed into the Middle Kingdom.  In spite of the 
reputation its authoritarian one party regime earned after the 1989 Tiananmen 
incident, the famous inscrutability of its business practices, and its well known 
reputation for corruption, China became the second most popular destination for direct  
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investment in the world during the millennium’s last decade.  Economic analyst Joe 
Studwell, dean of a growing club of China pessimists, and a veteran chronicler of what 
he calls “The China Dream,” colorfully summed up the 1990s China bonanza in 
explaining what happened after Deng Xiaoping’s famous 1992 “Southern Tour.”  That 
tour of the prosperous coastal region – reminiscent of similar dynastic imperial tours 
hundreds of year earlier – broke the post-Tiananmen frost: “When Deng offered up the 
China Dream,” Studwell noted, “not only the mainland Chinese, but the whole world, 
arose in frenzy” (2002 p. 64). 
 
Table 5-1: 
Foreign Direct Investment into China and India 
  
Net Inflows 
Current U.S. $ 
(Billions) 
Net Inflows as 
Percent of  GDP 
 
China  India  China  India 
1985  1.7  0.1  0.54  0.05 
1986  1.9  0.1  0.63  0.05 
1987  2.3  0.2  0.86  0.08 
1988  3.2  0.9  1.04  0.03 
1989  3.4  0.2  0.99  0.09 
1990  3.5  0.1  0.98  0.05 
1991  4.4  0.7  1.16  0.03 
1992  11.2  0.2  2.67  0.11 
1993  27.5  0.5  6.37  0.20 
1994  33.8  0.9  6.23  0.30 
1995  35.8  2.1  5.12  0.61 
1996  40.2  2.4  4.92  0.63 
1997  44.2  3.6  4.92  0.87 
1998  43.8  2.6  4.62  0.64 
1999  38.8  2.2  3.91  0.49 
2000  38.4  2.3  3.56  0.51 
Source: World Bank, 2002 
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Export performance, the other key factor in the two countries’ external sector, 
presents another diametric contrast.  As the rest of East Asia climbed the product cycle 
or lost wage competitiveness, the coastal regions of Mainland China rapidly became 
the new-low cost workshop of the world.  China jumped on the “export-led growth” 
bandwagon wringing as much as twenty-five percent of growth in gross domestic 
product out of its export sector.  India might also have been exploiting its comparable 
low-wage, high-skill advantage to grab some of this market. But, it failed to do so; in 
spite of both the theoretical benefits of its fundamental low-wage comparative 
advantage, and the special policy measures it had taken to promote exports and 
depreciate the Indian rupee. 
In the Chinese case, these two key parts of the external sector – FDI and 
exports – became increasingly intertwined with one another, and together helped 
contribute to the country’s brisk growth rate, with foreign invested enterprises 
contributing as much as 47% of China’s total exports and 37% of industrial output.  
Over the 1990s, coastal China became increasingly popular as the preferred location 
for the manufacture of low cost exports to the world, and late in the decade even began 
a run at the upper end white goods market. The story behind China’s impressive 
export performance includes targeted tax incentives, “Special Economic Zones” 
(SEZs), the possible role of poor labor standards (including even coerced labor), and 
the special role of overseas Chinese investment.
13  Figure 5-1 summarizes the Sino-
Indian comparative trends, highlighting the role of exports in growth and hard 
currency augmentation. 
                                                 
13 Puzzling to some has been the persistence of the China’s export competitiveness after 1995, when the 
Chinese currency was increasingly recognized as overvalued.   For a discussion of this problem, see 
Song (2001).  
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Figure 5-1 
Export Contribution to Growth and Foreign Currency Reserves 
Source: World Bank, 2002 
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In China the FDI-export nexus contributed remarkably to growth and to the 
accrual of foreign currency.  At the dawn of the decade China's balance of trade 
shifted into positive territory and for the rest of the decade it exported more then it 
imported.  While Indian exports grew moderately during the 1980s and 1990s, imports 
grew also.  The inability of India in the near term to generate value or productivity 
dividends on the export side sufficient to offset this persistent import intensity was a 
key problem that Indian officals recognized, forthrightly admitting that it shaping their 
grand strategy for economic policy making. 
It is worth noting that these contrasting country outcomes may themselves be 
related to one another.  The empirical research is indeterminate on the degree to which 
global FDI is fixed.   Indeterminate also is research on the degree to which the 
allocation of FDI into developing countries is a zero-sum game.
14  However, as two of 
Asia’s largest economies, China and India are likely to be viewed by potential direct 
investors as competing destinations, with the two countries being targeted both as 
promising final markets and as attractive export platforms.  It is therefore reasonable 
to infer that there is at least some element of a strategic interaction dynamic between 
them with regard to the external profile outcomes discussed above.  There is evidence 
suggesting this to be the case.  For example, executives of large multinational direct 
investors such as General Electric (Standard 2002) and Motorola (Srinivasan 2000 p. 
669) are on record as claiming they consider the two countries as competing hosts for 
their production facilities.  Over the last decade India has been on the losing end of 
these considerations. 
Moreover, the role of the business and financial press in this strategic 
interaction, while hard to measure, is not insignificant.  The media relish a face-off 
                                                 
14 For a discussion of this, see Sader (1992).  
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between the heavyweight “Asian Giants,” and with good reason.  The India-China 
comparison has all the glamour of exotic, ancient civilizations that are easily portrayed 
by endearing and evocative mascots − the “elephant” and the “dragon” (Studwell and 
Sekhar 1995).  Both business writers and academics enjoy the trope of a race, and this 
one has most often been framed in Aesopian terms, with India cast as the tortoise and 
China as the hare (Gilley 2002).  Lastly, there is direct evidence that in the second half 
of the decade the two governments themselves were engaged in precisely this kind of 
strategic interaction.  India’s Ministry of Commerce has specifically sought to copy 
the Chinese FDI-export-led-growth model.
15  While discussions with officials and 
experts suggest this rivalry exists,
16 I do not consider it a driving cause, but rather an 
influential background condition. 
Finally, FDI and export-led growth in combination with the broad macro-
structure of the two economies produced a circumstance in which the levels of hard 
currency reserves that were accruing in each country were also in diametric contrast.  
Countries' foreign exchange reserves are typically measured in terms of "months of 
imports covered" by the current stock of hard currency holdings.   This figure must be 
evaluated along with the balance of payments.  As discussed below, the importance of 
this joint evaluation forms the base from which credit rating agencies evaluate country 
risk.  Figure 5-2 displays this combination for the Chinese and Indian cases. 
                                                 
15 According to a 1999 Ministry of Commerce report, "foreign direct investment has a direct 
coordination with an exponential increase in exports from China,” and that “India should emulate China 
by opening free trade zones to attract more foreign investment and ensure higher economic growth” 
(Press 1999). 
16 Author’s interviews with investing executives, (Hong Kong, 1999, #28), and with the central officials 
who deal with them in India (New Delhi, 2000, #14), and in China (Beijing, 2000 #35).  A major 
difference between process of FDI investing in China and India, aside from the greater volume of red-
tape in India, is that the center plays a smaller role in Chinese FDI interactions (Thakurta 2002).  
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Figure 5-2: 
Balance of Payments (B-of-P) and Forex Reserves for China and India 
Source: World Bank, 2002 
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The stickiness of the trends in FDI and export-led growth, and the fixity of 
institutional and productive structure in the economy meant that this hard currency 
accrual trend was something the Chinese central-state-elites could reasonably expect 
to persist in the near future, and probably in the medium term as well, while the Indian 
state was forced to fight tenaciously for the hard currency needed to cover every 
month's worth of imports.  
Table 5-2 summarizes the contrasting profiles of Chinese and Indian external 
exposure.  It makes clear that China's benign profile meant that the country enjoyed an 
abundance of investment capital (from FDI) for industrial growth, a reliable trade 
surplus, and a consequently dependable inflow of foreign currency.  Together these 
assured China of a stable balance of payments and imposed no urgent need for 
alternative sources of investment funds and foreign currency.  Table 5-2 also shows 
how India's precarious profile meant that the country suffered from a scarcity of 
investment capital (from FDI) for industrial growth, a chronic tendency to trade 
deficits, and an accordingly insecure inflow of foreign currency.  Together these 
undermined India's balance of payments and imposed an imperative for alternative 
sources of investment funds and foreign currency.  
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For those who cared, this contrasting symmetry of extreme conditions in the 
two country cases was rather remarkable.  Polar cases like these should spark the 
analytic interest of social scientists.  Such “naturally occurring” polar cases offer rare 
methodological opportunities for small-n historical-institutional researchers to isolate 
the effects of similar processes – such as responses to securitization – using the 
extreme contrast of polar cases to frame a process-tracing analysis.  The international 
political economy (IPE) and comparative political economy (CPE) literature on the 
stark contrast in Chinese and Indian FDI has focused almost exclusively on explaining 
why overseas Chinese (OCs) invest in China more then non-resident Indians (NRIs) 
invest in India.
17  Few scholars have explored the contrasting records of export 
performance.  Fewer still have bothered to inquire after the political consequences of 
these extreme conditions.  Perhaps with good reason, since when dealing with the 
structure of FDI and the determinants of export performance, analyses quickly lead to 
technicalities in the balance of payments such as exchange rates, and the composition 
of, and relationship between, eye-glazing matters such as capital and current account 
                                                 
17 For a review of the literature and the final word on this topic, see Guha (2002). 
Table 5-2 
Structure: External Exposure Profiles 
Securities Governance Trend 
India - Constrained 
•  Capital mobilization needed
•  Bbalance of Payments Insecure/  - 
•  Investment funds/Forex needed 
Precarious 
Scarcity
Benign 
Abundance
Profile Component
China - Discretionary 
•  Growth from FDI 
•  Balance of Payments Stable/+
• Investment funds/Forex suffice 
Low  High  Foreign Currency Reserves  (Forex) 
Low  High  Export -  led Growth
Low  High  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
China India  
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transactions.
18  The two countries’ contrasting profiles of external exposure in the late 
1980s and early 1990s did indeed produce very different balance of payments 
positions.  This raises the question whether the political implications of these balance 
of payments positions might influence the development of domestic financial 
institutions. 
The secondary literature was largely silent on this question, so I began by 
asking Chinese and Indian policy makers and financiers themselves.  Precisely 
because of the sensitive politics associated with these different profiles of exposure it 
was not always easy to trace the process that links external exposure profiles with the 
institutions of securities governance.  As discussed below, Indians consider their 
external exposure profile (EEP) an awkward topic, provoking nationalistic pride and 
even anti-Western indignation.  Chinese are reluctant to consider their profile a 
possible source of financial pathologies.   Nevertheless, there is good reason to believe 
that there existed some relationship between profiles of external exposure and the 
choices of central-state-elites with regard to securities finance.  The rest of this chapter 
traces that relationship and presents evidence of its political nature. 
 
III. From Profiles to Politics 
 
How does each country’s profile of external exposure make its mark on the 
international side of the institution forging “dual imprint”?
19  The material conditions 
created by a particular external profile, institution builders’ perceptions of those 
                                                 
18 The “current account” refers to the net of trade (imports minus exports) in goods and services.  The 
“capital account” (which is strictly controlled in China and India) refers to the net of flows (purchases 
by locals minus purchases by foreigners) in financial assets such as securities and currency. 
19 For a discussion of the “dual imprint,” see chapter three.  
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conditions, and their reactions based on those perceptions, must all translate somehow 
into the political process of actual institution building.  How does this happen? 
For a country that strictly controls financial flows, operating a closed or semi-
open capital account, and sustaining the keystone policy of such a fundamental 
external sector regime, a fixed exchange rate,  one of the most important 
macroeconomic priorities is maintaining a positive balance of payments position. Thus 
a top government objective must be to secure an ample stock of forex. 
Both China and India have maintained capital controls that are comparatively 
strict for semi-open trading states.  This is consistent with the “approved” reform 
sequence for DTEs.  This is the sequence that multilateral lenders such as the World 
Bank and International Monetary fund advise.  It was and continues to be (as of this 
writing) the sequence endorsed by mainstream international economists.
20  In this 
sequence the first step (following macroeconomic stabilization) is to open the “current 
account” and allow settlement of payments for the trade of goods and services in 
foreign currencies directly between transacting parties (firms).
21  Once this step is 
complete, countries are advised, with an important caveat, to proceed to the next step 
in the sequence, “capital account” reform, in which the exchange of financial assets 
directly between the transacting parties is permitted.  The caveat is that this second 
step should only be undertaken when strong financial institutions are in place. 
                                                 
20 For a summary of the approved sequence, see Edwards (1992).  For a summary of its application in 
general and in some Latin American cases, see Schamis (1999).  The debate on this issue in Anglo-
Saxon academia since the Asian Financial crisis has been increasingly lively, see, Bhagwati (1998), 
Edwards (2000), and Rodrik (1997).  For explorations of the real-world politics of the issue, see Wade 
(1998) and Winters, (Winters).  For the debate on this in India see Ghosh (2000) for the view from the 
old left, and from the more mainstream Indian view see, Raje (2000).  For the debate in China, see Chiu 
(2002), and Chen (2001). 
21 For this to happen under a capital control regime, the access to foreign currency by local firms 
becomes the node of state control, and the deposits of those firms and their subsidiaries in foreign banks 
the node of non-compliance.  For a review of how this sequencing has worked in India, see Ahluwalia 
(2002), and in China, see Lardy (1998).  For a review of how China and India conducted trade prior to 
opening the current accounts see respectively, Lardy (1992), and Desai (1994).    
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However, the ultimate goal of full capital account convertibility was not 
always the mainstream view, and its merits continue to be a matter of debate 
politically, empirically, and theoretically, both within the wider international financial 
episteme, and locally within China, India, and other DTEs.
22 
Financial crises around the world in the latter half of the 1990s underscored 
what was at stake in “getting the sequencing right.”    Currency and financial crises 
from Thailand, and Korea, to Russia and Brazil made clear that optimal sequencing 
indeed had consequences beyond the seminar room, and that the task of “developing 
strong financial institutions” − the caveat that had been uttered almost as an aside in 
the early 1990s − was much easier said then done.   India, it seems, has been making 
clear progress in following the prescribed sequence, while in China progress has been 
less clear.
23 
China and India took the first step in this sequence during the early 1990s and 
completed their current account reforms by 1996.  Under the semi-open conditions of 
current account openness with capital account closure, trade flows and payments on 
merchandise and services were freed, but financial flows and payments for financial 
assets were not, and the balance of payments position could still be significantly 
influenced by ongoing government manipulation of components of the balance of 
payments.  This magnified potential political contestation surrounding the balance of 
payments position and its consequences in a number of ways.  Most importantly, 
                                                 
22 I return to this issue at the end of this chapter in discussing the role of the various 1990s financial 
crises in reinforcing the political incentives linking Chinese and Indian EEPs with the persistence of 
their differing patterns of financial governance through the late 1990s and early years of the new 
millennium. 
23 For three years India has been expanding the range of the band within which the “managed float” of 
the Indian Rupee trades.  The quality of India’s commercial banking sectors has steadily improved over 
the last five years.  And, the maturity range of government securities and the mechanisms for their use 
in fiscal and monetary matters are increasingly transparent and sophisticated.  On currency control, 
China shows no sign of movement.  Despite heroic-seeming efforts, commercial banking may be worse 
today than it was three years ago.  Only in central banking have measures to improve fiscal and 
monetary calibration have the Chinese shown much progress in the last three years.  
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persistent imbalance risks a payments crisis.  Second, there is political contestation 
over the structure of authoritative allocation of benefits generated by semi-closure, 
which accrue differentially among importers, exporters, producers, and consumers.
24  
And third, the contestation just mentioned must be refracted through the symbolic 
politics of external sector policies within a given national political culture and what 
citizens and policy makers consider appropriate ways of relating with foreign business 
and the world economy.  The dynamics of the balance of payments under a strict 
capital control regime therefore require active and vigilant attention to both the 
technical and symbolic ramifications of every change.  This line of reasoning would 
thus suggest the following general propositions: 
Among developing and transitional economies with formerly 
directed-credit financial systems, a country’s profile of external exposure 
will shape the political incentives for securities finance reform.  In 
particular:   
•  The more benign a country’s profile of external 
exposure at the time of securitization, the less will be 
the political incentives to alter the old principles and 
practices – the institutions – of securities governance. 
And, conversely: 
•  The more precarious a country’s profile of external 
exposure at the time of securitization, the greater will 
be the political incentives to alter the principles and 
practices – the institutions – of securities governance. 
                                                 
24 This is standard Hecksher-Ohlin open market distributive politics.  For the classic explication of this 
in the IPE literature, see Rogowski (1989).  
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The rest of this chapter will examine this proposition based on evidence from 
the Chinese and Indian cases.  It should be obvious that the proposition is informed by 
the striking contrast between China’s and India’s junctures with international economy 
in the last two decades discussed at the opening of this chapter: China’s favorable 
(benign) position in the international economy and India’s unfavorable (precarious) 
position. In highlighting the external profile at the time of domestic financial 
institution building the proposition also seeks to capture world historical and world 
socio-economic “temporality” of the Chaudhry-inspired “structural junctures” 
approach so central to the dual imprint conceptual framework introduced in chapter 3. 
If the proposition is valid, we should see evidence that the contrasting 
conditions in the two countries’ external macro-economic positions – their profiles of 
external exposure – created compelling incentive structures and resource flows that 
influenced central-state-elite preferences and later significantly shaped the institutional 
development of securities governance during the 1990s.  This chapter outlines the first 
step in this process: The step in which the incentive structure of each country's EEP 
moulds central-state-elite preferences. 
To put this in a broader comparative context, Table 5-3 arrays the China and 
India cases along with some other developing and transitional economies within a 
two-by-two property space representing the intersection of ideal-typical exposure 
profiles (benign versus precarious) and ideal-typical securities finance reform 
trajectories (discretionary versus constrained).  
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Like China, Hungary enjoyed a flood of foreign direct investment, and did 
quite well as an exporter at various points along the product cycle (Bartlett 1997).  
Explaining why the Budapest stock exchange only “plays a bit part” in the Hungarian 
financial system, one analyst emphasized the point that “Hungary has relied more on 
FDI than any other Central European country” (Porter 2002, 5).  Indeed, during the 
1990s Hungarian net inflows of FDI as a percent of GDP were neck  to  neck with 
those of China (averaging well over 4 percent).  Both Hungarian export receipts and 
foreign currency reserves were also quite high.
25    This structural fact, combined with 
the small total pool of firms and funds (savings) within the country, has lead to a range 
of problems for the Budapest exchange (including off-exchange trading of firms, 
fraud, and poor official support) even though it had a state-of-the-art trading 
infrastructure and the availability of good quality companies for listing.  As a result, 
                                                 
25 High export receipts and high forex reserves were offset however by the extreme import intensity of 
Hungary’s aggressive post-socialist reconstruction. 
Table 5- 3: 
External Exposure Profiles and Political Incentives
Securities Governance Trend 
External
Exposure
Profile
India
Poland
Brazil
China
Hungary  Benign
Precarious
Discretionary  Constrained 
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like China, Hungary ended up with a formally impressive securities finance 
infrastructure that was hollow.  Hungary did not involute as China had because its 
domestic politics were different, but its securities governance regime was 
discretionary in ways that much resembled China's securities governance regime. 
For example, Hungarian securities attracted few issuers or investors (foreign or 
domestic), producing low trading volume, and its securities finance was of little 
significance to the Hungarian economic system (Review 1999).  Investors, domestic 
and foreign, preferred direct equity involvement over portfolio investment in 
Hungarian stocks.  High export earnings produced stable balance-of-payments and 
forex conditions.  The Hungarians built a securities exchange with great potential, but 
no one came.  The benign profile of Hungary’s external exposure meant the country 
could ignore the relative insignificance of its stock market – that is, like the Chinese 
they both enjoyed discretion with regard to securities finance, and they pursued a 
discretionary policy trajectory in the governance of securities.  With relatively 
abundant flows of FDI and reliably strong foreign exchange receipts from exports, the 
Hungarian central-state-elite had little incentive to fix the securities finance situation 
either for domestic users or to attract foreign portfolio investors.  They just didn’t care.  
This incentive structure created a preference for what we might call discretionary 
neglect in the Hungarian securities governance regime (as compared to China’s 
discretionary involution).   
Poland and Brazil present India-like contrasts to Hungary and China, and 
illustrate the political incentives of precariousness and scarcity in a country’s external 
exposure.  In the early 1990s both countries attracted meager FDI.
26  Their trade 
balances were highly volatile which meant they could not rely on export receipts.  
                                                 
26 This did change for both countries, and by the end of the 1990s they were doing better at attracting 
FDI.  
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Poland began its post-socialist development with very scant forex reserves.  Brazil 
seemed to have an ample amount, but the Real crisis of 1999 showed that in fact they 
needed more (Rajan 2002).  In both cases, at the dawn of the securitization drive in the 
early 1990s, central-state-elites faced severe pressures to deal with the precariousness 
of the external macro-economic circumstances precisely at times that were sensitive 
for the domestic political position of new governments.  Elite policy makers preferred 
to improve domestic capital mobilization and attract foreign portfolio investment as 
ways of addressing these problems. 
 
IV. Indian Exposure: The Imperatives of Adversity 
 
How is it that the Indian governance regime for securities evolved so quickly 
and involved such a remarkable transformation in the structure of hierarchies (in state-
economy relations and within and among firms), markets, networks, and associations?  
This change is remarkable both in contrast to Chinese securities-related financial 
governance, the alleged “superior reformer,” and in contrast to other sectors and 
factors of the Indian economy, such as power, telecommunications, or labor.  Second, 
it is a remarkable achievement given the obstacles overcome in the course of this 
change, not only in confronting organized interests, but also in confronting deeply 
seated ideological beliefs and the institutions of economic governance associated with 
them.  The former included the state-owned banks and their employees, and the old 
Bombay and Calcutta financial communities of stockbrokers, their exchanges, and 
their comfortable cartel.  The latter included the ideological aversion to finance capital 
inspired by the Nehruvian- Gandhian principles of political economy and national 
development that pervaded the government, the elite, and large parts of small-scale 
industry.  These profound changes were launched during the months and years  
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following the dramatic events of India’s 1991 elections and balance of payments 
crisis. 
 
A. Antecedents
27 
 
The politically salient antecedents of the 1991 crisis include the forty-year 
post-Independence development of India’s institutions of economic governance and 
the ideology associated with them.  These institutions included; central planning, 
export pessimism, a “modernization-oriented” heavy industrialization drive based on 
import substitution (ISI), combined (contradictorily) with institutions designed to 
promote small scale industry (in a nod to Gandhian values) (Herring 1999).  When 
married to the prevailing ideology, a blend of self-sufficiency and Fabian Socialism 
inflected with the ideas of Gandhi and Nehru, this produced what came to be called 
India’s "Nehruvian mixed-economy.” 
Blending the ideology of self-sufficiency with the institutions of export 
pessimism (and ISI) produced the specific circumstances of India’s external sector in 
the forty years preceding the 1991 crisis, including the historical features most 
important to an understanding of India’s external exposure profile (EEP).  Students of 
India’s modern development are fond of lamenting that, “India’s share of world trade 
declined steadily from 2 percent in the 1950s to 0.05 percent in 1990” (Srinivasan 
2000 p.698).  As with other autarkic developers, including many countries in Latin 
America, the import intensity of India’s export pessimism, and the related policy of 
                                                 
27 By 2002, India may have won in the battle of foreign currency reserves, but has yet to win the war of 
the balance of payments precariousness.   In July the Confederation of Indian Industries convened a 
conference in which there was some serious consideration that the growing forex reserves could 
actually become a problem (forcing appreciation of the rupee).  This is because ten years after reform 
India still is not exporting enough or producing enough capital intensive goods at home to either 
produce large export earnings and create demand for dollars by importers in a healthy symbiosis of 
importing inputs for domestic and export-oriented production.  
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import-substitution industrialization produced persistent pressure on India’s balance of 
payments.
28 
Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, and former Ministry of 
Finance official, Y.V. Reddy is a man whose career has placed him on every possible 
side of India’s B-of-P problem.  Reflecting on the historical context of the unusual 
position in which India found itself in 2002, holding approximately 66 billion US 
dollars in forex, a sum sufficient to cover over twelve months of imports (Figure 5.X: 
India’s Forex Position 1950-2002), Reddy remarked: 
 
This  position  needs  to  be  contrasted  with  the  1980s,  when  external 
debt, especially short-term debt, mounted while the forex reserves got 
depleted. In fact, it is often held that, between 1956 and 1992, India 
faced  balance  of  payments  constraints  in  all  but  six  years  (Reddy 
2002). 
 
In 1981, following the second world oil shock, India’s B-of-P situation became 
so critical the government was forced to draw on its line of credit at the International 
Monetary Fund.  The psychological and nationalistic sentiment associated with this 
episode, and its place in the public narrative of India’s recent economic history is 
captured by an eminent Indian economist in his bitter quip that during the 1981 B-of-P 
crisis, “we had to go to Washington, DC with a begging bowl”: A vivid metaphor in 
the Indian context (Acharya 2002 p, 2). 
These comments underscore how, in India, the link between the balance of 
payments and the political incentives for financial reform emerge from the conflicted 
nexus of nationalist ideology and technical macro-economic necessity.  We know this 
particular nexus was powerful because, as we shall see, it overcame another deep-
                                                 
28 For a discussion of this in comparative perspective, see Schamis (1999).  For a classic treatment of 
the “import intensity of ISI,” see Diaz-Alejandro (1965).  
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seated element of nationalist economic ideology – fear of, and principled resistance to, 
foreign financial interests, particularly foreign portfolio investment. 
 
B.  The 1991 Crisis 
 
During the 1980s the Indian state ran out of money.  A military build-up had 
been costly, and government revenues were slipping. Large deficits developed, 
national debt increased, and the government was no longer able to support investment 
as it had in the past (Rudolph 1989).  Combined with poor export performance, and 
little FDI, these conditions conspired with the First Gulf War spike in oil prices to 
bring the Indian state to the verge of bankruptcy in 1991, when India went to the IMF 
for an emergency stabilization loan, and a new government embarked on a range of 
economic reforms. 
Watching the shipment of forty-six tons of gold from Bombay to London 
might provoke in the casual observer a range of reflections on matters such as imperial 
expropriation and the power of money, particularly if the year is 1991 and not 1891.  
In mid-July of 1991 when that transfer of gold took place, there were, however, no 
such casual observers because, for security reasons, the transfer was kept secret until 
the new Indian Finance Minister announced the completion of the transaction on the 
floor of the Indian parliament.  That Finance Minister, Dr. Manmohan Singh, had held 
his portfolio for less then a month, having been sworn in as part of the new cabinet of 
recently elected rookie Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao.  Rao was at the helm of a 
minority government, his Congress Party having failed to muster an absolute majority 
in the previous month’s election.  He was being asked to fill some large shoes, for the 
country had just begun mourning the assassination, during the recent election 
campaign, of the scion of the country’s leading political family, Rajiv Gandhi, former  
 
261 
leader of Rao’s Congress Party.
29  As if this were not enough trouble for the new 
administration, Finance Minister Singh explained in his Parliamentary floor speech on 
July 18, that drastic measures like the gold transfer (provided as loan collateral to the 
Bank of England) were necessary because India was facing its worst ever balance of 
payments crisis. 
The 1991 crisis sparked a round of economic reforms across a broad front, 
marking a watershed in modern Indian history.
30  The rupee was devalued, tariff 
barrier reductions begun, and the industrial “license-permit-quota Raj (rule)” largely 
dismantled over the next two fiscal years.
31  Changing the related system of directed-
credit that, together with the industrial licensing system, characterized the old pattern 
of financial governance in India was more difficult due to the scope of the state-owned 
banking system, the power of the unions who staffed it, and the political equilibrium 
associated with the provision of credit to “priority sectors.”  The 1991 reforms 
changed the face of the Indian economy, ushering in a period of sustained strong 
growth between 1993-1999 (see, Table 5-4).
32  However, no area of reform achieved 
such fundamental change as the restructuring of the governance regime in the 
securities sector. 
                                                 
29 At the time Rao, a kindly old Congress Party stalwart, was seen as an innocuous caretaker figure, 
who would occupy the premiership until a, more aggressive "real" leader could be selected.  He upset 
these expectations, lasting in that position for six years based on a mix of success on the part of his 
economic team combined with the very innocuousness that had led observers initially to dismiss him. 
30 Previous efforts at reform in 1984 under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had been largely still born, but 
had begun the incipient growth of securitization, particularly in the liberalization of the construction 
materials sector,especially cement where production quotas and M&A controls were loosened.  
Author’s interview, Bombay, 2000, # 113.   
31 See the budget speeches of Finance Minister, Manmohan Singh for 1992 and 1993. 
32 For evaluations of the reform period, see Joshi and Little (1996), and Ahluwalia (2002).  
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Table 5-4: 
India's GDP Growth in Percent 
 
Year  Percent 
Growth 
1991  0.4 
1992  5.4 
1993  4.9 
1994  7.5 
1995  7.6 
1996  7.2 
1997  4.4 
1998  5.9 
1999  7.0 
2000  3.9 
 
C.  The Politics of Precarious Scarcity 
 
In his assessment of the reform period, a former top official in the Ministry of 
Finance and the  prestigious Planning Commission, summed it up thus, “No other 
regulator has achieved as much as SEBI (Securities Exchange Board of India) and no 
other SROs (self-regulating organizations) as those in the stock markets.”
33 
The newly appointed Finance Minister Manmohan Singh was a technocrat 
with experience in all of India’s top economic posts and a neo-Keynsian pedigree.
34   
Singh embodied the nexus of old and new, the domestic traditions and institutions, as 
well as the cosmopolitan perspective and the exasperation with India’s precarious 
external profile.  With the Prime Minister’s support, Singh collected around him what 
John Waterbury calls a “change team” composed largely of foreign trained technocrats 
                                                 
33 Author’s interview, New Delhi, 2001, #104. 
34 Singh was trained as an economist at Cambridge with Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor.  
 
263 
who also were seasoned veterans of the New Delhi policy arena, and all like-minded 
in their desire to transform the ideas and institutions of India’s economy.
35  
The ideological side of the EEP-politics nexus operated at two levels, the 
public, vernacular, intersubjective level of India’s post-Independence political culture, 
and the elite, entre- nous, level of the policy-making elite’s persistent psychological 
discomfort with India’s precarious profile of exposure and mediocre macroeconomic 
performance.
36 At the first level, where political culture shapes economic institutions 
indirectly through ideological legitimation, and directly through the media and through 
the electoral and parliamentary processes, India’s post-Colonial discourse of self-
sufficiency and antipathy toward finance capital was embodied in the culturally and 
politically pervasive principles of swadeshi and Nehruvian-socialism.
37  As discussed 
in chapter 4, this discourse had shaped India’s economic institutions over the course of 
forty years, with profound implications for the ancien regime of financial governance. 
At the elite level, the genuine discomfort that these proud bureaucrats and 
politicians shared was another major factor linking the profile of external exposure to 
the political incentives for change in the institutions of financial governance.  Like the 
political culture of swadeshi and Nehruvian socialism, this “sentiment” also took on an 
intersubjective, constitutive aspect based on many of these men’s (they were all men) 
shared experiences.  They shared the common bond of having endured long years of 
                                                 
35 Waterbury defines the “change team” as the “brain trust of the political leadership,” requiring “the 
visible and consistent support of the head of state” (Waterbury 1992 p. 191).  This discussion is drawn 
from Vanita Shastri’s excellent and meticulously documented analysis of the Indian change team and 
the general reform process it spawned (Shastri 1996). 
36 I am here speaking of the “collective representation” of Durkheim (1895 (1964)).  For a study 
demonstrating the intersubjective basis of political culture, see Mitchell (1988).  Katzenstein (1996), 
and Wendt (1999 especially pp. 157-165) discusses the use of intersubjective knowledge as an 
independent variable in explaining foreign policy and IR outcomes.  For a discussion of common 
knowledge in the "epistemic community" among technical experts such as macroeconomic policy 
makers, see (Haas 1992).  For a discussion of the particular case of India, see Chatterjee (1993). 
37 Swadeshi, meaning literally "of our country" is the popular self-reliant expression of economic 
nationalism in India.  As a political project it draws legitimacy from Mohandas Gandhi's framing of the 
anti-Colonial movement. The anti-finance bias was discussed in chapter 4.  
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arduous research and interagency policy strife in skirmishes along India’s precarious 
B-of-P frontier. They also shared similar levels of exposure to Anglo-American 
macroeconomic theory.  Finally, the cosmopolitan perspectives they had gained 
studying or working abroad, produced a general feeling of wounded national pride 
provoked by the “penury” of the precarious external profile.
38  For example, memories 
of the 1981 B-of-P crisis were vivid in the minds of change team members, among 
whom numbered several professional economists who had cut their open-economy 
research teeth on case studies of that episode among others. 
It is hard to overestimate the impact of the cosmopolitan perspective, and how 
it affected the framing of the reform debate.  Finance Minister Manmohan Singh was 
fond of pointing out in public fora the provocative fact that in 1960 India and South 
Korea had similar levels of per capital income and GDP, and that less then forty years 
later, “Korea has become a member of the OECD, and we (India) are where we are,” 
with a annual per capital income of US$ 450 compared to South Korea’s US$ 
11,000.
39 
The 1991 crisis set the stage for an odd confrontation between the technical 
problems of FDI, foreign trade, industrial finance, and forex management associated 
with the external profile on the one hand, and the vernacular ideology of swadeshi and 
the institutions of Nehruvian-socialism on the other hand.  Even the near apocalyptic 
urgency of the 1991 crisis was insufficient to propel the “feasible set” of policy 
making completely out of the orbit of India’s finance-phobic post-Colonial discourse 
of Nehruvian self-sufficiency. The crisis was sufficient, however, to create political 
                                                 
38 The rhetoric of the B-of-P precariousness constantly invokes this sense of shame using words such as 
“penury.”  See, Damodaran (2002). 
39 Singh has made this comparison in many interviews and speeches.  For a convenient reference, see 
(Singh 2001).  
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space for significant innovation and change.
40 Yet, that change was constrained in turn 
by the mechanics of India’s external profile.  These ideological and psychological 
factors interacted with India’s EEP and the new mechanics of the semi-open external 
sector management in interesting and politically complicated ways. 
 
V. Chinese Exposure: The Liberties of Abundance 
 
For the last twenty years one of the most striking features of China’s political 
economy has been the huge inflow of foreign investment.
41  Already in 1993, FDI 
equaled 20% of fixed investment and accounted for more than 10% of industrial 
production (Naughton 1996, 303).  Also, despite the size of its domestic market, China 
followed its neighbors Japan, Korea, and Taiwan in an export-led growth pattern.  In 
1998, two decades after initiating basic economic reforms, as much as 25% of China’s 
GDP growth came from exports. 
As discussed above in Section II, this “China Dream” was a factor largely 
beyond the near-term control of the state during the establishment of China’s new 
pattern of securities-related financial governance in the 1992-1995 period.  
Nevertheless, it had profound consequences for many economic, political, and social 
elements of the transition process.  Most significant, were the effects on growth, the 
fate of medium and some large sized organized industry, and exports.  The “China 
Dream” and the benign structure of external exposure that the abundant inflow of FDI 
represented also influenced the development of the securities market. 
                                                 
40 For a discussion of how economic crises facilitate institutional change, see Nelson (1990) and 
Haggard and Maxfield (1996). 
41 Even if we significantly discount the official FDI statistics for “roundtrip investment” recycled 
through Hong Kong, and for sloppy or propagandistic Chinese accounting, the volumes are still world 
beating (Chandra 1999).  
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The initial corporate restructuring phase of China’s enactment of the securities 
market script may have had cosmopolitan inspiration from Hong Kong, but the actual 
investment capital in the securities markets before 1994 was largely domestic.  Then, 
as now, FDI was the major source of foreign funds.  The central state carefully 
supervised the flow of FDI,
42 and through 1994 enforced a severe and wide range of 
controls on capital both domestically and internationally.  Multiple administered 
exchange rates were in effect at an appreciated-level.  Currency was controlled by a 
dual-track system in which local currency and “foreign exchange certificates” 
circulated simultaneously.  Foreign exchange retention by provinces, municipalities, 
and state agencies, was based on centrally administered formulae.  It was not until 
1994 that foreign capital played any significant direct role in the securities markets 
through the growth of foreign listings and portfolio investment in B shares [Figure 
5.X: The Composition of China’s Share Market].  However, starting in the 1980s, and 
booming in the 1990s, foreign capital indirectly was playing a large role in securities 
market development as the process of corporatization expanded and FDI flooded in 
from the level of Township and Village Enterprises up to major Joint Ventures (JVs) 
in such areas as automobile manufacturing. 
 
A. The Politics of Benign Abundance 
 
Abundant flows of foreign direct investment in China, and the abundant 
foreign exchange cover derived from FDI and FDI-driven exports shaped securities 
market policy in the 1990s.  FDI continued to pour into China, and foreign exchange 
reserves rose throughout the decade.  Indeed, Chinese policy-makers were surprised 
                                                 
42 For a discussion of Chinese control of FDI, and the “miniaturization” of FDI to avoid those controls, 
see Fu Jun (2000).  
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that these flows kept coming, and increasing.
43 The foreign invested sector was soon 
taken for granted as an important driver of economic growth.  Paid-in capital from 
FDI, and the contributions of foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) to the trade surplus, 
together accrued large amounts of forex cover.  Later, overseas listings by Chinese 
companies added to the security that China’s formidable hard currency reserves 
offered against balance of payments risk.
44  Remembering, as discussed in section two 
above, the high esteem accorded the evaluations of credit rating agencies (CRAs) by 
central-state-elites, and the reverence with which the CRAs treat the components of 
the external exposure profile, the statement reproduced below from Moody’s 
Investors’ Service (the “gold standard” of CRAs) regarding several of China’s 
sovereign ratings aptly captures how all good things went together in China’s profile 
of benign abundance.  Each of the elements discussed above are represented. 
Moody's said it took the ratings action because of the "exceptional 
strengthening" of China's external-payments position. "Several significant factors – 
China's dynamic export performance, its ability to attract substantial amounts of 
foreign direct investment, its relatively modest level of external debt, and the very 
large buildup in official foreign-exchange reserves – make it likely that the nation will 
continue to reduce its vulnerability to external shocks," it said (Hong 2003). 
So that the booming growth in foreign trade might be more smoothly 
administered, currency convertibility was introduced on the “trade account” in 1996.
45   
Two years earlier, in a masterful implementation of reform sequencing, the currency 
had been unified (discarding the system of foreign currency certificates for foreigners) 
                                                 
43  The OECD calculated that China was the number two worldwide recipient of FDI in the twenty years 
between 1979 and 1999.  The US was number one (ChinaOnline 2000).   In the mid-1990s the foreign 
invested sector accounted for almost 75% of export growth. Export growth in turn accounted for 
anywhere from 18% to 27% of China’s GDP growth (Chandra 1999). 
44 Given Chinese state preferences for stability and strength, BoP security is crucial. 
45 This meant locals and foreigners could exchange hard currency for the otherwise inconvertible 
Chinese Renminbi, but only for the purposes of  settling contracts on the trade of goods and services.  
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and devalued.  The feudalistic foreign currency retention regime was replaced by a 
system of foreign currency trading centers servicing the trade-related exchange needs 
of businesses. 
Growth, together with B-of-P security from ample foreign exchange, provided 
the government with a wide margin to maneuver in directing access to financial assets 
in general, and to securitized equity and debt assets in particular.  With continuous 
inward flows of investment and steady GDP growth,
46 the government could safely 
maintain a strict set of capital controls. This limited outward foreign investment by 
locals, maintaining a captive pool of savings for investment in stocks and government 
paper.  The government then further “encouraged” the flow of these savings into the 
securities it had made available by imposing low interest rates (often negative in real 
terms).  Faced with such a Hobson’s choice, locals invested despite the   poor quality 
of the firms and the poor quality of the claims embodied in their equity shares (due to 
the segmentation of property rights). 
The boon of persistent foreign investment in China thus allowed the 
government to assimilate the securities market into the financial governance regime 
as; 1) a life-support system for the SOEs,
47 servicing the “socialist social contract” 
while providing a system of side-payments into the regional and sectoral coalition 
network, and 2) a means of managing an ambiguous state-dominated property rights 
regime. 
 
                                                 
46 The degree to which there was growth after 1997 is now in doubt. 
47 This was done in conjunction with a system of transfer payments disguised as commercial bank loans 
(Lardy 1992).  
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VI. The Crux of the Matter:  The Political and Economic Consequences of FDI 
 
After more than a decade of what many experts consider Indian 
“underperformance” in attracting Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), the last two years 
witnessed distinct increases in direct investment from abroad.
48 This recent dramatic 
change raises the important question; what role did FDI policy play (and not play) in 
the development of Chinese and Indian securities finance institutions? The core 
analytical claims of this thesis and the strongest evidence supporting those claims are 
most succinctly revealed in the analysis presented through this thesis of  the 
contrasting role FDI played in the recent development of Chinese and Indian financial 
governance. 
FDI was a key element in the Chinese profile of external macroeconomic 
exposure discussed in this chapter.  Its absence (particularly in the period preceding 
1995) in the Indian case was symptomatic external closure; the export pessimism and 
the precarious scarcity that so distinctly characterized India’s profile of external 
exposure.  The evidentiary base at the level of structural incentives, elite ideas and 
purposes, and their consequences for the domestic politics of institution building in the 
domain of securities finance, is clearest and most compelling when the analytic lens is 
focused most intensively on FDI dynamics in the two countries. 
                                                 
48 The empirics of FDI flows are themselves painfully fraught.  Indian data (for FY 2000 and forward) 
have now been aligned with those of most other major countries.  Nevertheless, since Chinese (and 
increasingly Indian) FDI flows disguise a lot of “roundtrip” money clear apples-to-apples comparisons 
are tricky. (“Roundtripping” is when funds that originate in China or India sneak out and come back in 
disguised as “foreign” investment). Some have argued that when updated Indian data are compared with 
appropriate estimates of Chinese FDI (i.e. aggressively discounted for roundtripping) the differential 
between the two countries’ FDI/GDP ratios would be much narrower. 
  These accounting disputes aside, few would argue that a country with India’s economic 
potential and relative capital scarcity could not have “done better” at attracting FDI.  FDI is one area 
where absolute numbers matter for two reasons.  First, there is evidence that the global stock of 
potential FDI is limited, and therefore its distribution among countries tends toward a zero-sum 
dynamic.  Second, FDI is prospective, and the amount of FDI relative to the current size of economy is 
not the best of indicators.  See, Sader (1992), Pfeffermann, (2002), Eichengreen and Tong,  (2005), 
Chantasasawat  (2005).  
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To begin with, one must take explicit cognizance of the fact that these are still 
very different political systems.
49  A few apparently benign clauses in China’s 1982 
constitution do not make a secure business environment. Multi-party democracy, for 
example, has been part of numerous Chinese constitutions. It has never become 
reality.   
Each political system has its costs and benefits.  There are developmental 
advantages to China’s blend of single-party authoritarian politics and state-socialist 
economics.  Chief among these advantages are its long-term institutional consistency 
and its efficacy in policy implementation.  But, there are costs too, and these are 
visible, for example, in the institutional structure and economic consequences of 
China’s FDI experience.  Similarly, there are developmental costs to India’s blend of 
democratic federal politics and mixed economics.  Costly populism, phobia of 
exposure to the world economy, and poor policy implementation are at the top of most 
experts’ list of such costs.  But the core economic problem in China also has a political 
source: The CCP’s fear of an independent entrepreneurial class that might challenge 
the regime has produced perverse institutional contrivances to limit or co-opt that 
class.  The Indian state and its agents do not fear an independent entrepreneurial class.  
While the Indian state has generally been apathetic, and occasionally even hostile to 
private business, there has always been political and economic space for an 
entrepreneurial class.  Specific implications of this general conclusion become 
apparent from the way China has developed its FDI policy.  
First, consider the politics and perverse outcomes of Chinese FDI policy, 
generally characterized as a positive feature of Chinese economic institutions. Looking 
at its downside, Chinese FDI policy can be seen as nationalist and unfriendly to 
                                                 
49  A question slighted by Indian economist D.N. Ghosh and Chinese political scientist Yasheng Huang.  
See, Ghosh (2005), and Huang (2003).  
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private domestic entrepreneurs. Excessive Chinese dependence on FDI also does grave 
harm to the enterprise and finance systems.  On the up side, China’s external 
macroeconomic strength has given it an advantage in negotiating FDI. Also, the 
expatriate investment has had very positive consequences for small or medium sized 
industry.  
 
A. Chinese FDI: Too Much of Good Thing? 
 
In Selling China Huang concluded that FDI was “overabundant” in China.
50 He 
takes as given, a discriminatory politically-sanctioned hierarchy among Chinese 
domestic enterprises.  According to Huang, ill-advised institutional design and 
misguided incentives resulted in economic and policy "imperfections" creating a 
"political pecking order” of firms.
51  State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and foreign 
invested enterprises (FIEs) enjoyed favorable political attention at the expense of 
private local firms without foreign investment.  This institutional design, and the 
special incentives that accompanied it, favored FIEs through advantageous tax 
treatment, convenience in licensing, retained earnings dispensations, and export 
assistance.  From this Huang concluded that China’s "large absorption of FDI is a sign 
of some substantial weaknesses in the Chinese economy".
52 
Huang’s central thesis holds: that China’s FDI policy over the last quarter 
century retarded and perverted the development of dynamic private enterprise in 
China.  In a 2003 article in the journal Foreign Policy, Huang and co-author Tarun 
                                                 
50 For example, many Chinese SOEs and regions really have no use for or did not deserve the FDI flows 
they received.  In spite of this, government incentives directed investment to those firms, regions, and 
sectors.  For Huang, "high" FDI is indicated by the ratio of FDI to domestic investment (DI) or the ratio 
of FDI to contractual arrangements.  
51 Huang takes these policies as given.  He does not adequately consider the possibility that the 
“imperfect” economic institutions might have been designed “more perfectly” to serve political ends. 
52 Huang (2003xv) p. xv.  
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Khanna extended the Selling China thesis to a direct China-India comparison.  They 
suggested that the reason why Indian firms are today on the whole performing better 
than their counterparts behind the Great Wall` is that the institutions of China’s FDI-
centered growth strategy discouraged merit–observing domestic investment in 
potentially dynamic private Chinese firms.
53  This is not a model for India. 
 
B. Political Expediency First: Contriving Growth Without Private Capitalism 
 
FDI was a “preferred instrument of change” for Chinese policy makers. What 
were the political advantages that rendered the institutional structure of FDI-intensive 
development preferable?  That this institutional ensemble was politically useful to the 
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attested to by the durability of that institutional 
structure over the last quarter century. 
China’s FDI policy was not just an enlightened ‘plan-rational’ means of 
optimizing economic growth.
54 Chinese officials were concerned about foreign 
infringement of sovereignty and nationalist purpose. Political considerations, 
therefore, drove the fashioning of Beijing’s FDI policy. Descriptions that feature the 
policy’s  “adaptive efficiency” scant both the domestic political priorities of the CCP 
and its government, and the many clever but economically counter-productive means 
with which Chinese FDI policy hemmed-in foreign investors. 
Government relations with “business interests” in China are, along with 
religion and the management of laid-off or retired workers, at the top of the sensitive-
issues list for Beijing’s rulers.
55 FDI policy was not used to “revive…a dormant 
                                                 
53 Huang and Khanna (2003) Pp. 75-83. 
54 Ghosh’s account is reminiscent of the politically neutral ideal-type “developmental state” derived 
from Chalmers Johnson’s study of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Investment (MITI). See, 
Johnson (1982). 
55 One might now add disgruntled farmers who are losing their land to that list.  
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indigenous entrepreneurial class.”
56  Huang makes clear in his book that FDI policy 
and the “political pecking order of firms” which it produced served powerfully to 
retard the development of domestic private industry.  Indeed this was the favorable 
political outcome the CCP intended to achieve via what was a successful economic 
development policy in the short-term. The Chinese elite was deeply concerned to 
prevent the growth of an independent, business oriented domestic entrepreneurial 
class. 
Independent business interests might contest the elite’s power to calibrate the 
country’s prevailing state-socialist structure of property rights and, ultimately, rival 
the party elite’s control of the economy.  It was the “corporatism” and 
commercialization of local state institutions – not an “entrepreneurial class” – that 
caused foreign-invested business to flourish among the townships and village 
enterprises and that were crucial to China’s recent industrial-commercial growth.
57 
Let us turn now to the claim, often made by admirers of China’s development 
policy, that China’s stance on FDI reflects a clear-eyed non-nationalist acceptance of 
foreign investors. Is it true that the fashioning of China’s FDI policy was, and 
continues to be, “pursued without any obsessive hangover (sic) about   foreign 
domination or a nagging fear that their country’s national interest or sovereignty is 
being compromised?”
58 Is it true that, “(t)hroughout the 1980s, continuing till the 
middle of the 1990s, foreign investors were freely allowed to play the role of venture 
capitalists in a big way” (Ghosh 2005).  Nothing could be further from the truth.   
                                                 
56 See, Ghosh (2005). 
57 See Oi, (1999). 
58 Presumably, Ghosh here means to write the colloquial term “hang-up” which is defined in the 
Concise Oxford English Dictionary as, “an emotional problem or inhibition”. The argument I present 
here with respect to FDI is that, because the Chinese are likely to suffer a painful FDI-induced 
“hangover”, the Indians may be justified in their FDI-related "hang-up”. See, 
http://www.askoxford.com.  
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It is rare for Chinese bureaucrats or politicians to use openly nationalist 
rhetoric in documents or public explanations related to economic policy.
59  
Nevertheless, in trade, investment and foreign economic policy, nationalism is 
pervasive.
60  Ideologically China’s economic nationalism is more akin to the 
mercantilist nationalism of America’s Alexander Hamilton, Germany’s Friedrich List, 
or India’s Rajagopalachari than it is to the contemporary Indian economic nationalism 
of Sitaram Yechury [Communist Party of India (Marxist)] from the Left, or S. 
Gurumurthy (Swadeshi Jagran Manch) from the Right.   Epic battles within China’s 
elite over FDI policy in the early reform period produced “modern treaty ports” – the 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs) – along China’s coast where “polluting” and 
“decadent” foreign trade activities were quarantined.  Later a subtle and complex array 
of mechanisms was established to restrain the Gulliver of foreign investment as it 
stalked into the Middle Kingdom.   
 It is easy to misunderstand the clever and seemingly-contradictory Chinese 
FDI policy.  Yes, FIEs were offered special treatment as inducements.  In particular 
joint ventures (JVs) were encouraged with tax and other dispensations.  Before 
Thomas Friedman coined the term, “golden straight jacket,” the Chinese were enticing 
foreigners with incentive-laden access to their market while shrewdly keeping them 
constrained.
61  Yes, FIEs were favored over domestic private enterprise.  But, this does 
not mean they were free.  Nor does it mean they faced no competition.  State-owned 
domestic enterprise, particularly at the local and regional levels, was often aggressive. 
                                                 
59 The exception is if the policy involves the Japanese, in which case a good dose of nationalist venom 
is generally de rigeur.  
60 See, Crane (1999) Pp. 215–32.  Gries, (2004), and Zhao (2004). 
61 Friedman’s “golden straightjacket” refers to the alleged economic benefits countries would enjoy if 
they adopted a range of constraining globally- and market-oriented policies Friedman (2000).  In the 
Chinese FDI “golden straightjacket”, FIEs enjoyed access to a low-wage high-quality infrastructure 
export platform if they complied with a range of constraining limitations on their business decisions.  
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The “golden straightjacket” contradiction is central to understanding the 
Chinese FDI experience.  One can start by looking at the numerous fetters the Chinese 
used to restrain the foreign investment Gulliver.
62  The JV model adopted in China 
made it easy to control FDI.  It ensured that JV enterprise ownership was fragmented 
(sometimes even adversarial) in ways that politically weakened both foreign and 
domestic partners. 
The freedoms foreign investors enjoyed in China were curtailed by a range of 
measures: The 1980s Special Economic Zones literally fenced-in the physical and 
financial components of FDI.  Foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) were eventually 
allowed to move inland from their coastal quarantine. However, high up-front, non-
interest-bearing equity deposits and a host of regulations at the national, regional and 
enterprise levels replaced the earlier geographic restraints.  Added to the mix was an 
abundance of informal protections for wholly-domestic Chinese competitors to FIEs.  
Some of these were so brazen they might make even the drafters of India’s Press Note 
18 blush.
63  Then there was the most important nationalist safeguard of them all: The 
product of all FDI investment was for export only. 
                                                 
62 Pearson (1999). 
63 Press Note 18 (1998) issued by the Ministry of Industry and the Foreign Investment Promotion Board 
seems to have worked well in giving Indian JV partners some protection from coercive or predatory 
foreign partners.  The (2005) Press Note 1 was a shift in emphasis favouring contractual solutions to 
“conflicts of interest” among JV partners.  See, Express (2005). 
Those who claim that China never took action akin to India’s 1998 Press Note 18 ignore the many 
informal “dirty-tricks” in the Chinese playbook.  A good example is the “dual facility” common gambit 
in which a local JV partner allows the foreign collaborator to build, manage and link a new facility to 
the global supply chain.  Then the local partner duplicates the facility as a non-JV, often in the same 
neighbourhood.  Soon the first facility seems to be doing poorly and the new “duplicate” is vibrant. 
Though Chinese FDI policy is today much more liberal than in the early days of the SEZs, rules still 
strictly regulate equity size, geographic location and (as in India) investments in auto, retail, 
telecommunication services, and other sensitive industries are restricted.  Discretionary approval for 
large-scale investment (over 30 million dollars) persists.  Discretionary control of size lead to the 
“miniaturization” of FDI in China, yet another salutary outcome for the CCP which prefers that large-
scale industry is state owned.  See, Fu (2000). 
FDI procedures in which foreign partners mange to devise some advantage over their local partners are 
quickly revised.  This happened in the case of zhong-zhong-wai (Chinese-Chinese-foreign) partnerships 
in the telecommunications sector in the late 1990s.  See, Folta (2005).  
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What was the broad political-economy context of this now-controversial 
Chinese FDI regime?  For over two decades the Chinese government has taken 
advantage of its citizens’ world-topping savings rates to operate its banking system as 
a supplement to both its fiscal and welfare/social-security systems.  This produced an 
overhang of bad loans so large that by most accounting standards much of the Chinese 
banking system was (and may still be) technically insolvent.  This institutional leger 
de main has cleverly disguised what would otherwise have been much higher 
government deficits.  While the banking system was busy servicing this “socialist 
social contract” and helping keep large SOEs alive, FDI became the centerpiece of a 
new institutional ensemble that supported the industrial-commercial sector during the 
first two decades of China’s post-Mao economic readjustment. 
One of the most important parts of the Chinese FDI story and one that clearly 
distinguishes it from India has to do with the role of small- and medium-sized 
enterprises.  The flourishing of small industry in rural China’s “Township and Village 
Enterprises” (TVEs) was one undeniably positive consequence of China’s FDI policy. 
The TVE boom provided employment and spread the benefits of industrial growth 
beyond core urban areas.  Economist Pranab Bardhan has often noted – with pointed 
(if tacit) comparison to Indian Small-Scale Industry policy – that the key to the 
success of China’s TVE experience was a hard budget constraint.  China’s TVEs were 
often allowed to fail.
64 
Where did much of the TVE investment come from? We must consider the 
role of overseas ethnic Chinese in China’s FDI miracle.  When wage costs for labor-
intensive manufacturing around the Pacific Rim rose in the 1970s and 1980s, 
entrepreneurs of the ethnic Chinese diaspora relocated to mainland China.  The 
Chinese government, particularly at the local level, welcomed expatriate investment.  
                                                 
64 See Bardhan (2004).  
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True, there was no explicit ethnic nationalist policy here, but there was a powerful 
informal bias based on Chinese heritage, native-place and dialect affinities.  On the 
other hand, the Indian government has, until very recently, failed to draw on the 
entrepreneurial skill and capital of its expatriate and ethnic diaspora.
65 
The FDI-intensive finance of China’s export-led strategy was successful at 
doing two things: Attracting or earning foreign exchange (thus avoiding India’s bane – 
a precarious balance of payments position) and providing an alternative (non-state, yet 
also tame) source of finance for new firms.  It did so without overly empowering or 
emboldening either the domestic or foreign partners in those firms.  En route the 
policy created employment opportunities (particularly at the township- and village-
levels), and generated growth (much of China’s recent growth was investment-driven, 
not productivity-driven). 
The so-called “reform and openness” (gaige kaifang) of the FDI policy has, 
according to University of Michigan political scientist Mary Gallagher, “resulted in a 
strengthened Chinese state, a weakened civil society (especially labor), and a delay in 
political liberalization.”
66 China’s FDI institutions achieved a marriage of long-term 
political expediency with medium-term growth that helps to explain China’s favorable 
external macroeconomic position.  The consequence, however, (like China’s banking 
policy) may be economically harmful in the long run. 
 
C. FDI, Corporate Finance and the Broader Business Climate 
 
China finance guru and economist Nicholas Lardy, along with Huang and most 
other experts agree that today China has a tremendously vulnerable Achilles heel: its 
                                                 
65 See Guha and Ray (2000). 
66 Gallagher (2002). Pp. 338-372.   
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rickety and still highly-politicized finance system.
67  In conjunction with a state-
socialist property rights regime, this system has stifled dynamism among the country’s 
firms.  Remember, according to Huang, the discriminatory “political pecking order” 
among firm types is the result of political favoritism. 
 To understand the full consequences of China’s FDI regime we should follow 
Gallagher’s lead and extend further the political logic behind it.  Doing so reveals the 
system of Leninist capitalism that emerged in China at the end of the 1990s.  Such an 
exercise also helps us understand how the politics of Indian financial reform, while 
tortuous, have yielded a more flexible and fertile environment for firms.  Where 
Huang is satisfied with identifying perverse effects of the nexus between FDI and the 
“political pecking order” of firms, I argue that we must look beyond microeconomics 
and consider the consequences of the “success” of the Chinese FDI regime. A good 
place to look for such consequences is the realm of securities finance (the allocation of 
corporate or public funding through stocks and bonds).  It is in this subfield of 
political economy that we see most starkly the contrasting effects of China’s 
“successful” reliance on FDI and the alleged failure of India’s neglect of FDI. 
 
D. China: The Affliction of Abundance 
 
For elite officials in the Communist Party and its government in Beijing, 
China’s success in attracting FDI was part of a package in which “all good things went 
together”.  As mentioned above, FDI itself attracted foreign exchange and funded new 
industrial-commercial enterprise.  However, exports from foreign-invested firms 
brought in the bulk of foreign exchange, producing a favorable balance of payments.  
These inflows produced a growing stockpile of hard currency reserves, which 
                                                 
67 Goldstein and Lardy (2004).  
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authorities used to protect a low exchange rate based on pegging the Chinese Yuan to 
the US dollar. (The low exchange rate amplified the export advantage of China’s 
already-cheap goods).  At the margin, FIEs promoted growth and employment, 
particularly in rural and peri-uban areas.  China’s FDI-centered matrix of institutions 
based on political financing decisions produced abundant finance, trade and currency 
flows.  
These flows did a lot of good for China’s rulers and for the economy.  They 
secured the external macroeconomic position of the country.  They satisfied the 
finance-needs of a favored foreign-invested industrial-commercial sector. They 
produced economic growth to meet the rising material expectations of citizens.  And 
they helped to legitimize the regime. Above all, these flows were organized (the FIE 
“golden straight-jacket”) to minimize any challenge (foreign or domestic) to the 
political control of the single party state.  This left the Chinese political elite at liberty 
to manipulate other parts of its financial system, particularly securities finance.   
The system of securities finance made it possible for elite officials to allocate 
access to capital markets in a politically instrumental fashion.  Initially, in the early 
1990s, this took the form of political favors and competitive rivalries between the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen municipalities where most securities were listed, traded and 
regulated. These favors and rivalries disrupted the central elite’s management of the 
economy and threatened its authority to define property rights (financial securities 
embody rights, after all).  In response to such disruptive consequences, the center 
relieved the “troublemaking” municipalities of their securities-related authority, 
shifting control to agencies directly under the state council.   
In the mid-1990s, a new system coalesced.  This happened as a result of 
Premier Zhu Rongji doing two things:  He asserted central control over securities and 
banking finance and he restructured the government into a more lean and responsive  
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instrument of Leninist dirigism.  With all securities-related authority centralized and 
all innovative spirit squeezed out of the system, securities finance became a primary 
tool for discretionary allocation of access to funds. Premier Zhu used securities 
finance to pursue two primary objectives; restructuring state-owned enterprise (SOE), 
and managing the dominant political coalition in the polity.  Zhu used access to 
securities finance to reward or punish the powerful ministries, sectors and provinces 
who are the “partners” in China’s “intramural coalition”.
68  The wily Premier also 
manipulated securities finance to provide life support to ailing SOEs, thereby helping 
the banking system to service (and delay the demise of) the “socialist social contract”. 
The result?  A new system.  Leninist capitalism.  The nature of a country’s 
securities finance regime says a lot about the variety of capitalism prevailing there.   
The Chinese Communist Party had successfully “hacked” the core institution of 
capitalism – securities finance – bending it to their political will.  China’s quarter 
century of reforms produced what economist and China-expert Barry Naughton has 
called “Potemkin stock markets”.
69 Impressive façade of change, dysfunctional interior 
of atavistic dirigism.  The securities finance regime in China today is merely the old 
wine of developmental-state directed-finance grandly presented in the new bottles of 
terminal-based nation-wide share trading.
70  In 2004 Chinese securities finance was 
where Indian securities finance was in 1964 when the state-promoted Unit Trust of 
India US-64 was established.  
                                                 
68 In the Chinese context of a state-socialist single party polity, that coalition is an “intramural 
coalition” within the Chinese state itself. 
69 See Naughton (1998). 
70 Carefully calibrated semi-repression of the financial system makes the whole thing possible.  Low 
(sometimes negative) real interest rates on bank deposits, a tightly limited supply of equity shares, state 
support for the financial services industry, and central bank use of repurchase markets (along with 
massive sterilization routines) are the only reasons there is any value or trading volume at all in China’s 
securities markets.  Of course, there are also various controls on capital account convertibility.  
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Securities finance in China does not provide a market for companies or a 
market for corporate control.  The nominally high market capitalization of China’s two 
exchanges is inflated by two thirds, since only one third of the shares actually “float” 
or trade freely.   The difficulty of accessing the market for initial offerings in China 
today is perhaps even worse than the challenges faced by Indian firms in the pre-
reform days of the dreaded Controller of Capital Issues.  Much of this is a political 
consequence of the “success” of China’s FDI-intensive model:  It provided the 
macroeconomic strength and institutional structure upon which the Party elite’s 
recentralizing and manipulation of the financial sector was built. 
 
E. India: The Advantage of Adversity 
 
In 1991, as precious gold bullion was shipped from Bombay docks to deal with 
the reform-provoking balance-of-payments crisis, India was a reverse-image of China.  
Its profile of exposure to the international economy, its export capacity, and (as Ghosh 
rightly points out) its trade and investment philosophy all were the opposite of 
China’s.  Just as many “good things went together” in the macroeconomic and 
institutional matrix surrounding China’s FDI policy, many “bad things went together” 
in an Indian macroeconomic and institutional matrix that lacked FDI.  This created a 
powerful set of incentives for India’s economic policy “change team” assembled in 
1991 by the ruling Congress Party.
71  The mandarins (forgive the turn of phrase) in 
North Block explained to politicians that it would take too long to resolve India’s 
chronically precarious balance of payments through a China-style FDI-intensive, 
export-led program.   
                                                 
71 See Shastri (2001) pp. 241-263.  
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Analyses of Indian economic reform tend to focus on the “momentary” or 
transient aspect of the reform initiatives undertaken during and immediately after the 
crisis of 1991.
72  Indeed, looking at the reform period in general from the perspective 
of the late 1990s, some World Bank officials often quipped about the “Hindu rate of 
reform” (playing on economist Raj Krishna’s adage about India’s “Hindu rate of 
growth”).  A central plank in the argument I present here is that the lack of FDI, and 
the associated Indian profile of macroeconomic exposure, produced an incentive 
structure that lasted beyond the crisis, and that created an enduring momentum 
favoring the transformative set of institutions that made Indian securities finance 
governance uniquely dramatic when compared to other Indian sectors or when 
compared to other developing and transitional economies (and particularly China, 
which is typically seen as a more successful reformer than India).  
Instead of FDI, India would use FPI (foreign portfolio investment) to attract 
much-needed foreign exchange.  Improvement in securities finance would have 
politically and economically useful second-order consequences.  Firms would have a 
greater range of options for corporate finance.  Securities finance would provide a 
useful temporary way to sidestep the obstreperous trade unions and hidebound 
managements of the country’s then-lumbering banks.  It would also put pressure on 
those banks to reform. 
Many problems still plague India’s regime of securities finance.  But even the 
harshest critics of India’s reform process concede that 1990s securities finance, driven 
in large measure by competition between the National Stock Exchange and Bombay 
Stock Exchange, was one of the most remarkable change stories of the decade.  Today, 
Indian firms and their shares of stock are some of the most competitive and attractive 
in the developing world and beyond.  Why?  One important reason is that Indian 
                                                 
72 See, also Mohan and Herring (2001).  
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businesses and regulators have operated for more than a decade with a securities 
finance system that (for all its failings) has steadily approached global best practices 
and, in the case of the takeover code, perhaps even set them itself. 
How do we know India’s regime of securities finance is so good?  Discount the 
recent long bull-run.  It may be rigged, and US interest rates have been low anyway.  
Ignore most of the Foreign Institutional Investors’ (FII) money.  Much of it is Indian 
(on a roundtrip ticket) or expatriate Indian investment. 
Consider instead the behavior one of the largest, most risk-averse, socially 
progressive, and conscientious investors in the world today: The California Public 
Employees Retirement Scheme (CalPERS).  This is not the “hot money” that gets 
India’s Left policy intellectuals and politicians like Gurudas Dasgupta (CPI) so 
exercised.  Not all foreign institutional investors are alike.  CalPERS invests for a 
minimum of three years and normal investment durations are roughly a decade.  For 
years now India has ranked high on CalPERS index of equities finance regulation 
among developing and transitional countries.
73  Two years ago the massive pension 
fund moved to invest 100 million US$ in Indian firms through Indian stock exchanges.  
Notably, CalPERS board withheld approval for such investments in China because, 
                                                 
73 The securities governance regime indicator includes variables such as: 1) Market Liquidity and 
Volatility, 2) Market Regulation/ Legal System/ Investor Protection, 3) Settlement Proficiency, 4) 
Transaction Costs, and 5) Capital Market Openness.  Every year the CalPERS board reviews the 
parameters of an investment index that includes a wide range of political, social, and economic factors.  
A private consultant, Wilshire Associates, then compiles the index.  The board also sets thresholds for 
countries’ overall scores on the index and on each of contributing sub-variables.  Countries that exceed 
these thresholds are deemed “permissible,” and the board can then vote to invest there (occasionally 
disregarding Wilshire recommendations and voting for even tighter standards).  CalPERS approval is a 
widely-used benchmark for “responsible investing” among those in the institutional investment 
community worldwide who look for investment cues that combine social and political considerations 
with those of financial risk. For years India’s securities and corporate “scores” were well above the 
threshold, but its labor standards were not. In 2004 India finally “scored” favorably on labor standards 
and the pension fund sank 100 million dollars into Indian equities.  China is still verboten on various 
indicators including governance of securities finance.  See, for example, Wilshire Associates (2003).  
Also see, Reuters (2003).  And see, Business Line (2004).  
 
284 
among other things, that country’s regime of governance for securities finance ranks 
too low on many measures of corporate and trading standards. 
In summary, it is important to recognize that there are developmental costs that 
offset the benefits of China’s non-democratic politics.  Similarly, there are 
developmental benefits that offset the costs of an Indian democracy at once feisty and 
staid.  
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Chapter Six 
 
TAKING STOCK: THE POLITICS OF EQUITY SECURITIES 
 
The late 1980s and early 1990s were a period of juncture between the “world 
time” global rise of securities finance, and the “domestic time” policy and business 
initiatives in China and India to begin securitizing in earnest. At this time, the arena in 
which securities circulated – the stock exchange – became an important focus of 
attention. I use the term “stock exchange,” because that is largely what they were. 
Though some of the exchanges discussed in this chapter did support bond trading (or 
at least recorded such trades even if they were not actually executed on the exchange), 
the circulation of bonds happened largely off the exchange. 
This chapter focuses on equity assets, drawing on case material that links the 
interests of issuers and investors to the politics of stock exchange development. It 
demonstrates the role of stock exchange development in the emergence of China’s 
involuted securities governance regime – a regime heavily biased in favor of issuers. 
In the Indian case, the evidence illustrates how stock exchange development played a 
role in forging a regime that was dynamically balanced between issuers and investors. 
Using the asset-class/financial-position (AC/FP) matrix as a guide, I try to trace the 
process that causes the different outcomes in each country. I deploy the matrix to 
demonstrate how elements of it can be used to explain the politics behind the distinct 
securities governance regime outcomes in China and India, focusing particularly on 
the market outcomes and governance structures of their respective stock exchanges. 
The stock exchange outcomes are consistent with outcomes I find in other areas like 
mutual fund development, privatization, and mergers and acquisitions.  
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This chapter explores the politics of equity assets. It elaborates in detail the 
roles of enterprise finance and wealth capitalization in the calculations of various 
actors, including the central state and members of the dominant coalitions in India and 
China. However, this analysis also brings in the issue of shareholder rights. The 
discussion is organized as follows. In the next section, I first explain the importance of 
stock exchange governance and structure of exchange. Together, these two factors can 
tell us much about the role of states and markets in a governance regime. Exploring 
the politics of equity finance by way of stock exchange development requires that we 
consider how governance and market structure on an exchange affect particular 
domains of equity-asset politics of differently positioned financial actors, such as 
issuers and investors (and in the Indian case, intermediaries such as brokers too). 
Section three employs these insights in a case study of India’s stock exchange 
development in the 1990s, with particular attention to the breakthrough of the new 
National Stock Exchange (NSE). Section four undertakes a similarly oriented case 
study focusing on the takeover of the stock exchanges by the central government 
during the mid-1990s. 
 
I. The Politics of Equity Finance in Stock Exchange Development 
 
 
An important part of how securities governance regimes developed in China 
and India is the place where securities are traded: stock exchanges. Changes in where 
and how securities circulate – such as the operation of securities exchanges – are 
crucial to understanding outcomes in several of the components that constitute the 
securities governance regime. The stock exchange is a market arena rich in linkages to 
other key components of the securities governance regime (SGR), the firms that list, 
agencies of the state responsible for securities regulation, business and consumer (in  
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this case investor) associations, providers of financial information in the media, and of 
course various affective networks among those who use or operate the exchange. 
Most significant for India’s SGR was the outbreak of vigorous competition 
between securities exchanges in the mid-1990s. In the Chinese case, the biggest story 
was the takeover of the exchanges by the central government in the period 1995-1997. 
In the analysis that follows, I trace how structurally-inspired central-state-elite state 
preferences were translated into regime-shaping strategies in the course of stock 
exchange development in China and India. 
 Ignoring the debt asset class of the asset-class/financial-position matrix, I will 
let the elements of Table 6-1 guide the analysis, focusing on how the connection 
between actors’ (issuers or investors) relative coalition power and their interests with 
respect to equity property-rights institutions influenced the development of stock 
exchanges in several components of the securities governance regime – particularly 
the state, the market, and associations – and looking for evidence related to enterprise 
finance, wealth capitalization, and some parts of shareholder rights.
1 
                                                 
1 Stock exchanges themselves have little to do with the industrial organization outcomes mentioned in 
the full version of the AC/FP matrix introduced in Chapter 3.  
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Table 6-1: 
Isolating Equity Politics: Breaking Down the Domains of Action 
 
  Issuers  Investors 
Equity 
 
Enterprise Finance 
• share issuance 
Wealth Capitalization 
• “founders rent” 
• “equity leverage, equity currency” 
 
Shareholder Rights 
• exit-entry 
 
A. Governance and the Design of “Market Structure” on the Exchange 
 
There are two key issues in the operation or development of a securities 
exchange: governance and design. “Governance” in reference to exchanges overlaps 
with way the word is used elsewhere in this analysis with regard to “governance 
regimes.” The scope of the term here refers just to the exchange, and involves the 
structure of management and ownership as well as the conduct of supervision or 
regulation. Supervision and regulation in this instance refers to “self regulation.”
2 
Take, for example, two American examples, the NASDAQ and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). The NASDAQ exchange is a wholly owned subsidiary of the 
National Association of Securities Dealers. In principle, it is operated and managed by 
a professional team of managers who are not themselves participants in the exchange.
3 
                                                 
2 For the most part, the vocabulary used in India reflects the common English heritage of the two 
countries’ legal and financial vocabulary. In China, exchange (jiaoyisuo) governance is referred to with 
using the word guanli, the same the all-purpose term for control/regulation/management. Supervision 
(jiandu) is added to guanli in the compound jiandu guanli used to translate the English word 
“regulation.” Yet, in China’s 1999 Securities Law, the only “self-regulating” organization (ziluxing 
zuzhi) mentioned is the Securities Association of China (Artlice 162). Stock exchanges are tasked 
(Article 110) with “supervising” jiandu-listed company disclosures mandated by securities law (not by 
their own rules) (Changwu Weiyuanhui 1998) This task is a common part of the self-regulating function 
of American and Indian exchanges, based on disclosure guidelines set by the exchanges themselves. 
3 In practice, this became truer after the 2000 “demutualization” of NASDAQ and its transformation 
into a publicly-traded for-profit firm, but it is not likely to be entirely true until the firm lists on an  
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The NASDAQ regulator, NASDAQ Regulation, Inc., is a separate subsidiary of the 
NASD, “responsible for regulating both issuer and trading activity on NASDAQ.” The 
NASD is a “self-regulatory organization” (SRO) with legally mandated enforcement 
responsibilities. The SEC must approve any rule changes that affect trading or listing 
qualifications. The NYSE is a non-profit mutual organization owned and operated by 
its owner-members.
4 It too is an SRO under the rubric of the 1934 Securities and 
Exchange Act. 
“Design” refers to the actual details of the way the market works – that is, the 
precise mechanisms and rules that determine how securities are traded on the 
exchange. Market structure, or “market microstructure” as financial economists call it, 
includes the practices and procedures by which prices are revealed and trades 
executed.
5 Taking the same two American examples introduced above, the NASDAQ 
is a centralized electronic limit order microstructure design in which securities trades 
are transacted by electronically matching “ask” (sellers) and “bid” (buyers) orders 
based on “price-time priority.”
6 More than 500,000 terminal outlets around the world 
display NASDAQ trading and offer trading access.
7 By contrast, at the NYSE, the 
                                                 
exchange and makes its management systems transparent and compliant based on listed company 
criteria. This listing has been delayed now several times (Barnard 2002). 
4 The term “mutual” refers to the way the NYSE, like the Bombay Stock Exchange, is owned and run 
by members who pay for their “seat” on the exchange, becoming member-owners. “Demutualization” 
of stock exchanges has been a major global trend since the zenith of the “equity cult” in the late 1990s. 
Demutualization of a stock exchange is “the entire process by which a non-profit member-owned 
mutual organization is transformed into a for-profit shareholder corporation.” According to a recent 
report from the Asian Development Bank, “exchanges around the world have been demutualizing 
because of international competition and technological challenges to traditional modes of trading 
securities. The change of a stock exchange from a member-owned organization to a for-profit 
shareholder corporation triggers a number of questions about regulatory oversight. When a 
demutualized exchange is listed on its own board, some regulatory oversight needs to be transferred to a 
government regulator. In many countries, demutualization of the major national stock exchange has 
been accompanied by general securities regulatory reform” (Akhtar 2002, xiii). 
5 For a general discussion of this, see O’Hara (1995), and for a exploration of the Indian case, see in 
India, see Echeverri-Gent (2001). 
6 The computer looks at who placed an order at a given price first. That order automatically gets filled. 
7 With the advent of on-line trading and electronic communication networks (ECNs) in the late 1990s, 
the number of access points to NASDAQ trading has expanded even further.  
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market is organized as an “open-outcry” auction. This auction design is further 
“enhanced” by the presence of highly capitalized brokers known as “specialists” who 
“make the market” for specific stocks listed on the NYSE.  
Market design does not, however, end with an agreed price between seller and 
buyer. Assuring the completion of the trade, including the exchange of funds and 
securities, and the guarantee to either party if one side fails to deliver, are part of the 
processes financial economists call settlement and “novation.” These include such 
things as depositories for the securities (now typically stored digitally), and the legal 
and financial mechanisms necessary to guarantee all trades. Both the governance and 
the design of securities exchanges have implications for the issues of enterprise 
finance, wealth capitalization, and shareholder exit (the ability of shareholders to 
“liquidate” their securities by selling them for cash). 
 
B. Using the Matrix: Enterprise Finance, Wealth Capitalization, Shareholder 
Exit 
 
In one version of the matrix it is possible to populate the cells with familiar 
actors, attributes of each asset-class for each given financial-position, and to infer a 
priori interests for those actors in any given intersection of an asset-class and 
financial-position. This version of the matrix allows us to think about specific domains 
of economic action related to securities finance at each position in the matrix. Table 6-
1 is a version of the AC/FP matrix modified to show only the issue areas of equity 
finance politics for which stock exchange development has relevance.  
Looking first at the enterprise finance domain for issuers of equity assets: 
Unlike debt finance, where interest payments are required, enterprise finance gained 
through the issuance of equity has practically no pecuniary cost to the firm and its  
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founders.
8 In return for this low cost of finance, insiders must suffer the dilution of 
ownership control. This is the cost-benefit logic of equity finance for enterprises.
9 But 
equity finance for enterprises is not only a matter of efficient and diverse forms of 
capital allocation.  
Another observable domain of equity finance for issuers is “wealth 
capitalization.”
10 This is of particular importance in DTEs, where many of the 
productive assets in the organized economy were previously state owned or privately 
held. Stock markets make it possible for shares of corporatized enterprises (that is, 
firms limited by shares) to have a notional value based on the market price of publicly 
listed and traded shares of the same company, facilitating the price discovery and price 
realization that are both important parts of the wealth capitalization domain of equity 
assets for issuers.
11 As financial economist John Edmunds explains: 
 
Securitized  assets  are  worth  more  than  the  “lumpy”  assets  that 
collateralize them, partly because they are more liquid. Shares trade 
daily and are easy to buy and sell. Buildings, factories, and farms (and 
the people who work in them) are harder to sell, so buyers take that into 
account by paying less for them. Securities trade at a higher multiple of 
cash  flow  (known  as  the  “price/earnings  ratio”)  than  unsecuritized 
businesses (Edmunds 1996, 126). 
 
From a political perspective, wealth capitalization may be more important than 
enterprise finance for issuers of equity assets. Founder’s rent – the first component of 
                                                 
8 There are fees paid to merchant banks and the transaction costs involved with issuance, exchange 
listing, and regulatory compliance. None of these are significant for any individual firm paying them, 
though they aggregate across many firms to make such fees a major source of revenue for merchant 
banks and stock exchanges. 
9 Public exposure and brand recognition are additional benefits. 
10 For improvement of the discussion in this chapter, and the conceptual elaboration of the “issuers” 
column in the asset-class/financial-position matrix, I am grateful to political scientist Herman Schwartz 
for his suggestions and commentary (1989, especially Chapter Two); and (2002)  
11 Without a price set by secondary trading on an exchange, the value of insider shares (held by private 
or public actors) is difficult and costly to ascertain. This is one part – the “valorization” function – of 
share trading. Stock exchanges help facilitate this process. Without the exchange, it is also difficult and 
costly to realize (turn to cash) the wealth reflected in that price. Exchanges make it easy to “cash out” of 
the shares. This is the price realization function of an exchange.  
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this wealth capitalization attribute – is the potential capital gain insiders may reap 
when shares are listed and a price is set for those shares on an exchange.
12 “Equity 
leverage” – the second component of wealth capitalization – is the utility of those 
now-valorized shares that constitute a collateral against which they can borrow in 
order to buy other companies, or build new ones. Without the liquidity furnished by 
the market for equity securities on an exchange, insiders can’t easily use current assets 
or the value of those assets’ future income streams to either: A) actualize wealth today, 
or B) support new investments or the acquisition of existing productive assets.
13 
Finally, the design of market structure on an exchange matters for any 
shareholder because certain market designs can enhance liquidity and settlement 
security, thereby safeguarding shareholders’ ultimate protection, the ability to sell 
shares quickly and reliably at the best price. 
 
II. The Politics of Stock Exchange Development in India’s SGR 
 
 
The preferences of India’s policy-making elite and the strategies those 
preferences inspired were imposed by, and were likely (but not predetermined) 
responses to India’s precarious scarcity profile of external exposure. After all, many 
                                                 
12 Founder’s rent is the gains that a firm’s promoters may collect upon public issuance of shares either 
through an IPO, or later if they sell their original shares on the secondary market. This is one important 
element of the “wealth capitalization” domain identified in Figure 6-1 of the asset-class/financial 
position matrix. 
13 Edmunds offers the following useful example: 
 
A business that would bring $10 million in a private sale could bring as much 
as $20 million if sold via the stock market. The owner can sometimes sell half 
the shares on the stock exchange for $10 million and still keep control. If the 
company prospers, or if the stock market goes up, the half that still belongs to 
the original owner could be worth even $15 billion. After the shares are listed, 
they  become  excellent  collateral  for  loans,  allowing  the  original  owner  to 
borrow  perhaps  $7  million  against  the  half  he  still  owns,  while  retaining 
control of the business (Edmunds 1996, 126 italics added).  
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countries (such as those in Africa) have EEPs of similar precarious scarcity, and yet 
they do not adopt similarly effective strategies. Why was Indian securities-related 
development and re-regulation so speedy and wide ranging? Compared to the reform 
of other economic sectors, securities reform has been swift and thorough in “India’s 
Ten Year Miracle” (see Table 6-2). I argue that the decisive factors in overcoming the 
obstacles to change were the compelling preferences of the state in conjunction with 
its relative autonomy in imposing those preferences, and the flexibility of Indian 
property-rights structures to accommodate change during the struggle among coalition 
actors over the fashioning of securities-related property-rights institutions. The 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) was one such obstacle
14: one of the most dramatic 
episodes in the struggle was the breaking of the BSE’s monopolistic hold on securities 
trading by the upstart National Stock Exchange (NSE), the consequent establishment 
of competition among Indian stock exchanges, and the effects of that competition on 
the quality and governance of securities circulation and use. The success of the 
National Stock Exchange fundamentally changed the configuration of the previous 
Nehruvian directed-credit financial system, and was a decisive event in shaping the 
trajectory of India’s constrained evolution SGR. 
                                                 
14 The other two were the unusual settlement systems known as Badla (Rudolph 2001) and the colossal 
state-managed mutual fund, the Unit Trust of India (Pendharkar 2003)  
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Table 6-2: 
A Decade of Change in the Indian Equities Markets 
Competition  1993-
1995 
The NSE (the “sarkari” exchange”) comes on-line, quickly 
becoming India’s most liquid exchange, and succeeds in 
pressuring the BSE to change. 
Electronic 
trading  1994  All exchanges in India switched from floor trading to 
anonymous electronic trading 
Risk containment  
at the clearing 
corporation 
(novation) 
1996 
The largest exchange, the NSE, adopted risk management 
through “novation” at the clearing corporation. Other 
exchanges also substantially improved their risk 
containment mechanisms. 
Dematerialization  1996  Begun in 1996, today almost all equity settlement occurs 
electronically at a depository. 
Derivatives 
trading 
2000-
2001 
Equity derivatives trading commenced, with index 
derivatives and derivatives on some individual stocks. 
Adapted from Shah and Thomas (2001) 
 
Placing the importance of the NSE breakthrough for financial change in the 
context of economic reform more broadly, Sucheta Dalal, the doyenne of Indian 
financial journalists, and a commentator not easily moved to applaud the success of 
those reforms, remarked in 1999 that: 
 
Capital  market  reforms  in  India  have  far  outstripped  the  process  of 
liberalization in every other sector of the economy. In fact….the Indian 
securities trading infrastructure compares with the best in the world – 
and  in  some  respects  is  even  better…The  National  Stock  Exchange 
(NSE),  a  market  intermediary,  through  example,  demonstration  and 
sheer  success  forced  a  swift  and  relentless  pace  of  change  in  the 
markets. 
 
Dalal, who has followed events closely since her 1992 (Basu and Dalal 1993) 
scoop of the big “Scam” that upset Indian financial markets and provoked the broad  
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reformist momentum that central-state-elites leveraged to launch their transformation 
of securities governance, was herself surprised at the rate and scope of change: 
 
The pace of reforms has been so dramatic that it is difficult to recall 
that less than five years ago the picture of stock trading in India was 
one  of  sweaty,  raucous  jobbers  jostling  to  conduct  trades  in  the 
crowded trading ring of India’s oldest stock exchange (Dalal 1999). 
 
Finally, summarizing the importance of the NSE breakthrough in a speech at 
the NSE itself in 2002, Indian Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha explained: 
 
In  all,  we  had  new  institutions  -  electronic  trading,  novation  at  the 
clearing corporation, dematerialised settlement - which converted the 
possibility of economic freedom into a reality. The equity market is the 
one area in finance where the greatest changes have come about (Sinha 
2002). 
 
The story of the Indian stock exchanges involves each element of the 
governance regime ensemble summarized in this chapter’s introduction, and in the 
formation of that regime the political and social responses to securitization in India 
depended on pre-existing institutional and ideological paths. The role of the state in 
the formation of that governance regime was decisive. The state, which was so 
important in the pre-reform political arena, persisted in its “central mediating role” as 
both promoter and pilot of change.
15 Yet, the state was also increasingly constrained in 
historically unprecedented ways. The economy’s precarious scarcity profile of 
external exposure imposed a specific trajectory that prioritized evolution, constraining 
the Indian state to set market scope and progressive development as the objectives for 
securities-related governance. The origins and political significance of the preferences 
                                                 
15 This finding is consistent with the view that the Indian state can at times act autonomously, imposing 
its preferences over those of organized corporate interests (industrial or rural), and those of the 
electorate. For the typical formulation of this view, see Rudolph and Rudolph (1987, especially Chapter 
One). For an update of this view in the era of reform, and an explanation of how the state promotes and 
pilots change via “stealth,” see Jenkins (1999, especially Chapter Six).  
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this profile produced in the political elite were summarized in the previous section. 
They included two key policy elite preferences with respect to securities governance: 
•  Provision of sufficient, stable foreign exchange, and stabilization of the 
balance of payments. 
•  Improving industrial finance. 
On the eve of general reform in India, the majority of finance capital was 
embedded in the state-dominated directed-credit system. However, a small enclave of 
equity finance activity existed in South Bombay, with outposts in Calcutta and 
Ahmedabad. Stock issuance and trading were conducted through closely-knit, 
geographically concentrated networks of securities brokers. At the periphery of the 
directed-credit system, corporate and government securities circulated through the 
stock exchanges run by these brokers, and through the state-run monopolistic mutual 
fund manager, the Unit Trust of India. 
Though well established, this enclave of equity securities activity was shallow 
and commercially unimportant. It consisted of a primary market for equity that was 
government controlled and little used by corporations. Stock issuance was severely 
limited by the Controller of Capital Issues (CCI), who determined the volume and 
price of share issuance; the end of this system in 1992 portended a new world of 
rivalry and openness in the sourcing of enterprise finance. 
In the secondary market where shares were ostensibly traded, the Bombay 
Stock Exchange (BSE) and its regional satellites were dominant. They were broker-
owned and managed, and were run opaquely as clubs largely for the benefit of an 
exclusive exchange membership dominated by two tightly networked cultural-
linguistic groups.
16 The “murky” trading practices of these exchanges involved entry 
barriers, poor transparency, geographic concentration of trading, unorthodox 
                                                 
16 Gujuratis and Marwaris have dominated securities trading in India for the past century.  
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settlement procedures, and volatile fluctuations in leverage. Together, these practices 
produced limited trading volume, high brokerage fees, high transaction costs, 
settlement-related “payments crises,” conflicts of interest (often favoring 
intermediaries or issuers over investors), and a variety of insider hijinks such as 
cheating and market manipulation. These practices also insured that the system of 
equity trading would help perpetuate the directed-credit system’s sleepy but profitable 
(for the BSE brokers) marginalization of the securities market enclave (Echeverri-
Gent 1999). The paper-based share certificates and their exchange through “open-
outcry” floor trading operated in very limited hours were the foundations of the BSE 
“rent” maximizing system, and the Bombay, Calcutta, and Ahmedabad brokers would 
fight desperately to preserve those foundations. Outsiders came to view the BSE and 
securities trading as a market “of BSE members, by BSE members, for BSE members” 
(Shah and Thomas 2001, 10, 18). Nevertheless, as in China during that period, the 
issuance and trading of shares did grow as the corporatization of private and state-
owned firms proceeded apace. 
Promoting the new National Stock Exchange were the development financial 
institutions (DFIs), the vast bureaucracies of the former directed-credit system that 
were powerful members of the “permanent state” component of India’s dominant 
coalition.
17 The state-directed DFIs played an unusual role in the Indian economy 
representing a wide range of financial activity including long-term development 
                                                 
17 The dominant coalition in India under the Nehruvian political economy was composed of the state as 
a mediating actor, the “dependent capitalists,” and rich farmers. The corporate actors referred to as “the 
state” can be disaggregated at a first order into professionals in the public sector, and the central elite 
located in the Prime Minister’s cabinet and the related central ministries. These actors, despite their 
many conflicting interests, were common beneficiaries under the narrow finance and autarkic 
orientation of the directed-credit system (Bardhan 1998; Herring 1999; Rudolph and Rudolph 1987). 
With the decline of the Congress Party and the rising power of sub-national states and regional political 
parties, this coalition is now being transformed. 
  The power and role of the DFIs is distinct from that of the “central-state-elite” discussed here. 
They are subject to the orders of the Ministry of Finance, but have a margin to maneuver and a power 
base in their hard-to-fire, well trained, highly networked, broadly dispersed personnel. Thus they are 
often collectively considered an important coalition actor.   
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finance,
18 insurance and pension management,
19 and mutual fund management.
20 
During the1980s, the brief and stillborn spurt of reform under Rajiv Gandhi provoked 
an increasing awareness among the DFIs of the costly and frustrating consequences of 
the securities market “enclave” that the directed-credit financial governance regime
21 
had created. This increasing awareness had already caused enough concern among the 
DFIs to inspire their earlier ill-fated effort to launch a stock exchange to compete with 
the BSE. In the 1980s they failed in their effort to promote a new exchange – The 
Over the Counter Exchange of India (OTCEI) – for small, entrepreneurial companies 
modeled on the American NASDAQ. 
The Bombay exchange and its regional allies were an important collective 
actor in the securities enclave of the Nehruvian financial system, but compared to the 
development financial institutions, they did not play a significant role in Indian 
coalition politics; not, that is, until the beginning of securities related reforms in the 
mid- to late 1980s and early 1990s. Under the directed-credit financial system, the 
property-rights claims embedded in securities were restricted to the point of 
effectively nullifying issuer and investor interests, while both enhancing the market 
power of intermediaries such as the BSE brokers and honing their interest in the 
enclave status quo.
22 Concentrated in South Bombay, and acting in alliance with their 
subservient satellites in Calcutta and Ahmedabad, they controlled the vast majority of 
                                                 
18 Most prominent among these are the Industrial Development Bank of Indian (IDBI), Industrial 
Finance Corporation of India (IFCI), and the World Bank-promoted Industrial Credit and Investment 
Corporation of India (ICICI). 
19 Most important among these are the mammoth Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), and the 
General Insurance Corporation of India (GIC). 
20 The Unit Trust of India is a statutory agency of the Indian government, established in 1964 to manage 
mutual funds. 
21 Another important factor was the 1985 publication of the Report of the High Powered Committee on 
Stock Exchange Reforms (known as the “Patel Report”) – a comprehensive evaluation of Indian 
securities markets – that was an eye opener for the DFIs into action (Government of India 1985) 
Author’s interview with former IDBI officials, Bombay, 2000, #117.  
22 Before the major securitization push, there were occasional efforts by issuers or investors to buck the 
enclave system. Celebrated cases include the “Mudhra Scandal” of 1957, the 1984 “Escorts Affair,” and 
the grass-roots “equity cult” campaign of Dirubhai Ambani in the 1980s (McDonald 1998).  
 
307 
trading in Indian shares.
23 Thus, despite their relative lack of political power, the 
growing use of equity securities from the mid-1980s onward conferred upon the BSE 
the market power of a “natural monopoly.”
24 
Establishment of the National Stock Exchange represented a potential 
challenge to the Bombay Stock Exchange and provoked a struggle over the control of 
securities-related property rights that ultimately pitted the DFIs against the Bombay 
brokers and their regional allies. Had it not been for an unusual alignment of actors 
and purposes, the aggressive implementation of the new National Stock Exchange 
project might have languished indefinitely as a rump electronic venue for the ex post 
reporting of bond trades, and nothing more. After all, judging from the DFIs’ previous 
ill-fated foray with the OTCEI exchange, their prospects were not bright. 
In the event, one important collective actor by the dominant political coalition 
– the “dependent capitalists” (large family conglomerates and the so-called FERA 
companies
25 that had been co-opted and constrained in the “license permit quota raj”) 
– stood aside, neither promoting nor undermining the National Stock Exchange 
project.
26 Property-rights claims embedded in stocks not only facilitate efficient capital 
allocation through equity-based enterprise finance, they also help issuers of securities 
                                                 
23 In 1994, the Bombay Stock Exchange itself controlled 75% of national trading volume (Shah and 
Thomas 2001, 9). 
24 This was due to what financial economists call the “network externality character of stock market 
liquidity.” For users, the appeal of a market depends on the number of other users. Trading flow is 
attracted to the most liquid market, and this in turn insures the liquidity appeal of that market. As 
financial economists Shah and Thomas explain with regard to the international empirical experience of 
such natural securities trading monopolies, “when a second market tries to compete with the first 
market, it is difficult to attract away the trading flow” (Shah and Thomas 2001, 5). 
25 The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973 was an effort to control the flow of foreign 
exchange and limit a perceived threat of capital flight. It also limited the level of foreign direct 
investment of multinationals in their local subsidiaries. Multinationals like the Anglo-Dutch 
conglomerate Unilever were obliged to reduce their stake to comply with FERA, but continued to 
manage some of the most dynamic firms in India. 
26 The term “Dependent Capitalists” characterized the status of private capital as a “second actor” in 
India’s pre-1991 dominant political coalition. “Private capitalism in India is dependent capitalism. It 
relies on the patronage and protection of the third actor, the state, for its profits and security” (Rudolph 
and Rudolph 1987, 25, and 25-35 passim).  
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capitalize their wealth. The potential improvements of the National Stock Exchange 
promised increased margins of wealth capitalization and control, because a more 
liquid, investor-friendly exchange would squeeze out as much benefit to issuers as 
possible from a “thin float.”
27 Not coincidentally, the government, who owned many 
listed firms and wished to make money from further “privatizing” more of their 
holdings, shared a similar interest in maximizing wealth from thin floats, while 
minimizing the loss of control. Under these conditions, the dominant apex business 
association at the time took no stand on the issue of establishing the new National 
Stock Exchange, and the “dependent capitalists” as a collective actor in India’s 
dominant coalition were indeterminate on the stock exchange issue, further opening 
space for the central state to exercise its preferences in the matter.
28 
                                                 
27 A “thin float” is the issuance of a small quantum (relative to insiders) of publicly traded listed shares, 
and therefore a small dilution of promoters/insiders’ ownership. Good liquidity on a “thin float” would 
benefit issuers’ wealth capitalization interest by maximizing their potential to realize founder’s rent and 
equity leverage, while minimizing their loss of ownership control. 
The “thin-ness” of these floats and the tendency of more professionalized (read, not family-
run) companies such as the FERA firms to use them has recently received further corroboration by the 
trend of such firms to “buy back” their listed shares.  
28 There had always been divisions among the “dependent capitalists.” During the heyday of the 
Nehruvian system of financial governance, these divisions had been expressed in the rivalry among 
India’s apex business associations, between the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry (FICCI – associated with India’s large family-run business conglomerates) and the Associated 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (Assocham – associated with firms such as the FERA 
companies and the Tata conglomerate) that presented a professionalized and cosmopolitan public image 
(Kochanek 1986). The failed round of Rajiv Gandhi reforms in the mid-1980s, followed by the post-
1991 paradigm shift, had upset the status quo within and between these associational groups, as some 
saw advantages to be gained from the end of the license raj while others feared it. This was reflected in 
the decline of the two old associations and the rise of a new (formerly engineering-focused) association 
that was generally supportive of the post-1991 reforms – the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII). 
But by 1994 the issue of foreign investment – direct and indirect (“portfolio investment” in securities) – 
was provoking a division in the membership of this new leading business association (Bhattacharya 
2000) 
  Former partisans of the FICCI apex business group (mostly status-quo-oriented family-run 
businesses) were largely satisfied with the coziness of the BSE-dominated securities enclave, and 
perhaps did not comprehend the threats and opportunities from reform. Former ASSOCHAM partisans, 
and the more dynamic family-conglomerates who had defected to the CII, were not necessarily converts 
to neoclassical economic theory and efficient market gospel of Anglo-Saxon financial economics, but 
they saw wealth capitalization benefits from the NSE breakthrough. These businesses wished to 
valorize their future income streams while maintaining the ability to control both their enterprises and 
the future structure of Indian industrial organization (shaped by the rules and practices governing 
mergers and acquisitions).  
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The Development Financial Institutions presented a unified and persistent front 
favoring the NSE, based on their overwhelming interests as both issuers of securities 
and investors in securities. This unified resolution, combined with the clear 
preferences and strategies of the central-state-elite, were decisive in resolving this 
struggle in favor of the NSE. 
On the one hand, DFIs were issuers of securities and therefore particularly 
interested in realizing founder’s rent.
29 In terms of the asset-class/financial-position 
matrix the DFI’s were, in this role, located in the financial position of securities issuer 
and thus suffered from the structure of the Bombay Stock Exchange, both because it 
was difficult to participate directly in the exchange on its own behalf (entry barriers), 
and because of the illiquid, costly, and volatile nature of trading produced by the 
BSE’s practices. Furthermore, the DFIs held shares in firms its loans had nurtured, 
until those firms went for an initial public offering (IPO). After the IPO took place, the 
DFIs faced severe constraints on trading in large transaction sizes
30 and were 
confronted with the general risk of severe illiquidity in the secondary market. There 
was also the problem that individual companies’ share capitalization was probably 
constrained by the limited overall market capitalization
31 that resulted from poor 
volumes and investor wariness. These issues affected the DFIs’ wealth capitalization 
interest as equity issuers by limiting potential both for collecting founder’s rent and for 
equity leverage. 
                                                 
29 On founders rent, see note 12. The DFIs became co-promoters of the firms and long-term projects 
they funded, including private, public, and joint public-private ventures. As participants in such 
ventures, they had an interest in outcomes at all three domains identified in the first cell of Figure 6-1; 
enterprise finance, wealth capitalization, and the privatization of state owned enterprises. 
30 This was due to paper-based trading and other practices that served to increase BSE brokerage fees 
(good for the BSE), but increased impact cost, or obstructed large volume trading altogether (bad for 
DFIs). 
31 The overall market capitalization is the combined market value of all listed-company shares.  
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On the other hand, Development Financial Institutions were also investors in 
securities, thus suffering double jeopardy at the hands of the Bombay exchange. As 
investors and managers of major securities portfolios in fiduciary capacity and on their 
own account, BSE practices were costly and frustrating for the DFIs.
32 Moreover, there 
were “serious conflicts of interest” built into the BSE’s “mutualized” governance 
structures.
33 In the “of, by, and for the BSE” world of Indian stock trading, poor self-
regulation and worse enforcement often led to settlement errors and other problems. If 
an investor had a complaint against a BSE member, other BSE members adjudicated 
the dispute, with “few complaints resolved in favor of investors” (Shah and Thomas 
2001, 14). Finally, the illiquidity of the BSE increased the risk, and diminished the 
appeal, of securities for investors. Following the paradigm shift in overall Indian 
economic policy, these problems faced by the DFIs, both as an issuer and as an 
investor, were magnified. 
This compelling interest of the Development Financial Institutions as both 
issuer and investor provided a powerful sense of purpose in an important collective 
coalition actor with financial expertise. This meant that there was now some serious 
political gravity from both the issuer and investor financial positions with respect to 
the issues of market design and governance on the stock exchange. The market design 
and governance structure the DFI proposed were also compelling. The National Stock 
Exchange promised to replace the open-outcry, geographically concentrated paper-
based trading system controlled by the BSE with a new market structure based on a 
nationally accessible, electronic, screen-displayed limit-order book, along with a shift 
to “dematerialized” (digital, not paper) shares. These changes would eliminate the 
                                                 
32 An investor who sold shares on the BSE might get his or her money, but often with huge delays. 
When dividends or stock splits were due, brokers might delay share transfer to reap these benefits 
before executing the trade. 
33 Similar conflicts persist on other famous broker-run exchanges such as the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE). See Levitt (2001), and Ip (2003).  
 
311 
majority of the problems the DFIs faced as issuers and investors when dealing with the 
BSE. If the NSE succeeded in attracting liquidity, this new state-of-the-art trading 
platform would lower impact and other transaction costs.
 34 It would also diminish risk, 
and improve the wealth capitalization potential of issuers’ securities.
35 The NSE would 
also avoid the Bombay Stock Exchange’s problems of conflicted governance.
36 It 
would be set up as a limited liability company, owned by public sector financial 
institutions – the large DFIs – and led by the largest long-term lending institutions 
(IDBI), but run by an independent professional management team, not by brokers. 
NSE brokerages would merely be franchisees of the exchange.
37 
Following the 1991 reforms, the Ministry of Finance (MOF), under the 
guidance of Manmohan Singh, was given a wide margin to pursue economic reforms 
by Prime Minister Rao. The debates and decisions of the economic policy elite were 
focused in the MOF’s “Department of Economic Affairs” (DEA). The DEA was 
responsible for most of the dismantling of the old Nehruvian system, and it was there 
that the preferences imposed by India’s external exposure profile, discussed earlier, 
coalesced.
38 In the absence of significant FDI and trade receipts, the Indian central-
state-elite, whose most focused and powerful representative at the time was the DEA, 
                                                 
34 Impact cost is the “additional” expense of immediate trade execution, and is a measure of the price-
per-share consequences of liquidity on an exchange. Highly liquid exchanges reduce impact costs 
(Bangia et al. 1998). Selling large positions (blocks) of shares tends to incur higher impact costs. 
35 A robust secondary market would also create a structural incentive on the investor side that could also 
improve the potential for equity-based enterprise finance. 
36 Another issue the DFIs faced under the old BSE-dominated securities enclave system was the corrupt 
and costly links between the BSE and DFI employees. The new NSE governance structure promised to 
alleviate this problem through surveillance and segmentation of exchanges operations, achieved through 
a variety of technological and organizational measures. (Author’s interviews, Bombay, 2000, #16; 
Bombay, 2000, #17). 
37 The primary promoters and owners of the NSE were IDBI, UTI, LIC, and ICICI, with additional 
participation from other DFIs. The board of directors was composed of both DFI representatives and 
private sector directors. For background on these entities, see chapter 4. 
38 Bhattacharya (1999) and Jenkins (1999) discuss this. In the course of my research, this view was 
confirmed in interviews of three of the key DEA officials involved, and a variety of officials from other 
agencies (such as the central bank and securities regulator) who advised the DEA on securities related 
matters at the time. (Author’s interviews, New Delhi, 2000, #14; confidential correspondence, 2000, 
#3).  
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recognized that foreign portfolio investment (FPI) could be a useful and quick solution 
to the balance-of-payments instability and foreign exchange needs associated with the 
precarious scarcity of India’s external exposure. Improvements on a variety of 
securities-related governance issues that would attract FPI could be achieved more 
quickly than a turn-around in the FDI and export-led growth parameters. The strategy 
that emerged – the aggressive, pro-competitive stance, encouraging state-of-the art 
trading and settlement, and the sanctioning of professional exchange management and 
governance – was by no means a certain outcome from the ex ante perspective of 
anyone familiar with the politics of Indian economic reform. The broad effects of the 
NSE breakthrough were also facilitated by another dimension of the strategy that later 
emerged: simultaneously pressuring the banking system and working around it in the 
provision of enterprise finance.  
In early 1993, the NSE was poised to go on-line with its “wholesale debt 
segment,” a reporting venue for trades in corporate and government bonds that was to 
be a precursor to full-fledged, countrywide, screen-based bond trading, a market 
which was then still phone-dominated and concentrated in Bombay. While there was 
at the time no explicit plan to trade stocks on the NSE system, its infrastructure was 
extremely powerful and technically capable of immediately furnishing a trading 
platform for the trading of all Indian stocks. 
The Ministry of Finance’s Department of Economic Affairs had for some time 
been leaning on the BSE to upgrade its trading systems, begin the dematerialization of 
stocks, and initiate the development of “novation” systems of depositories, settlement, 
and trade guarantees. Ministry of Finance officials and other observers reported both 
contemporaneously and in retrospect that a common pattern was emerging in which 
the BSE seemed to respond positively on request to deal with the market design and 
exchange governance issues, starting task forces and study committees but doing  
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nothing.
 39 It became increasingly clear to the government that the BSE was not acting 
in good faith. The DEA official in charge explained that the MOF was losing patience 
with the BSE. He reported that at a meeting in 1993, the DEA was ready to give the 
BSE a last chance to propose changes. But, he said, the BSE “just did not take the 
issues (improvements in market structure and exchange governance) seriously.” 
Furthermore, according to former DEA officials, the BSE also underestimated the 
potential threat of the NSE – a claim that was famously and amusingly borne out.
40 
The Bombay Stock Exchange’s splendid isolation in the Nehruvian securities 
enclave had facilitated their passive enrichment. It had also meant that they were not 
conversant with, or connected to, the wider world of Indian coalition politics. 
Consequently, at this critical juncture they were internally inflexible regarding 
organizational change, lacking the skill and clout to influence policy. Ministry 
officials realized that the Bombay Stock Exchange underestimated the DEA’s resolve 
and the top-level support it enjoyed (meaning Finance Minister Singh and Prime 
Minister Rao). In the end, the central-state-elite, represented by the Department of 
Economic Affairs, tipped the balance in favor of the NSE. It authorized the Securities 
and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) to enable the National Stock Exchange to 
undertake equity trading.
41 The central-state-elite was forced to pursue their 
preferences through a strategy that was, in the Indian context, unusually aggressive 
and pro-competitive. However, the Ministry’s carte blanche was no certain guarantee 
                                                 
39 In the 1980s, for example, a forward-looking leadership at the BSE (under the leadership of executive 
director M.R. Mayya and president Mahendra Kampani) had begun the process of automation, 
proceeding as far as selecting hardware systems. “But,” writes Dalal, “the broker coterie simply forced 
it to drop the move, fearing that automation and transparency would end their dominance. This process 
was revived only after the NSE’s turnover crossed that of the BSE, and continued to rise relentlessly” 
(1999) 
40 Author’s interviews, confidential location, 2000, #118. 
41 In principle, SEBI is an autonomous regulatory agency. In practice this is only half true, because the 
complicated customary practice in which central ministries may issue “written requests” to statutory 
bodies such as SEBI is a Sword of Damocles over the heads of these agencies’ chairmen.  
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of success for the NSE. The BSE still held the trump card of its natural monopoly 
position as the dominant locus of liquidity. 
The BSE brokers were sanguine. There was knee-slapping mirth and ribald 
jokes made about the NSE. It was, after all, the brainchild of government-run financial 
institutions. The South Bombay community referred to it derisively (if not entirely 
accurately) as the “sarkari share bazaar” (government stock exchange). Smugly 
believing the government too incompetent in matters of securities finance, and 
probably misunderstanding the superiority of the market design and the degree to 
which the governance structure was civilian, the BSE fatefully dismissed the NSE out 
of hand.
42 NSE stock trading was made available nationwide through its state-of-the-
art satellite connections and widespread network of trading terminals. The NSE 
business structure permitted small and regionally dispersed actors to become involved, 
attracting participants – firm listings, brokers, and investors – to the NSE in the face of 
the BSE’s entrenched natural monopoly on liquidity. The laughing stopped at the BSE 
on South Bombay’s Dalal Street when, in November 1995, within a year of opening, 
the upstart National Stock Exchange beat out the 120-year-old Bombay Stock 
Exchange as the highest volume exchange in India (see Figure 6-1).
43 
 
                                                 
42 The recent (1993) failure of a previous effort by the DFIs to establish a competing exchange (the 
Over the Counter Exchange of India), based on the then-popular American NASDAQ model, served to 
further confirm BSE partisans in this belief that the NSE was a dead letter. Author’s confidential 
correspondence, 2001, #100. 
43 By 1999, the NSE was one of the world’s four most active exchanges as measured by trades per day 
(Shah and Thomas 2001, 15).  
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Figure 6-1 
The Origins of Competition Among Indian Stock Exchanges
44 
 
Competition bred improvements that were a hallmark of the “scope” outcome 
in the market component of India’s constrained evolution securities governance 
regime. The National Stock Exchange competed directly with the Bombay Stock 
Exchange and with other regional exchanges. This competition eventually provoked 
improved market structure on all Indian exchanges, improving price discovery, 
narrowing bid-ask spreads for equity securities, and provoking other dramatic 
improvements in trading practices, risk management, efficiency, and eventually 
settlement countrywide.
45 Most of the immediate effects of these changes on the 
observable outcomes identified in the asset-class/financial-position framework were 
                                                 
44 Shah, Ajay, and Susan Thomas. "The Evolution of the Securities Markets in India in the 1990s." 
Bombay: Indira Gandhi Institute for Development Research, 2001. 
45 The original NSE plan envisioned the establishment of links to a related depository and related 
clearing agency. These came online in 1996.  
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achieved through market structure improvements, and their consequences for cost, 
trading execution (diminished transaction time and increased reliability), and liquidity. 
Such changes benefit issuers and investors of all asset classes alike. Take liquidity for 
example: By providing swift low transaction-cost equity sales, liquidity at once 
improves issuers’ ability to capitalize their wealth, even as it is the first line of defense 
in investor protection from fraud or manipulation. Liquidity is also the most powerful 
means by which shareholders can exercise their “voice” vis-à-vis bad companies. 
Novation in a market structure eliminates settlement risk, further benefiting investors. 
The stock exchange reforms explained in this section were provoked by a 
state-elite strategy that evolved in interaction with political coalition members’ 
changing power and interests with respect to securities-related property rights. I 
started this section by reiterating the securities-related preferences of India’s central-
state-elite. I then mapped the institutional context, and the other actors and their 
interests with regard to stock market structure and exchange governance in pre-reform 
India. By demonstrating that the DFIs’ interests and actions were influenced by their 
dual role as both security issuers and investors, I was able to show how, in the contest 
between the DFIs and the BSE, the autonomous, facilitative, “mediating role” of the 
central-state-elite in pursuing the specified preferences were translated into a political 
strategy. I demonstrated the impact of that strategy on the development of the stock 
exchange institutions, and the consequences of those institutional changes for 
observable elements in a securities governance regime primarily issuer interests like 
enterprise finance and wealth capitalization, but also some areas of interest to 
investors such as shareholder rights.
46 
                                                 
46 In regard to founder’s rent and wealth capitalization, it may be argued that things went too far in the 
Indian markets during the period 1994-1996, provoking what came to be known disarmingly as the 
problem of “disappearing companies.” In that period, a number of companies were established and 
made it to the IPO phase, whereupon the promoters disappeared with the IPO proceeds, leaving nothing 
behind.  
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Transformation in the area of securities trading, provoked by market structure 
improvements and exchange governance reform, are only part, albeit an important 
part, of outcomes in the market component of India’s SGR. In combination with other 
changes (not discussed here) in securities-related markets, in the organization and 
orientation of the state with respect to securities, in the associational sphere, and in the 
role of the media and social networks, this stock exchange transformation was 
important in determining the configuration of those components in the overall pattern 
of the Indian SGR.
47 Whereas the development of the institutional framework for stock 
exchange in India showed how autonomous state action, and flexibility in the 
relationship between the dominant coalition and the structures of property-rights, 
contributed significantly to shaping the constrained evolution securities governance 
regime in that country, the development of the institutional framework for stock 
exchanges in China went in almost exactly the opposite direction, diminishing 
competition and enhancing state discretion. 
 
                                                 
47 What were some of the effects of the overall pattern of India’s SGR? The central elite’s strategy 
worked. By the end of the decade, the constrained evolution SGR helped achieve the state’s 
preferences. In the decade of the 1990s, 52% of India’s foreign exchange (forex) came from foreign 
portfolio investment (Damodaran 2002). In 2002, India’s forex reserves of US $66 billion were 
sufficient to cover thirteen months of imports, well over the Asia average (ex-Japan, Hong Kong, and 
Taiwan) of seven months. Finally, regarding industrial finance, as the SGR developed, it enabled the 
central elite to achieve its goals of improving industrial finance by working around the state-owned 
banks and encouraging firms’ use of securities markets. Indian firms’ use of non-bank capital markets 
went up in the 1990s as compared to the 1980s by between 30% and 40%, and their use of funds from 
intermediaries (banks) went down by about 5%. 
The effectiveness of India’s SGR in attracting FDI has its dark side. Central policy makers 
now constantly worry that Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) will take their hard currency home at 
the first sign of falling share prices. They consider the consequent forex outflows a threatening 
symbolic challenge to the prestige of Indian markets. They are also wary of the impact on hard currency 
reserves. However, during the severe turbulence of the spring 2001 market scandal and crash, FIIs 
maintained their interest in Indian shares, remaining net buyers throughout. In its weekly newsletter, 
Morgan Stanley assured institutional investors that “such crises are usually short-lived and the market is 
likely to be back on its feet reflecting fundamentals,” adding that “the upside is in the pipeline and that 
it makes sense to buy into the current weakness” (Rudolph 2001).  
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III. The Politics of Stock Exchange Development in China’s SGR 
 
 
Why have China’s securities-related development and regulation focused so 
much on segmentation, quarantine, and increasing government centralization? This is 
particularly puzzling at a time when the government is retreating from product 
markets, and much commercial decision-making and economic power is being 
devolved away from the center. In the 1990s, Chinese securities finance seemed to be 
a greenfield prospect. There were few entrenched interests to obstruct the “optimal” 
design of securities institutions and governance. Yet, what emerged by the end of 1997 
were the “Zhu Regime” and the discretionary involution pattern of securities 
governance (see Table 6-3).
48 One important piece of this pattern was China’s stock 
exchange institutions. As in the Indian case, the role of exchanges as a market arena 
with dense linkages to the various components of the SGR (states, firms, associations, 
and networks) meant that the trading practices and organization of these institutions 
contributed to and reflected the country’s overall SGR trajectory. 
Carl Walter, the most seasoned foreign investment banker working in China, 
suggested that the establishment of China’s bourses, and the policy regime of which 
they were a part, represented a successful strategy to “ring fence” China’s Wild West 
securities market of the late 1980s.
49 Commenting on the cosmetic conformity of the 
exchanges to the social norms and technological standards of the global securities 
script, Fraser Howie
50 favors a Chinese metaphor that captures the contradiction of the 
exchanges’ formal grandeur and substantive shallowness – the crux of the financial 
governance pattern identified in the following case study. In the days of confrontation 
                                                 
48 For an introduction to the “Zhu Regime,” mapping the factional configuration of elite politics and its 
consequences for macro- and micro-economic policy institutions (monetary, labor, and corporate), see 
respectively Shih (2003), Hurst (2002), and Lin (2003)  
49 The “ring fence” metaphor was Walter’s. Author’s interview, Beijing, 2000 #71. 
50 Howie is Walter’s co-author and former colleague at China’s first international joint-venture 
investment bank, China International Investment Company.  
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with Central Asian invaders, defenders of the Han heartland built forts along the 
frontier. The forts were quickly built, lightly garrisoned, festooned with banners, and 
bristling with shiny weapons. This was called the “empty fort” tactic of achieving 
border security on the cheap.
51 Finally, in describing the internal function of the stock 
exchanges, one of China’s most well-regarded professional economists had this to say: 
“China’s stock markets resemble a casino, only less standardized.”
52 
The Chinese state operated under the severe uncertainty caused by economic 
backwardness and rapid, widespread social-economic transformation. It was also 
constrained by its distributional coalitions and state-socialist property rights. Under 
these conditions, the Chinese state preferred to avoid the substantive effects of the 
securitization that had begun during the liberalizing 1980s and continued through the 
establishment of the formal securities exchanges in 1990. These preferences and the 
strategies they inspired were facilitated by, and indeed were rational responses to, 
China’s benign abundance profile of external exposure.  The preferences of China’s 
central-state-elite, as identified earlier, were:
                                                 
51 Author’s interview, 2000, #72. This is a well-worn historical analogy in the China field, used in a 
variety of issue areas (Nathan and Ross 1997).  
52 Zhongguo de gushi henxiang yi ge duchang, erqie hen bu guifan (Wu 2002).  
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•  Servicing the distributional coalition and providing life support to the large 
SOE-sector, interior provinces, and sunset sectors. 
•  Limiting the disruption to those elements of the state-socialist property-rights 
regime that facilitate the exercise of CCP discretion. 
 
A. Repression and Reform: Establishing Stock Exchanges, Expanding 
Securitization 
 
Like many ground-up initiatives that grew out of the vibrancy of China’s post-
Mao civil economy and society during the 1980s, the heterogeneity and 
experimentation of securities finance were abruptly and dramatically halted with the 
Tiananmen event of 1989. In early 1990, a powerful agency of the State Council (the 
locus of China’s central-state-elite) finally weighed in on securities policy. Its most 
concrete institutional change had to do with stock exchanges. First, the State Council 
Committee for Reform of the Economic System (SCRES, known as the Tigaiwei) 
issued rules limiting the spread of shares by restricting their flow to employees, 
directing newly issued share flow only to other SOEs. SCRES also limited the spread 
of OTC trading outside of Shenzhen and Shanghai.
53 At the end of the year, two new 
exchanges opened in Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
All at once, China jumped from having no formal exchange trading system, to 
the world frontier. True to Gerschenkon’s “imperative of economic backwardness,” 
the Chinese bourses, ex nihilo, and at great expense, leapfrogged to state-of-the-art, 
                                                 
53 Informal zhengquan jiaoyizhongxin (“securities trading centers”) in a number of China’s larger 
commercial cities and provincial capitals such as Chongqing and Shenyang persisted for several years, 
vainly lobbying the center to establish their own exchanges (Xiehui 1993). But as the nationwide 
network of satellite and fixed connections to the main boards in Shanghai and Shenzhen proliferated 
and local governance problems associated with jiaoyizhongxin became apparent, prospects for these 
regional centers withered.  
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centralized “dematerialized” trading and settlement systems.
54 This would appear to 
have been a major reform. It was well timed. The early hour of this measure – only a 
decade into the economic reforms and well before any significant or durable 
institutions of securities finance had emerged from the civil economy or civil society – 
meant that the Chinese state faced none of the political economy problems that 
confronted India in the initial establishment of exchanges. It avoided resistance or 
positive input to changes in market design that would have been the likely 
consequence if those civil economy and civil society elements of securities 
governance had been given space and time to grow and develop a collective 
consciousness.
55 
During his now storied “nanxun” (“Southern Tour”) of February 1992, Deng 
Xiaoping sought to awaken China’s economic reform movement from its post-
Tiananmen torpor. Toward that end, he specifically used the symbolic gravity of the 
securities markets to amplify his message. In doing so, he succeeded in rallying the 
state propaganda apparatus and crucial party leaders in support of securities market 
development. “We must seize this opportunity,” he declared. Silencing his more 
cautious, market-phobic, “hard-line” opponents, Deng instilled a sense of urgency in 
the reform agenda, arguing that a crucial, fleeting window of opportunity must be 
exploited. The focal points of his artfully staged foray were the new securities 
exchanges in Shenzhen and Shanghai. “As for securities and the stock market,” 
queried Deng publicly in Shenzhen, “are they finally good or bad, are they dangerous, 
are they things only capitalism has, or can socialism also make use of them?” 
                                                 
54 The market microstructure of trading was an “order-driven” system based on “price-time priority” 
connected directly to the securities depository and the designated bank (ICBC), and linked over time to 
an increasingly large national network (Kumar et al 1997). The market microstructure of the primary 
market changed and proliferated frequently in this period as the government adjusted the 
corporatization policy and the associated primary market for those companies’ new securities. 
55 This is, as the previous case demonstrated, in stark contrast to the Indian case where the NSE 
breakthrough involved a struggle to impose a “world standard” settlement and microstructure design.  
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Fatefully, he opined, “we are allowed to try and see…” [quoted in (Hertz 1998 90-
93)]. This launched the expansion of Chinese securities finance in the digital era. The 
number of listed firms exploded, growing at more than 200% from that year to the 
next (see Figure 6-2). 
The new exchanges where all these firms were listing – centralized platforms 
capable of nationwide linkages for electronic trading and settlement using a screen-
based limit-order book – were the best way then known to enhance liquidity and 
supply fair, low risk securities trading. By itself, the 1990 Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchange infrastructure did not foreshadow the discretionary involution pattern of 
securities governance in China. Nevertheless, at the same time, the centralization of 
trading and the dematerialization of shares made control and surveillance of securities 
finance much cheaper and easier. They provided a necessary, though not a sufficient 
condition for the convenient exercise of central-state-elite authority over securities 
finance that was crucial to the later emergence of the discretionary involution pattern. 
What gave the establishment of these exchanges their potential to be the regulatory 
equivalents of tanks rumbling into the central squares of Chinese financial would be 
their governance structures. 
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Figure 6-2: 
Number and Percentage Change of Chinese Companies Listed Per Annum: 
1992-2000 
 
  In the protean context of Chinese securities finance in the early 1990s, it is 
difficult to discern actual or even potential winners and losers. Guidance from the 
asset-class/financial-position matrix suggests we consider the consequences of various 
policies and institutions for differently situated financial actors. At the time, treatment 
of equity, including the shares available on primary equity markets,
56 and of 
government bonds, seemed to favor issuers of securities.
57 There were also, even then, 
                                                 
56 Between 1989 and 1992, the development and implementation of the “Standard Opinion” (guifan 
yijian) was a major cause of this change. This bit of legislation, drafted by the then-powerful SCRES, 
was a crucial first step in directing the process of securitization to serve the needs of the state as an 
issuer of equity securities. It stripped away the regional and ownership-type heterodoxy of the 1980s, 
focused exclusively on the state sector, granted approval authority for corporate restructuring to specific 
government authorities, and most importantly developed the tripartite share categories that are the 
bedrock of state-domination of equity-related property-rights in China (Rudolph 2002; Walter and 
Howie 2001, chapter 2). The 1994 Company Law further enhanced the center’s ability to exercise its 
discretion by further formalizing the share categories first detailed in the Standard Opinion. 
57 This growth and euphoria was not limited to the equity trading on the exchanges. Issuance and 
trading volumes in government-issued bonds were growing rapidly as the central government acquired 
an increasing taste for fiscal deficits. 
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early signs that the initial institutional design and governance structures of the 
exchanges were also likely to favor issuers of securities over investors in securities. 
First, the structure of the relationship between the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
exchanges was set by central fiat. Companies were forced to list on one exchange or 
the other. Thus, the primary parameter of competition between the exchanges was for 
the listing of firms. The only variable of choice for investors, therefore, was the 
“merit” of the listed firms, not the quality of an exchange’s listing requirements or the 
quality and price of trading and settlement. Second, the governance structure of the 
exchanges was state dominated. At first, local governments represented by the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen municipalities regulated their own local exchanges. This 
structure did encourage some competition between the two cities to promote their 
respective exchanges. The incentives of this institutional design strongly encouraged 
these municipal governments to promote local business.
58 Pressure was put on local 
bankers and businesspeople to lend and invest funds in the market, and local firms 
were dragooned into restructuring and later listing bids.
59 Enticing firms from 
elsewhere in the country remained a secondary concern to the local governments and 
their agents in the stock exchange management.  
Within these new confines, securities governance in the 1992-1995 period was 
nevertheless one of experimentation, growth in scale, learning, and increasing 
international exposure. Then came the “Zhu Regime” and a full shift to the 
discretionary involution pattern. 
 
                                                 
58 Fore example, Shanghai ICBC branch president, Shen Roulei. 
59 Author’s interviews with Shanghai Stock Exchange staff, Shanghai, 2001, #70.  
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B. Reaction: The “Political Conquest” of the Exchanges 
The liveliness of the previous period came to an abrupt halt in the summer of 
1995. In the spring of that year, a scandal erupted around the trading of government 
bond futures (Yatsko 2001; Zhongxin 2001). This event set in motion a series of 
policy measures over the next two years that completed the extension of Beijing’s 
control over the exchanges. This process had begun with the state-centric bias in the 
specification of equity-related property-rights and the tying, at the time of its creation 
in 1992, of the new securities regulator – the China Securities Regulatory Commission 
(CSRC) – to the apron-strings of the State Council.
60 Between 1995 and 1997, the 
CSRC took over direct regulatory and operating control of the exchanges, completely 
sidelining the Shanghai and Shenzhen municipalities, and the earlier exchange 
management. 
Significant personnel changes at the CSRC initiated a severely conservative 
shift in the wake of the 1995 bond futures scandal. These changes had implications for 
stock exchange governance. Liu Hongru, the cosmopolitan and dynamic first chairman 
of the commission, was removed in favor of Zhou Daojiong, a nominee whose twin 
qualifications for the job seemed to be his reputation as a “yes-man” for the State 
Council, and his well-known ignorance of securities finance (Nan 2001).
61 Customary 
practice is an important part of elite politics in China (Nathan and Tsai 1995; Tsou 
1995). This first succession at the CSRC involved the performance of an important 
customary element in the state domain of securities governance: the signaling of 
                                                 
60 On equity-related property rights and share segmentation, see note 56, above. On the institutional 
history of the CSRC, see (Rudolph 2002). 
61 Expressing the prevailing gloom of the time, one former CSRC official commented, “The central 
authorities don’t want experimentation, they don’t want new products, they only want stability and 
that’s what they’ll get from Mr. Zhou, who prides himself on knowing little about the industry. 
Hopefully they will not choke the market to death” (Nickerson 1995). This quote is particularly credible 
and damning because there is good reason to believe that the former official quoted here was Gao 
Xiqing, de facto leader of the CSRCs haiguipai (the “sea-turtle faction” of foreign trained experts 
recruited by Liu Hongru), and the mainland’s most respected securities finance expert.  
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control structures in informal politics or factions. During this succession, the extension 
of factional elite politics into the state domain of securities governance served to begin 
the process of inscribing the hierarchical relationship between the CSRC and the local 
stock exchanges.
62 The hierarchy was reinforced when this pattern of factional control 
and political allegiance moved both down to the local level and up into the apex 
stratum of the State Council during the next CSRC succession.
63 
The 1995 government bond futures scandal forced then-Vice-Premier Zhu, 
fresh from his triumphant taming of a severe inflationary episode, to direct his 
attention to securities finance. This was crucial to the consolidation of what until then 
had been only incipient elements in a contingent tangle of policy and institutional 
initiatives. Out of this tangle, Zhu would sort out and reinforce those elements that 
could be usefully woven into the pattern of discretionary involution.
64 
Zhu’s attention to securities finance was a tipping point in the discretionary 
involution direction for several reasons. First, Zhu embodied the center’s preferences, 
as described above. Second, his eventual post as Premier put him in an official 
position to profoundly influence securities governance. His heroic inflation-fighting 
reputation as a master of macroeconomic policy, and his demonstrated “managerial” 
approach, protected him from criticism.
65 Third, his attitude toward securities finance 
predisposed him toward the type of manipulation permitted by China’s benign 
                                                 
62 Outgoing CSRC Chairman Liu’s protégé at the Shenzhen exchange was replaced by a protégé of the 
incoming Chairman Zhou. Zhuang Xinyin – a man whose appointment puzzled all observers until it 
was discovered that he had close links to incoming CSRC chairman Zhou Daojiong – took over the 
important post of General Manager at the Shenzhen exchange (Ibison 1995). 
63 During the formation of his new regime as Premier, Zhu Rongji replaced Zhou Daojiong as CSRC 
Chairman with his own handpicked finance maven Zhou Zhengqing. 
64 Walter and Howie do a very good job in their book of drawing out the many contradictory trends and 
potential alternatives that “might have been” in the development of China’s SGR (2001). 
65 For a discussion of the fundamentally “political” nature of Zhu’s seemingly technocratic policies, see 
(Shih 2002)  
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abundance profile of external exposure.
66 Fourth, he had a motive to exploit securities 
finance. Upon becoming Premier in 1998,
67 Zhu made the resolution of the State 
Owned Enterprise “problem” his number one priority. Finally, there was the global 
economic zeitgeist of 1997/1998. The East Asian crisis was unfolding, and Zhu knew 
he was being scrutinized at home and abroad for how he would guard against its 
contagion. At the same time, the poor reputation of securities finance in the 
privatization of other former socialist economies spotlighted (in the domestic gallery) 
China’s capacity to manage the privatization process.
68 Chinese banks were already 
facing serious problems, and SOEs were in desperate need of life-support from 
alternative funding sources. Seeing an opportunity and a resource in securities finance, 
Zhu proceeded to bend the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges to his will. 
While Zhu was making choices, he was not making them under conditions of 
his own choosing. As premier, he was also coalition manager-in-chief. What locked in 
the central discretion of the discretionary involution pattern of securities governance 
during 1996/1997 was Zhu’s strategy for managing the struggles within the dominant 
political coalition over securities-related property rights.
69 It is important to remember 
                                                 
66 As one China stock market expert aptly remarked, “for all his credentials as a radical reformer, Zhu 
was extremely suspicious of the stock market. He felt it was too speculative and of little economic use” 
(Green 2003, 21) 
67 For the argument made here regarding the development of the “Zhu regime,” it is important to note 
that Zhu’s post-inflation-episode reputation from mid-1995 on empowered him greatly. More 
important, however, was the general expectation from mid-1996 onward that he would be the next 
Premier. 
68 The following remark accurately reflected the consensus view in the Chinese leadership at the time: 
 
If China re-distributes its assets like in the former Soviet Union and the East 
European  countries,  the  productive  force  in  the  country  will  be  severely 
destroyed. Violent social chaos will be inevitable, and the economic reform 
will suffer a standstill or even retrogression quoted in (Gu and Art 1996). 
While the validity of the assumptions underlying this assertion may be questionable, my interviews 
corroborate that this was indeed a common belief among Chinese policy makers at the time. Author’s 
interview, Beijing, 2000, #19. 
69 That coalition is composed of those who were the winners before reform, and who, as potential losers 
in reform, continue to obstruct it unless they are accommodated. The coalition includes heavy industry, 
inland provinces, the military, and central agencies (Shirk 1993; Shirk 1996)  
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that the dynamics of China’s dominant coalition involve the central state balancing 
and controlling the power and interests of other parts of the state. It is an intramural 
coalition. Zhu therefore cultivated an SGR that ensured that the spoils of securities 
finance could be distributed at the discretion of the State Council, acting through its 
agent, the CSRC. This distribution was managed to maximize the benefits of 
patronage regionally, while at the same time minimizing sectoral instability.
70 The 
management solution to this struggle biased the governance of securities in favor of 
issuers, distributing access to securities-related property-rights – in this case access to 
equity finance – in ways that would maintain support within the intramural coalition. 
This bias was achieved through a range of policies and institutional calibrations, 
including changes to the way the stock exchanges were governed. With low and often 
negative real interest rates, a closed capital account prohibiting overseas investing, and 
few alternative investment options for a 40 percent domestic savings rate, individual 
Chinese had little to lose by taking a punt in the market, however rigged. This 
provided a minimal reservoir of retail investment, and when trading volumes flagged 
and markets turned down, the state “encouraged” investment in the markets with a mix 
of propaganda, innuendo, tax incentives, and loans to securities companies.
71 
Recall that during the reformist period following the establishment of the stock 
exchanges and before the 1995 bond futures scandal, the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
municipal governments were in charge of the exchanges. The municipalities 
nominated the exchanges’ top management, but nominees required State Council 
approval.
72 There had long been rivalry between the CSRC at the center and the local 
                                                 
70 Regional patronage is an important source of stability and state strength (Shirk 1993). Sectoral 
stability – that is, the managed, slow-motion restructuring and winnowing of the socialist legacy of 
heavy industrial urban-bias, was crucial to coalition management and broader social stability. 
71 For discussion of the central-state’s use of propaganda and “stamp-tax” incentives, see (Rudolph 
2002) 
72 After the founding of the CSRC in 1992, approval authority shifted to that body.   
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governments running those exchanges. The 1995 bond futures scandal triggered 
realignment in the locus of regulatory authority and state discretion (Foo 1995a). That 
scandal undermined the credibility of the Shanghai authorities as a regulator, but the 
realignment that followed addressed some deeper structural problems as well. 
The two cities were vibrant points of economic growth in China, but they had 
gotten greedy. Rivalry between the two municipalities was provoking volatility and 
risky practice in securities finance, threatening the stability of the dominant coalition. 
The cities’ fierce competition for company listings and increased trading volume 
encouraged lax regulation and shameless local promotion through a range of 
enticements offered to listing candidates and securities traders, including tax 
incentives and preferential bank loans (to companies or to securities firms). Other 
regions of the country, and some sectors not well represented in the Jiangnan and 
Pearl River Delta regions adjacent to Shanghai and Shenzhen, felt neglected despite 
some central efforts to distribute listing access. The cities’ flagrant instrumental 
exploitation of the exchanges looked risky and began to disrupt the coalition balance. 
More importantly, though, it also demonstrated to Zhu the potential for instrumental 
exploitation of securities finance.
73 Under the “Zhu Regime,” that potential would be 
harnessed to the center’s political agenda with according side-payments to the internal 
coalition. 
All this was probably enough by itself to justify a more muscular central role 
in exchange governance, but in August of 1995 the Shanghai exchange openly clashed 
with the center over a matter that directly involved the property-rights status of equity 
securities, and the center’s definition of those rights.
74 The CSRC disagreed with the 
                                                 
73 Author’s interview, Beijing, 2001, #43. 
74 The dispute developed over an arcane and seemingly minor matter of “bonus shares.” These bonus 
shares had been issued to holders of the “Legal Person” category of non-tradable stock held only by 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Individuals were not permitted to own “Legal Person” (LP) shares, and 
their SOE owners could only exchange such shares with special permission from the Ministry of  
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Shanghai exchange over the exchange’s ruling on the status of some bonus shares 
issued by a firm in Sichuan. The commission removed the exhange’s Managing 
Director, and suspended trading of the company’s stock. In the two years that followed 
– from August 1995 to August 1997 – the center aggressively intervened in stock 
exchange governance and made institutional changes that increasingly expanded State 
Council discretion. These changes began shortly after the bonus-shares fight, with a 
reversal in the procedures for appointing apex management at the exchanges. As 
discussed earlier, in the past, exchange leadership was nominated by the Shanghai and 
Shenzhen municipal governments and confirmed by the CSRC. Thenceforth, however, 
the process was to be reversed. Whereas municipal government and the exchange had 
previously ruled on the issuance of shares and supervised member brokerages, the 
final say now shifted to the commission. By August 1997, local governance of the 
exchanges had become a mere formality when the State Council officially instructed 
the CSRC take over direct administration of the exchanges in order to foster “legal, 
supervised, self-disciplined and regulated” markets.
75 
 By the end of 1998, the “Zhu Regime” was in place. In 1998, the CSRC was 
elevated to a ministry-level rank nominally on a par with powerful agencies such as 
the central bank, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Planning Commission (SPC). 
This appeared to be a relative gain for the CSRC. Its power and jurisdictional 
competence relative to localities and other bureaucratic players such as the central 
bank were elevated and expanded. But this change also made the CSRC a more 
                                                 
Finance. This prohibition was part of a system of share “segmentation” that ensured state domination of 
the property-rights embedded in equity securities. The Shanghai exchange (and therefore its patron the 
Shanghai municipal government) had ruled that some bonus shares that had been awarded on the non-
listed “Legal Person” stock of a Sichuan-based company and later transferred to individuals could be 
listed and traded on the exchange (Foo 1995b) and author’s interview, Shanghai, 2001, #70. 
75 It explained that “the rapid expansion and scale of development force the need to strengthen unified 
central control.” To reinforce the point, high-ranking CSRC officials, veterans in securities finance, 
were dispatched to take charge of the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges (Standard 2000)  
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effective tool in implementing a governance regime of discretionary involution. At the 
same time that the CSRC was elevated, Zhu placed his loyal protégé Zhou Zhengqing 
at the commission’s helm. Most important, circling its wagons around the finance 
sector, the central-state-elite established the powerful and secretive Central Financial 
Works Committee (CFWC), a body of carefully picked CCP members tasked with 
assuring party control in all financial departments.
76 
Since 1993, provincial governments had formally participated in the political 
competition (mostly, as we have seen, competing with Shanghai and Shenzhen) over 
securities markets, regulating local securities companies, and nominating candidates to 
fill the regional and sectoral quotas for new stock market listings (Cooper 2002). This 
changed during the 1997 and 1999 period, as the CSRC dominated these functions and 
established a network of regional branch offices modeled on the “U.S. Federal 
Reserve”– which had also inspired the system then being implemented by the Chinese 
central bank for its branch banks. These measures were consistent with the larger 
administrative thrust of Premier Zhu’s 1997 plan to restructure the government, 
streamlining it and implementing a more vertical form of administration (chuizhi 
guanli) (Yang 2001. 8). In both cases the objective was the same: reducing local 
influence and preserving central discretion.
77 
The first potential threads of China’s discretionary involution SGR emerged in 
the post-Tiananmen, reactionary phase of the enactment of the securities finance 
script. This phase served to increase central government discretion in the composition 
and control of equity finance in the categorization of shares, through rules on 
                                                 
76 Author’s interviews, Beijing, 2000, #20. At the time of its establishment, CFWC secretary Wen 
Jiabao declared its purpose to be assuring that “that the party’s line, principles and policies as well as 
relevant instructions and decisions of the party Central Committee and State Council are implemented 
in financial departments” (Gilley and Murphy 2001). 
77 Material in this paragraph has been culled from (Zhongxin 2001), (Li 1998), and (Walter and Howie 
2001)  
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corporatization such as the Standard Opinion and later the Company Law. Similarly, 
in the central government’s first major secondary market initiative – establishing the 
stock exchanges – the content of the global securities script stipulated a bundle of 
technologies and trading practices that seemed benign or “power neutral.” But the 
consequence of their enactment facilitated the exercise of state power. In contrast to 
the “Wild West” days of the multiple and heterodox principles for corporate 
restructuring,
78 and the OTC and informal markets for secondary trading of shares 
around the country, the advent of the Standard Opinion and electronic centralized 
trading on exchanges together represented a diminution of competition. They too 
represented a diminution of ground-up innovation in securities governance and 
market-oriented pricing. The irony is that, in many ways, the technological “advance” 
and “modernization” heralded at the opening of the world-class Shanghai and 
Shenzhen bourses, and the formulation of a standardized nationwide restructuring 
policy for firms, together facilitated the preservation rather than the diminution of that 
state discretion in securities governance. This result belies the common belief that 
“more market means less state.” 
In the 1980s, the issuance of stocks and bonds was a liberalizing salvo. In the 
1990s, the march to domination by China’s central regulatory authorities was a 
response  to the political consequences of securitization provoked by the earlier 
corporatization heterodoxy and trading experimentation. Table 6-2 is a stylized 
depiction of the cycles
79 of openness and closure that afforded central authorities 
various opportunities to manipulate the securities finance script as it was enacted in 
                                                 
78 The Shenzhen corporatization principles were discussed in Chapter 4. 
79 Analysts of Chinese political economy use the terms zouzou-tingting (“stop-and-go”), or fang-shou 
(“letting go/clenching”), in referring to this prevailing pattern in which punctuated change occurs in an 
oscillating cycle of reform and retrenchment (Baum 1994; Tsang 1995). Zouzou-tingting suggests a 
progressive, evolutionary trajectory, while the fang-shou metaphor connotes no teleology. This was a 
common talking point among a number of the financial experts I interviewed.  
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China. Stock exchange design and governance enhanced the bias in favor of equity 
issuers. The political purpose of this issuer-bias is revealed in how it contributed to 
enterprise finance. It contributed moderately in the crude sense of providing cash for 
SOE life-support, but not in terms of allocative efficiency and the provision of 
alternatives for firms’ capital composition choices.
80 
Moreover, wealth capitalization in the form of founder’s rent or equity 
leverage was subordinated to the exigencies of coalition management and property 
rights constraints of the Chinese political economy. Never mind that the “float” of 
tradable shares was less than a third of all ownership, and that investors got nothing 
for their investment other than occasional capital gains. This is why investment banker 
Carl Walter refers to Chinese stocks as “equity-like” securities: They confer no de 
facto ownership rights and few other shareholders rights. The segmentation of China’s 
share structure ensures that investors access no rights that would allow them to shape 
industrial organization in the economy, and through the 1990s even the likelihood of 
receiving a dividend became remote (Xu and Renhao 2001).
 81 
Tight control of the wealth capitalization dynamic reinforced the involutionary 
logic of Chinese securities governance. As discussed in chapter 4, the state, and state 
insiders, held shares that were not tradable on an exchange. Firms that listed did get 
“free money,” in the sense that control of the firm changed in no appreciable way 
following the notional dilution of the state’s ownership in the initial public offering 
(IPO) or in later additional (“seasoned” or “secondary”) offerings of stock. The 
government entity that was responsible for the firm before the IPO, continued in that 
role after the IPO. The quota system of approval for candidate firms wishing to list 
                                                 
80 At best, this cash was used as “working capital” (read: life support for failing SOEs) and immediate 
consumption by the firms. At worst, it was squandered on speculation in securities and real estate, or for 
personal enrichment (Wang, Xu, and Zhu 2001) 
81 For an argument about recent developments in private securities litigation that could portend some 
change in this, see (Hutchens forthcoming).  
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shares put the IPO-derived “founder’s rent” at the discretion of the central state (as 
discussed in chapter 4). The “equity leverage” component of wealth capitalization was 
tricky, because shares pledged against loans had only their market value and no de 
facto ownership rights. Moreover, throughout the decade, the state regularly changed 
the policies regarding the use of shares as collateral. 
 However, a significant consequence of the discretionary involution pattern 
was a sort of “wealth capitalization” in two different senses for the central-state-elite. 
First, securitization through listings on the Chinese stock exchange (or by listings 
abroad) can have a “wealth capitalization” effect for the national economy as a whole. 
This macro effect occurs as securitization gathers momentum when more firms list on 
the exchange and there is increasing trading and valuation of those firms. This in turn 
increases the market value of the country’s income-producing assets, including, as 
Edmunds points out, “those that have not yet been securitized.”
82 Second, the 
“symbolic” founders’ rent realized by valorizing China’s capital stock was useful to 
the central-state-elite in establishing its credentials as effective economic reformers 
and pragmatic managers of “market socialist” development in China. To the extent 
that these pecuniary and symbolic macro-level wealth capitalization effects were 
achieved, the mercantilist purposes of the involution pattern were served by skillful 
central-state colonization of the stock exchanges. 
                                                 
82 Edmunds offers the following hypothetical scenario to illustrate how this might work. 
Securitization generates equally dramatic profits at the national level. The macro fact is to increase the 
market value of income-producing assets in the country, including those that have not yet been 
securitized. Companies that have already listed their shares on the stock exchange could buy the assets 
that are not securitized. A company with earnings of $5 million per year and a price/earnings ratio of 15 
would have common stock worth $75 million on the stock exchange. That company could buy a closely 
held business (not listed and having a small number of owners) that earns $1 million per year and pay 
$9 million for it – a price/earnings ratio of only 9, due to illiquidity. The newly purchased business, if 
consolidated with the existing business, creates a company earning $6 million per year with common 
stock worth $90 million, or 15 times earnings. The company would have added $15 million to the value 
of its stock with the $9 million purchase (the assumption that the old P/E ratio of 15 will persist for the 
post-acquisition enlarged firm is debatable, but the general principles expressed in this stylized account 
are still valid) (Edmunds 1996, 125-126).  
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The ensemble of institutions that enabled the central-state-elite’s “political 
conquest” of the stock exchanges was complete by the end of 1997. Almost every 
policy measure involved in building the institutions of that ensemble was enabled by 
the center’s large margin for maneuver, by virtue of the country’s external exposure 
profile. The benign abundance of that profile permitted the exploitation of securities-
related finance. It did not, however, foreordain that outcome. Given such a structurally 
imposed disposition, the center’s strategy, and the resulting SGR pattern, were 
sculpted by the exigencies of a relatively constrained central state managing its 
intramural coalition in the context of China’s rigid state-socialist property-rights 
system. Changes in the design and governance of China’s stock exchanges were one 
area where evidence on the development of this strategy could be found and traced 
with guidance from the asset-class/financial-position matrix. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
The politics of stock exchange development is important, because the 
governance of the exchange and the design of its market structure determine the 
quality of the market for securities, who controls that market, and toward what ends. 
Relying on guidance from the asset-class/financial-position matrix, the case studies in 
this chapter analyzed the politics of securitization in the domain of equity finance, 
drawing on evidence from stock exchange development in China and India. Market 
structure on an exchange is an important part of the market component of any 
securities governance regime. So too is the nature of exchange governance, which 
involves associations, and networks as well as firm and state participation in shaping 
the market arena of the exchange. Both market design and exchange governance 
matter for equity issuers in terms of enterprise finance, but particularly in terms of  
 
 
337 
wealth capitalization. They also matter for investors in terms of shareholder 
protection. 
The National Stock Exchange breakthrough was crucial to the development 
trajectory of India’s constrained evolution SGR pattern. The National Stock Exchange 
opened in 1994. A year later, it was the largest stock exchange in India, as measured 
by trading volume. It established a competitive position against a powerful entrenched 
incumbent. The contribution of the NSE breakthrough to the overall nature of 
securities governance in India is hard to underestimate. It introduced competition, 
improved self-regulation, and a host of other changes to the conduct of securities 
finance in India. The politics of the breakthrough, and particularly the role of the 
central state and its interaction with various actors in the dominant coalition, form the 
basis of the case material. The analysis highlights the autonomy of the central state, 
and the relationship of coalition actors such as the Financial Institutions and India’s 
“dependent capitalists” to the property-rights claims that could be made over equity 
securities in India. 
Beijing’s conquest of the stock exchanges was crucial to the development 
trajectory of China’s discretionary involution SGR pattern. The Shanghai and 
Shenzhen exchanges were established in 1990. Governance of these exchanges was 
initially in the hands of the municipalities. But the exigencies of China’s intramural 
coalition and the rigidity of state-socialist property rights made such an arrangement 
politically unsustainable. In the end, the establishment of state-of-the art exchanges 
with impeccable market structure design and technical infrastructure became part of an 
exercise in building an ever better casino in which “the house always wins.” 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
EXTENDING CONCEPTS AND ARGUMENTS: THE POLITICS OF BOND FINANCE  
 
The analysis in Chapter Six solved the chief problem plaguing the study of 
securities finance in developing and transitional economies (DTEs): How do we 
untangle and map the identities and interests of actors involved in the development of 
securities finance?  What and where are the political forces shaping the governance of 
securities finance in DTEs?
 1 
The framework supporting that analysis, developed throughout this thesis, was 
used to show why and how very different regimes of governance for securities finance 
developed in China and India.
2  Chapter Six focused on the politics that shaped the 
governance regime for the equity asset-class – that is, shares of stock.  However, the 
debt asset-class (bonds) is just as crucial to understanding the changing structure and 
balance of financial power as securitization spreads internationally and within DTEs.
3 
                                                 
1 Chapter Five explained how varying profiles of external economic exposure (China, benign 
abundance.  India, precarious scarcity) produced different interests and goals of central policy-making 
elites in China and India.  Chapter six moved from effects of that international structure to the domestic 
political process by which central state elites in China and India pursued those goals in the development 
of regimes governing equities finance.  That chapter offered some answers to these questions in the 
domain of equity (stock) assets using a matrix that distinguishes asset-classes (equity/stocks versus 
debt/bonds) and financial positions (issuers versus investors) to guide conceptually the “process–
tracing” of political interactions in the 1990s stock-exchange-related changes that produced Indian 
“evolution” and Chinese “involution”. 
2 This is an asset-class/financial-position matrix (AC/FP) that helps identify actors and interests in the 
often-opaque realm of securities finance.  That framework is a new and unique contribution to the 
international and comparative political economy of finance. 
3 The global “equity cult” of the 1990s, the “Las Vegas and Macau” appeal of bright lights and 
brokerage trading rooms, and the glamour of “owning” companies have focused attention on stock 
markets.  This is as true among academic researchers as it is among the global public and global 
business research industry.  Even among academic political economists (who should know better), the 
equity-asset class has attracted the lion’s share of attention in the study of securities finance in DTEs.  
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Who gets bond finance?  And, under what conditions?  Firms can use bonds.  
So too can governments.
4  The regime governing bond finance, therefore, shapes the 
fate both of firms at the enterprise-level and of subnational governments at the polity-
level.  Businesses, provinces, central state elites and the coalitions with which they 
deal are very concerned, therefore, with the character of the bond-finance governance 
regime.
5 
In this chapter I examine how the same variables and analytic framework used 
in earlier chapters can be extended to other domains.
 6  In particular, with the global 
and domestic pressures described in Chapter Two driving growth and change in 
Chinese and Indian securitization, what shaped the regimes governing bond finance?  
How is political authority exercised in the governance of bond finance?  And, toward 
what ends?  Economic development?  Political interest? Analyzing the politics of bond 
finance in China and India during the “securitization decade” of the 1990s can reveal 
much about these two countries’ different trajectories of capitalist development. 
Further study of this issue would be driven by a simple question. What 
freedom do businesses and provincial governments have to access bond finance?
7  To 
                                                 
4 Municipalities too are in many countries users of bond finance.  In China and India some 
municipalities are practically on a par with the state- and province-level stratum of government.  
“Direct-supervision cities” (zhixiashi) in China include Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing.  In 
India “Union Terrirories” like Chandigarh and Delhi have a similar role.  Municipalities in the states 
and provinces of India and China do access bond finance, but they do not enjoy similar constitutional or 
statutory taxation, revenue, and lending (using bonds or banks) that state or provinces do.  This was 
changed somewhat by the 1992 74
th Amendment to the Indian Constitution. 
5 As a reminder, I first explained how each country’s profile of external macroeconomic exposure 
created a structural incentive of central state elites in the two countries.  The domestic politics of 
securities finance unfold as those elites pursue policies and build institutions in accordance (as much as 
possible) with those incentives.  I thus identify the process of the domestic politics securities finance as 
the struggle over access to securities finance and the property-rights implications of increasing reliance 
on securities finance (securitization).    Increasing securitization through greater use of bonds by firms 
or governments intensifies the struggle over access to bond-based securities finance with the rival actors 
focused on these property-rights implications and the potential distributive consequences. 
6 The framework is the asset-class/financial-position matrix.  The variables are: a) the country’s profile 
of external economic exposure, b) state autonomy vis-à-vis the dominant coalition and c) the structure 
of property rights. 
7 Henceforth, the reader should take the word “province” as referring to state- and province-level, 
“subnational” units in both China and India.  This sidesteps the awkward formulation “state and  
 
345 
the extent that this freedom is restricted, what are the reasons?  Is it a particular 
ideology and orientation to economic development?  Elite desire to control the 
organized economy? Or, is it political partisanship used to manage implicit coalitions 
or formal party coalitions? 
Making general comparisons of bond finance governance is tricky because, as 
mentioned above, the secondary literature is thin.
8  Data is of poor quality and poorly 
organized.
9  But some empirics (quantitative and qualitative) are clear.   
First, the quantitative empirics.  Data on bonds in DTEs other than government 
treasury bills are notoriously fickle and unreliable.  Nevertheless, the snapshot of bond 
finance in China and India presented below tells most of the story. Figure 7-1 
illustrates that India has many more pieces of the bond finance “pie” (7 to China’s 4).  
This means more options as well as more detailed and transparent accounting.  The 
range of corporate bond issues in India is more diverse. China’s bond market, like its 
equity market, is larger than India’s measured in dollar terms.  But there are fewer 
bond instruments, and those that are available are almost all state-sanctioned, 
controlled and guaranteed.
10 The figures and their implications demonstrate the market 
patterns of scope in India and scale in China. These patterns are the same as those 
presented in earlier chapters’ discussion of equity finance. 
                                                 
province” every time I refer to these subnational units.  This will also prevent confusion between “The 
State” (meaning the central state in China, India and any other federal polity) and subnational “states” 
like California or Rajasthan in the US and India. 
8 It is dominated by papers from multilateral lending institutions like the World Bank and Asian 
Development Bank, or by investment professionals.  They are speaking to one another and not a wider 
audience.  Their assumptions and categories, particularly political ones, therefore go unexamined. 
9 No two sources I used for this research agreed even on the two most basic data points: 1) the size of 
corporate bonds relative to GDP, or 2) the size of state/provincial bonds to GDP. 
10 China’s “Financial bonds” shown in Figure 7-1 are bonds issued by state-owned financial institutions 
such as the development lenders like its Export-Import Bank and China Development Bank, or by the 
four state-owned commercial banks.  Corporate Bonds (qiye zhaiquan or “enterprise bonds”) in China 
include the “transmuted bonds” that constitute Chinese provinces’ indirect access to bond finance.  
Chinese Ministry of Finance Bonds are central bonds.   Approximately half of the funds raised by these 
bonds (recently) has been handed over to provinces.  “Public Sector Unit Bonds” are the bonds of 
central-government and state-government owned enterprises or “undertakings”.  
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World Bank, 2004. 
 
Figure 7-1: 
The Structure of Chinese and Indian Bond Markets 
 
These quantitative measures of market scope or scale tell us about the 
objective conditions of the market outcomes within the two countries.  They don’t tell 
us much about the quality of state regulation of these markets.  What, for example, do 
outside experts have to say?  How did they think and talk about Chinese and Indian 
bond finance?  These are subjective opinions based on experience and the attention-
focusing imperative of investing large sums of money in these markets.  In Chapter 
Three I explained how the president for Asian operations of a top-three global 
investment bank himself used the business historian Alfred Chandler’s idiom of scale 
and scope to contrast Chinese and Indian securities market outcomes.   The clarity of 
the pie charts’ presentation of objective conditions in Chinese and Indian bond finance 
is matched by the opinions of informed outsiders. 
"Within the Asian region, India's bond market is clearly one of the strongest in 
terms of institutional infrastructure," explained the head of credit research for Asia at 
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another giant global investment bank.  He singled out the country's broad investor base 
of local commercial banks, insurance companies, bond funds and mutual funds. "It's 
liquid, it's traded, and we ourselves trade this market."  India’s bond finance is not 
compared to China, where foreign investors were not even allowed in until very 
recently.  It is more often compared favorably to much more developed countries 
known specifically as financial centers.  “Many analysts agree”, a 2000 report 
claimed, that “India's rupee bond market has more to offer foreign investors than some 
of its more-sophisticated Asian counterparts, including Hong Kong and Singapore" 
(Richardson 2000). 
 
I. Bonds and Business: The Politics of Corporate Debt Securities 
 
By constraining or encouraging firms' range of financing options, the structure 
of bond finance in a given country's securities governance regime helps determine 
firms’ prospects of survival, expansion, adjustment or transformation.  As with bonds 
in public finance, the regime governing bonds in corporate finance often serves a 
number purposes, including political interest of powerful political actors, elite control 
of the organized economy, economic development and financial stability, or the 
control of risk. 
The comparison of Chinese and Indian corporate bond governance regimes is 
straightforward.  Looking at the two fields of the governance regime discussed in 
Chapter Six – state and market – the same patterns outlined for equity asset (stocks) 
governance in the two countries are also evident in their patterns of corporate bond 
finance governance.
11  Consider first the role of the state and state regulation. 
 
                                                 
11 Civil society, a third important component of governance, is not elaborated.  
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A.  The State and Governance of Bond Finance 
 
  In Chinese governance of corporate bond finance, the central state has imposed 
a regime of outright discretion with an explicit distributive allocation of access to bond 
finance.
 12  Unlike state regulation in the equity-asset class, even the pretence of 
supervisory or regulatory neutrality has been ignored.  The main purpose of 
government regulation is to prevent access to bond finance by firms for fear those 
firms will abuse the system.  The National Development and Reform Council sets 
quotas for the value of corporate bonds that may be issued.  Officials authorize 
corporate bond issues based on the “merit” of the applicants, not on the basis of 
compliance with issuance requirements.  Ceilings are fixed for the interest rate that 
can be charged on the bond.
13  Finally, guarantees from state banks of all corporate 
bonds are mandatory.  This is hugely important, as mentioned below in the discussion 
of bonds and property rights. 
In India, since 2000, state regulation of the bond market has been increasingly 
clarified and rationalized.   Jurisdictional confusion and rivalry between the central 
bank and the securities regulator has been clarified and most disputes resolved in favor 
of the securities regulator (SEBI).  Issuance of and trading (primary and secondary 
markets) for corporate debt has benefited from reform of government securities market 
structures. These have been increasingly pushed to become competitive, demand-
supply matched, and transparent. As the government securities market is the larger 
                                                 
12 Of course the entire notion of “corporate bonds” in China is tricky in the first place.  The distinction 
of “public finance” from corporate finance can be a hard one to make. As we saw in the discussion of 
provincial government bonds, it is state-owned firms that issue bonds for the purposes of “public 
finance”.  This is why the Chinese category “enterprise bond” (qiye zhaiquan) elides the distinction.  
Data reporting and transparency on Indian “Public Sector Unit” bonds as distinct from “corporate 
bonds” or “state government bonds” is yet another manifestation of the scope and evolutionary pattern 
of Indian bond governance in contrast to Chinese bond governance. 
13 These regulations each come from different sources showing that there is yet to be uniform regulatory 
coordination in Chinese bond finance governance.  The regime of bond governance is so blatantly of a 
distributive interventionist nature that members of the financial services community in China regularly 
go on record in the financial press decrying the practices (Caijing 2001).  
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market by far, reform of  its structure puts pressure on and creates a benchmark for the 
development of corporate bond-market structure.  Again, the Indian state is playing a 
positive developmental role in   at once nurturing change while pressuring private non-
state parts of the securities finance system.   
The political importance of bond finance is most significantly reflected in the 
location of issuance authority.  In India, this is now clear, and it is in the hands of two 
agencies that are widely regarded as independent executors of procedural supervision 
and risk containment – the Reserve Bank of India and the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India.
14  In China, by contrast, the authority structure for CBs in 2002 looks 
much like the authority structure for equity finance did in 1992.  Agencies well known 
for their political allegiance to (as opposed to autonomy from) the central elite’s main 
governing institution – the State Council – manage all aspects of corporate bond 
finance.
15 
 
B.  The Market and Governance of Bond Finance 
 
The market itself, as I’ve explained earlier, is an important component of 
securities finance governance.  In earlier chapters I introduced yardsticks that measure 
market outcomes in a hybrid of qualitative-quantitative indicators: Scale and Scope.  
Data from any part of the two countries’ corporate bond markets make clear the 
contrast, whether it is firms’ use of bond finance, or the operation of exchanges, or 
                                                 
14 Before 2000 the central bank, with its concern over credit and money supply, had a say in these 
decisions.  The Department of Company Affairs (later the Ministry of Law Company Affairs) also tried 
to grab some jurisdiction.   Ultimately SEBI emerged as the as the lead agency with some formal 
recognition and authorities (represented it its right to regulate Debt Mutual Funds) and informally too 
(as the lead agency on the issuance and trading of corporate securities).  Today, companies that comply 
with the relevant requirements (under the Companies Act or the Securities Contract Act) can freely 
issue bonds for listing or private placement.  There are delays with approval, but approval is not 
discretionary. 
15 As discussed earlier, China’s central NRDC sets a quota for corporate bond issuance, the central bank 
fixes the pricing, and the securities regulator gets to be the traffic cop, checking up on the desultory 
secondary market trading (to the extent that such instruments are traded, which is very little).  
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other trading mechanisms for bond trading, or even the technical parameters of bond 
market activity.
16 China has scale, while India has scope.  In terms of monetary value, 
China appears to have greater scale.  In terms of components of the market (the way 
the market works and the diversity of its pieces) India has greater scope. 
Firms’ use of bond finance is one of the indicators that contribute to the broad 
variable “market outcomes” that I use to characterize Chinese and Indian securities 
finance.  Indian firms use bonds as part of their generally balanced approach to 
corporate finance.
17  Particularly large ones use a range of financial sources Use of 
corporate bonds in India has varied over time as the business cycle, reform cycles, and 
tax and interest rate regimes have shaped the relative appeal of bond finance for 
firms.
18  While it is still not a significant source of funds for Indian firms today, as 
Figure 7-1 showed, it is nevertheless an option, available on a transparent, 
procedurally regulated basis. 
One peculiarity of India’s corporate bond finance is crucial to understanding 
the interaction of state regulation and market structures that produces India’s distinct 
governance regime pattern.  This is the large amount of corporate bonds that are 
“privately placed”.
19   Private placements are not regulated as rigorously as public 
                                                 
16 In the financial services industry and among financial economists the common indicators include: 
number of issues (India more), turnover (the number of trades – India more), interest rate variability (an 
important indicator of the market’s evaluation of the firm that issued the bond – India more), and the 
variety of bond types.  These we can consider measures of scope (though turnover could also be 
considered a measure of scale).  Measuring scale¸ the standard measurement is the very gross figure of 
the value of “corporate bonds” relative to GDP (China greater).    
17  It is reasonable to exclude firms whose business it is to deal with finance such as banks, insurers, and 
non-bank financial companies including trust and investment companies and asset management 
companies. 
18 Indian financial firms (particularly the so-called All Indian Financial Institutions) are the largest users 
of corporate bonds. 
19 In a “private placement” a bond with otherwise normal characteristics (interest paying coupons, 
maturity etc.) is issued to investors.  The bond is not a “public issue” and is for “investment” and “not 
intended” for resale (though there is no law prohibiting such resale).  Typically private placements are 
sold to large institutional investors like insurance companies.  Until recently data on private placements 
were poor.  Even the Reserve Bank of India did not have a clear regular reporting on the amount of 
private placement.  Today, private placement makes up over ninety percent of corporate debt issuance.  
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issues.  Disclosure requirements and issuance procedures are minimal making them 
easier and cheaper for issuers and investors alike.  The use of private placement raised 
disclosure issues and concern over the difficulty of collecting data on the activity.  
Most of all it seems to defy the “norm” (global and domestic) favoring transparent 
listed securities trading on an exchange.  On the liquidity spectrum discussed in 
Chapter Three, private placements lie somewhere between a bank loan (less liquid) 
and a publicly listed bond (more liquid).  This is a market outcome that serves the 
needs of both the issuers and investors in these securities. 
The response of the Indian state to this activity is telling.  Naturally, official 
commissions were convened and reports written.  The state did not prohibit the 
activity outright, thereby not violating the securities-related “property rights” of both 
issuers and investors.  While both financial and political officials saw the practice as 
an aberration, there were no legal grounds to prohibit it. At the current size of India’s 
corporate debt market (roughly 3.3% of GDP) there was little system risk, and so little 
“public goods” justification for proscribing the practice (Gyntelberg, Ma, and 
Remolona 2005). 
From all three sides of the governance triangle, the way the regime of 
governance for private placement developed is typical of Indian securities finance 
governance generally.  Markets shifted as the actors in the primary market for bond 
finance – firms – substituted or intensified their use of corporate debt through private 
placement.
20   As the nature of the private placement phenomenon became clear 
between 2002-2004 the state did devise a regulatory response of surprising subtlety.  
Rather than prohibit or regulate private placement head on, it took an oblique route, 
giving private placement an inferior grade in the classification hierarchy of bank 
                                                 
20 Firms “substituted” equity for private placement and listed debt for privately placed debt (Shirai 
2004).  This is what financial markets are supposed to do; provide substitution options.  
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accounting standards required by the central bank.
21  And, most interestingly, a private 
firm filled the need of the public to know the levels of this debt by buying the data 
from banks and selling it to financial and academic analysts.
22  The intensive use of 
private placement by firms in the market for bond finance; the response of the state; 
and the opportunism of a market-cum-civil society reaction – these together as an 
ensemble form a telling case of how Indian authorities permit market-driven 
outcomes. 
Chinese firms don’t use corporate bond finance.  Or rather, as with equity 
finance in China, only a few Chinese companies use a lot of it. Corporate bonds 
represent roughly 10% of GDP.
23  In China, large firms still use inter-firm sources,
24 
banks, and other state-allocated sources of funds.   What can firms’ uses of corporate 
bonds tell us about market development and market outcomes in China? 
Sometimes the good-faith questions of economists can seem naïve to political 
scientists.  Interested in prices and microeconomic efficiency, economists who 
investigate Chinese securities finance often seem bewildered by market outcomes that 
are expected and consistent with the political perspective presented in this thesis.  For 
example, one expert analyzed Chinese listed firms’ uses of external funds.
 25  His 
                                                 
21 This outcome was the result of intensive arguments among elite financial technocrats (with 
occasional input from politicians) in the High-Level Committee on Capital Markets (HCLM).  As 
discussed earlier in the thesis, the HCLM is the interagency committee that coordinates the state 
regulation of securities finance in India.  Its members include representatives from the Ministry of 
Finance, Reserve Bank of India, Securities and Exchange Board of India, Ministry of Company Affairs, 
and the Insurance Regulatory and Development Agency. 
22 Prime Database did this, and was for several years the only source of data on private placements.  
Once the RBI required disclosure of private placement under the standards of Basel II bank risk 
provisioning norms, the data became available through the Reserve Bank of India (a possible 
infringement of the privacy and competitive position of banks?). 
23 In the US, for example, corporate bonds represent 128% of GDP. 
24 “Triangular” debt and trade credit in which firms owe each other physical inputs or accounts payable 
is very different from a bonded debt security (Lardy 1998).  This observation of unusually high levels 
of “triangular debt” and trade credit among Chinese firms fits my theory that the state favors any 
alternative arrangements (however perverse) that help avoid or prevent the development of clear 
creditor-debtor relations, lest the rights of non-state (or rival intra-mural state) creditors be clarified.   
25 Listed firms are those that have issued equity publicly in shares of stock listed on an exchange.  
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results caused him to wonder, “Why do Chinese firms have such a low long-term debt 
ratio?”  Firms (use and misuse) bank funds for short-term debt.  Listed firms can go 
back to the equity markets with some ease.  Equity does not come with the 
requirements of bonds (repayment, default risk).  Rather than consider the possibility 
that corporate bond finance is a political persona non grata many [some?] economists 
offer the banality that perhaps the “Chinese bond market is still in an infant stage of 
development” (Huang and Song 2002 p. 22).
26        
 
II. The Comparative Politics of Bonds, Public Finance and Federalism 
 
Governments use bonds in a variety of ways.
27  In this section I consider only 
the role of bond finance in central-provincial relations.  This relationship between 
bond markets and the character of federalism and center-local authority is often 
overlooked.  Analysis using the insights and analytic tools devised for this thesis 
might examine how the regime governing bond finance shapes, and is shaped by, the 
political-institutional dynamics of center-provincial relations in China and India over 
the last twenty-five years.  The conclusions drawn from such an analysis [will?] 
challenge the conventional comparisons of China and India in current scholarly work 
on fiscal federalism. 
   A common theme running through this mainstream research agenda suggests 
that China is a de facto federal state (despite a strong constitutional emphasis on 
unitary governance) while India is in practice failing to achieve the federal ambitions 
                                                 
26 This is common among mainland economists with a career or family to think about.  But any with a 
memory going back to before 1993 when the corporate bond market flourished, will know they are 
dodging. 
27 Governments of all kinds finance deficit spending through the use of bonds. Governments also use 
bonds to manage the money supply.  This important use of bond finance is not discussed here.  
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written into its constitution.
28  Developments in bond finance suggest otherwise, 
confirming the view of other finance-sector analyses that, formally at least, there has 
been a powerful, persistent, recentralization trend afoot in China since 1993.  In India, 
the evidence from the structure of bond finance reflects the broader decentralization 
trends in that country throughout the 1990s.
29 
The degree of autonomy a province has in accessing bond finance and the 
space for initiative a province enjoys in accessing bond finance are, together, an 
important indicator how “federal” center-provincial power relations are in a given 
polity. 
Federalism is, of course, not an either-or matter.   Even where constitutions 
profess a federal structure (as in India) Federalism is a matter of degree and can vary 
across countries and within a country over time (as in US history).  We can easily 
imagine a “spectrum of federalism”.
30  Using  “access to bond finance” as one key 
measure of where countries fall on the federalism spectrum, I would argue that China 
clearly lies toward the unitary end of the spectrum and India toward the federal end. 
                                                 
28 See, for example Montinola et al, (1994) on China, and Parikh (1997) on India.  The literature 
regarding what formal and informal characteristics actually shape the unitary nature of China’s system 
of center-local relations is still indeterminate.  See, Nathan (1996) and Lam, (2004).  However, the 1982 
constitution (and all constitutions since the 1950s) is clear that there are no “rights” enjoyed by 
subnational political bodies.  Subnational governments are the expression of “state (guojia) power.”  It 
is a stretch to claim, as Lam seems to, that this “state power” represents some sub-rosa expression of 
local sovereignty as understood in any interpretation of federalism (even Mao’s interpretation of 
Federalism).  A draft constitution from the time of the Jiangxi Soviet considered a federal system.  See, 
Apter (1994). 
29 In 1992 the 73
rd and 74
th Amendments to the Indian Constitution gave formal recognition to the rights 
of rural and urban local bodies.  In 1996 the fifty-year Congress Party dominance of electoral policy 
was broken, ushering in electoral federalism of regional- and identity-based political parties.  Finally, 
the fiscal crisis of the state forced the center to play a smaller role in direct grants to the states.  See, 
Echeverri-Gent (2002). 
30 Unitary states like France and Thailand would lie toward the “non-federal” end of the spectrum and 
Australia and Canada toward the federal end.  Many variables determine the degree to which a 
country’s center-local relations are federal.  Language and cultural policy, law making and law 
enforcement, cross-border commerce control are some of the important other variables determining a 
country’s degree of federalism.  
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This simple indicator – access to bond finance – is deceptively narrow and 
technical.   Beneath it lie two roads:  Along one road provinces may find opportunities 
for prosperity and increasing autonomy.  Along the other lie opportunities for 
profligacy and dependence.  Though seemingly narrow and technical, the autonomy 
and initiative of a province in accessing and using bond finance is determined by its 
“rights” within the polity, and its ability to make credible the bonds that it issues.
31   
This idiom of “provincial rights” is fundamental to the politics of bond finance 
and federalism generally.  Should provinces have the “right” to use their revenue 
raising (tax) powers, their ownership of other assets (real estate, land, and often 
businesses), and their powers of persuasion to convince investors to buy their bonds?  
State governments are close to the action and know their dominion better than far-
away central authorities.  Should they not be able to make choices about how to 
develop through investment in infrastructure, education, or industrial production 
capacity?  Naturally such freedom means they also have the choice to bankrupt their 
state if they borrow and are unable to service their debt or pay back principal.  They 
may also fail to invest wisely, e. g. use the borrowed funds in ways that don’t produce 
public goods or produce the means to pay back their debt. 
In a now-widely-cited World Politics article Barry Weingast and his 
collaborators claim that China is now a de facto federal system.  On the strength of 
this article and its sequel research this claim is now taken nearly as an article of faith 
in the China literature, and even in the broader comparative politics literature.  In 
                                                 
31 That, after all is why bonds are a form of “credit”.  That credibility is in turn related to the 
constitutional, legislative, electoral (in India) and bureaucratic institutions of fiscal federalism.  
Important also (often critically so), are the informal institutions and dynamics of fiscal federalism.  
Revenue assignment shapes the ability of a province to service the financial obligations of bonds (or 
helps state-sponsored or state-aided issue through guarantees).  On the flip side, a province’s 
expenditure responsibilities lay claim to revenue resources and other capabilities that would otherwise 
be available to “enhance” the credibility of the bonds.  
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contrast to China, Weingast has claimed that India, a de jure federal system, fails to 
meet its formal federal aspirations. 
Weingast and his collaborators portray China and India as mirror images of 
each other and mirror images of each country’s own de jure constitutional 
arrangements.  Their arguments are based on an economic analysis of competition 
among (state-owned) firms and subnational governments at various levels.  The near-
hegemony of these controversial claims about a fundamental structure of political life 
in the world’s two largest polities is puzzling.  These claims seem impervious to new 
research on Chinese political economy since the middle of the 1990s research that has 
shown that there has been a recentralizing tendency in many sectors.
32 
The structure of bond finance in these two country cases discloses important 
untold stories of the current and past structure of center-local power relations in large 
multi-layered polities.  Extending my argument about Chinese and Indian regimes of 
securities governance offers a clear and easily testable rebuttal to Weingast’s 
comparative thesis.  The evidentiary base for the rebuttal would be the nature of 
center-local (state- and province-level) relations in the domain of bond-based public 
finance. 
Looking at the available evidence, the national patterns identified in equity 
securities finance seem again to be evident in on the governance of bonds in fiscal 
federalism: Chinese government bond securitization in the 1990s was producing 
discretionary involution and India’s producing constrained evolution.    If we look at 
the broad role of the central state in governing subnational bond finance the outcomes 
are clear.  A schematic summary is presented in Table 7-1.
33  Provincial borrowing in 
                                                 
32 See, particularly Gallagher (2002).  For banking see Sehrt (1999) or Shih, (2002).  For large state-
owned enterprises and the petrochemical sector see Lin (2003).  And, for labor see Hurst (forthcoming).  
33 So much of the activity in China happens informally that the World Bank researchers had to leave 
much of the Chinese case empty.  
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China is legally prohibited, but allowed in India. 
34  In India, permission is not 
necessary under all conditions, but is required under current conditions and for the 
foreseeable future (i.e. state indebtedness). 
There is no doubt that China’s political economy during the 1990s experienced 
great dynamism and loosening.  Whether this lead to an informal regime of federalism 
is another matter.  Regional economic growth accelerated and with it economic 
independence expanded.   Much of this had to do with low-level developmentalism, 
the so-called “local-state corporatism,” and municipal, provincial and regional 
economic dynamism.  Tax sharing arrangements were decentralized, as were credit 
provisions and industrial policy.  The 1994 provisions for tax sharing reshaped the 
structure of revenue assignment in China.   However, in the mid-1990s the inflationary 
and other disruptive effects of this opening process provoked a centralizing backlash.    
In Chapter Six I discussed how the greedy rivalry between Shanghai and 
Shenzhen in the period between 1992 and 1996 was destabilizing for China's financial 
and political systems and was introducing dangerous levels of risk through financial 
leverage.  Favoritism in equities finance access leading to excessive promotion of 
local companies was another problem.  The center, of course, feared a repeat of this 
behavior in state-level bond finance.  They had had a taste of it with the flourishing of 
enterprise bond finance that eventually lead to dangerous excess provoking a stern 
reaction.   But, the immediate motivation of reigning in the emergent economic 
disorder obscured another motivation. 
 
 
                                                 
34 In China, the “work around” system of “transmuted bonds” is the route through which provincially-
owned firms issue bonds for “their” province.  These bonds thus become “enterprise” or corporate 
bonds (see Figure 7-1).  They therefore require all the same permissions discussed earlier in the section 
on corporate bonds, which is to say that there are powerful political constraints on the permission to 
issue bonds.  
 
 
Table 7-1: 
Regulatory Framework for Sub-national Borrowing 
  Allowed?  Sub-national Borrowing 
Controls /1 
Institutional setup 
for capital market 
access 
Numerical 
or other 
constraints 
on 
borrowing? 
Constraints 
on the use 
of loan 
proceeds? 
Is borrowing approved by the 
center? 
   Domestic    Foreign        
China  Formally, 
no  Prohibited Prohibited 
Commercial banks 
or financial 
institutions set up 
by local 
governments to 
raise money for 
investments.  
    
India  Yes  Market/ 
administrative  Prohibited 
States can borrow 
from the central 
government and 
from the market 
No No 
In case the state is indebted to the 
center, states can only borrow 
from the market if it is approved by 
the center. All states are in fact 
indebted to the center, so in effect 
there is a strong central control 
with borrowing. 
 
Source: World Bank. Qualitative Indicators: Regulatory Framework for Sub-National Borrowing 
3
5
8 
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China’s central elite had reasons other than financial risk and economic 
disorder in mind as they developed a highly centralized regime of government bond 
finance. The center was concerned about what would happen if sub-national economic 
authorities began to translate their economic independence into political 
independence.  One official told me that, “autonomy in province level finance would 
lead us down the road of the former Soviet Union.  Disintegration.  Through a step-by-
step process provinces and municipalities,” he added, “would slowly develop an 
independent political identity. Also, we would be unable to manage regional 
inequality.”
35 
Outcomes in the market for provincial bond finance governance fit the country 
patterns In China. Rather than let provinces borrow for themselves, the center issues 
bonds and then hands over the money raised to provinces.
36  This means the 
government is the only issuer and faces no competition from state borrowing.  This 
serves two purposes.  It prevents state borrowers from becoming financially 
autonomous.  It also prevents profligate states from spreading “poor credit” contagion 
to other provinces or even the center.
37  
Indian states increasingly use bond finance directly or through the “public 
sector undertakings” that they own in full or part; so much so, in fact, that many states 
built up crushing levels of debt.   This is the downside of federal autonomy and 
initiative (and a negative example Chinese interlocutors pointed out to me).
38  This 
                                                 
35 Confidential interview, Beijing, 2000 #20. 
36 About half of the annual central domestic bond borrowings (not including central bank bonds) are 
given to provinces (Cui 2003). 
37 The 1998 failure of Guangdong International Trust and Investment Company (GITIC) did precisely 
this.  Fujian International Trust and Investment Company, a solvent and well-run concern, suffered calls 
on its debt and the skeptical regard of investors in what became a contagious, “guilt by association” 
dynamic.  Chinese central authorities are fastidious about their own credit rating, going so far as to issue 
sovereign bonds even when the money is not needed, just so they maintain a recent “benchmark” for 
their credit. 
38 Critics of Indian federalism argue that this excessive state-level debt is the consequence of soft-
budget moral hazard.  According to this view, state’s believe they will be bailed out by the center and 
therefore do as they please.  However, even so, profligate states know they will not be bailed out rupee- 
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profligacy is not without costs.  In the past, under the patrimonial phase of India’s 
Nehruvian developmental state (with its unitary tendencies), state-level governments 
might have believed there were few costs to being an irresponsible debtor.  However, 
this is changing.  Today, states can sell up to 35% of their bonds at a competitive 
auction, paying interest rates as low as the market will bear.
39  More dramatic still is 
the hardening of budget constraints in the market itself.  First, states are now rated by 
credit rating agencies that are willing to give bad grades to irresponsible borrowers.
40   
A second order consequence is that in bond trading on the secondary market poorly 
rated, riskier states’ bonds are suffering.
41 
To the degree that Weingast is correct about the economic vigor of  “local state 
corporatism,” competition and experimentation in product, service, and labor markets 
in China, I would argue that there is an even greater political imperative for China’s 
single party state elite to maintain central control of money and finance.  Weingast and 
his collaborators see states and markets in a zero-sum rivalry.  They do not consider 
the possibility that the Chinese state is using the financial markets they create for their 
own ends.  This is a form of “internal mercantilism”.   Markets are just one “tool” the 
central elite uses among others such as economic growth, nationalism, the legal 
system, and force majeur to maintain political and economic control in the country.   
Central dominance of bond finance – particularly public finance – is evidence of this.
42 
                                                 
for-rupee and the moral hazard arguments are often overwrought.  Recent policy initiatives laid out in 
the Twelfth Finance Commission Report harden budgets and will change the incentive structure facing 
states. 
39 Soon, states with fiscal responsibility track records and legislative constraints will be able to issue all 
their bonds this way. 
40 As happened to even the mighty state of Maharashtra in October of 2002. 
41 These premia are measured by yield to maturity rates and indicate that an issuer is a higher risk and 
therefore that its bonds should be cheaper to buy.  For example, the state of Orissa, a poorly rated, bad 
credit risk faces a higher risk premium than does Karnataka, which has an A+ rating from the Indian 
credit rating agency CRISIL (Shivkumar 2000). 
42 The center's recapturing of control from localities of the soft budget discretion in state-owned banks 
in the period after 1994, would be other proof.   
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The broad regime of bond finance in China does not seem federal.  It appears 
highly centralized.  And the reasons are much the same as those that explain the 
central control of equity securities finance.  On the property right’s side, greater 
autonomy and initiative in provincial access to finance would establish a provincial 
right to access bond finance.  It would also create creditors who might make claims 
against provinces; claims that might rival the center’s claims.  On the state autonomy 
side of my analytic framework, greater provincial freedom and initiative in accessing 
bond finance would also challenge the center’s ability to control the flow of credit in 
ways that help it to manage the “intramural coalition”. 
Weingast and his collaborators claim that "federalism, Chinese style” is the 
“political basis for economic success in China".  Similarly they claim that 
insufficiently federal center-provincial relations are the basis of Indian economic 
failure.  They are answering an economic question:  What is the basis of Chinese (or 
Indian) economic success (or failure)?  But, they rely on an inadequately conceived 
political variable – “federalism, Chinese style”.   Extending the research begun in this 
thesis, I ask instead a political question: What is the institutional basis of political 
authority in the economic life of China and India?  My answer for China, phrased in 
the idiom of Weingast and his colleagues, is that ‘central political discretion in 
securities finance’ is the basis of a ‘unitary state, Chinese style’ in the contemporary 
People’s Republic.  My answer for India is that ‘constrained political dispersion’ is the 
basis of ‘evolving formal and informal Indian federalism”. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
The state is present and active in regulating corporate bond finance in both 
countries, in the same ways we saw in equity finance.  Toward what ends is state  
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authority over bond finance directed?  How is that authority used?  As described in the 
preceding discussion, an analysis of some evidence observed in regulatory structures 
and their effect on market outcomes reveals different state objectives in the two 
countries with respect to the governance of corporate bond finance.
43 
In China, state regulation of securities finance assures that securities markets 
can be manipulated by the central elite in an instrumental fashion.  The objective is 
economic growth, creation of an additional instrument for state management of 
economic activity, and (most importantly) preventing the growth of a creditor class or 
any substantial corpus of non-state creditors.  Early analysts of Chinese securities 
finance were wrong in their assessment that stock market development was a dire 
threat to the CCP state (Bowles and White 1993; Schell and Lappin 1992).  It was not 
shares that challenged the ownership system and property rights system most 
fundamentally.  Segmentation and state dominance of the stock exchanges and equity 
ownership took care of that.  It is corporate and local government use of bond finance, 
and the related issues of bankruptcy and creditor rights that are the major challenge.  
The Chinese developmental state is reproducing instruments of distributive 
intervention in the public finance and corporate finance uses of bonds.  This pattern of 
discretionary involution recreates the old directed-credit system of finance by 
facilitating discretionary allocation of access to finance through bond securities (of 
governments and enterprises). 
In India, state regulation of bond finance is moving toward procedural 
supervision.  The objective is to create markets that provide diversity of choices and 
greater autonomy to firms and subnational governments.  The Indian pattern of 
constrained evolution is again seen in bond finance for firms and subnational 
                                                 
43 I have focused here largely on the property rights variable in both countries and on China’s coalition 
politics.  More can and should be said about coalition politics in India.  
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governments.  The developmental state shifts toward procedural regulation and a 
mode of supervision. 
When applied to bond finance, the argument and framework presented in this 
thesis can be extended to provide comparative insights into the politics of bonds both 
in government-business and inter-governmental relations (particularly federalism) in 
China and India.  As with equity so too with bonds, the framework devised in this 
thesis, and the variables it has identified, can be used to extend comparative political 
analysis to securities finance in other developing and transitional economies (DTEs).   
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Chapter Eight 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
I. Summarizing the Evidence 
 
In chapter five I argued that the contrasting conditions of Chinese and Indian 
profiles of external exposure produced very different political incentive structures 
from which central-state elites derived their preferences for how to deal with 
securitization. Within these contrasting conditions they fashioned the political 
strategies they would use to manage the coalition and property rights struggles 
produced by increasing securitization.  India's external profile of precarious scarcity 
produced an acute political imperative for Indian policy makers to reform the 
structures of governance within the securities sector in order both to improve domestic 
financial allocation (to promote industrial investment and pressure obstreperous 
banks) and to attract foreign currency in the form of portfolio investment.   Chinese 
policy makers faced no such imperative of adversity.  The Chinese profile of benign 
abundance produced a distinct range of liberty.  Institution builders instead were left 
with a large margin to maneuver in the development and regulation of securities 
finance.  Chapter 6 then presented a case study of how central-state-elites formulated 
and executed strategies to pursue these preferences in the domestic context of each 
country's prevailing coalition politics and property rights structures.  Changes in the 
design and governance of these countries’ stock exchanges were one area where 
evidence on the development of the central states’ strategies could be found and traced 
with the guidance from the asset-class/financial-position matrix.  
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Empirically, these chapters together provided evidence for the claim that China 
and India responded very differently to the process of securitization.  In the Chinese 
case, the congruence of international economic felicity and a relatively constrained 
central-state operating in a rigid state-socialist property-rights structure determined the 
impact of the dual imprint on China’s securities governance regime.  Domestically, the 
relative lack of central autonomy in conjunction with the rigidity of state-socialist 
property-rights sculpted the discretionary involution of China’s securities governance 
regime in a number of ways.  These conditions obliged the state to service the 
distributional political imperatives of provincial, sectoral, and popular support (by 
those employed in the SOEs).  They circumscribed the degree to which the state could 
“harden” the claims of investors in financial assets, creating a bias in favor of the 
issuers of securities.  And, finally, they forced the state to limit non-state and sub-
national governments’ access to bond-finance (not discussed here).  Thus, the Chinese 
combination of economic opportunity and political constraint produced a regime of 
securities governance exhibiting significant formal change.  At the same time it 
encouraged the central state to reproduce the old system of state-controlled 
discretionary financial allocation through an issuer-biased manipulation of securities-
related property-rights.  That was discretionary involution.
1 
In the Indian case, the congruence of economic adversity (the precarious 
scarcity EEP) and relative state autonomy was critical to the dual imprint’s impact on 
India’s SGR.  This Indian combination of economic constraint and political 
opportunity shaped a regime of securities governance exhibiting substantive changes.  
                                                 
1 China scholars have done a poor job explaining the "weaknesses" of the China’s “strong” central state.  
Using the guidance provided by the asset-class/financial-position matrix, the process-tracing presented 
in the China case materials throughout this thesis has begun to illustrate how struggles over the nature 
of financial governance involve local level governments (or regional and sectoral authorities) – which 
are, of course, also parts of the state structure – more than "interests in society."  We do not have to give 
up our general belief that the Chinese state (as a whole) is more insulated from societal interests than is 
the Indian state; but we do have to realize that the Chinese state cannot insulate itself from its own 
internal contradictions or countertendencies.  Once understood properly as internally- or self-generated, 
the constraints on the Chinese state's central policymakers referred to here are not so surprising.  
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These reversed the “dependent capital” system of Nehruvian socialism and began to 
evolve new means of allocating finance and controlling property rights.
2  This was 
constrained evolution. 
These contrasting responses to securitization do not fit well with the 
globalization theories popular in the 1990s.  These theories posited convergence 
among countries' market and regulatory institutions, and expected this convergence 
trend to be strongest in sectors such as finance where cross-border activity was easy, 
and in which the volume of transactions was high and rising.  Some formal indicators 
discussed here, such as trading practices and market growth present an appearance of 
convergence; but in terms of substantial institutional and market outcomes, the two 
countries’ systems of securities finance developed in very different ways over the 
1990s.  This diversity of governance regimes amid the convergence in the forms of 
securities finance is summarized in Figure 8-1. 
Three conclusions may be drawn from these empirical findings.  First, at the 
very least, the evidence presented here suggests that the deductive expectations and 
empirical assertions of these globalization arguments are probably exaggerated, and 
certainly inconclusive in the near term.  Second, the thesis also shows that, in contrast 
to the scholarly depiction of China’s authoritarian system as superior to India’s 
democracy in the reform process, in the area of finance, Indian and Chinese reform 
patterns are mirror images: reform with substantive change in India, reform without 
substantive change in China.  India’s securities sector reform has out-performed 
relative to other Indian sectors and relative to Chinese securities reform.  Chinese 
securities reform has under-performed relative to other Chinese sectors and relative to 
Indian securities reform. Third, the research presented here extends the empirical base 
                                                 
2 The result is a remarkable forced march in which the development of a “world class” securities market 
was compressed into ten years, an achievement remarkable in any country, and particularly remarkable 
in India, a political economy well known for slow and incomplete reform.  
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for arguments that consider financial organization and reorganization to be important 
circuits of social power.  In China securities finance was reconfigured to preserve the 
state’s dominant position in the society and economy.  In India, the central state 
prevailed over organized interests and its own institutional legacy to reshape securities 
finance in order to address a potentially fatal threat to state stability and legitimacy. 
 
Table 8-1: 
What is Securities Finance For? 
 
  China  India 
Diversity 
 
State control of firms 
 
Coalition management 
- SOE life support 
Not allocative efficiency 
- Socialist social contract 
 
Expression of property rights 
- Calibrate changing property 
rights? 
 
Not for avoiding high opportunity 
costs of closure in finance (serial 
1990s financial crises lowered 
those perceived costs) 
 
Manage balance of payments 
- Attract foreign exchange 
 
Improve allocative efficiency by: 
- Pressuring banking system 
- Improving enterprise finance 
 
Improve corporate governance 
 
Not for avoiding high opportunity 
costs of closure in finance 
(serial 1990s financial crises 
lowered those perceived costs) 
Convergence 
 
Modernity and statehood in world society 
 
Enterprise finance (but for different reasons in each case) 
 
Some acceptance of the ideas (episteme) of neoliberal economic doctrine 
 
 
The remarkable success of the Chinese economic growth in 1990s led many 
outside analysts of Chinese political economy to regard the professed commitment of 
that country's leadership to a "socialist market economy" as duplicitous or at least  
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unintentionally ironic, believing the Chinese economy headed toward an essentially 
capitalist end point.  The argument in this thesis is that the Chinese leadership's 
commitment to the "socialist market economy" is very real, and has been astonishingly 
successful – even in the era of securitization – in precisely the way Hilferding 
suggested.  That is, the commitment to the socialist market economy is based on a 
state-socialist model of the economic system in which the party-state maintains a 
dominant role based on its control of finance.  Though there is a strong urge to 
discount the propagandistic posturing surrounding the official aspirations to a 
"socialist market economy," the evidence presented here strongly suggests that in the 
case of securities finance, as elsewhere in finance, this is precisely what has happened.  
Moreover, considering the documents and policies presented earlier in tracing the 
progression toward the regime of discretionary involution, it is evident that the 
functional consequences of that regime were largely the result of pre-meditated 
political intention, even if the details and specific content of that outcome were 
contingent results of strategic interaction between the central state and intramural 
coalition members within the structure of the state-socialist property rights regime. 
Establishing the discretionary involution system of securities finance was, for 
the Chinese, a remarkable achievement in that the central-state succeeded in squaring 
a circle.  The CCP state managed to reproduce a directed credit-system of economic 
governance within a realm often considered to be quintessentially capitalist and 
resistant to state control – securities finance.  This is something many developing and 
transitional states might like to do.  But, few enjoy China's uniquely advantageous 
economic position in the world economy and are therefore unable to do so.  From 
today’s perspective, the conclusion of China maven Orville Schell regarding this 
aspect of Chinese securities finance in the early period (circa 1992) is striking as a 
historically precocious analysis. "China," wrote Schell, "may have succeeded in 
breathing new vigor into its system of one-party rule by cloning capitalist institutions  
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into its mutant system of socialism.  While it seems probable that in the long-run these 
institutions (of securities finance) could help destroy the Communist Party’s grip on 
the Chinese government, in the short run they have had the paradoxical effect of 
strengthening the party and prolonging its survival" (1992, 738). 
 
II. Analytic and Conceptual Innovations 
 
At a theoretical level, the thesis highlights the political consequences of the 
securitization shift for state authority in the economy, arguing that the old regimes of 
directed-credit, 1) enhanced state discretion in the management of distributional 
coalitions; 2) facilitated the perpetuity of poorly specified property rights; and 3) 
mitigated the consequences of the country’s position with respect to external trade and 
investment. The development and regulation of securities finance is politically and 
institutionally demanding, provoking struggles over the property rights implications of 
securitization within the dominant political coalition, encouraging a shift in the way 
state authority is exercised in the economy, and requiring the capacity for procedural 
supervision in place of the developmental state’s old institutions of distributive 
intervention. 
The thesis makes several analytic points that contribute to our understanding of 
globalization, market development, and comparative politics.  First, I accept that 
global forces encourage convergence in market forms and policy institutions.  I further 
agree that the opportunity costs of access to transnational capital flows and the 
improved allocative efficiency that securitization offers (domestically and 
internationally) are a crucial background force that set in motion the changes I observe 
in Chinese and Indian securities finance.   However, states, particularly large and 
stable states like China and India, are not passive price-takers in the globalization 
game.  During the 1990s, the perceived structure of opportunity costs for Chinese and  
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Indian central-state-elites did not uniformly favor of openness in domestic and 
international securities finance.  The ideas and practices embedded in particular forms 
of economic action, such as securities finance, do have independent effects.  This is 
what I’ve called “the global script.”   But, technology, market forces, and norms do 
not operate only through price signals and coercive-competitive isomorphism. 
Second, in a conceptual modification to the common understandings of 
globalization based on techno-market and sociological explanations of how global 
forces promote convergence in market forms and policy institutions, this analysis of 
securitization suggests that even while the script may exercise its own independent 
convergent logic, there are also a range of different ways in which market forms and 
policy institutions can be used domestically. Powerful local actors enact that script, 
modifying it to suit their political objectives and to accommodate domestic conditions 
like coalition politics and property rights.  The securities finance script – a defining 
element of contemporary global finance – is thus a code that guides (but does not 
determine) the ways in which countries build or reshape the regimes that govern 
economic action in the large organized industrial sector of their economies. 
 
A. From Strong Thumbs to Nimble Fingers: Reconfiguring State Authority 
 
Financial economists evaluate cross-country variations in financial structure 
with an interest in how those variations affect allocative efficiency.   A political 
approach to financial structure should ask what are the implications of various 
financial structures for the exercise of state authority in the economy.  Proponents of 
various theories of “market transition” impute a universal, unidirectional logic to the 
expansion of markets that (they believe) should transcend the local, geographic, 
cultural, and institutional specificities of individual countries.  Examining both the 
democratic, private property-based Indian system, and the once-fully socialized, party- 
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state-controlled PRC system in the same analytic perspective is an important way of 
evaluating such theories.  The analysis in previous chapters bears on the argument that 
market growth leads to the retreat of the state. 
The example of India's constrained evolution regime of securities finance 
indicates how important the state can be in cultivating the market development and the 
exercise of new forms of state authority in the economy.  The example of China's 
discretionary involution indicates how market growth can be accompanied by the 
expansion of state power and discretion.  The identification of these two patterns in the 
Chinese and Indian responses to securitization confirm the value of comparative 
sectoral (or factor) analysis, reminding us of the dictum that, while local market 
penetration may indeed favor “direct producers” vis-à-vis the state, financial 
development may often favor authority holders whoever they may be (Szelenyi and 
Kostello 1996). 
In the early 1990s mainstream economists and those inspired by them in 
economic sociology considered the proposition that marketization empowers non-state 
actors at the expense of the state to be self-evident.  For example, economic 
sociologist Victor Nee argued that in transition there is a zero-sum, unidirectional 
process in which entrepreneurs' and consumers' power waxes as the state's power 
wanes (Nee 1989).  This is partially true, and overly simplistic.  The problems 
observed in the Russian experience, in particular, provoked some serious 
reconsideration of this proposition.  What these views ignored was that the process of 
delegating allocative power to markets and market actors requires the construction of a 
new institutional environment (Fligstein 1996).  Analysis of economic transitions is 
now more nuanced in its characterization of the interaction between marketization and 
state power.  Disagreeing with Nee, his colleague in the field Andrew Walder pointed 
out that there may be a middle zone of positive-sum interaction between states and 
markets, and that in transition, political actors undertake to structure economic  
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institutions in ways that both facilitate and constrain markets (Walder 1996).  The 
research presented here bears out Walder's claim, and suggests that it is important to 
recognize that there is significant variation across types of markets in this regard.  
That is to say, state-market relations vary by sector or factor in important ways.  The 
first move in introducing this nuance is to recognize that  in many sectors, and 
particularly in finance, the alleged retreat of the state in DTEs may  best be understood  
as a reconfiguration of state authority in the economy. 
The Chinese and Indian responses to securitization analyzed in previous 
chapters raise an important question about how developmental states exercise 
authority in the economy in the era of securitized finance.  A securities governance 
regime is not merely the sum of its parts (state, market, and civil society).  Moreover, 
the governance of securities finance affects the rest of the economy and society both in 
the financial and real sectors.  Those effects operate in a number of key areas 
including the process of privatization, the structure of industrial organization, the 
conduct of economic adjustment, firm-level organization (including “corporate 
governance”), fiscal policy, monetary policy, federalism, and the degrees of economic 
inequality and volatility.  In this section I begin to move beyond the question of why 
Chinese and Indian securities governance differed in the 1990s, to the questions of 
how and why state authority in finance is exercised in different ways. 
By encouraging the expansion of markets in areas such as securities finance, 
China and India face a contradiction.  More flexibility in financial markets will 
decrease obstacles to entrepreneurship and efficient allocation of resources, helping to 
spur growth and innovation.  These potential benefits to general welfare must be 
balanced against the costs of potential "public bads" that these changes may also 
bring.   Along with their salutary effects, greater financial openness and flexibility also 
introduce the possibility of dangerous failures in the financial sphere such as fraud,  
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scams, and crises (particularly boom-bust-crash cycles).
3    The experience of recent 
and historical financial crises suggests that the frontiers of financial activity can be 
unpredictably volatile, and seem always to extend beyond the regulatory capacity of 
even the most capable states.
4 
The messianic view of securitization emphasizes growth and innovation.  
Advocates of securitization focus on its contributions to productive and allocative 
efficiency gains that may be vital for countries’ long-term welfare prospects.  The 
commodification of finance via securitization holds out the promise of efficiency gains 
through wealth realization in asset capitalization and through the less costly and more 
competitive allocation of finance, ownership, and control.  For the first reason 
(allocative efficiency and faster growth), some analysts and countries applaud 
securitization and seek to promote it (as in the UK, US, and Singapore). 
The skeptical view of securitization emphasizes equity and stability.  Critics of 
securitization focus on two potentially related characteristics of securities finance – 
inequality and volatility – and the threat they pose to the social and political bases of 
countries’ long-term welfare prospects.
5  First, consider the issue of inequality.  The 
tendency of securities finance to facilitate the accumulation of wealth and power 
through the concentrated control of financial assets increases the likelihood of growing 
inequality.
6  Second, consider the issue of volatility.  Swift changes in market 
conditions, or outright market failures in finance (such as financial crises) 
disproportionately affect weaker and poorer members of society.
7  For these reasons 
                                                 
3 In the category of crises we should count the sequences of events that Kindleberger (1978) and 
Minsky (1982) both consider close to inevitable in financial markets – " mania, panic, crash"   
4 I have in mind the Latin Debt crisis and the U.S. Savings and Loan failure in the 1980s, and the Peso 
crisis, Asian Flu, and Russian crisis of this decade. 
5 Fraud and scams fall under the category of inequality because it is typically wealthy actors with 
special knowledge and access who undertake such activities. 
6 These were discussed in Chapter 2. 
7 For those living in marginal conditions, even small negative movements in the purchasing power of 
their wages, the loss of savings or fixed income payments (such as pensions invested in securities), can 
have large consequences for their living standards.  These dynamics may be further exacerbated when 
such changes are sudden, offering little time to adjust.  
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some analysts and countries are wary of securitization and seek to constrain it (as in 
Germany and France).  Critics of securitization also add that the dangers of volatility 
and concentration may be even more acute among “young” markets such as those in 
many DTEs.
8 
The controversy between these rival messianic and skeptical views of 
securitization is a magnified expression of the universal problem that Polanyi 
identified with respect to the expansion of markets generally in the modern era. That 
expansion, he argued, posed a paradox.  The expansion of markets introduces a 
tension between the welfare goals of social stability and economic growth.  In a 
statement that could easily serve as the summary epigram for East Asia's experience in 
the 1990s, in which the "Asian Miracle" was followed by the "Asian Crisis," Polanyi 
remarked that while markets seemed to increase productivity, failure to properly 
regulate their operation threatened society as surely as did “floods and droughts in 
primitive society” (1957, 76).   The simultaneous "double movement" toward markets 
and toward regulation was the outcome Polanyi foresaw.  His framing of this market 
paradox has been elaborated upon in the contemporary consensus that market 
capitalism is good at production but bad at distribution (Barber 1995).  
The promise of increases in economic efficiency from marketized finance 
relates to a central question in the theory and periodization of late economic 
development: The relative importance and institutional challenges of generating 
“extensive” and “intensive” growth.  These challenges can be thought of as a contrast 
between "the Gerschenkronian growth dilemma" and "the Kaldorian growth 
dilemma."
9  The resolution of Gerschenkronian growth dilemmas requires institutions 
that facilitate the capital accumulation required for large investments in heavy 
industrialization.  The centralized state and directed-credit political economy systems 
                                                 
8 For a thorough study of this see, Owen et al (2000). 
9 This distinction comes from Waldner (1999).  
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of late developers were a historical solution to this dilemma.  The resolution of 
Kaldorian growth dilemmas requires institutions that facilitate innovation and 
efficiency gains, increasing micro- and macro-level productivity, and advancement up 
the product cycle.  A variety of solutions to this dilemma have been tried historically, 
but the most common have been export competition in world markets, and the 
increasing use of competitive capital markets to reward or punish firm-level 
innovation and productivity. 
In the past China and India (like many other DTEs) relied on distributive 
intervention to resolve the Gerschenkronian growth dilemma that was most acute in 
the post-World War Two period when heavy industrialization was a priority.  Today, 
as these countries move up the product cycle they increasingly face the Kaldorian 
growth dilemma confronting them more starkly than ever with Polanyi's market 
paradox.  To improve productive and allocative efficiency they must rely increasingly 
on markets.  At the same time that they are building these markets, often from scratch 
(as in China) or from an archaic legacy (as in India), they must also regulate them.  
This is why we so often see cycles in which periods of exuberant and unruly growth 
are followed by periods of severe constraint.  Balancing the potential benefits and 
costs of an increasing reliance on the securitization that will help address the 
Kaldorian growth dilemma is the challenge now facing developmental states in the era 
of securities finance.  The central role of securities finance in a country's economic life 
– as the source of investment, and the arena in which ownership and control are 
determined – makes it the ultimate battleground in the contest to determine the trade-
off between economic efficiency and equity-stability.
10 
                                                 
10  The priority that the Chinese and Indian states seem to be giving to stability in the process of 
financial reform reflects an intuitive recognition on their part of Polanyi's dilemma and the “double 
movement.”  Such recognition is evident in both countries persistent policy bias favoring capital control 
and urban employment.  
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The economist Charles Lindblom attended to these dilemmas in his 
comparison of economic systems.  Recast in my conceptual idiom, Lindblom's 
analysis draws a distinction between what he calls "authority-based economic 
systems" governed by what I call "distributive intervention."  These systems are good 
at resolving Gerschenkronian dilemmas.  Lindblom's contrasting "market-based 
economic systems" governed by what I call "procedural supervision" are good at 
resolving Kaldorian dilemmas.  In one of his typically colorful formulations, 
Lindblom, writing in the mid-1970s, characterized the difference thus: 
 
If the absence from authority systems of specialized devices for rational 
calculation and economic choice, as well as for fine-tuned incentives 
(all of which can be found in markets), makes the hand of authority 
look like all thumbs, no figures, the thumbs are nevertheless powerful.  
And they're strong enough…to account for the high growth rates of 
communist systems and for Soviet achievements in space technology.  
They  are  strong  enough  too  to  account  for  such  diverse 
accomplishments as, on the one hand, China's health care system and, 
on  the  other  hand,  massive  feats  of  American  worldwide  military 
organization in World War Two (1977, 75). 
 
In Lindblom's formulation there is a clear yet crude distinction between the 
statist, hierarchical "hand of authority" with powerful thumbs, and the decentralized, 
horizontal "hand of markets" with nimble fingers.  Such a formulation implies that 
authority is absent from market systems, which is obviously not true.  The analytic 
challenge is to identify what distinguishes the type of authority powering strong 
thumbs from the type of authority enlivening nimble fingers.  The different Chinese 
and Indian securities governance regimes provide an empirical base from which I 
induce contrasting ideal types of state authority in the economy: distributive 
intervention and procedural supervision. 
The defining characteristic of the type of state authority operating in 
hierarchical, strong thumb solutions to the Gerschenkronian development dilemma 
was discretion with regard to state intervention to distribute economic resources or  
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gains: distributive intervention.  The defining characteristic of the type of authority 
operating in decentralized, horizontal, nimble fingers, solutions to the Kaldorian 
development dilemma was the capacity to supervise the procedures and rules that 
constrain and regulate economic activity among independent and competitive actors in 
the market: procedural supervision.
11 
Change (or lack of change) in the nature of state authority, as evidenced in its 
exercise over securities finance has been a large part of the dependent variable in this 
study – the securities governance regime.   I have been looking for the emergence of a 
governance regime in which the role of the state is characterized by a “supervisory” 
mode of political power (Foucault 1979 (1978); Mitchell 1991).
12  The essential 
difference between a distributive -interventionist state and a procedural-supervisory 
state turns on where economic decisions are made.
13  The authoritative mode of 
procedural supervision is based on establishing and enforcing rules that define the 
arena within which market actors make decisions.  Procedural supervision operates in 
a monitoring capacity that seeks to increase transparency in markets, and enforce 
exogenously determined rules and constraints.
14  Political economists commonly think 
of dismantling a state’s regulatory and distributive functions as leading to a lower 
requirement for state capacity.  But deregulating in a transitional economy requires 
reregulating under a different form of political authority.
15  The design of domestic 
                                                 
11 This formulation commits me to Krugman's view of the "ICOR debate" that the "Asian Miracle" was 
a Gerschenkronian development dynamic driven by persistent capital investment, not by innovation and 
technology driven efficiency gains (1999, 21-37). 
12 Foucault’s French term surveiller has infelicitously been translation as “discipline” (Foucault 1979).  
State action in the surveillance mode therefore has no natural English term. “Supervise” is the closest 
English usage I have found. 
13 It is easy to draw an artificially distinct line between regulatory behavior and decision-making.  In 
securities regulation, for example, margin requirements, credit provisioning requirements, and even 
settlement schedules can easily shade over into the domain of allocative decisions. 
14 This is akin to James Scott’s notion that the authority of the high modern state is based on producing 
“legibility” within society and economy (Scott 1998).  However, in his typology, many high modern 
states were also dirigiste distributive interventionists. 
15 Recent research suggests that deregulation, even in advanced market economies, requires larger 
states, and greater state capacity (Rodrik 1996) Vogel 1996).  
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capital markets and their cross-border links are an important part of this reregulation 
process. The form of political authority is embodied in the institutions that govern the 
newly designed markets. Operating as a complement and restraint to markets demands 
more capacity of state and civil institutions than does the mere replacement of markets 
by planners.
16 
In order to enjoy the increased potential for allocative efficiency that markets 
offer, large measures of freedom (entry and exit), predictability, and “transparency” 
are necessary.  Regulation and the rule of law can help ensure the provision of these 
conditions.  Regulation can also mitigate the effects of volatility and limit the 
excessive concentration of economic power that are both common tendencies in 
securities finance.   To achieve these goals of preventing market failure, containing 
volatility, and curtailing concentration, rules and constraints must be enforced.  The 
procedural supervision mode of state authority in the economy can thus be defined as 
the monitoring and enforcement of rules and constraints that diminish market failures 
and preserve an exogenously determined trade-off point between equity-stability and 
allocative efficiency.  From this perspective, the politics of regulation is this 
exogenous determination (the political process of adjudicating the economic efficiency 
vs. equity-stability trade-off point).  The political process of determining this trade-off 
point has a high normative content shaped by the power, ideas, and culture of those 
involved in that political process.   However, once the trade-off point is established, 
the implementation and enforcement of the rules and constraints devised to maintain 
that trade-off can be carried out by a capable and autonomous set of governance 
structures in a process that has a low normative content.  Those governance structures 
                                                 
16 John Echeverri-Gent uses the term "procedural regulation" in much the same way as I use procedural 
supervision (Echeverri-Gent 1998).  I prefer supervision instead of regulation because the expression 
regulation has been used to refer to state and non-state action in the economy ranging from highly 
intrusive distributive behavior such as price setting in the U.S. airline industry before the 1980s, to 
completely non-intrusive monitoring such as verification of truth in advertising.  In contrast to such a 
broad range of meaning, supervision more specifically connotes an absence of dirigisme, emphasizing 
instead surveillance and enforcement.  
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would include the same elements of the state, market, and civil society laid out earlier 
in the definition of the governance regimes. 
Distributive intervention is itself a means of managing the political struggle 
over this trade-off between economic efficiency on the one hand and social stability 
and equity on the other hand.  With distributive intervention, however, the struggle 
over the trade-off is endogenous to the means of exercising authority.  By contrast, 
procedural supervision of economic action (such as securities finance) requires that the 
political struggle over this trade-off be exogenous to the exercise of state authority in 
the economy. 
Distributive intervention may persist for two reasons.  A state may be either 
unable or unwilling to exercise its authority in the mode of procedural supervision.  
First, a state may be unable to exercise its authority in the economy through 
procedural supervision because it lacks the capability itself, and because other 
elements of the economic governance regime (the market or civil society components) 
are insufficiently developed.  Procedural supervision's nimble fingers, enlivened by 
painstakingly cultivated perquisites in law and various governance regime 
components, are much harder to develop than are the crude muscles that power the 
strong thumbs of distributive intervention.  Second, distributive intervention can also 
persist as result of a political failure to re-adjudicate the equity-stability versus 
allocative efficiency trade-off.  In the absence of a new settlement providing the 
practical (material and institutional) and political bases for a reasonably durable 
settlement   the legitimacy of the ultimate decision may be clouded.  This is a problem 
that China’s single party monopoly political system faces. 
In India, during the 1990s, the precarious scarcity profile of external exposure 
forced a re-alignment of the trade-off favoring greater, albeit still significantly 
constrained, emphasis on the securities finance elements of market-inspired growth.  
This realignment provided the practical and political basis for the kind of political  
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authority that facilitated greater reliance on securities finance.  In China during the 
1990s Deng's two-decade-old post-Mao realignment favoring the liberalization of 
product markets and the encouragement of foreign-invested export-led growth 
continued to provide growth.  This meant that even as securities finance was 
introduced into the Chinese economy, there was little pressure to force a re-
adjudication of the equity-stability versus allocative efficiency trade-off.  The 
development of discretionary involution permitted the state to exercise authority in 
securities finance in the dirigiste fashion based on old practical and political bases. 
 
B. The AC/FP Matrix and Debt Politics 
The asset-class/financial-position matrix used to guide the analysis in chapter 6 
helps to solve a serious problem that has plagued the study of securities finance in 
developing and transitional economies: How to untangle and map the identities and 
interests of actors involved in the development of securities finance.  Using that matrix 
we can now begin to answer the question: What and where are the domestic politics of 
securities finance in DTEs?  This thesis has used the matrix to guide conceptually the 
process tracing of political interaction in the domain of stock exchange development, 
exploring the issues of enterprise finance, wealth capitalization, and (briefly) 
shareholder rights.  There are other areas of equity finance where further analysis is 
needed such as privatization and industrial organization. 
Another area for further analysis is the debt asset class.  Typically, in older 
capitalist economies bond finance is even larger and more politically powerful than 
stock finance.  This power is embedded in the legal and institutional structures of older 
capitalist systems, but also in the very logic of securities finance itself.  The 
computational or accounting "grammar" of securities finance relies on the stability and 
durability of the rates of return on fixed income instruments, particularly the bonds of  
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governments or very reliable firms, in order to assign value instantaneously and over 
time to all other securities.  This is the "benchmark" property of bonds. 
Debt and Coalitions:  With respect to debt assets, the distributional politics of 
access to and use of bond finance focuses our attention on the relationship between 
public and private finance (see tables and figures in Chapter 3).  In the standard 
securities market script, the largest player in any bond market is the government itself.  
Like any borrower, governments prefer to buy their funds cheaply.  Unlike most other 
actors, however, the state has the ability to constrain its competitors or trump them 
with its creditworthiness.  Often these competitors are the state’s own subnational 
political units.  Thus, in distributional terms, the state also has the power to control the 
securities markets through its domination of the debt market.  On the one hand, 
government paper becomes a benchmark for measuring the risk and return on other 
securities, and on the other hand it furnishes a near-money substitute for transactions 
and storage in the financial system.
17  This last step further augments the state’s 
distributional power to the extent that it controls debt flow through open market-like 
operations in the conduct of monetary policy. 
Debt and Property Rights:  Chapter 7 explains how, from an institutional 
perspective, the bond market tells us about the nature of the federal system and 
relations between the center and subnational units.  What “property rights” are 
accorded to subnational units?   This includes the nature of tax-based developmental 
incentives in the country.  Again, the standard securities market script stipulates that 
the use of debt securities invites tax benefits for private issuers of bonds and for 
private investors in many forms of public debt.
18 
                                                 
17 The depth of the government securities market enhances inter-bank and money markets, portfolio 
management, and financial trading. 
18 In China the use of debt enjoys no tax benefits, as the Ministry of Finance jealously guards all sources 
of revenue, discouraging any competition with its own debt issues and those few issues that SOEs are 
permitted to float.  
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Another institutional element of debt politics is related to default.  Whereas the 
risks of equity finance are generally limited to the individual firm, debt default can be 
contagious and can have magnified reputation effects for the political jurisdiction or 
economic sector in which the defaulting debtor is located (an industrial sector, or a 
firm, city, or province).
19  The institutional politics of debt assets thus involves the 
quality of contracts embedded in the property rights and legal regimes, and directs our 
attention toward the systems for default and bankruptcy. 
Bondage:  In Chapter 7 an analysis of the politics of bond finance in China and 
India reveals much about the present and future disposition of economic power in 
these developing capitalist systems.  It is also likely to disclose important untold 
stories of federal structure and federal power in such large multi-layered polities. 
Controlling the allocation of credit is an important source of power and a way 
to reduce the cost of funds to those who have such control.  At the same time, an 
important driver of economic development is the ability to make large, long-term 
investment.  This requires access to credit.  Who gets credit?  And, under what 
conditions?  The structure of bond markets influences the answers to these questions, 
and affects the fiscal capacity, developmental prospects, and ultimately the political 
autonomy of sub-national governments at various levels.  This relationship between 
bond markets and the character of federalism and center-local authority is often 
overlooked.  Future analysis using the insights of the analytic tools devised for this 
thesis (the dual imprint and the AC/FP matrix) should compare changes in the 
institutions of bond finance in China and India over the last twenty-five years.  I 
believe such analysis will demonstrate that, contrary to arguments that there is an 
emerging de facto federalism or localism in China (Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 
                                                 
19 The defaults of New York City, Orange County, or Enron are good examples in the U.S.  A good 
example in China is the wave of defaulting trust and investment companies that began in October of 
1998.  
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1994), developments in bond finance suggest otherwise, confirming the view of other 
finance-sector analyses that, formally at least, there has been a powerful, persistent, 
centralization trend afoot .  In India, the evidence from the structure of bond finance 
reflects the broader decentralization trends in that country.  Using these analytic tools 
it should be possible to offer a political explanation for these outcomes, based on 
differences in: 1) international variables (these countries’ external macro-economic 
positions), and 2) domestic variables (the configuration of dominant coalitions and the 
structure of property rights). 
 
III. Policy Debates 
 
 
Many observers believe China has successfully exploited the benign 
abundance of its external profile, applauding its economic policies for having 
produced a superior (to India at least) development strategy (Lau, Qian, and Roland 
2000).  At the same time, in the Indian case, many observers lament India's inability to 
sustain the reform momentum of the early 1990s.  Generalizing across the entire range 
of economic sectors and political institutions can be misleading.  Based on the 
preceding analysis of governance in the securities finance sector in these two 
countries, the point I wish emphasize is that many analysts have generalized too 
broadly about the success of Chinese economic reform, missing the problematic 
dynamics developing in the securities finance core of its emergent variety of 
capitalism.  At the same time many have ignored the potential medium- and long-term 
benefits of the institutional evolution in securities finance that resulted from India's 
response to its dire circumstances. 
Some researchers are coming to recognize these differences.  Two professors 
of business administration – Huang Yasheng and Tarun Khanna – recently wrote that,  
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"India is not outperforming China overall, but it is doing better in certain key areas."  
In accord with the thrust of the arguments I have presented here, they believe that "the 
speed with which India is catching up (to China) is due to its own efficient deployment 
of capital and China’s inefficiency, symbolized by all the money that has been 
frittered on SOEs. And China’s misallocation of resources is likely to become a big 
drag on the economy in the years ahead."  They conclude that if India catches up to 
China  "it will not only demonstrate the importance of homegrown entrepreneurship to 
long-term economic development; it will also show the limits of the FDI-dependent 
approach China is pursuing" (Huang and Khanna 2003, 78-81).  As I argue below, I 
agree that the FDI-dependent approach has limits, even though it worked well – 
economically and politically – for over two decades.  But, I go further, arguing that the 
FDI-dependent approach is likely to have significant medium- and long-term costs.  
Furthermore, these authors' micro-economic emphasis on entrepreneurship in the 
Indian case ignores the important effects of the broader structural context of the 
financial regime in which those entrepreneurs are located. 
 
A.  The Contrarian View Presented Here 
 
The conclusions offered here present a distinctly different picture from that 
drawn by some prominent analysts of Chinese finance.  British political scientist 
Stephen Green, for example, argues that Chinese securities finance will "improve" for 
four reasons.  First, foreign trained securities experts who have returned to China – 
known as the haiguipai ("sea turtle faction") – play an increasingly powerful role in 
the CSRC and this will lead to more rational and market oriented securities finance.  
Second, Green argues that the industrial policy of supporting large urban SOEs is 
coming to an end, and that therefore the issuer-bias of China's involuted securities 
governance regime will no longer be needed.  Third, government debt is rising,  
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forcing improvements in the structure of the government bond market.  Finally, the 
need to develop a pension system to replace China's fading cradle-to-grave danwei-
based (work unit) "iron rice bowl" social security arrangement requires the 
development of an alternative system for managing large volumes of savings and 
financial assets over a long period of time. 
Yet Green himself concedes  that the haiguipai have lost key battles in recent 
years and that, "ultimately, whether the market improves and the agenda of the 
haiguipai is supported is a political decision for the senior leadership" (2003, 174).  
The same may be said for the other three reasons Green offers as the basis of his 
argument for "why China's stock market will improve."  While China's recent World 
Trade Organization commitments to reduce subsidies, and the poor health of many 
SOEs do indeed augur well for changes in the way the state treats organized industry, 
this by no means insures that the ownership structure and mechanisms of discretionary 
involution will not be redirected toward as yet unforeseen uses in preserving central 
state power over the economy.  It is very possible that the state will continue using the 
regime of discretionary involution to guide the fashioning of competitive national 
champions in a modified version of the Korean Chaebol model, even while continuing 
in the medium term to service the various coalition participants among urban heavy 
industry and inland provinces with continued privileged treatment of securities issuers.  
As long as the political incentives of China's benignly abundant external profile 
persist, and there is no dramatic shift in the configuration of coalition dynamics or the 
structure of property rights, none of the reasons Green gives seem likely, even in 
combination, to trump the political dynamic of the dual imprint effects identified in 
this thesis in the near or medium term. 
Political scientist Yang Dali agrees that by the late 1990s, the Chinese state 
had the securities “regulatory apparatus in place.”  However, Yang argues that not 
only have things changed, but he believes they are getting “better,” by which he means  
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the Chinese financial system increasingly resembles Anglo-Saxon capital markets, and 
that it is developing U.S.-like regimes of securities governance.  “China’s securities 
regulatory authority had by 1999," he writes,  "teeth that bite” (2000, 2, 20).   Agreed, 
but for whom do these teeth bite?  Yang asserts that, as a result of these newly 
formidable regulatory mandibles, “China’s regulators today are tackling issues that are 
remarkably similar to those found in mature markets such as New York” or other 
“international counterparts” (2001).   Suggesting that Chinese and American securities 
regulators share a “similar” concerned with improving disclosure and enforcing 
existing laws misses the big picture – reform without real change in China.  In a long 
essay documenting many formal developments in Chinese securities governance, 
Yang neglects to mention the segmentation of shares and the quarantine of foreign 
ownership And though he discusses the quota system of share issuance and the year 
2000 plans to reform it, he takes these proposed statutory modifications largely at face 
value. He  does not mention that foreign listings approval procedures remain as 
opaque and tightly controlled as ever (Yang 2001).   Few if any of the modifications 
he discusses do anything to reduce state discretion in the governance of securities 
finance.  The teeth to which he refers bite on behalf of a state that continues to use 
dirigiste instruments of political authority to exercise its discretion through 
distributive intervention in finance to preserve its own political power. 
Business professor Huang has carefully studied China's FDI-dependent 
experience (2002).  He is interested in what he calls the "demand-side perspective" of 
China's high FDI inflows.  He concurs that FDI was overabundant, explaining that 
many SOEs and regions really have no use for or did not deserve the FDI flows they 
received.  But for Huang, "high" FDI is indicated by the ratio of FDI to domestic 
investment (DI) or the ratio of FDI to contractual arrangements.
20  According to him, 
                                                 
20 FDI/DI ratio in China in 1994 and 1997 were, respectively, 17 and 12 percent.  The average 
developing country FDI/DI ratio is 5 percent (Huang 2000).  In a contractual arrangement a foreign  
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misguided institutional design and incentives resulted in economic and policy 
"imperfections" that created a "political pecking" order of firms, with SOEs and 
foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) enjoying favorable attention at the expense of 
private local firms (71, 3).  This institutional design and the special incentives that 
accompanied it favored FIEs through advantageous tax treatment, convenience in 
licensing, retained earnings dispensations, and export assistance. 
For Huang, then, the "large absorption of FDI is a sign of some substantial 
weaknesses in the Chinese economy" (2002, xv).  Those weaknesses, Huang contends, 
are a symptom of imperfections mentioned earlier.  So, whereas for Huang high FDI 
is a consequence, in my argument high FDI is a cause.  Huang's is largely a 
microeconomic, firm-level account explaining how policies and institutions produced 
high levels of FDI that did not deliver the benefits typically ascribed to FDI.  Mine, on 
the other hand, is a macroeconomic account of the consequences of China's high FDI 
dependence on securities governance, corporate finance, and the financial system 
more broadly.  We both agree, however, that China's high level of FDI is a problem. 
While there is no gainsaying Huang's careful demonstration of the failure of 
FDI to deliver promised improvements to domestic manufacturing in the areas of 
technology, skills, and management, one wonders why he did not draw out more fully 
the political implications of his independent variables.  In his argument those 
independent variables – an institutional design encouraging FDI, favoring state owned 
enterprises, and discriminating against local private firms – were significant defining 
components of China's reform-era political economy.  On this, he and I also agree.  If 
these components produced high FDI (and I believe he exaggerates the degree to 
which they did), one must wonder why and how both the cause (the policies and 
institutional design favoring FDI) and the consequence (high FDI) were politically 
                                                 
company secures a local firm's agreement to manufacture a product for export without ever taking an 
equity stake in that local firm as would happen in an FDI arrangement.  
 
390 
useful to the central-state elite who designed and implemented them.  By taking high 
FDI as a cause, and a different but related set of institutions as the outcome – those in 
the regime of securities governance – my argument shows how those institutions 
reflected the central state's opportunities, political exigencies, and biases.  This in turn 
explains what Huang ignores:  Why the policies and institutions supporting high FDI 
and involuted securities finance dominated other priorities and policies such as 
improved financial allocation, better corporate governance, shareholder rights, and 
market-based decisions regarding industrial organization. 
While my argument does not contradict Huang's, there are three important 
areas of difference that matter very much for our understanding of the political causes 
and consequences of high FDI in China, and for our understanding of the political 
economy of Chinese and Indian finance in the recent past and in the medium-term 
future.  These areas of difference include; 1) the causes of high FDI, 2) the political 
and economic uses of high FDI, and 3) the consequences of the high FDI-benign 
abundance circumstance for institutional development in China. 
First, Huang emphasizes the domestic causes of high FDI, or what we might 
call the "pull factor."
21  In doing so he probably overstates the "endogeneity" of high 
FDI to the Chinese system.  It is true that Special Economic Zones and preferential 
treatment stimulated FDI, and favored it over domestic investment, and even 
"internationalized" a lot of domestic investment in the form of the "roundtrip" funds 
discussed in chapter 5.  But, Huang probably overestimates this effect.  It will be 
difficult to ever know for sure due to problems with Chinese statistical accounting, but 
two simple counterfactuals suggest the heavy burden of evidence Huang faces in 
making his case.  First, had China not benefited from the powerful appeal to all global 
investors of its large domestic market and low cost disciplined work-force, and had it 
                                                 
21 I am grateful to Lin Kunchin for highlighting this element of Huang's argument and for suggesting 
this term.  
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not enjoyed the special regard of overseas ethnic Chinese, could the high FDI levels 
have been reached relying solely on the special domestic incentives and institutions 
highlighted by Huang?  Second, and related, how high would Chinese FDI have been 
had it been based solely on its structural advantages in the absence of special domestic 
stimulants to FDI?  Given the large volumes of FDI involved, even if we take 
reasonable, but aggressive discounts for "roundtrip" FDI, Huang faces a significant 
burden of proof  in parsing the endogenous domestic policy determinant of high FDI 
from the exogenous structural determinants.  As I pointed out in chapter five, marginal 
differences in this distinction do not affect my argument as long the absolute levels of 
FDI were reasonably high (which they were even with the most aggressive estimates 
of "roundtripping") and as long as foreign invested enterprises ("real" or "fake") 
generated economic growth and foreign exchange (which they did). 
Second, Huang does not recognize that together, high FDI and the involuted 
securities finance regime it spawned "worked" both economically and politically.
22  
Looking first at the economics, one must remember that neoclassical economic 
equilibrium assumptions may misfire in a developing and transitional economy.  As 
with the problem of "rent-seeking," under the right circumstances "perverse" 
incentives (such as the FDI policies Huang identifies) can still lead to dramatic 
improvements in prosperity (Smart 1998).
23  Analyzing much of the same reform era 
evidence as Huang, economist Thomas Rawski concludes that the recent economic 
history of China “shows that achievement of a full market system, or anything 
remotely approaching a full market system, is not a prerequisite to accelerated 
economic growth, structural change, and technical development.”  Again, turning to a 
counterfactual: Would China have been better off had it not attracted FDI, particularly 
                                                 
22 In this instance it does not matter whether the high FDI was endogenously or exogenously driven. 
23 Neoclassical equilibrium assumptions eschew any but the most minimal role for the state and its 
"distorting" policies.  Rent seeking is here defined as directly unproductive activity.  
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expatriate FDI?  One is inclined to doubt it.  Furthermore, turning to the politics, it 
was never politically viable to undertake the reform of domestic finance first (Lardy 
1998; Shirk 1993). 
Third, in focusing on the micro-economic, firm-level issues, Huang neglects 
the political and macroeconomic effects of the high FDI regime, particularly on the 
governance of securities finance.  While it worked well in the short term, the reliance 
on FDI is a "fix that fails" for the financial system.  By identifying how China’s 
external financial profile interacted with distributional concerns and property rights 
structures in the securitization process, I have helped reveal why key elements of 
China’s apparent successes – namely FDI and export-led growth – might also be 
construed as important causes of structural weakness.  From this perspective FDI and 
export-led growth are not measures of competitiveness and success, as many China 
bulls claim. Instead, they are a form of dependence – even addiction – that caused 
China to neglect the intensive development of its domestic financial sector, 
specifically its securities sector.  Neglect is bad enough, but the dependence actually 
encouraged the gradualism and involution in the securities governance regime 
documented in this thesis.  Like an addiction to caffeine, the benign profile provided 
wakeful productivity in the short term, but may wear down the system in the long run.  
The durability of discretionary involution in the securities governance regime was one 
important consequence of this addiction to high FDI in the external profile. 
In conclusion, I accept Huang's arguments that there were important 
endogenous incentives that magnified FDI flows into China but consider his argument 
to have achieved only a downward revision of the impact of China's benign external 
profile, not a negation of its impact.  Regardless of the precise relative mix of causes, 
however, I argue that these high levels of FDI have created a positive feed-back effect 
that first provoked the development of the discretionary involution regime of securities 
finance, and then preserved it once it came to dominate the political economy of  
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organized large scale industry in China.  In my argument, as in Huang's, high levels of 
FDI provide liquidity and financial intermediation to firms that need them.  FDI itself 
brings in hard currency that is deposited in non-interest bearing accounts as part of 
FIE paid-up capital adding to foreign currency reserves.  Finally, the exports of FIEs 
drive growth, contributing to the positive trade balance, and bringing in hard currency.  
All of which means there is little need to improve financial intermediation, improve 
the balance of payments, or attract foreign currency in other ways. 
 
IV. Going forward 
 
Finally, let me move from evidence, conceptual innovation, and policy debates 
to prediction.   I consider first what future possibilities may be inferred from my 
argument for the Chinese case. 
 
A.  China 
 
 Massive foreign exchange reserves, world-topping volumes of foreign direct 
investment, and remarkable growth gains from exports are viewed as confirmation of 
China's economic strength and effective institutional design.  The argument in this 
thesis accepts much of this common view, especially the recognition that Chinese 
policies have been particularly salutary in the product, infrastructure, and 
petrochemical sectors.  However, this analysis of governance in the securities finance 
sector raises serious questions about the future costs of these earlier successes.  The 
benign abundance external profile meant that the Chinese central-state was at liberty 
to implement policies and institutions designed to exploit the benefits of that profile in 
securing its own privileged and dominant position.  This liberty permitted the central-
state to do two important things at once.  First, the combination of the permissive  
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external profile with the institutions of involution it encouraged, enabled the central-
state-elite to deliver economic gains sufficient to provide a base of popular political 
legitimacy in in the post-Mao period when the other sources of ideological and 
charismatic legitimacy were waning..  Second, that combination simultaneously 
furnished the central-state with both the discretion and the resources (material and 
institutional) needed to :1) accommodate the demands of the intramural coalition, and 
2) assure continuing control of organized economic assets by calibrating property 
rights to the state's own advantage.  But, the "liberty" of abundance produced by this 
combination of permissive profile and involuted governance has the potential to 
become instead an "affliction" of abundance.  This shift from the liberties of 
abundance to the affliction of abundance is akin to the institutional challenges that 
afflicted oil producing rentier states for whom the "price of wealth" was reckoned 
when the political institutions fashioned during a period of prosperity supported by 
high old oil prices came under stress when oil prices fell (Chaudhry 1997).  Viewed 
from this perspective, the affliction of abundance for China is an unhealthy economic 
and political dependence on foreign investment and export-led growth that has 
enervated the financial system, leading to deep and durable inefficiencies in the 
mobilization, allocation, and governance of finance. 
Huang Yasheng, has predicted that as the policy incentives and institutional 
biases favoring FDI decrease, so too will FDI decline.
24  If the argument that I make 
here is correct, the medium-term trajectory of Chinese securities finance development 
will depend crucially on the degree to which the previous high levels of FDI persist, 
and the degree to which the inflow of foreign currency associated with FDI and 
export-led growth remains stable.  These macroeconomic issues, in conjunction with 
                                                 
24 This is consistent with Huang's emphasis on the endogenous "pull-factor" motivating Chinese FDI 
and growth.  Like the causality driving the growth and sustained high levels of FDI in the past, the 
causality implied in this prediction will be very difficult to parse out.  As wages rise, as the markets 
saturate with exploited opportunities, and as China’s business climate becomes more competitive, there 
will also be less structural  (exogenous) appeal to China as an FDI destination.  
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the stability of the dominant coalition (the balance between sunset and sunrise sectors 
and their ministries, and the continued purchased quiescence of the disadvantaged 
provinces) maintain the involution pattern of securities finance I have identified. This 
pattern treats securities as another form of directed-credit and therefore locates 
Chinese central-state-elite securities finance policies and institutions somewhere 
between the (relatively benevolent) old developmental state and the (relatively 
predatory) "political capitalism" of other post-Socialist transitional states.
25 
Stability in the variables that comprise China's benign external profile will 
mean a continuation of involution, punctuated by occasional genuflection to world 
financial markets and world financial norms.  Such gradualist measures would, over a 
very long period of time (fifteen years or more), transform the Chinese pattern of 
discretionary involution in securities finance with attendant implications for the 
character of China's variety of capitalism.  However, in the near and medium term, 
such measures will not erode the discretionary involution regime through which the 
state controls finance (and through it the economy and society).  We may witness a 
“rise of the regulatory state” relying on a procedural supervision mode of state 
authority in other Chinese sectors, but in finance, the veneer of this “regulatory state” 
burnished by the existence of ambitious sounding statutes, the use of state-of-the-art 
technologies, and the presence of foreign trained officials will obscure the persistence 
of discretionary involution. 
China's gradualist approach to reform and transition has enjoyed the approval 
of a wide range of economic analysts.  Gradualism in the Chinese case refers to the 
deliberate, incremental, pacing of reform.  This is a distinct pattern when compared, 
for example, to the wholesale transformation of property rights and economic 
institutions in certain former Soviet and East European countries.  Many of these 
                                                 
25 For an application of this Weberian concept of "political capitalism" in other post-Socialist cases that 
is complementary to the "discretionary involution" notion I use here, see Ganev (forthcoming).  
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analysts have rightly recognized that gradualism as deployed in the Chinese case is as 
much a political strategy as an economic one, intended to delay the costs of change to 
potential losers, while maximizing the support of potential winners (Lau, Qian, and 
Roland 2000; Rawski 1999).  Indeed, the persistent, high growth that China has 
enjoyed for the last twenty years has meant that the gradualist changes in other sectors 
have been able to offset the lack of substantive change in securities finance.  In this 
way gradualism has worked well economically and politically for the central Chinese 
state. 
One of the points I wish to stress, however, is that sectoral variation matters.  
The Indian state's ability to act with relative autonomy in finance and not elsewhere is 
contrasted to the Chinese state's inability to act autonomously in finance even as it 
enjoyed relative autonomy in other sectors.  Thus I disagree with the views of analysts 
who extend the gradualist thesis of Chinese reform to the securities finance sector.  
Stephen Green claims to see a substantive shift away from the discretionary involution 
pattern having already begun in 2000 and likely to gather momentum with the changes 
in personnel, industrial policy, and pension reform mentioned earlier.  Such views of 
Chinese politics and institutions changing through gradualism seem to me valid in 
many sectors.  But in finance generally and securities finance particularly, I see behind 
the formalistic changes of the recent past significant threads of continuity.  In many 
sectors there has been reform with change.  In securities finance there has been only 
reform without change.  Based on the argument presented in previous chapters, I 
believe this continuity will persist as long as the variables I've identified remain 
roughly stable. 
Yang Dali contends that gradualism has begun to usher in modernization 
without Westernization (meaning democracy), and that this trend is continuing with a 
transformation of the Chinese state toward greater decentralization and development 
of a regulatory state.  I argue in contrast that the involution pattern is likely to persist  
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in securities finance even as modernization (such as improved money markets, trading 
systems, and financial product proliferation) proceeds.  This line of reasoning leads to 
a particularly provocative prediction:  If the external exposure profile continues to be 
permissive and alternative sources of political power continue to diminish, the control 
of finance may become even more vital to the central-state.  Political scientist Susan 
Shirk  persuasively argues that the hard reforms always come last in China (1993).   
The intramural coalition supporting CCP control of the central-state and the 
property rights structure together form the 'hard core' of CCP power.  They are the 
hardest reforms of all.  Changes in these areas are still too threatening, and evolution 
of securities finance in China would disrupt them.  So, the more reform moves ahead 
on other economic and political fronts, the more we should look for discretionary 
involution in finance, and particularly in securities finance.  A valuable proxy 
indicator of the "squeeze" from discretionary involution on the financial system at 
large is the size of  “underground” financial asset management services (Rudolph 
2002). 
What could change all this?  Were there to be a sudden change in any of the 
variables that comprise the dual imprint (external profile, coalition dynamics, property 
rights structure) I would expect change in the pattern of China's securities finance 
governance regime.  For example, if FDI and export-led growth dry up, then I would 
expect to see more aggressive securities finance "evolution" somewhat akin to the 
Indian case.  Changes that occurred in this way could be seen to confirm my argument.  
It is easy to identify developments that would undermine my explanatory framework.  
For example, the argument presented here would be seriously challenged if while 
Chinese FDI and exports continue to rise there were also substantive changes made to 
the discretionary involution regime. Such changes might include, inter alia; 1) the 
state unifying the currently segmented structure of share types; 2) the state permitting  
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unmediated private litigation of securities finance disputes;
26 3) the state relinquishing 
its ability to control access to equity and debt finance;
27 4) the state reducing its 
controlling ownership stake in the country's largest productive enterprises and 
concentrated employers. 
With regard to securities finance, India's past may be China's present.  China's 
current discretionary involution regime of securities governance is not unlike 
securities finance under India's Nehruvian system of dependent capitalism.  That 
system harnessed securities finance to state purposes using the Unit Trust of India and 
marginalizing the securities enclave of badla and the Bombay-Calcutta brokers.  But, 
India’s present is not necessarily China’s future.  This analysis may seem to present a 
bleak picture of Chinese securities governance.  While I certainly intend to strike a 
tone of critique and even warning, there are important positive implications as well.  
The Chinese state’s control of the share-capital structure and its discretionary power in 
securities finance together put China’s central-state-elite in a position where they 
enjoy a range of choices regarding the type of capitalism China may develop in the 
future.  I think this is reason for both concern and hope. 
I believe the regime of discretionary involution is at once an obstacle and an 
opportunity.  As an obstacle, the institutions of discretionary involution now stand in 
the way of developments that would encourage state agencies to increasingly orient 
the exercise of state authority toward procedural supervision.  The state cannot 
develop and regulate a large and healthy financial system alone. A regime based on 
procedural supervision requires a host of non-state institutional capacities that I have 
here referred to as the realms of markets and civil society.    Self-regulation and the 
participation of non-state actors are crucial.  Discretionary involution has retarded and 
                                                 
26 Currently the securities regulator must first provide official notification to the court of "possible" 
grounds for legal proceedings against a firm or its promoters (Hutchens forthcoming). 
27 I’ll be wrong if, ceteris paribus, China begins moving toward allowing sub-national governments the 
power to borrow.  The first move in this direction would be permitting them greater freedoms in the 
power to tax.  
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subverted the growth of precisely those capacities in civil economy that are a 
necessary complement to the legal and bureaucratic structures that are as yet 
incomplete.  However, such control is not exclusively malignant or avaricious, and we 
must resist hastily concluding that the discretionary involution policy pattern serves 
only the narrow interests of a Leninist party seeking to preserve its hold on power. 
During the 1990s, relative stability was maintained at the possible cost of 
increases in efficiency.  This is not trivial.  The institutions of gradualist involution, 
among them the range of domestic and transnational capital controls, protected China 
from abrupt dislocation in the short term following the Asian Financial Crisis.  
Furthermore, though the primary consequence of the discretionary involution pattern 
was the retarding and coopting (some call it "state corporatism") of markets and civil 
society to serve the purposes of distributive intervention, there were also latent 
"developmental" crosscurrents.  To some extent, the regime of discretionary 
involution served as an incubator, providing time and political space for some subtle 
yet important advances at the institutional level.  These advances include the 
development of major prerequisites for a more balanced, less-state dominated 
governance regime that in the future might enable the exercise of a procedural 
supervision mode of state authority.  The prerequisites that were developing in these 
contradictory developmental crosscurrents included much-needed legal and 
bureaucratic infrastructure, independent associational life, as well as media quality and 
independence.  The segmenting of shares, and the quarantine of foreign capital were 
largely a tactic of discretionary involution.  But, to a lesser extent they were also a 
form of "training wheels" of particular use in calibrating the transformation of 
property rights in Chinese securities governance.
28 
                                                 
28 As with the infant industries argument, there comes a time when the adolescent elements of a sectoral 
governance regime must be ushered out of the nursery into the bracing environment of self-reliance and 
competition, or else become stunted, perpetuating their reliance on their governess – the state.  
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B.  India 
 
The contrasting nature of the Chinese and Indian patterns of securities 
governance means there are different implications in the Indian case.  The precarious 
scarcity external profile meant that the Indian central-state faced an imperative to 
implement policies and institutions designed to offset the adversity of that profile and 
to avert macroeconomic failure and the associated political disruption.  To 
accommodate this imperative the Indian state was obliged to evolve the elements of 
securities governance in order to attract foreign portfolio investment, pressure the 
obstreperous domestic banking system, and improve enterprise finance.  The Indian 
state was able to accommodate this imperative because; 1) in the realm of securities 
finance it enjoyed a comfortable margin to maneuver within the dynamics of the 
dominant coalition, and 2) the property rights structure of the Nehruvian "mixed-
economy" did not constrain the policy and institutional innovations needed for 
evolution.  India may have succeeded in making a virtue of its weakness, taking the 
"imperatives" of adversity produced by the constrained profile and, by way of the 
evolutionary governance regime they provoked, turned them into an "advantage" of 
adversity.  India succeeded in developing, over the course of just one decade, a regime 
of securities governance that has encouraged the development of scope in the markets, 
a procedural supervision form of state authority, and an increasingly independent 
governance role for the institutions of civil society.  This rich tapestry of securities 
governance institutions, while vulnerable to the fraudulent, volatile and inequality-
producing tendencies of securities finance, has been successful in attracting the much 
needed foreign portfolio investment and in providing scope and depth to India's 
financial system, provoking improvements in the banking system and expanding the 
options for enterprise finance.  
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A significant reversal in the nature of India's external profile – a shift to high 
FDI inflows and a stable source of growth and forex from exports – would very likely 
slow the evolution of Indian securities finance governance.  However, since India's 
constrained evolution pattern was developed in order to offset adverse conditions 
rather than to exploit advantageous ones (as in the Chinese case), I suspect the 
orientation and organization of the constrained evolution institutions are less 
vulnerable to external changes than are the institutions of China's discretionary 
involution regime. 
In a dynamic that is somewhat similar to the provocative prediction I made 
regarding the conditions under which we might see a persistence or deepening of 
involution in the Chinese case, I also believe that even as reform stalls on other fronts 
in India, as long as that country continues to face some problems with its external 
profile – most particularly its inability to develop a competitive export sector – we will 
see contradictory trends in that case as well.  That is, even as India becomes less 
secular and more nationalist, constrained evolution is likely to persist.  The central-
state-elite of the BJP and its partners recognize the effectiveness of the evolutionary 
pattern for macroeconomic management, for industrial performance improvement, for 
local development, and for managing the ongoing transition to a more federalized 
polity. 
 
C.  Governance Regimes and Capital Controls 
 
In recent analyses evaluating the East Asian Crisis of the 1990s, a key a 
conclusion is that countries with more developed domestic financial institutions are 
less vulnerable to exogenous financial shocks (Kawai, Newfarmer, and Schmukler 
2001).  The result is an emerging consensus that inverts the prescriptions that were  
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common before that crisis.  Those prescriptions emphasized opening financial markets 
in order to stimulate institutional development domestically.  Along with Malaysia, 
China and India are often cited as examples of the benefits of relative closure and 
gradual, protected development of domestic institutions of financial governance. 
One obvious indicator of how the governance patterns of securities finance are 
likely to change in China and India is the domestic debate over further opening of 
finance to outsiders.  Two key issues in this current debate are the admission of hedge 
funds and capital account convertibility.    China will almost certainly not admit hedge 
funds any time soon, and India probably will not.  The hedge fund debate reveals how 
deeply the lessons of the 1990s have influenced Chinese and Indian financial policy 
makers (Iyengar 2003).  The Rubicon for these countries will be capital account 
convertibility (CAC) including a floating exchange rate.  As discussed in Chapter 5, 
this shift offers benefits in the form of attracting more investment, but also comes with 
risks of increased vulnerability to international financial crises.  Today, though there 
are strong reasons to open, the perceptions of risk, if not the actual probabilities of 
economic damage from a crisis, are still significant.  Moreover, the evidence so far 
does not clearly confirm that open capital accounts even help deliver more growth.
29 
China and India could go the way of mainstream OECD countries with full 
capital account convertibility and access for hedge funds.  They could revert to strict 
closure of the early 1990s.  What is most likely is a combination of the Chilean and 
Korean models of capital account control.  I predict there will not be full CAC in 
either case any time in the medium run.  Both countries will maintain in the medium 
term semi-porous capital control regimes, and that the patterns of securities 
                                                 
29 Rodrik argues that the case for the benefits of CAC is not even clear.  Based on his own research, 
Rodrik concludes, “the data provide no evidence that countries without capital controls have grown 
faster, invested more, or experienced lower inflation.  Capital controls are essentially uncorrelated with 
long-term economic performance” (1997, 61).  He provides a vivid analogy, urging readers to “think of 
capital flows as a medicine with occasionally horrific side effects.  The evidence suggests we have no 
good way of controlling the side effects.  Can it be good regulatory policy to remove controls on the 
sale and use of such a medicine?” (60).  
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governance discussed here will be reproduced in their regimes of capital control.  That 
is, Indian capital control will resemble Indian securities governance.  It will have 
controls that will be of a procedural supervision nature – not always implemented or 
enforced comprehensively – but consistent with the elements of constrained evolution, 
including market scope, institutional density, and a recognition of private property.  
China will have a discretionary and involuted regime exploiting the appeal of its 
market and the interest of the overseas Chinese networks.   The appeal of China's 
market may diminish as wages rise but its size will continue to be attractive continuing 
the benign abundance determinants of its financial involution. 
 
D.  Varieties of Asian Capitalism? 
 
In the Nehruvian era, the Bombay Stock Exchange was an exchange “of, by, 
and for” the Bombay Stock Exchange, snug  in the securities finance enclave.The 
establishment of the National Stock Exchange changed all that.  China’s stock 
exchanges today are “of, by, and for” equity issuers under the discretionary involution 
pattern of securities governance consolidated during the Zhu Regime. In pursuing the 
preferences inspired by China’s benign abundance external exposure profile, the 
strategy of the central Chinese state emerged as a classically mercantilist one.  It 
emphasized the commercialization of securities finance as national policy in a fashion, 
as Polanyi famously put it, “exactly contrary to the market economy” (Polanyi 1957, 
73).
30  The result was a pattern of market-miming practices within a policy trajectory 
that maximized government discretion and capacity for intervention, and favored 
                                                 
30 The goal of servicing the distributional coalition, and providing life-support to the large SOE-sector, 
interior provinces, and sunset sectors is best expressed in the guiding industrial policy admonition of the 
late 1997-2001 period that coincided with the cementing of the discretionary involution SGR:  
“Zhuada, Fangxiao” [seize (meaning control and preserve) large firms, let small firms go (meaning let 
them whither or privatize)].  
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issuers of securities.   The securities “enclave” of India’s past resembles the involution 
and political capitalism prevailing in China’s securities governance regime today. 
Does intention matter?  Are these states trying to create specific forms of 
capitalism?  It would seem that if the different paths are a product of default and not 
design, the form is likely to be shorter-lived.  Accidental formations seem less durable 
than economic arrangements that are the result of a carefully cultivated political 
support and a consciously erected policy ensemble such as the Nehruvian system of 
dependent capitalism in India, the New Deal edifice in the U.S., or the varieties of 
Keynsian welfare systems in Europe. 
The priority that the Chinese and Indian central states seem to be placing on 
stability and equity in the process of financial reform perhaps reflects a benign 
cognizance of the “double movement” and a conscious intent to balance the costs and 
benefits of financial markets.  Yet, it is not clear that the two countries' are equally 
concerned about inequality and instability.  Within the Chinese state it is difficult to 
distinguish between two different sets of motives for mitigating the dangerous, 
socially disruptive tendencies of securitization.  One set of motives is the more 
altruistic emphasis on the priority of harmony, and the fear of chaos (luan) that is a 
durable attribute of Chinese political culture across historical periods.  The other set of 
motives is the more self-interested emphasis on preserving the party's control on 
power and the access to security, status, and privilege that accompany such power.  
The Indian political culture that has produced what economist and former U.S. 
Ambassador to India John Kenneth Galbraith once called "functioning anarchy" has a 
relatively high tolerance for crisis and instability.  In this context, the "public bads" 
that accompany greater reliance on markets in the governance of finance, and 
particularly the increasing use of securities, are today probably more acceptable to 
central-state-elites and to the public in India then they are in China.  Perhaps this also  
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helps explain why India has already moved more quickly to open finance and is likely 
to continue to do so. 
While it is unclear if the world is witnessing a diminution or proliferation of 
forms of capitalism, it is certain that the durability of the characteristics that 
differentiate these forms certainly varies.  The models represented by India's 
constrained evolution and China's discretionary involution are likely to occupy the 
medium-term end of the durability spectrum.  The New Deal and Post-War 
arrangements in the U.S. and Western Europe lasted for over thirty-five years.  With 
regard to how profoundly and durably the Chinese and Indian patterns of securities 
governance will influence these two important varieties of Asian capitalism, I am 
inclined to agree with Thomas Rawski that, “eventual convergence with US-style 
arrangements may turn out to be the best long-run option for China and other Asian 
nations.  Whether or  not this happens, Asia’s twentieth-century economic history 
shows that the long run is long indeed, and that vast progress is possible with 
institutional arrangements that differ immensely from the (hypothetical) long-run 
optimum” (Rawski 1999, 154).  
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